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AMENDMENTS 
Among the material reviewed and/or used in this thesis there were three articles by Professor 
Jackson: (a) Jackson (1985), a review of Be&s model; (b) Jackson (1987), an article on the 
new directions in Management Science; and (c) Jackson (1988), a paper on the appreciation 
of the management cybernetics viewpoint of managerial practice. These three articles have 
frequently been referenced in this thesis, either explicitly in the text or in the many footnotes 
at the end of each chapter. However it has become apparent that misunderstandings might 
occur concerning the adequacy of referencing to these and also to a textbook, Schoderbek et 
al (1975). Ile reader is requested to bear in mind the following amendments while reading 
the thesis. All the above material is referenced in full in the References in the thesis. 
1. CHAPTER 1, PAGES 1-2 
1.1 In the section of Chapter I of the thesis, starting on page 1, eight lines from the bottom ("... have been proposed by Jackson (1988)... ") up to the end of page 2, three lines from the bottom (... are in fact derived. ") should be amended as follows: 
Starting at page 1, seven lines from the bottom, immediately after "have been 
proposed by Jackson (1988)" and ending at page 2, fourteen lines from the bottom, 
with "... an emancipatory interest in their functioning" should appear in italics and/or 
quotes. 
2. CHAPTER 2, PAGES 33-34 
2.1 In the section of Chapter 2 of the thesis, starting on page 33, sixteen lines from the bottom, with " In a recent paper, Jackson (1987) identifies... " up to the middle of 
page 34, sixteen lines from the bottom, ending with "... This strand is based on Beer's 
work. " should be amended as follows: 
The section starting with "All three thinkers are concerned... ", page 34, twelve lines from the top, should appear in italics and/or quotes. 
3. CHAPTER 3, PAGES 45-55 
3.1 Section 3.2, pages 45-54, entitled "Methods of Dealing with Cybernetic Systems" is part of an introductory chapter of the thesis aiming at demonstrating the linkages between Cybernetics and Management. Among the material reviewed for the 
purposes of this chapter there was a textbook Schoderbek et al (1975) which collates 
and comments upon relevant material. 'Ihis book has itself been reference in footnotes but there were also instances where the original sources used in that book were also 
consulted. In such cases this source material is also attributed to where it originally 
appeared. However, such material, referenced in footnotes numbered 13, 19,21,24,25,26,28,29, and 30 should also be understood as also contained in Schoderbek et al (1975) 
3.2 On page 55 the page should be amended to start with "According to Jackson (1987)... " 
4. CHAPTER 4, PAGES 65-68 
4.1 Page 65, second paragraph, starting with "According to Beer, maintenance of viability 
means capability to respond to environmental changes... " should read: 
"Jackson (1987) says that according to Beer, maintenance of viability means 
capability to respond to environmental changes, even if those changes could not have 
been foreseen at the time the system was designed. Any viable system has to achieve 
requisite variety (at a level concordant with its effective performance) with the 
complex environment with which it isfaced. " 
4.2 Page 65, fourth paragraph, starting with "Beer (1981) has pointed... " should read: 
"Jackson (1987) says that Beer (1981) has pointed out a number of strategies that 
can be used in management in order to balance the variety equation for organisation 
in a satisfactory way. These strategies are aiming either at attenuating the variety of 
the external environment or at amplifying management's own variety" 
4.3 Page 65, fifth paragraph, starting with "Essentially the variety engineering strategies 
that Beer prescribes ...... should read as: 
"Jackson (1987) says that essentially the variety engineering strategies that Beer 
prescribes are designed to fulfil two requirements: ((])) that the organisation should 
have the best possible model of the environment relevant to its purposes; (2) that the 
organisation's structure and information flows should reflect the nature of that 
environment, so that the organisation is responsive to it13'. 
4.4 Section 4.3.1 of the thesis (pages 65-66), attributed to Jackson (1985) by footnote 14 
(page 66) should be understood as a summarised description originating in Jackson (1985). In detail, 
4.4.1 Page 65, seventh paragraph, starting with "Systents ONE of an organisation are the 
various parts ...... should read as: 
"According to Jacks6n (1985), Systems ONE or an organisation are the various parts 
of it directly concerned with implementation, Le carrying out the tasks that the 
organisation is supposed to be doing. Each System ONE of the organisation should be autonomous in its own right so that it can absorb some of the massive 
environmental variety that would otherwiseflood higher management levels. Systems ONE posses their own relations with the outside world and their own localised 
managements". 
4.4.2 Page 65, eighth paragraph continuing in page 66, starting with "Under normal 
circurnstances, compatible instructions from higher management should ensure... " 
should read as: 
"According to Jackson (1985), under normal circumstances, compatible instructions from higher management should ensure that the various System ONE of an 
organisation act in harmony. However, the actual interactions set off amongst the Systems ONE may lead to unpredictable and dangerous effects for the whole 
organisation and the divisions themselves. there is a need, therefore, for a co- 
ordinating function provided by System TWO. System TWO consists of the regulatory 
centres of the Systems ONE linked to a corporate regulatory centre, which receives information about the actions of the various divisions and is able to prevent dangerous oscillations arising the system created by all the divisions". 
4.4.3 Page 66, first paragraph, starting with "System THREE is the control function should read as: 
"According to Jackson (1985), System THREE is the control function ultimately 
responsible for the internal stability of the organisation. This system must interpret 
the policy decisions of higher management and allocates resources to the divisions to 
carry out policy. It must ensure the effective implementation ofpolicy... " 
4.4.4 Page 66, second paragraph, starting with "System FOUR, the intelligence function of 
the organisation", should read as: 
"According to Jackson (1985), System FOUR, the intelligence function of the 
organisation, has two main tasks: (1) It switches instructions from the 'thinking 
chamber'of the organisation, System FIVE, down to the lower level systems, and it 
switches upwards from Systems ONE to THREE, information required by System 
FIVE to take ma* r strategic decisions. (2) It captures for the organisation all 
relevant information about its total environment. having recognised environmental 
threats and opportunities, System FOUR filters the information and redistributes it 
downwards or upwards according to its implications. System FOUR is the point in 
the organisation where internal and external information can be brought together". 
4.4.5 Page 66, fourth paragraph, starting with "system FIVE is responsible for the 
direction... " should read as: 
4.5 
4.6 
4.7 
4.8 
4.9 
"According to Jackson (1985), the model described can be used: (1) witherfor the 
design of new organisational systems, according to the cybernetic principles 
elucidated in the model; (2) or for the diagnosis of deficiencies in existing 
organisation structures; (3) or, finally, as part of the design of efficient and effective information systems". 
Page 66, last paragraph, starting with "The model described can be used ....... should read as: 
According to Jackson (1985), the model described can be used: (1) either for the design of new organisational systems, according to the cybernetic principles 
elucidated in the model; (2) or for the diagnosis of deficiencie in exisiting 
organisatonal structures; (3) or, finally, as a part of the design of efficient and 
effective information system". 
Page 67, first paragraph, starting with "The most ambitious attempt to use the 
model... " should read as: 
"According to Jackson (1985), the most ambitious attempt to use the model in this 
way was Project Cybersyn, involving the regulation of the Chilean social economy... ". 
Page 67, third paragraph, starting with "The model can also be employed as a diagnostic tool... " should read as: 
"According to Jackson (1985), the model can also be employed as a diagnostic 
tool ...... 
Page 67, sixth paragraph, the sentence "The following features would be regarded as 
a threat to the organisation's continued existence" should read as: 
"According to Jackson (1985), the following features would be regarded as a threat to the organisations' continued existence". 
Page 67, seventh paragraph, starting with "Mistakes in articulating the different level 
of recursion... " should read as: 
"According to Jackson (1985), mistakes in 'articulating the different level of 
recursion, so that the system is not logically organised at each of its levels of 
operation often lead to no recognition of the importance of certain Systems ONE32. 
Therefore, they are not treated as viable systems in their own right and a lack of 
localised System ONE management to attend to their affairs33". 
4.10 Page 67, eighth paragraph, starting with "System TWO is often notfully established 
should read as: 
"According to Jackson (1985), System TWO is often notfully established because the 
localised management of Systems ONE resent interference from this relatively junior 
control echelon. However, unless System 7WO is able to assert itself, co-ordination 
between the various activities of the Systems ONE will be put in jeopardy34". 
4.11 Page 68, first paragraph, starting with "System FOUR is often weak because... " should 
read as: 
"According to Jackson (1985), System FOUR is often weak because it is regarded in 
many organisations as a "staff function. For this reason, it may lack good 
communications with other parts of the organisation, and its recommendations may 
frequently be ignored". 
4.12 Page 68, second paragraph, starting with "However, if System FOUR is weak... " 
should read as: 
"However, according to Jackson (1985), if System FOUR is weak, System FIVE will 
lack the knowledge of the organisation's environment, necessary for it to give proper 
attention to developmental activities. It will forget its higher-level duties and will 
instead tend to get too involved with the work of System THREE, or even try to 
intervene at Systems ONE level36". 
4.13 Page 68, fifth paragraph, starting with "system FIVE should represent... " should read 
as: 
"According to Jackson (1985), System FIVE should represent what Beer calls the 
of essential qualities of the whole system... " 
4.14 Page 68, sixth paragraph, starting with "an autopoietic system is one... " should read 
as: 
"According to Jackson (1985), an autopoietic system is one which has the ability to "make itself to continue to produce those aspects of its organisation which are 
essential to its identity. However, according to the VSM, viability is a property which 
should be embodied only in the system's totality and in its Systems ONE. An 
organisation developing autopoiesis in any of its Systems TWO, THREE, FOUR or FIVE is 'pathologically autopoietic' and this threatens its viability. In an 
organisation, Systems TWO, THREE, FOUR and FIVE should serve the whole 
system, by prompting the implementation function, and should not be allowed to become viable systems in their own right. If they do develop as autopoietic systems it 
will inevitably be at the expense of the system as a whole. The faults of rigid bureaucracies can be traced to these organisations becoming pathologically 
autopoietic4l ". 
5. CHAPTER 4, PAGE 77 
5.1 The sentence of page 77 (Chapter 4,15 lines from bottom) "Ulrich (1981) argues that it is enoughfor the model .... to subvertfor authoritarian usageQ6" should read as: 
"According to Jackson (1985, p48), Ulrich (1981) argues that is enough for the 
model... to subvertfor authoritarian usage96". 
6. CHAPTER 12, Pages 279-282 
6.1 Page 279, first paragraph, the sentence " .... to deal with organisations possessing 
parts which are both horizontally and vertically interdependent" should read as: 
" ... to deal with organisations possessing parts which are both horizontally and vertically interdependent Jackson (1988) ". 
6.2 Page 280, last paragraph, the sentence " ... corporate constraints only to the 
degree 
requiredfor overall systematic cohesion and viability. This constraint rather than 
limiting liberty facilitates it because if less control was exercised, the result would not 
be greaterfireedomfor the part, but anarchy" should read as: 
to ... corporate constraints only to the degree requiredfor overall systematic cohesion and viability. This constraint rather than limiting liberty facilitates it because if less 
control was exercised, the result would not be greater freedom for the part, but 
anarchy (Jackson 1988) ". 
6.3 The last sentence in page 280, last paragraph "in the extreme, the VSM strongly 
implies employees' involvement... they are going to benefit by seeking its viability" 
should read as: 
"in the extreme, the VSM strongly implies employees' involvement in the 
determination of overall purposes. This is the only way to convince the parts that the 
systeth is serving their purposes and that they are going to benefit by seeking its 
viability (Jackson, 1988)". 
6.4 Page 28 1, sixth paragraph, middle, "since variety" (as discussed in Chapter 3) ... "and 
significance of these purposesfor the participants of the enterprise" should read as: 
"Jackson'(1988) argues that "since variety" (as discussed in Chapter 3) " is just and 
information- theoretic measure of complexity, it refers as pointed by Ulrich (1981), to 
the number of distinguishable states that a system or its output can assume syntactic level. This kind of explanation leads, probably, to the view that 'good'management is 
the one that establishes requisite variety between itself and the operations and between the enterprise and the environment, and nothing more. This view is not 
compatible with the previous discussion, i. e. that good management must also be 
concerned with the nature of the purposes served and the meaning and significance of 
these purposes for the participants of the enterprise". 
6.5 Page 282, the sentence "the model places the source of viability of an organisation in its structural arrangements rather than in its corporate culture" should include a 
reference to Jackson (1988) where it has previously earlier. 
Note: All publications referenced in the above pages are listed in the body of the thesis, both in the bibliography (pp 283-295) and in numerous footnotes at the end of each chapter. 
Cranfield, December 1992 
To the memory of Kostas N. Paradissopoulos, 
who didn't manage to change the world, 
though he tried hard, 
and is, therefore, still blamed by those 
who try hard 
for the world not to change. 
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ABSTRACT 
Two are the objectives of this thesis: 
To identify structural and cultural causes of ineffectiveness in a state-owned railway enterprise 
in the light of the management cybernetics area of knowledge. 
To assess the capacity of this area of knowledge, especially in its abstract and coded form 
(Beer's Model of the Viable System), to provide adequate explanations of organizational 
performance and organizational failure. 
The objectives are sought in the analysis of an actual enterprise, the Greek Railways 
Organization (OSE). 
An 'ethnographic type' pilot study is initially undertaken, to highlight organizational problems 
under a management cybernetics perspective. The study, though demonstrating structural problems 
associated with a certain organizational culture, is assumed in itself inadequate, as it reflects a 
subjective interpretation of reality. 
A 'survey within the case study' is therefore undertaken aiming at deriving the real dimensions 
of organizational problems from an analysis of managerial responses. 
Responses are designed to provide a picture of both 
the actual way in which the enterprise organizes in the pursuit of its tasks, and 
the organizational culture. 
The first subtheme (organizational structure) is examined in terms of the cybernetic model of 
the viable organization. The findings, in general, validate the assumptions of the ethnographic 
study. Numerous structural problems are identified. 
The second subtheme (culture) is examined in terms of managerial cohesiveness, defined as the 
agreement between managers on key issues of the identity of the enterprise. The overall conclusion 
is that though managers are, in general, in agreement, the content of this agreement tends rather to 
reflect a shared pessimistic view of the future than cohesiveness facilitating viability and 
development. 
The conclusion, as regards the enterprise, is, that though many problems are reflected in the 
organizational structure, proper modifications of this structure may not suffice to guarantee 
improved performance, unless considerable attention is paid in the building of a relevant 
organizational culture, quite difficult under the specific circumstances. 
The conclusion, as regards the adopted methodology, is that though Beer's model of the viable 
system assists in a diagnosis of many organizational deficiencies, it may not suffice to promote 
organizational change, especially when narrowly perceived, i. e., when results to a concentration on 
structural arrangements in the expense of the building of a corporate culture. Certain 
methodologies should develop, which, while making use of the advantages of the model, will not 
underestimate other significant aspects of organizational reality. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
"If a railway is to operate properly, responsible management is essential, but 
sound operation cannot be achieved if there is no scope for initiative or if 
responsibilities are not clearly defined... 
... It now seems to be the right time to put matters in order, since scarcer 
resources are an incentive to make better use of them". 
A. de Waele, 1986 
1.1. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
This thesis deals with railway management. For many reasons, managing a state-owned 
railway enterprise in a western european context is much more complex than either public 
administration or private enterprise management. 
Thus, though railway enterprises produce services and are therefore fundamentally no 
different from industries producing goods (in the sense that if they do not innovate they 
grow old and worn-out), they are different in that they have a public, state-supported function, are difficult to manage and it is particularly difficult to set clear and 
precise objectives for them. 
In addition, their traditions, administrative structures and sometimes also a kind of 
esprit de corps (which is as much akin to the army as to a commercial enterprise) make the 
railways different from a purely commercial undertaking. 
Obviously, management control in a railway enterprise is a sub-topic of the wider 
management control issue, which was defined by Tricker and Boland (1982) as "the process 
that guides the enterprise to its objectives- 2. They have arrived at this definition 
after assuming that the 'classical' definition proposed by Anthony (1965), i. e., that 
management control is "the process by which managers assure that resources are obtained 
and used eflectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization's 
objectivesw -1, though emphasising the purpose, excludes many inherent important ideas. Such ideas which establish a suitable basis from which to proceed in deciding to select 
and test a theoretical model of management control, have been proposed by Jackson (1988), 
using'the examples of Vickers' writings on the nature of management, on the popular 
conception of organizations as socio-technical systems, and on the sociological 
theorizing of Haberma's 4. 
Vickers (1967) argues that "business is a social activity and management a form of 
social regulation- 5. He supports his argument on two sets of concepts: 
The first emphasises the role of circular processes of control as found in feedback 
assemblies, and involving the comparison of 'what is' with 'what ought to be'. 
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The second set emphasises the part played by socially generated human expectations, 
which change the manifold and often conflicting standards of what 'ought to be', and 
hence determine and constantly alter the 'states' which human organizations are set 
to seek. 
Vickers' perception of the management function is concerned with both the social 
generation of objectives and the efficient pursuit of those objectives. This view, 
therefore, is compatible with contemporary views in organization theory, i. e. that 
organizations are best considered as open socio-technical systems 6. From this 
perspective, organizations are represented as having a technical aspect, being systems 
which seek effectively and efficiently to pursue goals in often volatile environments. 
They also possess a human and social aspect and depend for their viability on the 
establishment of shared understanding among their members about the goals to be pursued 7. 
The nature of organizations as socio-techical systems and, therefore, the task of 
management may also be deduced from the sociological basis offered by Habermas (1979), who 
distinguishes two fundamental conditions, which define the sociocultural form of life of 
human beings 8. These he calls 'work' and 'interaction. 'Work' enables human beings to 
achieve goals and to bring about material well-being through social labour. The importance 
of work leads people to have a 'technical interest' in the prediction and control of 
natural and social affairs. 'Interaction' enables human beings to secure and expand the 
possibilities for mutual understanding among those involved in social systems. The 
importance of interaction leads people to have a 'practical interest' in the progress of 
intersubjective communication. 
Work and interaction have for Habermas pre-eminent anthropological status, but the 
analysis of 'power' and the way it is exercised is also important, he believes, if we are 
to understand past and present social arrangements. The exercise of power in the social 
process can prevent the open and free discussion necessary for the success of interaction. 
Human beings have, therefore, an 'emancipatory interest' in freeing themselves from 
constraints imposed by power relations and in learning through a process of genuine' 
participatory democracy, involving discursive will-formation, to control their own destiny. 
Organizations are at the heart of the socio-cultural life of humans, being the primary 
centres of social labour, social interaction and the exercise of power. People, therefore, 
all have a technical, a practical, and an emancipatory interest in their functioning 9. 
Putting together the insights above, Jackson (1988) proposes a set of prerequisites 
against which the validity of any organizational model should be judged. Thus, the model 
(1) should serve the 'technical interest', by providing principles which can become 
the basis for the efficient and effective design of adaptive goal-seeking 
systems. 
(2) it should also seek to support the 'practical interest' by facilitating debate 
about purposes and providing mechanisms through which genuinely shared purposes 
can emerge; and 
(3) it should support the 'emancipalory interest' by permitting reflection on whose 
purposes are actually served and how purposes are in fact derived. 
The interpretation of the work of this thesis, as regards the choice and the testing of 
an organizational model in the context of railway enterprises, will be structured in these 
terms. 
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1.1.1. Preliminaries to Problem Definition 
It should be stated that this view of organizations does not necessarily imply a 
perception of social reality compatible with the prevailing one. Since human knowledge, as 
every other cultural manifestation, is a result of the complex interaction between the 
members of a particular socio-economic formation and between them and their environment, 
as long as a culture remains valid to its creators, so do their values, knowledge, 
beliefs, and social practice in general. Kuhn (1962) has introduced the concept of 
paradigm as a set of recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in 
their conceptual, observational, and instrumental applications. These are the community's 
paradigm, revealed in its text-books, lectures, and laboratory exercises" 10. The 
prevailing paradigm is then what characterises the state of knowledge at any given time in 
history, and its stability is defined by its capacity to respond to society's contemporary 
needs. I 
Kuhn has distinguished periods of crisis, when the scientific community perceives a 
growing concern about the ability of the prevailing paradigm to respond adequately to the 
problems currently encountered. A crisis period normally preceeds a major change in the 
state of scientific knowledge. In this sense, the force defining the dynamics of knowledge 
towards more stable forms is provided by the confrontation of theoretical knowledge with 
experimentation and social practice on one hand, and with the epistemological 
reformulations that such a confrontation provokes, on the other. Scientific knowledge may 
be Perceived as a system that is being continuously tested, in order to reinforce or deny 
its validity, depending on how well it is capable of contributing to the solutions of 
contemporary social problems. 
This thesis is dealing with Railway Management, which can be considered as a 
discipline in its own right, with its own community of theoreticians and practicioners 
and, of course, with its prevailing paradigm. This discipline in turn may be viewed as a 
part of a wider one, Management Science, the latter being an integral part of Social 
Science. Attempting to tackle the Railway Management issue outside the prevailing paradigm 
would be justified if serious indications of a Wuhnian crisis' were encountered. This 
point will be discussed soon after an alternative reasoning has been provided. 
Need for Scientific Research outside the Prevailing Paradigm 
Knowledge and Science are systems achieved through social practice. They are, 
therefore, linked to the historical and cultural experience. Values, perceptions and 
customs affect the way knowledge develops. The way in which a society organizes in order 
to provide material conditions for the survival of its members also affects the development of knowledge. Society as a system itself fixes the references for the development of knowledge within limits that ensure or tend to ensure the viability of its 
prevalent institutions. Waddington (1977) defines this condition as "Conventional Wisdom 
of the Dominant Group" 11. Wiener (1964), illustrating the problems encountered by a 
scientist working outside the conventional wisdom, has noted: 
"... Even in the field of science, it is perilous to run counter to the accepted 
tables of precedence. On no account is it permissible to mention living beings and 
machines in the same breath. Living beings are living beings in all their parts; 
while machines are made of metal and other unorganised substances, with no fine 
structure relevant to their purposive or quasi-purposive function. Physics -or so it is supposed- takes no account of purpose; and the emergence of life is something 
completely new. 
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If we adhere to all these tabus, we may acquire a great reputation as conservatives 
and sound thinkers, but we shall contribute very little to the further advance of 
knowledge. It is the part of the scientist -of the intelligent and honest clergyman 
as well- to entertain heretical and forbidden opinions experimentally, even if he is 
finally to reject them". 12 
This thesis somehow responds to Wiener's demand, i. e., that 'heretical' opinions 
should be encouraged, as it attempts to tackle the Management issue on grounds different 
to the ones that support most current developments. 
1.1.1.2. Questionable Stability of the Prevailing Paradigm 
We may now return to the question whether the prevailing paradigm in the discipline of 
Management Science, shows serious symptoms of instability. To answer this question, we 
should consider what type of model of the social system is employed in analyses within the 
'classical' or 'traditional' school of management. 
Ackoff (1981) has assumed that a 'mechanistic' model underlies 'traditional 
management' analyses 13. The organization is conceptualised as a machine that works with a 
regularity dictated by its internal structure and the natural causal laws of nature. This 
type of model is based on two assumptions: that the world can be completely understood and 
that such understanding can be obtained by analysis. Analysis is thought to be a 
three-step process. First it takes apart that which it seeks to understand. Then it 
attempts to explain the behaviour of the parts taken separately. Finally it tries to 
aggregate understanding of the parts into an explanation of the whole. 
"Mechanistically modelled organizations are structured hierarchically and are 
centrally controlled by a completely autonomous authority. Such an authority call 
affect any part of the system without being affected by any of them. This separates 
the ultimate authority from the system making the authority an external controller. 
All members of the system other than the one with ultimate authority are deprived 
from all information except that required to do their jobs- Instructions from above 
are not explained or justified. 
The operations of an ideal machine do not vary. Therefore, as long as its input does 
not vary, its output will not vary. For this reason, controllers of mechanistically 
modelled social systems focus on inputs rather than on outputs. For example, they 
assume that control of costs is equivalent to control of outputs. The quantity of 
output is assumed to be determined by the quantity of input. The system is thought 
of much as a vending machine". 14 
Since a social system conceived in terms of a mechanistic model is inflexible, it can 
operate effectively only in a static environment. However, the rapidly changing 
environment of social systems requires continuous adaptation and learning by organizations 
if they are to remain effective. Prerequisites to adaptation and learning are precisely 
these characteristics that mechanistically managed and structured organizations lack; 
i. e., the readiness, the willingness and the ability to change. 
Every organization is contained in a wider social system, which it shares with other 
embedded organizations. No organization is any more permitted to ignore its effects on its 
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environment. Equally, it is not permitted to ignore the effects of the environment on it. 
The recognition of this inevitable interaction by mechanistically conceptualised 
organisations poses to them a severe dilemma: 
As they have either difficulties or virtually inability to respond to environmental 
changes, their effectiveness suffers. 
Increasing ineffectiveness results in reinforcement of their rigidity, and closer 
adherence to rules and regulations. Their effectiveness further deteriorates. 
Concentrating on this vicious circle, in which such organizations become more and more 
dysfunctional, Ackoff argues that the performance of a system is not the sum of the 
independent performances of its parts. It is the product of their interactions. Therefore 
Neffective management of a system requires management of the interactions of its 
parts, not their independent actions. Moreover, since a social system interacts with 
its environment, management of this interaction is also required for it to function 
effectively". 
1.1-2. Problem Formulation 
I Attempting to locate an organizational model without the disadvantages assigned to the 
mechanistic model employed by 'traditional' management science involves a move towards the 
periphery, or even outside this discipline, where, as discussed, multiple alternative 
approaches have developed, each of which declares incompatibility with any other. To the 
non-specialist in the partial disagreements among the various 'Schools of thought' the 
choice of a certain methodology tends more to reflect specific requirements imposed by the 
nature of his research than certainty concerning the soundness of the methodology adopted. 
However, any attempt to apply a model to a situation under investigation inevitably leads 
also to a deeper understanding of the tool selected and the scientific principles that 
underwrite it. Thus, a possibility arises to conclude on both the subject of the 'experiment' and the 'apparatus' itself. The objective of this thesis is to pursue this 
possible outcome. 
The selected 'apparatus' is the management cybernetics methodology, summarised in Stafford Beer's Model of any Viable System (VSM). 
The subject of the 'experiment' is a nationwide state-owned railway enterprise, 
namely the Greek Railways Organization (OSE-CH). 
Explanations for both choices are provided in subsequent sections of this Chapter. 
1.1.2.1. 'The Theoretical Framework 
The view that management control is essentially the same basic process as is found in 
physical, biological and social systems is attractive. As pointed out by Wiener (1948) 15, 
communication, or information transfer, and control occur in the functioning of many 
systems. All types of systems control themselves by information feedback, which discloses 
error in accomplishing goals and initiates corrective action. A whole scientific discipline has emerged around the concepts of information, communication and control, defined, by Wiener, as Cybernetics. Within cybernetics, several orientations have evolved, 
the most well-known of which, as regards human organizations, is Management Cybernetics. 
This alternative to 'traditional' Management Science builds mainly on Beer's work 16 17, 
central to which is the Model of the Viable System. The model depicts the organization as 
consisting of five subsystems (labelled systems ONE to FIVE), the existence and the proper 
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functioning of each of which is a necessary and sufficient condition for organizational 
effectiveness and viability. 
As this thesis utilizes Beer's model, both detailed description and application may be 
found in several chapters and appendices. However, the dangers incorporated into any 
attempt to describe and analyze a social system by means of an abstract construct, even as 
elaborate as the VSM, should be stressed here. This is why the strict criteria for the 
assessment of the validity of an organizational model have been adopted. 
As it will be discussed, concerning Beer's model, debate has mainly focused on its 
application for the regulation of the economy at a national scale 18. An experiment of 
this size inevitably involves wider considerations and does not facilitate the distinction 
between the actual weaknesses of the model and the 'conventional wisdom' or 
'institutionalised truth' on abstract and sensitive issues such as 'freewill' or 
'democracy'. However, at a minor scale or, in VSM terminology, at a lower level of 
recursion, two sets of justifications may be offered, for the choice of Beer's model for 
the purposes of this thesis. 
Plausibility of the Theoretical Framework 
The first reason is that various researchers have discussed the plausibility of the 
model. Morris (1983) argues 19, that Mintzberg (1979), from an independent viewpoint as 
may be judged by the lack of significant overlap in mutual referencing among his work and 
that of Beer, having conducted a detailed analysis of the literature in organizational 
design and development, seeks the underlying structure and proposes five sub-systems, 
which he calls 
(1) the operating core, 
(2) the middle line, 
(3) the strategic apex, 
(4) the support staff sub-system, and 
(5) the programming sub-system (the technostructure) 20. 
According to Morris, "if one looks carefully at the examples, given by Mintzberg, and 
especially at the preferred Ways of working chosen by each of these subsystems, one has little difficulty relating them to Beer's viable system model". 
Britton and McCallion (1985) 21 believe there is independent validation of the model 
and support the argument by comparing Beer's model to the set of propositions about 
organizational design and behaviour, developed by Thompson (1967) 22 from a theoretical 
framework different to that used by Beer. 
Duncan (1977) 23 finds a convergence between Beer's theoretical model and the concepts 
of the practicioner, Alfred P. Sloan 249 underlining Sloan's following point: "If you call 
describe the functions of the parts and the whole, you have laid out a complete working 
organization, for by implication the apportionment of responsibility for decisions at 
various levels is contained in the description". He further compares Beer's model to 
Miller's work 25 and argues: "The identification of Miller's subsystems processes within 
the components of the Beer schematic can be achieved and both conceptual systems remain 
intact. No processes beyond those identified by Miller are called for by Beer. The Beer 
scheme does not alter the Miller concept; it merely 'elaborates on it". 
Jackson (1988) finds some close Parallels between the way in which Beer deals with the 
problem of 'centralization versus decentraliZation' and the 'contingency theorlo approach 
to differentiation and integration offered by Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) 6. 
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Strongly Purposive Character of the Railway Enterprise 
The second reason that justifies the selection of Beer's model for the purposes of 
this thesis relates to the strongly purposive character of the railway enterprise which 
reduces the risks associated with an arbitrary definition of systemic objectives and hence 
with partial modelling. That is, besides ambiguities concerning the objectives of a 
railway as a public enterprise, the purpose of the system at functional level is more or 
less clear. Even clearer are the goals or purposes of the sub-systems within the 
enterprise. Thus, the 'purposiveness' of this system is to a large degree self-evident and 
not arbitrarily assumed. According to Jackson (1985), Beer's model is the best conceptual 
model available for understanding transport systems and hinting at possible improvements 
to the operation of organizations in the transport sector 27. Jackson (1988) testifies 
that the VSM was the only management model capable of integrating into a book six diverse 
contributions to a seminar series about the management of transport systems 28. 
1.1.2.2. Subject of the Research 
The thesis proceeds in examining the issue of railway management control by means of a 
study of the Greek Railways Organization (OSE). Thus the typeýof research undertaken may 
be defined as a field- or single case-study. 
According to Miller (1983), this type of research design is concerned primarily with 
processes and patterns under investigation of a single group, institution, organization 
or community. Emphasis is on the social structure, i. e., interrelationships of parts of 
the structrure and social interaction which are taking place. It attempts observations of 
social interactions or investigates thoroughly the reciprocal perceptions and attitudes of 
people playing interdependent roles 29. 
A case-study, defined as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and 
in which multiple sources of evidence are used, -30 
distinguishes from other research strategies. For example, 
an experiment deliberately divorces a phenomenon from its context, so that attention 
can be focused on a few variables (typically, the context is 'controlled' by the 
laboratory environment). 
a history does deal with the entangled situation between phenomenon and context, 
but usually with noncontemporary events. 
a survey tries to deal with phenomenon and context but its ability to investigate 
the 
' 
context is extremely limited. A survey designer constantly struggles to limit 
the number of variables to be analyzed (and hence the number of questions that can 
be asked), to fall safely within the number of respondents that can be surveyed. 
The following reasons justify the selection of the specific Single case-study design 
for the purposes of this thesis: 
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Case-Study as a Revelatory Case 
The case of Greek Railways (OSE-CH) is a revelatory case. The author of this thesis 
had an opportunity to observe and analyze the company from within, being himself an 
employee (civil engineer) for more than ten years. At the same time, due to his relation 
with the enterprise, he had the ability to conduct a substantial number of interviews with 
managers, to an extent difficult to achieve by an outside researcher. Moreover, since both 
the selection of the topic and the methodology adopted relate only to personal discretion, 
the thesis is to a large degree freed from formal limitations in the expression of ideas 
and conclusions, except for self-imposed ones. The advantage of this situation should not 
be underestimated, to the degree that similar favourable prerequisites of 
within-organizations social research are not very frequently satisfied. 
Case-Study as an Extreme Case within both Functional and National Contexts 
The case of Greek Railways (OSE-CH) tends to constitute an extreme case, according to, 
at least, two points of view: 4 
Greek Railway is probably the least developed railway within the European Community. 
Since "a chain is only as strong as its weakest link- 31, rail transport efficiency 
within the community is to some degree determined by the efficiency of the least 
effective partner. Though the geographical position of Greece within the continent 
may seem to prove this argument exaggerated, it should be kept in mind that this 
country provides physical and other links between the rest of the community and 
major markets within the Asian and African continents. 
The Greek Railway is probably the most problematic of all public interest 
state-owned enterprises in the country. Though this reality is the outcome of 
historical conditions discussed in several parts of this thesis, it highlights both 
the managerial dilemma as regards decisions on priorities between today's and future 
needs, and the environmental uncertainty within which these decisions are made. 
Case-Study as a Representative Case in Public Enterprises Context 
The extreme character of the under-study enterprise, regarding its performance, as 
assessed both in respect to other European Railways and to Greek Public Enterprises should 
not lead to an underestimation of principle common features of state-owned enterprises, 
globally. In the specific case, a decision has been made to invest heavily in the 
modernization of the company, though such modernization has been narrowly perceived mainly 
as infrastructure update and new rolling stock acquisition. However, even this narrowly, 
technologically peceived modernization progresses very slowly and is put in danger when 
considering that it takes place within a context defined by: 
- the reliance on government funding, being an argument of the overall development 
of financial indices at a national scale; 
the almost complete dependence on foreign technology, influencing both the 
availability of required materials/equipment, as it directly affects the balance 
of payments, and the ability to digest and make the most of complicated 
technological products, perceived, designed, produced and utilized in much 
different environments. 
the absence of short-term pay-offs which could both result in substantial 
political profit on behalf of any ruling party, and justify to the public opinion 
the large expenditure involved. 
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Similar managerial constraints are associated with the very nature of many public 
enterprises; thus, a thorough study of any of such enterprises may produce conclusions 
useful to the wider spectrum. 
1.1.3. Research Objectives . 
The following two main objectives of this piece of research derive from the 
formulation of the problem, as discussed above: 
To identify structural and cultural causes of Ineffectiveness In a state-owned 
railway enterprise, in the light of the management cybernetics area of knowledge. 
To assess the capacity of this area of knowledge, especially In Its abstract and 
coded form (VSM), to provide adequate explanations of organizational performance and 
organizational failure. 
1.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The twin objective of this thesis and the non-traditional character of the model 
employed have dictated the need both to review literature on diverse but related areas and 
to contain many of the various findings of the review in this volume. In order this to be 
achieved without loss of clarity of both the methodology and the assumptions, a certain 
format has been employed, which allows the distinction between various stages, but also 
demonstrates their linkage in the form of a sequential flow. However, both the stages of 
information collection and the thesis layout, as illustrated in the following paragraphs, 
provide a useful schematic, which does not correspond to the exact way in which the task 
was achieved, since much of the feedback is kept implicit to allow for readable material. 
1.2-1. Stages of Information Collection and Processing 
Schematically, this thesis may be perceived as the outcome of three stages of information collection and processing. 
The first stage involves examining material related to state-owned railway 
enterprises, aimed at realising fundamental dimensions of the management control 
problem within this context. The material processed is either in itself inadequate 
or gives rise to wider considerations, which inevitably lead to a further stage. 
The second stage involves an examination of the literature on management control 
and results in the selection of an organizational model assumed, initially, as 
appropriate for the purposes of this research. 
By the end of these two stages the principle elements of the applied research 
methodology are decided. Specific information required is now sought. Though information drawing on both published material and on personal participation within 
the case-study company over a long period seems adequate and relevant to the 
requirements of an ethnographic type of research, increased objectivity is desired, 
the information for which is sought in a survey within the case-study based on a 
structured questionnaire. 
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1.2.2. Thesis Layout 
The thesis develops in two volumes; Volume I contains the main body and Volume 2 
contains the appendices. 
Chapter 2 deals with Management Science within the 'traditional' paradigm. Two related 
issues are examined: Management Control and Information Systems for Management Control. 
Various indications are provided that the 'classical' definition of Management Control 
offered by Anthony (1965) might not suffice. Two fundamental conditions are underlined: 
the relation of control to planning, and, 
the relation of control to organizational structure. 
The chapter reviews the development of computer based information systems for 
management control and records reported dissatisfaction associated with their 
implementation. Certain dimensions of this dissatisfaction are assumed to stem from the 
inadequacy of the "official" paradigm. The fundamentals of an alternative understanding 
are sought in a perspective of management satisfying the requirements from an MIS as 
proposed by Argyris (1977), i. e., that it should 
contain abstract quantitative descriptions of key performance indicators, 
represent stable variance, 
represent the results of outputs of complex processes and not the processes 
themselves, 
contain explicitly rational logic, and 
confirm or disconfirm evaluations publicly. 
This kind of perspective is understood as having much in common with cybernetics. 
Chapter 3, therefore, deals with cybernetics as applied in Management. To the main 
part it is a rather technical chapter, introducing cybernetic definitions, concepts and, 
methods. According to Beer (1962), the characteristics of a cybernetic system are 
complexity, probabilism, and self-ýorganization. These are also characteristics of a social 
organization. The chapter presents methods of dealing with these characteristics, i. e., the law of requisite variety, the 'black box' technique, information transmission and 
transduction, and feedback. The exploitation of such methods characterises the 
organizational model employed for the purposes of this thesis. 
The chapter also reviews alternative trends within Cybernetics as applied to 
managerial situations and deduces that, to a great extent, many of such applications are 
well contained within the traditional management science paradigm. An alternative 
perspective drawing on Beer's work is introduced and the resulting views of organizations 
and management are outlined. 
Chapter 4 discusses the organizational model used in this piece of research, i. e., Beer's model of the viable system (VSM). The structure of the model is very briefly shown in this chapter, because a detailed illustrated presentation, based on Beer's own description and diagrams, is provided in Appendix A. 
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Three principle ways of, utilizing the model are presented, Le, the use for the design 
of new organizational systems, the use for the diagnosis of deficiencies of existing 
organizational structures and the use for the design of management information systems. 
Examples on applications are also reviewed. 
The chapter ends with a discussion of various criticisms to the model, the conclusion 
being that,, despite its diagnostic power, the model does not guarantee an effective 
organizational design. 
Chapter 5 introduces the domain of the railway enterprise. Three dimensions are 
discussed: 
the need for a regulated environment and, further, the extreme form of regulation, 
i. e., state ownership; 
the objectives of the state-owned railway enterprise; and 
the external assessment of the performance of the public railway enterprise. 
Through the review of related literature the chapter concludes that the state 
ownership of a railway, whether or not justified on the grounds of the promotion of the 
Public interest, has inherent disadvantages mainly related to the state's interventionism. 
Such disadvantages do not facilitate the setting of clear objectives, the operation of the 
enterprise and the assessment of its performance. 
Many of the conclusions in this chapter are employed, examined and validated in 
further parts of the thesis. The understanding of this validation has, in many cases, been 
assumed obvious, and hence not explicitly quoted. 
Chapter 6 provides the basics of the way in which the railway management issue is 
examined within this work. Discussing railway management implies knowing what the 
enterprise is doing at the implementation level., Hence, a view of the main functional 
systems is provided. The enterprise is illustrated in VSM methodology as consisting of 
sub-systems within systems. An unfolding of this complexity is offered for the first four 
recursive levels. This structure is one of the building bricks of this project. 
Management control has been perceived earlier as an argument of planning and of 
organizational structure. These issues are discussed here within a railway context. The 
resulting list of managerial activities, accountability for which is a prerequisite for 
proper management, is a second basic point of this thesis. 
Chapter 7 provides background informatio In concerning the specific enterprise in which 
the ideas discussed in previous chapters will be tested. Much of the information contained here is discussed in the remainder of the thesis, which constitutes the 'applied 
research'. Besides a few historical notes and information concerning the resources and the 
performance of the enterprise the chapter provides an original account of the development 
of the organizational structure of the enterprise and of the external conditions which have governed this development. Appendix B contains organizational information related tc 
this chapter. Finally, as the various organizational units are presented throughout this 
thesis under the latin-alphabet form closer to their actual abbreviated names this chapter 
starts the introduction of this format. 
The way in which a railway enterprise is perceived within this thesis has been made 
explicit in Chapter 6. The author's experience as an employee of the specific enterprise 
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offers the possibility of a comparison between this company and the model set up in 
Chapter 6. For this comparison, undertaken in Chapter 8, there are two main sources of 
information as regards the case-study enterprise: 
the author's personal experience of the structure and functioning of the railway, 
and 
the legislation assigning specific duties to the various units of the state-owned 
enterprise. 
The kind of research reflected by Chapter 8 may be defined as ethnography. The task of 
this ethnographic study is to diagnose managerial problems of the enterprise vis-a-vis the 
cybernetic model. 
By the end of this exercise several causes of ineffectiveness have been identified. It 
is shown that these causes are both structural and 'cultural'. However, this diagnosis, 
based on a personal interpretation of the reality, is subjective. A survey within the 
case-study is, therefore, decided upon. The survey is designed to provide information in 
order to illuminate both structural and cultural dimensions of organizational problems. 
Therefore, apart from understanding the actual organizational structure of the enterprise 
in terms of Beer's model, a method should be devised, in order to analyse the I organizational culture. The design of the survey phase of the project is discussed in 
Chapter 9. 
The fundamentals of the actual VSM construction have already been set up in Chapter 
6, in the form of the list of managerial activities within the railway enterprise. 
During the interviews accountability for each of these activities is requested from 
the managers of the company as well as actual information exchange for each activity 
for which any manager declares responsibility. 
The analysis of the organizational culture is attempted by the introduction of the 
concept of managerial cohesiveness. To this purpose, the discussion in Chapter 5 
proves useful. Certain dimensions characterising the organizational culture are 
identified in key issues such as objectives, operational tasks, internal 
functioning, performance assessment, performance constraints. Managers' opinion on 
these issues is requested. Managerial cohesiveness is defined as the degree of 
managerial agreement on these issues. Overall agreement indicates cohesiveness. 
However, this is not always a favourable sign, as much depend on the content of this 
agreement. 
Appendix C contains the survey questionnaire and Appendix D the data collected by 
means of this questionnaire., 
The two themes of the survey phase of this research are discussed in the following 
chapters. 
In Chapter 10, the VSM of the enterprise as deriving from managerial responses is 
constructed. As regards accountability allocation, the chapter, in general, is in 
agreement with the description provided in the ethnographic phase. Additionally, the 
chapter utilises information related to 'information flows' within the enterprise and 
between the enterprise and the environment and demonstrates some further causes of 
ineffectiveness in terms of information handling. Appendix E support the arguments of this 
chapter. 
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the constraints posed by weaknesses in the organizational structure. Appendix F contains 
relevant information. 
Finally, Chapter 12 provides the conclusions of the project, as regards its 
objectives. 
The main conclusion for the studied enterprise is that though many problems are 
reflected in the organizational structure, proper modifications of this structure may not 
suffice to gurantee improved performance unless considerable attention is paid in the 
development of a relevant organizational culture. 
As regards the management cybernetics viewpoint employed in the analysis, the main 
conclusion is that though the model proved very useful in the identification of structural 
problems it could not always reflect alternative dimensions of ineffectiveness, though 
many of these dimensions are adequately discussed in the management cybernetics 
literature. Hence, a proper organizational diagnosis in terms of the VSM implies either 
modelling in multiple alternative recursive dimensions, or a functional cybernetic 
analysis supplemented by an examination of cultural problems (undertaken in this thesis in 
the form of the analysis of managerial cohesiveness). 
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CHAPTER 2 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
2.1. CONTROL AS A MANAGERIAL ACTIVITY 
2.1.1. Definition 
Management control has been defined by Anthony (1965) as "the process by which 
managers assure that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the 
accomplishment of the organisation's objectives". According to Tricker and Boland (1982), 
this view equates management control with the tactical operation of the enterprise and, by 
focusing on efficiency and effectiveness, usefully emphasises the purpose of management 
control. However, they argue, it excludes many of the subtle and important ideas inherent 
in management control. It does not question the value systems underpinning the 
organisation or its attitudes to control: it assumes a rational, constitutional enterprise 
whose members accept the need for control for the maintenance of good order and the 
pursuit of goals in the best interest of the individual, the enterprise and the state. 
This is a wide assumption in a society of changing values and expectations, in which ideas 
about the role and place of organisations are being revised, and on a world canvas of 
scarce resources* monetary uncertainties and political and social upheaval, in which 
previously acceýted thinking is challenged. The notion of management control cannot now be 
separated from ideas about values, authority, responsibility and power. Management control 
is the Process that guides the enterprise to its objectives. 1 
According to Koontz et al. (1980), the managerial function of controlling is the 
measurement and correction of the performance of activities of subordinates in order to 
make sure that enterprise objectives and the plans devised to attain them are being 
accomplished. It is thus the function of every manager, from president to supervisor. 
Koontz et al. (1980) point that occasionally, in view of the authority of the upper-level 
managers and their resultant responsibility, top- and upper-level control is so emphasised 
that the impression is gained that little controlling is needed at lower levels. Although 
the scope of control varies among managers, those at all levels have the responsibility for the execution of plans, and, therefore, Ocontrol is an essential managerial function 
at each level-. 2 
2.1.2. Prerequisites of the Management Control Process 
According to Koontz et al. (1980), two major prerequisites must exist before the 
management devises or maintains a system of controls. Yet people frequently concentrate on 
control techniques and systems, without having made sure that the prerequisitives, i. e. 
plans and organizational structure, have been met. 
2.1-2-1. Control Requires Plans 
In a presentation to the members of the Academy of Management, Koontz (1956), 
expressing his view on the "principles of planning and control", proposed the following 
classification of managerial activities: 3 
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-Planning - 
-Organizing 
-Staffing 
-Directing 
-Controlling. 
Focusing on two of these activities, planning and controlling, Koontz (1956) was one 
of the first to describe their "singularly Inseparable" characteristic. His presentation 
outlined the principles of these two functions, which he categorised as: 
-principles dealing with the nature of planning, 
-principles having to do with the structure of plans, 
-principles explaining the process of planning, and 
-principles dealing with the managerial function of control. 
This work was followed by more research along the same lines, this time focusing on 
the control function. 4 
-ý Whereas his past research had delt primarily with planning principles, Koontz later 
realised that the perception of control as a "technical matter about which few 
generallsations could be made" was incorrect. He emphasised the importance of control as 
he had done with planning: 
'Controls are the reverse side of the coin of planning. First, managers plan; 
then plans become the standards by which desired actions are measured. This simple 
truzh means several things in practice. One is that all meaningful control 
techniques are, in the first instance, planning techniques. Another is that it is 
fruitless to try to des n control without first taking into account plans and how 
well they are made". 
ý 
According to Anthony and Young (1984), planning is deciding what should be done and 
how it should be done, whereas control is assuring that the desired results are obtained. 
They distinguish three types of planning and control activities in most organizations: 
Strategic Planning, i. e., the process of deciding on the goals of the organization 
and on the broad strategies that are to be used in attaining them. 
Task Control, i. e., the process of assuring that the tasks (the processess that are 
used in carrying out the day-to-day activities) are carried out effectively and 
efficiently. 
Management Control, i. e., an activity between the above two types of planning and 
control, which, accepting as given the strategies arrived at in the strategic 
planning process, deals with the implementation of these strategies. 6 
Management control does not involve the detailed operating decisions and activities 
that are the focus of task control; rather it is the means by which management 
assures that the organization carries out its strategy effectively and efficiently. 
2.1.2.2. Control Requires Organizational Structure 
Koontz et al. (1980) argue, that since the purpose of control is to measure activities 
and take action to ensure that plans are being accomplished, there is a need to know where 
in an enterprise the responsibility for deviating from plans and taking action to make 
corrections lies. Control of activities operates through people. But we cannot know where 
Chapter 2 -18- Management Control 
the responsibility for deviation and needed actions is, unless organizational 
responsibility is clear and definite. 
Therefore, a major prerequisite of control is the existence of organizational , 
structure. The clearer, more complete, and more integrated this structure is, the more 
effective control action can be. 
Tricker and Boland (1982) show how organizational structure and style can be 
characterised by their capacity for processing information. The same set of individuals 
using different organizational structures will have different abilities for processing 
information. In an organization with dependence on a central authority and very 
restricted, formal channels of communications will not be able to process as much 
information as a whole, as in an organization with a matrix structure, decentralised 
responsibility and open, informal communication channels. 
Galbraith (1980) presents a framework for assessing the information processing 
capacity of organizational structures. The information processing required of, the 
organization can be characterised as function of the inherent uncertainty of the task to 
be performed (including technological and environmental considerations), the number of 
elements to be coordinated and the interdependence of subunits. 7 
Assume an organization that initially has adequate information processing capacity 
with a classical structure that includes a set of standard operating procedures, and an 
annual planning process to establish goals and revise the operating programmes as 
necessary. Assume further that there is a change in the technology, environment, number of 
task elements or interdependence of units that increases the demand for information 
processing on the organization. The result will be an increased number of exceptions to 
standard procedures and variances from established goals which will create an increased 
number of requests for resolution and coordination from the hierarchy. Eventually, the 
hierarchy is overwhelmed with exceptions. 
2.1.3. The Management Control Process 
According to Anthony and Young (1984), the management control process takes place in 
the context of an organization ý that has goals and that has decided on broad strategies for 
achieving these goals. As already noted (para. 2.1.2.1), decisions on these goals and 
strategies are made in the strategic planning process, which is largely unsystematic and Informal. The management control system collects information that is useful in strategic 
planningi. but since strategy decisions are made only occasionally, and since each 
strategic issue requires information that is tailor-made to the requirements of that issue, this information cannot ordinarily be collected in any routine, recurring fashion. Rather it must be put together when the need arises and in the form required for the 
specific issue. 
Anthony and Young (1984) insist that much of the management control process is Informal. It occurs by means of memoranda, meetings, conversations and even by such 
signals as facial expressions. However, they state, many organizations have also a formal 
system, in which the information consists of planned (or estimated) and actual data on 
both outputs and inputs. They distinguish four principle steps in a formal management 
control process: 
I. Programming. 
2. Budget formulation. 
3. Operating (and measurement). 
4. Reporting and evaluation. 
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The steps reccur in a regular circle, and together they constitute a 'closed loop'. 8 
Koontz et A. (1980) show that control techniques and systems are essentially the same 
for cash, office procedures, morale, product quality or anything else. According to them, 
the basic control process, wherever it is found and whatever it controls, involves three 
steps: 
1. Establishing standards. 
2. Measuring performance against these standards. 
3. Correcting deviations from standards and plans. 9 
The essence of the control process is that information, from monitoring divergences of 
activities for requirements, is fed back to form the basis for control; i. e., for taking 
action to vary the plan or to bring the ongoing activity into line. 
Tricker and Boland (1984) have stated that the application of this view in management 
control implies that "the manager responsible for a performance centre can bring the unit 
into line, i. e. that s1he does have the power to act". Early works on management control 
systems did not question this assumption. The manager could expect to be obeyed when s/he 
gave an order. This assumption of an authoritarian climate remains the conventional wisdom 
behind many management control systems today. 10 
However, in some cultures in the world, the old order is giving way to a new. 
Management control analysis needs to consider where each decision maker derives his 
power and how is he able to take controlling action. 
Tricker and Boland (1984) identify three ways of derivation of power within 
organizations: 
Position power, where power stems from organizational position. This is the 
classical command situationýin which the authority of the 'boss, is perceived and 
accepted. Positional power is no longer the dominant power base in many 
organizations. Indeed, positional power is frequently challenged, even rejected. 
Action power, where power is derived from the ability to act rather, than from 
position. The ability to manipulate the use of essential resources, where no 
substitute is available, provides a source of power. 
Knowledge power, which stems from the ability to cope with uncertainty. It is 
typified in the enquiry, discussion and persuasion. The sensible application of 
knowledge power can produce power sharing, without a dilution of position power. The 
use of such power presupposes an organizational climate of trust. 
Tricker and Boland (1984) argue that, in many situations today, positional power alone is insufficient to manage. Management control has to be exercised in the context of both 
action and knowledge power. The skills and abilities needed by a manager, consequently, have additional dimension: negotiating and concilation skills, political awareness, 
sensitivity to developing issues and ability to make firm, clear actions reducing the area for conflict. Such skills are seldom intuitive and not, traditionally, considered part of 
management control. 
2.2. SYSTEMISING THE MANAGEMENT CONTROL FUNCTION 
Anthony and Young (1984), as already stated (para. 2.1.3), believe that a management 
control system as a whole includes both formal and informal systems. 
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Some of the key mechanisms in the formal system are budgets, committees, standards and 
reviews. Components of the informal system are the daily communications that go among 
organizational personnel and the informal work groups that appear because of the personal 
preferences and desires of the workers. Since the formal management control system forms 
many of the guidelines for the informal system, the design of a formal system is to some 
extent the design of an informal system. 
Anthony and Dearden (1976) define a formal management control system as consisting of 
some or all of the following phases: 
Programming: Deciding which projects the organization will undertake and allocating 
the organization's resources among these projects. 
Budgeting: Preparing financial and other quantitative plans for future periods. 
Operating and Accounting: Keeping records during the period of actual operations. 
Reporting and Analysis: Communicating information throughout the organization. 11 
Though a management control system focuses on programs and responsibility centres, it 
is a total system in that one of its primary purposes is to assure that all parts of the 
operation are in balance. Coordination of the individual activities is integral in 
assuring organizational efficiency and effectiveness. 
2.2.1. Requirements from a Managerial System for Adequate Control 
According to Koontz et al. (1980), every manager would want to have an adequate and 
effective system of controls, to assist him in making sure that events conform to plans. 
If a control system is'to work, it must fulfil the following requirements: 12 
It should reflect the plans It is designed to follow. Every plan and every kind and 
phase of an operation have unique characteristics. 
It should be tailored to positions. Different positions within an organization have 
differing control needs. 
It should reflect the organizational pattern. The more a control system is designed 
to reflect the place in the organization where responsibility for action lies, the 
more it will facilitate correction from deviation of plans. 
It should be tailored to the personalities of Individual managers. Control systems 
are intended to help individual managers to carry out their function of control. If 
they are not of a type that a manager can understand, they will not be useful. 
It should point up exceptions at critical points. By concentrating'on exceptions from planned performance, managers are allowed to detect those places, where their 
attention is required and should be given. However, it is not enough to look for 
exceptions. Managers must also look for them at those points which are critical to 
appraising performance. 
It should be objective. Where controls are subjective, a manager's or a 
subordinate's personality may influence judgements of performance inaccurately. 
It sbould be flexible. Control should remain workable in the face of changed plans, 
unforeseen circumstances, or outright failures. 
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It should fit the organizational climate. A tight control system applied in an 
organization where people have been given considerable freedom and participation 
will fail. On the other hand, people with a low desire to participate, or who have 
not been accustomed to participating, are likely to want to'have clear standards and 
measurement and be told what to do. 
It should be economical. Control techniques and approaches are efficient when they 
detect and illuminate the causes of actual or potential deviations from plans with 
the minimum of costs or other unsought consequences. 
It should lead to corrective action. Control is justified only if indicated or 
experienced deviations from plans are corrected through appropriate planning, 
organizing, staffing and leading. 
2.2.2. Management Control Systems Design 
A framework for designing management control systems for computers was proposed by 
McFarlan, Nolan and Norton (1973). This framework identifies resource inputs, processing 
and outputs as key monitoring points. It identifies processing and inputs as control 
points. 13 
Anthon u (1965) proposed a framework for the analysis of planning and control 
systems 1. This framework was the result of his earliest research in the area and was 
based on his division of planning and control into three categories: strategic planning, 
management control and operational control. Though the boundaries between the categories 
are not sharply defined lines, the processes are sufficiently distinct, so they can be 
discussed somewhat independently. 
Anthony and Dearden (1976) discussed this three-way division of planning and control 
further, also describing control systems in general. Their work describes the impact of 
structure on the management control system and gives a step-by-step analysis of the 
management control process. 
Anthony and Dearden (1976) include six functions as parts of an organization's control 
system: 
-Planning, establishing the organization's goals and objectives, 
-Coordinating the activities of the organizational units, 
-Communicating information, 
-Evaluating information and deciding what action should be taken, 
-Influencing people to change their behaviour, and 
-Processing information that is used in the other functions. 
The goals established through the planning process specify a desired state for the 
organization. The organization's control system is supposed to help maintain that state. 
Kinnunen and Kaplan (1978) have also presented a general description of management 
control. Following the lead of Koontz and Anthony, they attempt to provide more structure 
to the area, defining it as the process employed to: 15 
-specify the 'goals of the organization, 
-formulate plans for attaining these goals, 
-allocate the organization's resources, 
-communicate goals and plans throughout the organization, 
-provide goal congruence among managers, 
-maintain organizational balance and coordination, 
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-measure and evaluate performance (in relation to the specified goals), and 
-identify areas of unsatisfactory performance. 
Vancil (1973) has stressed fairness and goal congruence as two key criteria in the 
design of any management control system 16. He has discussed alternatives for the design 
of such systems in organizations, identifying three typ'es of responsibility centers: 
standard cost centers, profit centers, and revenue centers. The type of configuration 
needed in a company depends on the strategy of the firm. 
Vancil (1979) has done further research into the relationship of structure and control 
in decentralised organizations. He gathered data from 291 manufacturing firms, using a 
questionnaire designed to measure profit-and decentralisation. Data from the questionnaire 
were used to quantify three indices: 
functional authority Index, indicating the extent to which a profit center is 
self-sufficient in providing the goods and services required for its own operations, 
financial responsibility Index, indicating the extent to which a profit center is 
charged for all the goods and services it utilises in its operations, and 
management control Index, depicting the degree of control that a profit center 
manager has oveu all the costs asssigned to him from other operating units in the 
firm. 17 
Similar work was done by Rumelt (1974) , in analysing the interrelatonship of diversification strategy, organizational structure and economic performance. Rumelt's work 
is especially interesting for its methodology and his development of ratios to measure and 
classify organizational structure, and diversification strategy. 19 
Cammann and Nadler (1976) emphasised the need for a proper fit between the management 
control system and the individual manager and his style 19 . They point out the 
fact that 
while organizations spend a great deal of time and money designing the technical aspects 
of their management control systems, they seldom invest much in the training of managers 
in the use of the systems. They stressed the importance of the "human element" in 
management control, since the organization is made up of people. 
As Koontz and Anthony indicated many years ago, planning and controlling go hand in 
hand. Green (1976) states that control would be unnecessary if we had "perfect planning". 
However, perfect knowledge of the future is not available. As he says, "the need for 
control varies inversely with planning quality-. 20 
Newman (1979), Hughes (1978), and Mears (1978) have also discussed the relationship 
between planning and controlling. 
Newman (1979) states that the output of the planning process serves as the input to 
control. 21 
As Hughes (1979) points out Oil is doubtful, therefore, that the quality of control 
will differ greatly from that of the planninmg input-. 22 
Mears (1978) suggests that the individuals to be controlled should be involved in the 
planning process to ensure the commitment that is necessary to attain the organization's 
objectives. 23 
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2.2.3. Computer Based Management Control Systems 
The effect that computers would have had in society has fascinated commentators and 
researchers since their potential became apparent. Prognostications were made about : 
the reduction in middle management powers as top executives were able to control 
operations directly; 
the avoidance of functional conflicts as systems became integrated; 
the centralisation of decision making and the move towards the 'total system', run 
from the chief executive's chair. 
As subsequent research has shown, there have been discernable trends, but nothing as 
dramatic as originally postulated. Organizational changes have followed systems study and 
the redesign of data handling systems and management control systems. Overall, greater 
rigidity is met. In the manual system, human intervention can adjust and amend 
when abnormal circumstances occur. In the computer based system there is no such 
opportunity. 24 
In subsequent sections, the evolution of computer based information systems and the 
widespread dissatisfaction felt by management with the assistance they provide will be 
presented and discussed. At this stage, the following remark should be kept in mind: 
"Those studying Management Information Systems need a great awareness of the extent 
to which organization style and structure and the power bases on which they exist 
are affected by the availability of information. MIS is about Organization and 
Management Control before it is about computers". 
(Tricker and Boland, 1982) 
2.2.4. Management Control as a Cybernetic System 
Managerial control is essentially the same basic process as is found in physical, 
biological and social systems. As pointed out by Wiener (1948), communication, or 
information transfer, and control occur in the functioning of many systems. Wiener used 
'Information' in the general sense, to include a mechanical transfer of energy, an 
electric impulse, or any other means by which a 'message' might be transmitted. In the 
science he called 'Cybernetics, 25 Wiener showed that all types of systems control 
themselves by information feedbaýk which discloses, error in accomplishing goals and 
initiates corrective action. 
The evolution of Cybernetics and its application in Management are discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
2.3. THE EVOLUTION OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
2.3.1. Definition 
An information system is 'a set of organized procedures that, when executed, provides information to support decision making and control in the organization-. 26 
Formal organizations, from their inception, have required information systems to 
operate succesfully. 
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Production, accounting, financial;, and external data on consumers and markets are vital to 
the operation of most modern businesses. As governmental bodies provide more services, 
they too develop greater needs for information. 
Information systems existed long before the development of electronic computers. 
However, the explosion of information and the need to process large amounts of data to 
extract small amounts of information have contributed to the increasing importance of 
computer-based Information systems 27. 
Almost all organizations have to acquire and analyse information and take action based 
on their interpretation of that information. Therefore, organizations may be perceived as 
Information processing entities. 
Too frequently, the designers of an information system have considered output to be 
information, while users have not. The decision maker, not the systems designer, defines 
and uses Information. It is extremely important for users of information systems to be 
aware of different types of information and to think about how they interpret that 
information. 
Lucas (1982) defines information as "a tangible or intangible entity that serves to 
reduce uncertainty about some state or event". Another definition for information has been 
suggested by Davis (1974): ffInformation is data that has been processed into a form that 
is meaning(ýl to the recipient, and is of real perceived value in current or prospective 
decisions' ý8. This definition of information systems stresses the fact that data have to 
be processed in some way to produce information; information is more than row data. 
2.3.2. The Impact of Information Systems on the Organisation 
Many times, information systems have failed because the reactions of users were 
ignored or because designers did not consider the impact of the system on the 
organization. A technically elegant system is successful only if it is used. 
Early studies of the impact of computers on organizations were completed after the 
systems had been installed; these studies were broad in nature and in general were not 
oriented toward the design of better information systems 29. 
Leavitt and Whisler (1958) suggested that firms would recentralise as a result of new 
computer technology. Computers offer the power to make centralised management possible, so 
the organization can be tightly controlled by a group of top managers 30. Little evidence 
supports this early prediction 31. There is no real reason why computer systems lead 
naturally to centralisation 32 . 
According to Lucas (1982), the real problem with the impact of information systems on 
organizations is concerned with the distribution of power in the organization. Different 
departments in organizations have different levels of power. The information services 
department meets the conditions for high power as proposed by Hickson et al. (1971) 33, 
and, by its activities, alters the distribution of power in an organization 34. 
Early studies of the impact of computer systems were also concerned with user 
reactions. Some of these studies dealt with the psychological reaction of workers and 
others, concentrated on overall changes in levels of employment. Although isloated changes in employment have occurred, it is difficult to find an overall trend. 35 
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Writers were also interested in the impact of computer systems on jobs and job 
content. Turner (1990) suggests creating jobs with more decision latitude and more 
opportunities for problem solving. to mitigate the negative aspects of systems. 36 
A major impact of computers occurs when conflict arises between users and the 
information services department. 
Mutual dependence increases the potential for conflict, because the failure to 
perform by one party causes serious difficulties for the other. 
Task differences also create conflict. Computer work is highly specialised and there 
are many differences between the tasks of a programmer and the average user. 
Uncertainty and ambiguities also lead to conflict. 
Communications obstacles have become a major problem between the computer staff and 
users. The computer field has developed its own jargon, and many computer professionals do 
not realise they are using strange and unfamiliar terminology. The user may feel that the 
information services department staff members are trying to demonstrate superior knowledge 
or avoid making an accurate explanation of a problem by using jargon. 37 
2.3.3. Theoretical Framework for Designing Information Systems 
The necessity for a conceptual reference for the design and implementation of 
computer-based information systems grew together with the growth in the use of computers 
in business and public services. 
The prevailing view of Information S stems draws upon the framework for analysis 
first put forward by Anthony (1965) 
ý8. 
According to Mc Cosh, Rahman and Earl (1981), 
this framework "has proved very worthwhile and helpful in the analysis of control systems 
for nearly two decades-. 39 
Employing Anthony's (1965) division, the following kinds of control systems are 
identified. 
Since operational control is concerned with getting an assigned job done 
efficiently, operational control systems are intended to measure performance against 
a clearly defined target. Such systems are characterised by large volumes of 
repetitive data, by reasonably clear-cut operating rules, and by fairly high degrees 
of automation. 
Management control includes the process of designing an organization which will 
carry out policies, and also entails the measurement of the performance Of groups Of 
people, including managers. The task in this case is usually defined only in broad 
terms and the management control systems design issue includes the selection of a 
procedure for carrying these tasks out. 
Strategic planning is the least precise. It is concerned with the problem of 
deciding what goals the organisation should strive for. It is also concerned with 
selecting broad methods of approach, which can later be worked out in detail as part 
of the management control process. Therefore, strategic planning support Information 
systems are, necessarily, more vague, more forward looking and long-term than those 
required for the support of management decisions and operational decisions. 
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An underlying assumption in Anthony's approach is the consideration that organizations 
not only have objectives, but also that these objectives are decided in the process of 
strategic planning by the top management. It assumes that organizations are to achieve 
goals, set by the individuals that occupy the highest positions in the hierarchy. 
Anthony's concepts of Management Control and Strategic planning respectively 
correspond to the distinction between programmable and non -programmable decisions, made by Simon (1960). 40 
Blumenthal (1969) made an early attempt to provide a rationale to the process of 
planning Information Systems' developments. He recognised the need for systemic planning 
in order to overcome the organizational problems created by the then rapidly expanding use 
of computers. He argued that "Information systems planning is important enough to be 
formalised and not left to emerge namely from the interplay of interests that are narrower 
than those of the business as a whole. although this interplay will remain an important 
regulating mechanism-. 41 
Blumenthal's framework for planning consists of two major elements: 
a theoretical construction of the process of decision making derived from the 
synthesis of the feedback loop conception in the decision process (Forrester, 
1968) 42, the distinction between programmable and non -programmable decisions 
(Simon, 1960), and the three-levelled analysis of managerial decision making 
(Anthony, 1965). 
a set of criteria, assisting an orderly and coherent classification of the 
basic components of a business system. 
It is noticeable that Blumenthal (1969) ruled out the possibility of designing 
information systems for the top level of the hierarchy, on the grounds that it was unknown 
how to encapsulate the necessary information "in the kind of data bank we know to 
construct today". He argued, that as strategic decisions were based in something else than 
historical records, it was not possible to design systems to support decisions of that 
kind. 
2.3.4. Operational Control Systems and Management Control Systems 
Ansoff (1969) has developed a distinction between the logistic process and the 
management process within an organization. 
In the logistic process, resources are transformed into producrs, and services. 
The logistic process is directed and supported by the management process., In the 
management process the manager transforms signals from the logistic process (inner 
environment) and from the outer environment into action instructions, which lead to 
adaption of 
either the logistic process (inner environment), 
or the outer environment, 
or the goals of the company. 43 
These action instructions are usually called decisions. Hence Simon's (1971) definition of the management process as the decision-making process. 44 
Both logistic and management processes within an organisation can be supported by information systems. Logistic (operational) processes, however, are supported by logistic 
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2.4. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
2.4.1. Definition 
'The frequency with which the term management information system (MIS) is 
employed today is matched perhaps by no other phrase in our current business 
vocabulary. Current computer installations all purport to be information systems, 
and the majority of these in turn claim to be management information systems. 
Connotations run from sophisticated hardware systems to routine accounting reports.; 
from real time systems depicting the status of space shots to basic data sources 
such as billings and accounts; from central data bases which collect, structure, 
store. and summarize information to the present inventory system in existence for 
the past 20 years; from the holistic "integrated" system of central management to 
remote terminals of specialists connected to the computer% 
(Schoderbek et al., 1975) - 
A management Information system is a formal system in the organization which 
provides management with the necessary reports to be utilized in the decision-making 
process 45. Eventhough this system may also collect, store, process and retrieve data, its 
ultimate goal is to provide information for managers to assist them in making decisions. 
Management information systems are basically developed for providing information for 
planning and control purposes. A management Information system may be contrasted to a 
'data processing system', which is concerned with the collection and storage of data and 
its direct application to operating procedures and administrative tasks. 46 
An essential part of classical MIS is the use of a common storage medium (e. g., a data 
base or a data bank) to store frequently accessed data. The storage medium is accesible to 
all authorised users. With the storage of on-line data, standard and some complex 
mathematical models, taken from the discipline of Operational Research, can be brought 
into play with these data to produce meaningful output to control ongoing operations. 
The foregoing characteristics of classical MIS center on producing periodic reports 
designed not only to recap past operations with an accent on exception items, but also to 
pinpoint possible control problems about current operations for lower and middle 
management. According to Thlerauf (1982), although these factors represent improvements 
over prior information systems, they can be viewed from a two-dimensional framework; that 
is, the computer gives a periodic answer which is indicative of what should have been 
done or what should be done to control operations. 47 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, management control faces complexity and 
uncertainty, relies on judgement and interpersonal interaction, focuses on line management 
and seeks congruence, however ambiguous organisational goals may be. 
Management control information is, thus, both internal and external, broad in scope, 
sometimes detailed and sometimes aggregated, and equally variable in currency, accuracy 
and frequency of use. This information serves the twin functions of decision and control. 
The complexity of management control comprises complexity of goals, interrelationships 
and environment. The uncertainty comprises the turbulence of the environment and the 
unpredictability of responses to control actions. Consequently, few management control 
problems are structured. Many are semi- structured, with all three of Simon"s phases of intelligence, design and choice being a mixýof programmable and non- programmable elements. Therefore, stmany management control information systems tend to be decision support 
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systems, where man's judgement, insight and evaluative strength are combined with the 
analytical and processing power of the computer- 48 . Tblerauf (1982) argues, that, 
overall, classical MIS is rather narrow in its perspective (two-dimensional framework) 
versus a much broader perspective (three-dimensional framework) for a decision support 
system, which allows the manager or assistant to utilize the query capabilities of the 
computer to obtain requested information and retain control over the decision-making 
process, as changes occur. 
2.4.2. The Development of Management Information and Control Systems 
As already stated (para. 2.3.3), one of the early attempts to provide a framework for 
planned developments in information systems was that of Blumenthal (1969). 
There are at least two important characteristics in Blumenthal's network: 
The term Management Information System is used to refer to the formalised aspects of 
management control, leaving out the strategic or non- programmable decisions. 
The framework aims to be a holistic approximation, because in addition to 
hierarchical classification and to horizontal functional grouping of activities it 
adds a third dimension in the form of modules, that cross over the boundaries of 
organizational divisions. 
According to Blumenthal (1969), the purpose is to provide a framework, which is not 
derived from "traditional pictures of a firm, such as the organization chart, in order to 
rationalise the information network into its component systems" . 
On the same conceptual basis, Zanl (1970) put forward a very similar platform for 
Information Systems design and development. He argued that most of the implemented designs 
"had spunn-off as by-products of the process of automating or improving existing 
systems within a company, 49, and that, it was necessary for effective design to make a 
rational planning of the process of implementation in a way facing the organisation 
'top-down', instead of the current practice of looking the company 'bottom-up'. 
According to Zani (1970), the strategy of an organization is the result of external 
forces and internal resources. Accordingly, the resulting strategy determines, in turn, 
the organizational structure, and the way in which the strategy itself evolves via long- 
and short-term planning. Every development in information systems is conditioned to 
strategic considerations that manifest themselves in terms of an organizational structure. 
Zan! (1970) adopts Anthony's framework and states that a decision analysis should be 
carried out for each level of the hierarchy, in order to answer the following 
questions: 50 
-"What decisions are made ?" 
-*What decisions need to be made 
-*What factors are important in making these decisions 
-*How and when should these decisions be made ?" 
-"What information is useful in making these decisions ?* 
The answer to these questions would define the information requirements for each level of 
management, while the overall objective, defined by the global strategy, is kept in 
mind. An important outcome of the decision analysis should be the specification of 
tasks and their interrelations in the context of the organizational structure and their 
effect on the 'key success factors', such as opportunities, risks and competitors. 
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Gorry and Scott-Morton (1971) 51, although based on similar to Blumenthal's 
conceptions, introduced some new elements, especially in relation to the peculiarities of 
decision-making at different levels of the hierarchy. They explicitly expanded the scope 
of information systems design, to deal with problems that are less dependent on internal 
factors, promoting, thus, the idea of model building. They noted that the systems designer 
should posess greater managerial skills, as to elicit from top management itself views of 
the business and the environment. A new and special role was given to managers, as they 
were expected to work together with the analyst to develop a model jointly. 
The three frameworks discussed so far show how the prevailing views on management 
determine a particular way of tackling organizational problems. This is more clearly 
illustrated by the fact that they all adopted Anthony's decision types (operational 
control, management control, and strategic planning) and Simon's decision categories 
(structured and unstructured) in organisational management. This approach to - 
organizations is pervasive in Management Information Systems literature and 
widely found in iextbooks and research programmes. 52 53 54 55 56 
2.4.3. Dissatisfaction with Management Information Systems 
According to Lucas (1978), many organizations are experiencing only limited success in 
implementing computer-based information systems, in spite of the increased sophistication 
of management science techniques, on which they are based 57. Similar dissatisfaction has 
also been reported by other researchers. 'Managers frequently complain of information 
overload on the one hand and an information gap on the other. The professional information 
providers (systems analysis, accountants and management scientists) proudly describe their 
achievements and earnestly explain their current plans. The information users listen with 
mixed feelings ranging from hope to scepticism, from commitment to antagonism and from 
understanding to incomprehension. There are problems in the current state of MIS-- 58 
Earl and Hopwood (1980) argue that the existence of any a priori relationship between 
formal MIS as commonly conceived and effective organizational performance is being 
increasingly questioned. Grinyer and Norburn (1975), in a planning context, found no 
significant relationship between formal information systems and financial performance. 
Instead, they found that the use of both informal channels of communication and informal 
decision-making processes was associated with success 59. Lorsch and Allen (1973) found 
that the complexity of management control information systems facilitated upward 
information flows, but not downward flows. However, they argue, both downward and upward 
flows are found to be associated with favourable financial performance; thus, alternatives 
to formal MIS appear to be essential. 60 
One of the early critics to the way management information systems were designed and implemented comes from Ackoff (1967) 61. He questioned five assumptions commonly made by 
designers of MIS amd argued that these are not justified in most cases and hence lead to 
major deficiencies in the resulting systems. 
The questioned assumptions were: 
that the critical deficiency under which most managers operate is the lack of 
relevant information. 
that the manager needs the information he wants. 
that if a manager has the information he needs, his decision making will improve. 
that better communication between managers improves organizational performance. 
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that a manager does not have to understand how his information system works, only 
how to use it. 
According to Ackoff (1967), to overcome these assumptions and the deficiencies which 
result from them, a management information system should be embedded in a management 
control system. In his paper provides a procedure for designing such a system and an 
example of the type of control system which it produces. 
Earl (1978) argues that the reasons why many MIS fail to meet either their stated 
objectives or management's real needs generally center on the MIS design process. 62 
He identifies the following problems related to the design process of management 
information systems: 
Lack of top management support. 63, 
Inadequate management involvement. 64 65 
Poor management of the design rocess. 66 
Inattention to design decision.. 
Argyris has examined the problems of human factors in systems design. According to 
Argyris (1971), if management information systems achieve their designers' highest levels 
of aspiration, they will tend to create conditions where executives will experience: 
reduction of space of free movement, 
psychological failure and double bind, 
leadership based more on competence than on formal power, and 
decreased feelings of essentiality. 68 
These experiences will tend to create genuine resistance to MIS. MIS specialists, in 
turn, are not equipped to cope with the emotional problems caused by their systems. They 
react overrationally, which is an emotional response, and have difficulty in coping with 
their own and the executives' feelings and behaviour. In Argyris's view, the crucial 
problem of dysfunctional behaviour in organizations is the presence of over-defensive 
attitudes, which are unveiled by the introduction of an increasing rationality to 
managerial activities. No solution can be achieved without considering the fact that 
it emotional problems within organizations do not simply disappear when they are not faced; 
instead, they remain to obstruct continually the implementation of rational plans". 
In a further paper, Argyris (1977) relates the problems of information systems 
implementation to the more fundamental and subtle problem of organizational learning. He 
argued, that explanations for the information systems implementation gap could be broken 
down into eight different categories: 69 
MIS were not well understood by line management. 
Top line management was not involved in persuading and selling the use of MIS to the 
users in the organization. 
MIS were not as foolproof as they could be. 
MIS were technically too complex and too costly to create and utilize. 
MIS specialists and line managers did not understand each other's job requirements, 
Perspectives and pressures. 
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MIS ignored line managers' cognitive style. 
The implementation of MIS was too narrowly conceived. 
MIS were not adequately humanised. 
, He suggested that there were other and perhaps deeper reasons for the implementation 
gap, which, if valid, then the above explanations would provide solutions containing inner 
contradictions and counter- productive consequences. Thus, in order to get at the inner 
contradictions, Argyris (1977) suggested viewing MIS as part of a more general problem of 
organizational learning. "An organization may be said to learn to the extent that it 
identifies and corrects errors. This requirement, in turn, implies that learning also 
requires the capacity to know when it is unable to identify and correct errors-. 70 
Finally, Argyris (1980) points some inner contradictions in management information 
systems. By the fact that these systems are designed to use information that is objective, 
precise, generalisable, trendable and comparable, conditons of distancing and 
injustice are generated, which, in turn, may lead individuals, to distort the 
information in order to protect themselves. Hence a contradiction: "the conditions 
required for useful, valid information lead to conditions that may distort the 
information". As managers require management information systems to fulfill their 
responsibility for managing the system, it is necessary for the organization to be able to 
detect and correct error, which, in turn, also implies detecting when the unit cannot 
detect and correct error. If learning is defined as the detection and correction of error. 
then learning is a core activity of any organization and any MIS. Hence the inner 
contradiction: "Learnin about other's performance in order to control their performace 
may inhibit learning". 
Argyris (1980) pointed several other inner contradictions flowing from the above one. 
Some are related to the way administrators tend to use MIS while others are related to the 
very fact that MIS must use information if they are to be effective. He concludes that 
inner contradictions are features of systems that lead to success and failure, 
effectiveness and ineffectiveness. Unfortunately, most organizations contain people who 
are programmed with Model I and who, therefore, create 0-1 learning systems in their 
organizations. These learning systems are ill-suited to dealing with such double-loop 
problems as contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas that are embedded in the underlying 
theory of design of MIS. 72 
One of the many interesting conclusions of Argyris's work is that managers cannot use 
local information systems without having to be unjust with their subordinates, and that 
what managers really need are distant information systems containing abstract information 
about overall performance rather than about the way as the tasks are being carried out. 
The type of information systems that managers require is one that: 
Contains abstract, quantitative descriptions of key performance indicators. 
Represents stable variance. 
Represents the results or outputs of complex processes, and not the processes 
themselves. 
Contains explicitly rational logic in that they attempt to satisfy the logical 
systematic rules for defining categori'es, making inferences, and confirming or disconfirming evaluations publicly. 
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Excludes as much as possible tacit knowledge and tacit processes. 73 
Other authors have also delt with problems in the design and implementation of 
management , information systems. 
The problem of resistance to implementation and dysfunctional behaviour in 
organizations has also been discussed by Dickson and Simmons (1970). They distinguished 
three types of dysfunctional behaviour. 
Aggressive behaviour, aiming to damage the object that brings innovation, this being 
typical of operating personnel whose jobs are more directly threatened by 
elimination or change of processes. 
Projective dysfunctionality, expressed in the form of blaming the new systems for 
problems originated in entirely different causes, this behaviour being typical of 
managers whose job content is modified, by newly introduced methods. 
Avoidance, as defensive attitude, characterised by indifference and withdrawal, 
typical of top level management. 74 
Dickson and Simmons (1970) state that dysfunctional behaviour always takes place; it 
can be minimised by ensuring greater Involvement from managers and everyone affected by 
changes. The message to the system designer is that in his work he should consider 
behavioural elements as much as computer technology. 
Burton Swanson (1974) too, argues that failures in the implementation of management 
information systems can be attributed, in part, to a lack of managerial 'involvement' and 
9appreclation'. I 
However, the constraints imposed on a manager by the multiplicity of his roles have to 
be considered. Mintzberg (1975) 75 defines the following roles of a manager: 
Interpersonal roles: 
The figurehead role. By virtue of his position as head of an organizational unit, every 
manager must perform some duties of a ceremonial nature. 
The leader role, because being in charge of an organizational unit the manager is 
responsible for the work of the people of that unit. 
The liaison role, in which the manager makes contacts outside his vertical chain of 
command. 
Informational roles: 
The monitor role, scanning his environment for information, interrogating his liaison 
contacts and his subordinates, and receiving unsolicited information, much of it as a 
result of the network of personal contacts he has developed. 
The disseminator role, passing some of his privileged information directly to his 
subordinates, who would otherwise have no access to it. 
The spokesman role, sending some of his information to people outside his unit; informing 
and satisfying the influential people who control his organizational unit. 
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Decision&] roles: 
The enterpreneur role, seeking to improve his unit, to adapt it to changing conditions in 
the environment. 
The disturbance handier role, responding to pressures and changes beyond his control. 
2.4.4. Alternative Paradigms for Management Control 
The reported disappointment from the performance of management information systems 
could probably be assigned to technical problems, which could be solved by a better 
understanding of the organization, the consideration of intraorganizational power at the 
stage of design 76, the greater involvement of top management in the design and 
implementation process, etc. 
Alternatively, this disappointment might be taken as a symptom of instability in the 
consensual system 77. Considering this case, it has been argued that, indeed, Information 
Systems -and probably Management Science as a whole- as an area of knowledge and social 
practice shows symptoms of instability. This argument is based on the results of empirical 
observation of a sustained reporting of dissatisfaction with implementations, a 
proliferation of "new' methodological approaches to design and implementation, and the 
explicit questioning of the assumptions on which most of current developments and 
methodologies are supported. 78 
A number of new approaches to Management Science have evolved as a result of the 
realisation of these symptoms of instability. Dando and Bennett (1981) 79, assessing the 
debate expressed in Ackoff's (1979) papers 80 81, have suggested that efforts to move away 
from the 'Classical' or 'official' paradigm indicate the presence of a 'Kuhnian crisis' 
82. 
In a recent paper, Jackson (1987) identifies three new tendencies in management 
science, which "appear to represent genuine breaks with the kind of thinking found in the 
traditional literature*. He labels them respectively. 
-soft systems thinking, 
-radical or critical management science, and 
-organisational cybernetics. 83 
The work of Churchman 84 95 , Ackoff 
86 87 and Checkland 88 89 is taken to be 
representative of soft systems thinking. According to Jackson (1987) the significant 
similarities between these three approaches are that: 90 
All three thinkers are concerned to cope with ill-structured 'messes'. 91 
All are opposed to tackling messes by the method of reductionism. 
Rather than attempting to identify and analyse systems in the real world, all three 
approaches prefer to work with the different perceptions of systems that exist in 
People's minds. 
Multiple perceptions of reality are admitted and explored. 
Values are included rather than excluded from the methodological process. 
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The privileged role of experts in the systems approach is questioned. 
The aim in each case is to encourage learning so that an accommodation can be 
reached between participants involved with a problem -situation. 
Radical or critical management science emerged as a distinctive tendency in the 1970s. 
The first steps in its evolution consisted of attacks upon other forms of management 
science. 
Traditional management science, already under fire from the soft systems thinkers, 
came under further attack from Marxist- inclined scholars 92 93 94, on the grounds that it 
accepted existing structures of inequality of wealth, status, power and authority as 
given, and indeed helped to buttress the status quo. 95 
, Alternative approaches to management science, presented in this section, have been 
atacked too by the radical critics as not being radical enough. 96 97 98 99 100 
IA 
Organizational cybernetics is taken by Jackson (1987) to mean especially the work of 
Beer and his adherents (mainly Espejo and Clemson) 101, distin uishing thus from I 
management cybernetics, where he places the work of George 1 
N, 
Pask 103, Schoderbek et 
&1.104, and Strank 105. 
According to Jackson (1987), between management cybernetics (as he defines it) and 
traditional management science there is little to choose. Conventional management 
scientists are able to take cognisance of its key insights and to employ concepts such as 
feedback in their traditional analyses. "Management cybernetics offer no new direction in 
management science. Whether based on a machine analogy or on a biological analogy, it can 
be crticised for exactly the same reasons as traditional management science: an inability 
to deal with 'subjectivity', and with the extreme complexity of organizational systems and 
for an inherent conservatism" 106. He distinguishes another strand of cybernetic work 
concerned with management and organizations which "breaks completely with the mechanistic 
and organismic thinking that characterises management cybernetics" 107. This strand is 
based on Beer's work. 
In this thesis, an alternative paradigm for management control, capable of overcoming 
problems encountered in traditional applications, will be sought in the example of Beer's 
cybernetic model. An evaluation of this paradigm will be attempted by employing it in the 
study of a state-owned railway enterprise. 
2.5. SYNOPSIS 
Management control is the process which guides the enterprise to its objectives. Control is an essential managerial function at each level. 
Controlling Is the reverse side of the coin of planning. Trying to design control 
systems without first taking into account plans and how well they are made is fruitless. 
Control requires organizational structure. The clearer, more complete, and more integrated this structure is, the more effective control action can be. 
Control over a, unit Implies manager's power to act. This power, within modern 
organizations, stems from organizational position (position power), the ability to act (action power), and the ability to cope with uncertainty (knowledge power). Position power alone is insufficient to manage. 
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An effective control system must 
-reflect the plans it is designed to follow; 
-be tailored to positions; 
-reflect the organisational pattern; 
-be tailored to the personalities of individual managers; 
-point up exceptions at critical points; 
-be objective; 
-be flexible; 
-fit the organizational climate; 
-be economical, 
-lead to corrective action. 
An leformation system is a set of organized procedures that, when executed, provides 
information to support decision making and control in the organization. 
Information is data that have been processed into a form that is meaningful to the 
recipient, and are of real perceived value in current or prospective decisions. Therefore, 
Information is defined and used by the user. 
A management Information system is a formal system with ultimate goal to provide 
information for managers to assist them in making decisions. A management Information 
system Is something different from a data processing system, which is concerned with the 
collection and storage of data and their direct appilication to operating procedures and 
administrative tasks. 
Formal management information systems are designed accordingly to Anthony's 
distinction of managerial levels (operational control, management control, strategic 
planning) and Simon's classification of decision categories (structured and unstructured). 
The limited success in the implementation of management information systems is 
attributed: 
either to technical and behavloural deficiencies at the stages of design and - 
introduction; in this case solutions are sought within the paradigm of traditional 
management science; 
Or to the very nature of traditional management science; in this case a new and 
efficient paradigm is sought. 
This thesis will test the capacity of the mxn&gement cybernetics paradigm in tackling the 
problem of management control, by employing it in the study of a state-owned railway 
enterprise. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CYBERNETICS AND MANAGEMENT 
3.1. THE BACKGROUND OF CYBERNETICS 
N 
'Cybernetics is a discipline which, like applied mathematics, cuts across the 
entrenched department of natural science. - the sky, the earth, the animals and the 
plants. Its interdisciplinary character emerges when it considers economy not as the 
economist, biology not as a biologist, engines not as an engineer. In each case its 
theme remains the same, namely, how systems regulate themselves, reproduce 
themselves, evolve and learn. Its high spot is the question of how they organise 
themselves. " 
(G. Pask, 1961) 
3.1.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 2, it was stated that the thesis will proceed in examining the Management 
Control issue under a cybernetics methodology, by employing Beer's model. This chapter 
provides a brief description of cybernetics and its application in managerial situations. 
According to Pask (1961) 1. a great deal of cybernetics is concerned with how 
stability is maintained with 'control mechanisms'. One of the first of such mechanisms was 
Watt's invention of the 'governor, a device illustrating the Inegative feedback' 
principle. 
Perhaps the earliest cybernetic thinking comes from the field of physiology, where the 
notions of information feedback and control appear as the ideas of reflex and homeostasis. 
Whereas reflexis preserves the organism against the flux of its environment, homeostasis 
counters the internally generated changes which trhreaten to disrupt the proper structure 
and disposition of parts in the organism. Homeostatic mechanisms maintain the 'milieu Interieur, 2 of Claud Bernard, the proper values of acidity, water balance and, 
metabolites, i. e., a body temperature which the cells of the body can tolerate. 
In much, though not all, of the process of physiological control the brain is chief 
controller, and in effective control, chief recognizer, rationalizer and arbiter. Hence, 
cybernetic thinking stems also from psychology, where, in turn, it also applies. 
A further related notion is that of 'purpose'. All the homeostatic and reflexive 
mechanisms are goal-directed and self-regulating. Therefore, when a goal is sought by 
several interacting mechanisms, or several goals appear to be sought by one, the resulting behaviour can be characterized as 'purposive'. 
In zoology and embryology there used to be a problem equivalent to the teleological dilemma of purposive behaviour which took the name 'equifinality'. By the early 1920's biologists were thinking in terms of organization and it became obvious that in a wholly 
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pedestrian manner the whole of an organization is more than sum of its parts. Von 
Bertalauffy (1956) 3, thinking in this direction, exerted considerable influence, not 
only in biology but also in the social sciences, and he gave the name 'System' to the 
organization which is recognised and studied. He further realised that when looking at 
systems many apparently dissimilar assemblies and processes show features in common. He 
called the search for unifying principles which relate different systems General Systems 
Theory. 
General Systems Theory found little acceptance in engineering and had little relation 
to the physiological developments until the mid 1940's. About then, engineers had to make 
computing and control devices elaborate enough to exhibit the troublesome kinds of 
purposiveness already familiar in biology. Also it was in the 1940's that Julian Bigelow, 
then Rosenblueth and Wiener realised the significance of the organisational viewpoint, and 
had the insight to wed together the developments discussed above and the rigorous 
mathematics of communication engineering. 
3.1.2. Definition of Cybernetics 
Since born, cybernetics has been variously defined. At one extreme, there is the 
original definition, "the science of control and communication in the animal and the 
machine", advanced by Wiener (1949), 4 when he adopted the word in the book 
"Cybernetics', which is the first complete statement of the discipline. As Pask (1961) 
states, at the other extreme is Gouffignal's (1956) proposal, put forward as an expansion: 
*La Cybernelique est I'art d'assurer 1efficacite de I'action". 
The gap between 'science' and 'art' is filled by a continuum of interpretations. Thus, 
Beer (1962) 5 looks upon cybernetics as the science of proper control within any assembly 
that is treated as an organic whole. In industry, for example, this could be the science 
of management, which in fact is made explicit by Beer's (19SI) 6 recent definition of 
cybernetics as "the science of effective organisation*. Ashby (1956) 7, on the other hand, 
gave emphasis to abstracting a controllable system from the flux of a real world, and was 
concerned with the entirely general synthetic operations which can be performed upon the 
abstract image. He pointed out that cybernetics is no more restricted to the control of 
observable assemblies and the abstract systems that correspond with them, than geometry is 
restricted to describing figures in the Euclidean space which models our environment. Pask 
(1961) subscribed to both Ashby's and Beer's views, finding them compatible and both 
included by Wiener's global dictum. 
According to Bateson (1978), the subject matter of cybernetics is information, which is regarded as different to the events and things that can be perceived in nature. In this 
sense, cybernetics covers the whole realm of phenomenology, but it restricts its scope to 
the communicational aspects. The universality of information is what endows cybernetics 
with its multidisciplinary value. As a science, it deals -across the frontiers of conventional disciplines- with the 'information carried by events and objects". 9 
3.1.3. Characteristics of Cybernetic Systems 
Beer (1962) argues that a cybernetic system is recognisable by three oustanding 
characteristics. it is: 9 
Exceedingly complex, to the point where its interconnectivity is indefinable in 
detail. 
'0, 
Exceedingly probabilistic, to the point where its structure, though complex, becomes 
undifferentiated, and every trajectory is equiprobable. Such a system cannot be controlled by the imposition-of rules from outside, because the system, by 
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definition, defies analysis, and therefore no test can be applied, by which the 
adequacy of the rules could be judged. 
Self -organizing, because, therefore, the fundamental organization it displays is 
generated from within. 
Thus, as Clemson (1984) states, cybernetics is concerned with the general patterns, 
laws and principles of behaviour that characterize complex, dynamic, probabilistic, 
integral and open systems. 10 
3.1.3.1. Complexity 
The explanation of the term complexity can be approached from many different 
viewpoints. From the mathematical systems ý viewpoint, complexity can best be understood as 
a statistical concept: complexity can be explained in terms of the probability of a 
system's being in a specific state at a given time. 11 
From a non quantitative viewpoint, complexity can be defined as the quality or 
property of a system, which is the combined outcome of the interaction of four main 
determinants: 
the number of elements comprising the system; 
the attributes of the specified elements of the system; 
the interactions among the specified elements of the system; and 
the degree of organization inherent in the system (i. e., the existence or lack of 
predetermined rules and regulations which guide the interactions of the elements 
and/or specify the attributes of the system's elements). 12 
3.1.3.2. Probabilism 
Probabilism is defined in philosophy as the doctrine which asserts that "certainly is 
impossible; probability suffices to govern faith and practices". As known, in statistics 
probability refers to the likelihood of the occurence of a certain event and is measured 
by the ratio of the number of actual occurences to the number of possible occurences. It 
is obvious from this definition that probabilism refers to the degree of knowledge of the 
system's behaviour at a certain point of time. Since the degree of knowledge is closely 
related to the availability and the obtainability of information, the statistical 
treatment of information appears as a candidate for dealing with systems whose behaviour 
is not perfectly predictable. 
3.1.3.3. Self-Organization 
Complex systems organize themselves. The characteristic structural and behavioural 
patterns in a complex system are primarily a result of the interactions among the system 
parts. 
According to Ashby (1962), 13 self organizing system is one which: 
changes from 'unorganized' to 'organized' (e. g. the nervous system of an embryo), 
and/or 
changes 'from a bad organization to a good one. 
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Mechanisms emerge to cope with the several areas of complexity that are perceived as 
relevant. The structure of the system is continuously adapting. Self-organization is a 
mechanism for survival in the long-run. 14 1 
3.1.3.4. Self-Regulation 
As long as there are some references for systemic behaviour, the different parts of 
the system will develop naturally the relevant information flows to control each others' 
behaviour. This is immanent to the purpose of viability of complex organizations and is 
called self- regulation. 
3.1.3.5. Holistic Behaviour 15 
Cybernetics (and General Systems Theory) deal with systems which exhibit 'holistic' 
behaviour, i. e., they have characteristics which belong to the system as a whole and don't 
belong to any of its parts. In other words, they have 'emergent' properties; properties of 
the part give no hint of some property that the whole posesses. Ashby has shown that 
emergent properties are also due to interactions among the parts and more particularly to 
unexpected characteristics of those interactions. 
The issue of emergent properties would never arise if there was a If ull' knowledge of 
the parts of a system. However, due to complexity, full knowledge of the parts of any 
system is quite impossible. 
3.2. METHODS OF DEALING WITH CYBERNETIC SYSTEMS 
3.2.1. Dealing with Complexity 
3.2.1.1. The Law of Requisite Variety 
Ashby (1956) has proposed variety as a precise measure of systemic complexity. Variety 
is the number of distinguishable elements in a system, or, by extension, the number of 
distinguishable systemic states. 
Variety in social systems is supposed to be ke t under control by a legislative mode 
of regulation that restrains variety proliferation. 
F6 
Response 
Coenetic Subsequent 
Variable Occurence 
Environmental 
Circumstances 
Time 
Figure 1: Sommerhoff's Account of 'Directive Correlation' 
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However, as Ashby deduced from biological systems, something more subtle underlies any 
such technique. The delimitation of the variety of environmental circumstances and of 
regulatory responses at the same time is explained by the notion of a 'coenetic variable'. 
17 
According to Sommerhoff (1950), 18 coenetic variables simultaneously delimit variety, 
so that trajectories of the system converge onto a subsequent occurence (Figure 1). 
Sommerhoff called this 'directive correlation'. 
In the very process of disturbing environmental circumstances, the coenetic variable 
evokes a response that converges on an adaptive outcome. 
Ashby (1956 had developed the following schematic treatment (Figure 2), based 
on Shannons V notation. 
Figure 2: Ashby's Account of 'Requisite VarietV 
In this diagram, 
stands for disturbance (equated by Ashby with the coenetic variable), 
E is the outcome set, consisting of good and not-good subsets in relation to 
viability, 
T is a table of transformations which D will undergo to generate E, and is equated 
by Ashby with Sommerbars environmental circumstances, and 
R -is the systemic response, which, according to Ashby, may directly influence T in its task of modifying E. 
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Ashby argues that if R's state is always to have the same effect on T whatever state D 
may adopt, then the variety of E will be the same as the variety of D. But if R may adopt 
two states, then the variety at E can be halved. And so on: 'If the variety in the 
outcomes is to be reduced to some assigned number, or assigned fraction of D's variety, 
R's variety must be increased to at least the appropriate minimum. Only variety in R's 
moves can force down the variety in the outcomes" (Law of Requisite Variety). 
Therefore, if D is a coenetic variable, so that R and T are directly correlated, then 
the variety of the outcomes E will be constrained. Since in both biological and social 
systems there may be coenetic variables that are unrecognized as such, this would account 
for a more regulated system than the unrecognizing observer would have any right to 
expect. Even so, and as Ashby says: 
"Variety comes to the organism in two forms. There is that which threatens the 
survival of the gene pattern: the direct transmission by T from D to E. This part 
must be blocked at all costs. And there is that which, while it may threaten the 
gene-pattern, can be transformed (or re-coded) through the regulator R and used to 
block the effect of the remainder (in T)". 
Beer argues that Ashby's Law stands to management science as Newton's Laws stand to 
physics: it is central to a coherent account of complexity control. "Only variety can 
destroy variety". 
"People have found it tautologous; but all mathematics is either tautologous or 
wrong. People have found it truistic; in that ase, why do managers constantly act 
as if it were false ? Monetary controls do not have requisite variety to regulate 
the economy. The Finance Act does not have requisite variety to regulate lax 
evasion. Police procedures do not have requisite variety to suppress crime. And so 
on. All these regulators could be redesigned according to cybernetic 
principles-. 20 
3.2.1.2. Complexity and the "Black Box" 
According to Ashby (1956), the problem of the Black Box arose in electrical 
engineering. The engineer is given a sealed box that has terminals for input, to which he 
may bring any voltages, shocks or other disturbances he wants, and terminals for output 
from which he may observe what he can. He is to deduce what he can of the contents of the 
box. 
In our daily lives we are confronted at every turn with systens whose internal 
mechanisms are not fully open to inspection and which must be treated by the methods 
appropriate to the Black Box. 
T he primary data of any investigation of a Black Box (of gi 
. 
ven input and outPut) 
consists of a sequence of values of the vector with two components: input state, output 
state. From this there follows the fundamental deduction that all knowledge obtainable 
from a Black Box (of given input and output) is such as can be obtained by recording the 
protocol; all that and nothing more. 21 
The black box technique is illustrated in Figure 3, from where can be seen that by 
thus acting on the box, and by allowing the box to affect him and his recording apparatus (i. e., the Protocol), the experimenter is coupling himself to the box, so that the two 
together form a system. When a generous length of record has been obtained, the 
experimenter will examine it for regularities in the behaviour of the system represented by the box. 
Chapter 3 -48- Cybernetics and Management 
Figure 3: The Black Box Technique 
The following example of the above reasoning is given by Ashby (1956). Suppose that a 
system had two possible input states a and b and four possible output states f, g, h, and 
J. Thus, a typical protocol might read as in Table 1. 
Output 
I 
f, g, h. j 
I nput 
a or b 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
ag aj af af aj bf ah bi bf af 
Table 1: The Protocol 
As this protocol reveals, the primary data of any-black box investigation consist of a 
sequence of values of the vector with two components: an input state and an output state. 
One can also note the regularity or repetitiveness in the black box's behaviour. For 
example, the protocol entry aj is always followed by either af or bf; the transaction of J 
is single value (f), although a's is not. The more such regularities in the systern's 
behaviour the observer or experimenter can detect, the more knowledge he is said to have 
about the box. In some instances, combinatorial behaviour may be exhibited. In others, the 
pattern may be strictly sequential. 
One of the merits of the black box technique is that it provides the best antidote 
against the tendency of the investigator to oversimplify a complex phenomenon by breaking 
it into smaller parts. The black box technique for dealing with complexity represents a 
selection procedure based on a series of dichotomies. In other words, the investigator of 
a complex situation manipulates the Inputs to the black box and classifies the outputs into certain distinct classes based upon the degree of similarity of the output state. He 
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then converts each class into a 'many-to-onel transformation. In this way, the observer 
obtains a black box with a binary input and a large number of input variables which 
permute themselves and their interconnections to represent one output state. 22 
Concluding, the black box technique involves the following sequential steps: 
1. input manipulation, 
2. output classification, and 
3. many-to-one transformations. 
3.2.2. Dealing with Probabilism 
It has already been noted that , since the degree of knowledge of a system 
is closely 
related to the availability and the obtainability of information, the statistical 
treatment of information appears as a candidate for dealing with systems whose behaviour 
is not predictable (probabilistic systems). 
3.2.2.1. A Communication Model 
A communication system 23 (Figure 4) will consist of the following five elements: 
1. an information source, 
2. an encode r/transmitter, 
3. a channel, 
4. a detector, and 
5. a decoder. 
Information Encoder/ 
Source H Transmitter Ht Channel j 11 Detector 
11 
Transmitted 
Ntoise 
Received 
- 
Signal 
Dis or. tion 
Signal 
Figure 4: A Communication Model 
Decoder 
The information source selects the desired message out of a finite set of possible 
messages (verbal, written, etc. ). The message is then transformed into a signal (encoded) 
and sent over the channel, which is the medium used for sending messages from the source 
to the receiver. The detector picks up the transmitted signal. The signal is finally decoded into a message. 
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Prerequisites of communication are: 
A common agreement, specifically between the sender and the receiver, as to the 
language (symbols, phonemes, etc. ) to be used. When the symbols or words that the 
sender selects are unknown to the receiver, no information is transmitted. 
The existence of the same Information bank (source) between sender and receiver, 
that makes possible the quantification of information. The larger the information 
bank of the sender and the receiver is, the greater the number of choices available, 
and the more information needed to resolve the uncertainty. 
3.2.2.2. Measuring the amount of information 
'Information is a measure of one's freedom of choice when one selects a 
message. To be somewhat more definite, the amount of information is defined, in the 
simplest cases, to be measured by the logarithm of the number of available choices. 
It is convenient to use logarithms to the base 2. The information, when there 
are only two choices, is proportional to the logarithm of 2 to the base 2. But this 
is unity: so that a two choice situation is characterized by information of unity, 
as has already been' stated above-. 24 
(C. Shannon and W. Weaver, 1949) 
In measuring the amount of information the unit used is the 'bit', short for binary 
digit. A bit is the smallest amount of information possible, and it represents a single 
selection between two alternatives. Using logarithms, 
1 bit - 10922 (= 1) 
Hence, when N is the number of alternative signs available in the entire repertoir of 
the sender and receiver, the amount of information required (number of bits per 
alternative) is 
1092N. 
Taking account of differences in the probability of messages,. a message is assigned a 
probability p when it is selected from a predetermined set of I/p messages. The amount of 
information that must be transmitted for that message is then 
10921/P '- 1092P - 
If all N messages have an equal probability of being chosen, then the probability of 
any of these is 
1 
p- 
N 
thus 
- 1092P '- 1092N. 
If the probabilities assigned to n messages are 
P19 P29 0-- tPn, 
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then the amounts of information associated with each message are 
- 1092P19 -10192PV *** ý- 1092Pn* 
The average amount of information from a particular source is generally given by the 
equation 
n 
H (Pllof, 2Pl + P21092P2+ + Pn'092Pn) 
: 
P11092PP 
3.2.2.3. Channel Capacity 
Information transferred from one location to another travels over some sort of 
channel. The upper limit of the amount of information that can be transmitted over a 
channel is termed the channel capacity. Channel capacity is measured in bits per second. 
3.2.2.4. Transduction 
According to Beer (1981), all interconnections entail the crossing of boundaries. 
Because the 'language' of each sub-system is unique to it, messages have to be 
'translated' when a boundary is crossed. There has to be a mechanism at the boundary 
capable of coding or decoding these messages as they pass. This mechanism is called a 
transducer. Whenever the information carried on a channel capable of distinguishing a 
given variety crosses a boundary, it undergoes transduction. The variety of the transducer 
must be at least equivalent to the variety of the channel. 
3.2.3. Dealing with Self-Regulation and Self -Organization 
3.2.3.1. Feedback 
From the definitions of self-regulation and self-organization it follows that they can 
only be achieved by means of feedback mechanisms, built into the system. According to 
Wiener (1948), *when we desire a motion to follow a given pattern, the difference between 
this pattern and the actually performed motion is used as a new input to cause the part 
regulated to move in such a way as to bring its motion closer to that given by the 
pattern-. 25 
3.2.3.2. Negative Feedback 
Figure 5 depicts a closed-loop feedback system. The output in this is obtained by the 
multiplication of the transfer function (K) by the input to the block (e). 
This system may be described by the following set of equations: 
em di - do 
do -Ke 
which can be reduced to the single equation 
do 
K di 
I+K 
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ut 
Figure 5: Close-Loop Feedback System 
An example of negative feedback is illustrated in Watt's governor. The difference 
between the homeostatic parameter desired in the machine (in this case the speed of the 
engine) and its actual output will be detected as positive deviation and the feedback 
action is to counteract this. 26 
3.2.3.3. Positive feedback 
Positive feedback systems utilize part of their output as inputs to the same system, 
in such a way that they are, in fact, deviation- amplifying rather than 
deviation -counteracting systems. 27 
Power-assisted brakes, using machinery which detects the small manual movements made 
and enlarges them until the force a plied is capable of stopping a vehicle in motion, are 
an example of positive feedback. 21 
Positive feedback mechanisms are growth -promoting devices, while negative feedbacks 
are control -maintaining processes. 
3.2.3.4. Automatic Goal Attainment (First-Order Feedback Systems) 
In goal-directed systems which operate on the principle of negative feedback, the 
system is maintained by correcting deviations from the goal. There is no other choice to 
the system but to correct the deviation. Thus, the purpose of a first-order feedback 
system is to maintain the system at a desired state of equilibrium. The system cannot make 
any conditional response. It has no memory nor does it have available any alternative 
action. 
Figure 6 depicts a first-order feedback system. In this type of control system the 
operation is clearly circular, since, after the comparison against the standard, a 
recycling must take place. A first-order feedback system always operates in this manner irrespective of changes in the environment. 
Transfer 
Error Detector Function 
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Figure 6: First-Order Feedback System 
3.2.3.5. Automatic Goal Changer (Second-Order Feedback Systems) 
When a system contains a memory unit and can initiate alternative courses of action in 
response to changed external conditions, and can choose the best alternative for the 
particular set of conditions, it is said to be a second-order feedback system. A memory 
includes all the facilities in the feedback loops available to the system for storing or 
recalling data from the past. 
Churchman et &1. (1957) 29 use a telephone exchange as an example of an automatic 
goal-changing unit (Figure 7). 
Receptor 
Effector 
Figure 7: Second-Order Feedback System 
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3.2.3.6. Reflective Goal Changer (Third-Order Feedback Systems) 
A thrid-order feedback system is one that can reflect upon its past decision making. 
It not only collects and stores information in its memory, but it also examines its memory 
and formulates new courses of action. 
30 
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate two possible feedback structures of a system of this kind. 
In Figure 8, a device making simple predictions is illustrated. 
Receptor 
Effector 
Figure 8: Third-Order Feedback System: Device Making Simple Predictions 
The system becomes more versatile and autonomous, because information in the memory 
can be recombined and new alternatives produced for action by the system itself. 
Figure 9 depicts a system developing a consciousness. If many memories can be 
combined, and if from the many combinations a few can be selected for further 
consideration, further recombination, etc., the system will have reached a still higher 
level of versatility or autonomy. The dashed lines indicate comparisons of what is going 
on with what has happened in the past and what might occur in future (second- and 
third-order predictions). 
Receptor 
Figure 9: Third-Order Feedback System: Development of a Consciousness 
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3.3. CYBERNETICS AND MANAGEMENT 
Cybernetics as a recognised field of study posesses as long a history as the various 
methodological approaches that make up traditional management science (operational 
research, systems analysis, systems engineering). The publication of Wiener's book 
Cybernetics in 1949 brought together contemporary ideas about control processes and 
established the definition of cybernetics as the science of control and communication in 
the animal and the machine. 
However, from the very beginning, this definition appeared to be very limiting. Wiener 
himself was applying the insights of cybernetics to human concerns 31. Ashby (1956) notes 
that cybernetics should reveal numerous interesting and suggestive parallels between 
machinery, brains and society. 
The early pioneers of cybernetics frequently employed analogies in their work to 
illustrate particular insights. A tendency grew up in the secondary literature on the 
applications of cybernetics to management to treat organizations as if they were 
actually machines or organisms. 
This comes through, for example, in the discussion's concerning management cybernetics 
in George 32, Pask 33 34, Schoderbek et al. 35, and Strank. 36 
In this branch of management cybernetics, organization is presented as an 
input- transformation -output system. The goal or purpose of the enterprise is invariably 
determined outside the system. Then, if the operations are to succeed in bringing about 
the goal, they must be regulated in some way. This regulation is effected by management, 
equipped with a number of cybernetic 'tools', chief amongst which are the 'black box" 
technique and the use of 'feedback', to induce self-regulation into organizations. 
As stated, this branch of management cybernetics offers no new direction to management 
science. Concepts such as feedback can be employed'in traditional management analyses. It 
has no ability to deal with 'subjectivity' and with the extreme complexity of 
organisational systems. 37 
An other branch of management cybernetics, with which this study will deal, is the one 
stemming from Beer's work. Beer (1979) succeeded in building a model of the organization 
from cybernetic first principles, enabling thus cybernetic laws to be understood without 
reference to the mechanical and biological manifestations in which they were first 
recognised 38. At the same time, this branch gives more attention to human purposefulness 
and the role of the observer. Clemson (1994) makes a distinction between first-order 
cybernetics, appropriate-to organized complexity because it is concerned with matter, 
energy and information, and second-order cybernetics, with which one can tackle 
relativistic organized complexity, because it also includes the study of the observing 
system 39. Beer's work is second-order cybernetics. 40 
However, this branch of management cybernetics can only be found in developed form in 
the later work of Beer and in the writings of two adherents of his thinking, Espejo and Clemson, in spite of the respect which is accorded to Beer in, for example, the OR 
community. 
Jackson (1987) examines whether the lack of serious attention to Beer's work indicates 
that Beer's thinking stems from a different paradigm. He argues that the 
philosophical/sociological paradigm underpinning Beer's work rests upon 'structuralism', 
whereas traditional management science is based on 'positivism/f u nctional isms. 41 
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3.3.1. Cybernetic View of the Organization 
Espejo (1997) argues, that while traditional cybernetics was more concerned with the 
natural world, and, therefore, evolved in the tradition of positivism, managerial 
cybernetics has had to evolve taking into account the purposeful and intentional nature of 
human beings. The view of current managerial cybernetics is that social structures do have 
a great influence in the 'creation" of reality by indiividuals, and, therefore, in a 
sense, that this reality is not created by these individuals. However, the Implied 
organizations (the contexts of their interactions) are not Independent of the communities 
of Individuals defining them, and, in the broadest sense, all individuals participate, 
consciously or otherwise, in the creation of these organizations. 42 
In any case, whatever might be the implications of the 'creation' of organizational 
reality, constraints are imposed upon the mental states and actions available to any 
individual, by the actual capacity of the operating communication channels throughout the 
multiple organizations in which s/he is embedded. Organizational structure is a limiting 
factor to appreciations and actions. 
3.3.1-1. Nature of Organizations 
While for certain entities, like objects, there might be a large degree of agreement 
about identity, for social activities in which interacting people are the very parts of 
the processes creating the wholes, 43 identities are much less clear. 
Somewhere in between the extremes of well-defined objects and ill-defined social 
problems organizations may be found, characterised'by posessing a closed structure of 
communications, which defines them as wholes, independent of any particular observer. 44 
In social situations, the idea of an object for which one name is adequate (but 
potentially misleading), is overtaken by the idea of a multi-system, i. e. a social reality 
as created by the on-going processes of interaction, for which multiple names are 
necessary. The multi-system is the fluid outcome of the multiple viewpoints exchanging 
descriptions, Le. systems, in their on-going interactions. 45 
If, with reference to particular activities in the world (not necessarily 
well-defined), the multi-system of concern defines a closed network of interpersonal 
interactions, i. e., a network with autonomy vis-a-vis particular tasks or missions, then 
the multi-system Is an organization. 46 
3.3.1.2. Purpose of Organizations 
Ascribing a purpose to an organization implies choosing the essential variables of 
concern to the viewpoint. In other words, the boundaries of the system are defined by the 
variables the viewpoint pays attention to. 
In the extremes, the purpose of an organization refers to: 
the description of a real world as it is perceived by a viewpoint (e. g., "the 
purpose of this hospital is to produce its own output"), or 
the description of a notional world, with no reference to actuality (e. g., "the 
purpose of the hospital should be to improve the health standards in the 
community"). 
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Of course the truth value of a purpose in the former mode of description is not 
guaranteed. However, in this mode the inference is that the intention of the viewpoint is 
to describe the actual world, while the latter mode of description suggests the intention 
is to change the world from a current state to a new one. 
3.3.2. Cybernetic View of Management 
From the cybernetic standpoint, management processes are best regarded 
non-hierarchically. They are not, then, necessarily pyramidal power structures, althouýh 
they may approach this model in the limiting case of an authoritarian value system. 4 
Management is not confronted with 'discrete' problems; it faces interlocking sets of 
problems that can be separated only by artificially (and unhelpfully) carving the 
organization up into pieces 48. Succesful management does not solve problems in the sense 
that something is dealt with and disposed of. Rather, succesful management performs a more 
or less continuous balancing, adjusting, steering of very messy situations. 49, 
The naive positivistic world view assumes that human situations are objectively 
defined, that is, their boundaries are shared by the concerned people and the problem is 
to know how to pull the right strings to achieve the desirable results. If this assumption 
is unrealstic, as is more and more the case in modern organizations, then the complexity 
that has to be recognised becomes much larger, and the problem is more that of working out 
what to do to maintain stability in interpersonal interactions than that of 
achieving well-defined results. 50 
Organizations maintain internal stability through homeostasis 51. This means that the 
whole and each of the parts are maintaining a dynamic equilibrium, in which each part has, 
in Ashby's words: "a power of veto over the state of equilibrium of the others". 
In this regard, the critical task of management is to be alert to Incipient 
Instability, by means of a sort of model, that identifies the essential variables and some 
system to monitor those variables and set off an alerting signal if the variables diverge 
from their normal limits. 
This view of the organization and its management and the evolution of a model will be 
discussed in details in Chapter 4. 
3.4. SYNOPSIS 
Cybernetics as a field of study initiated as 'the science of communication and control 
in the animal and the machine'. By broadening its view towards the concept of general 
systems it has been defined as 'the science of the effective organization'. 
Cybernetics deals with exceedingly complex, probabilistic, and self-organizing 
sYstems. It treats them as wholes, in order to obtain a knowledge of the total system's, 
behaviour which is not fully obtainable from a division in parts and a subsequent 
examination. 
Tools enabling a cybernetic analuysis of a system are: 
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The concept of variety as a measure of the systemic Zomplexity. The Law of Requisite 
Variety, asserting that 'only variety can destroy variety', 
\aefines that the 
capacity of a regulator cannot exceed his capacity as a variety generator, as a 
communication channel or as a transducer. 
The concept of the 'black box', i. e. the recognition of the fact that there is 
inability of full knowledge of all the internal operations in a complex system. 'It 
is not necessary to enter the black box to understand the nature of function it 
performs'. 52 Employing the 'black box' technique (input manipulation, output 
classification and many-to-one transformations), the observer obtains an 
understanding of systemic behaviour. 
Concepts and terms of communication theory such as information, channel, channel 
capacity and transducer. 
, The concept of feedback for the regulation of complex systems, either as negative 
feedback in deviation-counteracting mechanisms, or as positive feedback in 
growth -promoting devices, or by combinations of types of feedback. 
Early cybernetic studies in management and organization evolved in the tradition of 
positivism, just adding to traditional management science the concepts of black box and 
feedback and using mechanical or biological analogies in their analyses of organizations. 
The work'of Beer enables cybernetic laws to be understood in the context of 
organizations Without reference to mechanical or biological manifestations and gives more 
attention to Purposefulness and the role'of observer. 
This branch of management cybernetics views organizations as multi-systems defining, 
with reference to particular activities, a closed network of interpersonal interactions, 
i. e. a network with autonomy vis-a-vis particular tasks or missions. 
Management's problem is to maintain stability in interpersonal interactions through 
homeostasis. 
The critical task of management is to be alert to incipient Instability by identifying 
the essential variables in the organization, monitoring them, and taking action when they diverge from their normal (planned) limits. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BEER'S MODEL 
"It would be disastrous if some neurotically disposed chairman or consultant tried 
to insist that everyone behave like the organization chart. But the questions 
whether real life in the firm is best described by this, and whether if so a 
structure specified like this really helps best in solving the problems that arise 
in transforming input to output. are unanswered". 
(S. Beer, 1981) 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
When discussing Management Control under the 'official' Management Science paradigm 
(Chapter 2). it was noted that recorded dissatisfaction could probably be taken as a 
symptom of instability in the consensual system. It was, therefore, decided to attempt to 
tackle the problem under an alternative paradigm. Chapter 3 has introduced cybernetics as 
an alternative method of dealing with managerial situations. However, cybernetic concepts 
can be employed in traditional management analyses without offering any new direction. A 
certain branch of cybernetics, Beer's management cybernetics, proposes a model of the 
organization, indicating an approach under a different paradigm. The implied views of 
organization and management, under this paradigm, have been outlined in Chapter 3. This 
chapter provides a more detailed examination of Beer's model and its various applications. 
The main criticisms to this approach are also discussed, before proceeding in attempting 
an evaluation of the model, in the case of a state-owned railway enterprise. in the 
remainder of this thesis. 
An organization is a system of high complexity, in which the input and the output are 
themselves high-variety sub-systems. An orthodox description used in discussing typical 
managerial problems as organization, efficiency and objectives is the organization chart. 
This indicates how each part of the company relates to each other part and its main 
intention is to determine where responsibilities lie. I 
Beer (1981) assumes that "orthodox organization chart does not help in solving 
problems arising within the organizations", for three reasons: 
The first reason is that today the description of the control of the organization 
by a formal organization chart Is arbitrary. In the origins of large, modern, 
enterprises, i. e., in small companies controlled by autocratic enterpreneurs, who 
did everything that mattered themselves, it used to be true that the control of the 
firm was a function of these different types of people interacting with each other 
and nothing more. Then, there was a reason to draw up ad hoc organization charts 
showing which of these actual people were actually doing what. But to allow this heavily personalized structure to become depersonalized was a mistake, because it 
erected a structural convention which has no particular raison d'eire. Today, 
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however, control in a business is something much more than the interaction of its 
senior managers. It has to do with information of an extent and complexity beyond 
the capacities of those senior people to absorb and interpret it. 
The second reason is that today the manager Is no longer the arbiter of 
sophistication In control. Computers have a capacity to cope with information which 
is vastly in excess of the human capacity. Managers have to organize the firm so 
that it can be computed with. However, people do not want, do not know how, and do 
not have tools or means of description which would enable them to work out a new 
mode of organization as needed from the reshuffle of responsibilities. Thus, 
something different from the archtypal organization chart is required. If people 
persist in drawing in computers on their existing organization charts, they cannot 
possibly succeed in doing more than overload the humanly limited control system they 
have already got. 
The third key reason for objection to orthodox company descriptions and ways of 
discussing organizational structure derives from the other two. If the distinctions 
cuffently used are wholly arbitrary and Indeed archaic (first objection), and If 
they are constrained by human limitation In a way which modern facilities falsify 
(second objection), then there Is no guarantee that what really matters In modern 
management can be expressed like this at all. 1 
Therefore, in his work, Beer attempts to define an alternative model of the effective 
organization, which he calls the model of the viable system (VSM). 
4.2. METHODOLOGY FOR DEFINING AN ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL 
Beer (1966) has discussed the process of building a 'scientific' model of a managerial 
situation 2. These steps were followed for the construction of the Viable System's Model 3 
and are illustrated in Figure 10. 
(1) The perception of similarities between two different systems (e. g., between the 
regulatory system of an individual and a group or between a brain and a firm), 
gives, initially, way to a comparison, often beginning in a literary manner 
(e. g., ffmanagement communications are like the nervous system... ). Such 
comparisons help to convey insights, although everyone knows better than to take 
them more seriously. 
(2) As perception of the two systems deepens, conceptual models of both systems are 
derived. At this stage it may be found that, some circumstance understood in one 
system throws light in a parallel circumstance in another. It is now worth 
'drawing analogies'; on the other hand, everyone knows that 'analogies may be 
carried too far*. 
(3) The process continues, and begins to have the marks of a scientific method, when 
attempting to develop rigorous formulations of the two conceptual models. These 
will each be a homomorphic mapping, insofar as many elements in the system that 
is conceptually modelled will map onto one element in a rigorous model. 
(4) When mapping the two rigorous models onto each other, if Invarlances are found 
between the two systems, then these are Isomorphic mappings, one-to-one in the 
elements selected as typifying systemic behaviour in some selected but important 
way. The generalized system that comes out of this process (which applied to all 
systems of a particular class) is a scientific model. 
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(5) The generalization of some behaviour invariably and invariantly exhibited by the 
system as interpreted through this systemic model is usually called a law. 
However, a selection has been made: systemic variety has been reduced through 
homomorphisms. This is natural, as it is the very business of scientific 
discovery. 
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Figure, 10: Beer's Account of Scientific Modelling 
rnp oying this methodology he mapped a set-theoretic model of the brain onto a steel company 5. 
providing thus a first version of his model. Beer (1972) published for the first time his 
popular version of the VSM using neurophysiological terminology 6. To overcome accusations for 
artalogical modelling, Beer (1979) developed a new version of the VSM from management 
principles 7, which is the one which will be presented and used in this thesis. 
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4.3. THE VIABLE SYSTEM'S MODEL (VSM) 
The main assumption underlying the model is that there are invarlances in the behaviour of 
all viable systems (i. e. capable of maintaining their identity independently of other such 
systems in a shared environment 8), whether they are organisms or organizations. Any viable 
system contains and is contained in a viable system (principle of recursion). 
According to Beer, maintenance of viability means capability to respond to environmental 
changes, even if those changes could not have been foreseen at the time the system was designed. 
Any viable system has to achieve requisite variety (at a level concordent with its effective 
performance) with the complex environment with which it is faced. Obviously, then, Ashby's Law 
of Requisite Variety plays a central role in the design of the Model of The Viable System. 
Though Ashby in his original formulation of the law put the emphasis on the channel 
capacity of the regulator (para. 3.2.1.1), asserting that "W's capacity as a regulator cannot 
exceed R's capacity as a channel of communication" 9, Beer recognised that, in the Viable 
System's Model, the requisite variety of the homeostats applies in three distinct ways: 
-to the blocks of variety homeostatically related, 
-to the channels carrying information between them, and 
-to the transducers relaying information across boundaries. 10 
Thus, at a methodological level, he has made a distinction of the regulator as a 
variety generator, as a communication channel and as a transducer. 11 
Beer (1981) has pointed a number of strategies that can be used in management in order 
to balance the variety equation for organizations in a satisfactory way. These strategies 
are aiming either at attenuating the variety of the external environment or at amplifying 
management's own variety. 12 
Essentially, the variety engineerng strategies that Beer prescribes are designed to 
fulfil two requirements: 
that the organization should have the best possible model of the environment 
relevant to its purposes; 
that the organization's structure and information flows should reflect the nature of 
that environment, so that the organization is responsive to it. 13 
4.3.1. Summary of the Organization of the Viable System's Model 
A full description of the VSM is provided in Appendix A of this thesis. 
Systems ONE of an organization are the various parts of it directly concerned with Implementation, i. e., carrying out the tasks that the organization is supposed to be doing. Each System ONE of the organization should be autonomous in its own right, so that it can absorb some of the environmental variety that would otherwise flood higher 
management levels. Systems ONE possess their own relations with the outside world and their own localised managements. 
Under normal circumstances, compatible instructions from higher management should 
ensure that the various Systems ONE of an organization act in harmony. However, the actual interactions set off amongst the Systems ONE may lead to unpredictable and dangerous 
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effects for the whole organization and the divisions themselves. There is a need therefore 
for a co-ordinating function, provided by System TWO. System TWO consists of the 
regulatory centres of the Systems ONE linked to a corporate regulatory centre, which 
receives information about the actions of the various divisions and is able to prevent 
dangerous oscillations arising in the system, created by all the divisions. 
System THREE is the control function, ultimately responsible for the internal 
stability of the organization. This System interprets the policy decisions of higher 
management and allocates resources to the Systems ONE to carry out policies. It must 
ensure the effective implementation of policy by monitoring (by means of System THREE-*) 
and controlling-(by means of System TWO) the activities of Systems ONE, gathering 
information on their performance. Some of this information will require action from System 
THREE, some will need to be aggregated into corporate statistics, while some may have to 
be passed immediately upwards, for the urgent attention of higher management. 
System FOUR, the Intelligence function of the organization, has two main tasks: 
It switches instructions from the 'thinking chamber' of the organization, System 
FIVE, down to the lower level systems, and it switches upwards, from Systems ONE to 
THREE, information required by System FIVE to take major strategic decisions. 
It captures for the organization all relevant information about its total 
environment. Having recognised environmental threats and opportunities, System FOUR 
filters the information ad redistributes it downwards or upwards, according to its 
implications. 
System FOUR is the point in the Organization where internal and external information 
can be brought together. - 
System FIVE is responsible for the direction of the whole enterprise. It is the 
thinking part of the organization, formulating policy on the basis of all the information 
passed to'it by System FOUR and communicating this policy downwards to System THREE 
implementation by Systems ONE. One of its most difficult tasks is balancing the sometimes 
conflicting external and internal demands placed on the organization. The internal demands 
are represented by the commitment of autonomic management to ongoing operations, while 
external demands are represented by System FOUR which, with its links with the 
environment, tends to be outward and future oriented. System FIVE must ensure that the 
organization adapts to the external environment, while maintaining a degree of internal 
stability. Finally, System FIVE must represent the essential qualities of the whole 
organization to any wider system of which it is part, acting in this case simply as the 
localised management of a particular System ONE of the wider system. 14 
4.3.2. Using the Viable System's Model 
The model described can be used: 
either for the design of new organizational systems, according to the cybernetics 
Principles elucidated in the model, 
or for the diagnosis of deficiencies in existing organizatonal structures, 
or, finally, as a part of the design of efficient and effective management Information systems. 
for 
the 
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4.3.2.1. Design of New Organizational Systems 
The most ambitious attempt to use the model in this way was Project Cybersyn, 
involving the regulation of the Chilean social economy at the times of President Allende. 
Detailed accounts of this work have been provided by Beer 15 16 17 18, Espejo 19, and 
Schwember 20. 
Beer 21 offers some more examples of the model's use for the design of new 
organizations, i. e., the organization of Manchester Business School 22, further discussed 
by Morris 23 and Greiner 24, the organization of the Operational Research Society 25 and 
other applications. Beer (1984) provides a further list of uses of the model 26. 
Espejo 27 28 and Davies, Demb and Espejo 29 have also worked in the same direction. 
4.3.2.2. VSM as a Diagnostic Tool 
The model can also be employed as a diagnostic tool. The organization being analysed 
can be compared to the VSM to check that its structures and processes are such as to 
ensure viability and effectiveness. 
Beer (1984), discussing the statement, that when dealing with an existing 
organization, which is actually there to be investigated, then surely it is by definition 
a viable system and nothing remains to be said, argues: 
"The fact that the societary system is there does not prove that it is effectively 
there ... Monoliths and monopolistic systems in particular often operate at the 
margins of viability, creaking and choking like the valetudinarian organizations 
that they are. Moreover, many such are operating at such an' enormous cost that they 
are becoming less and less viable in front of everyone's eyes-. 30 
Diagnostic Points 
The following features would be regarded as a threat to the organization's continued 
existence: 
System ONE: 
The absence of Beer's five necessary functions from any System ONE may threaten its 
abilities to operate succesfully. 31 
Mistakes in articulating the different levels of recursion, so that the system is 
not logically organized at each of its levels of operation often lead to no 
recognition of the importance of certain Systems ONE 32 . Therefore, they are not treated as viable systems in their own ri ht and lack a localised System ONE 
management to attend to their affairs. 
A 
System TWO-. 
System TWO is often not fully established, -because the localised managements of Systems ONE resent interference from this relatively junior control echelon. 
However, unless System TWO is able to assert itself, co-ordination between the 
various activities of the Systems ONE will be put in jeopardy. 34 
If System TWO is missing, activity in System ONE can turn deadly and self-defeating, 
as units fight for resources and against entropy. 35 
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System FOUR: 
System FOUR is often weak because it is regarded in many organizations as a 'staff' 
function. Thus, it may lack good communications with other parts of the organization 
and its recommendations may frequently be ignored. 
However, if System FOUR is weak, System FIVE will lack the knowledge of the 
organization's environment, necessary for it to give proper attention to 
developmental activities. It will forget its higher-level duties and will instead 
tend to get too involved with the work of System THREE, or even try to intervene at 
Systems ONE level. 36 
If System FOUR is missing, Systems THREE and FIVE collapse onto each other 
37, 
leaving the critical System FIVE a mere functionary. 38 
System FIVE: 
System FIVE should represent what Beer calls "the essential qualities of the whole 
system" to the wider systems of which it is part. Inability to do that, questions 
the organization's survival. 
Metasystem THREE- FOUR- FIVE: 
Systems THREE, FOUR and FIVE need to form a THREE-FOUR-FIVE metasystem to 
encourage 'synergy' and interactivity. Without a constant interaction and exchange 
of information between them, System THREE is vulnerable to 'narrow tunnel' syndrome 
and System FOUR is exposed to the perils of 'flights of imagination. 39 
Pathological autopolesis In Systems TWO, THREE, FOUR and FIVE: 40 
An autopoletic system is one which has the ability to continue to produce those 
aspects of the organization which are essential to its identity. However, according 
to VSM, viability is a property which should be embodied only in the organization's 
totality and in its Systems ONE. An organization developing autopoiesis in any of its Systems TWO, THREE, FOUR and FIVE is 'pathologically autopoletic' and this 
threatens its viability. 
In an organization, Systems TWO, THREE, FOUR and FIVE should serve the whole 
system, by Promoting the implementation function and should not be allowed to become 
viable systems in their own right. If they do develop as autopoietic systems, it 
will inevitably be at the expense of the system as a whole. The faults typical of 
rigid bureaucracies can be traced to these organizations becoming pathologically 
autopoietic. 41 
Diagnostic applications of the VSM 
Beer (1984) states that no systematic archive of applications has been kept 42 Therefore, this section, besides presenting a number of applications of VSM as a' diagnostic tool in the field of Management, might also facilitate in the future the construction of such an archive. 
Espejo (1980) uses the model to diagnose organizational problems in the structure of a manufacturing company 43. Further work undertaken by Espejo relates mainly to the introduction of Beer's ideas in MIS design and will be discussed in that section. 
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Gomez (1977 1978) presents a VSM-based methodology for, problem- solving in 
Management 44 ý5 and Public Administration 46 
Gomez (1982) combines the VSM with Checkland's "root definitions" to provide a 
problem-solving methodology in a publishing company. 47 
Ganete and Criggs (1977) have undertaken and presented an organizational analysis, 
employing VSM, of the Fisheries and Marine Service of the Federal Government of Canada 48. 
The same project is discussed in a paper of Baker, Elias and Griggs (1978) 49 . 
Karlin (1977) has shown the application of Beer's work through graphics. 50 
Carbart, Slagle and White (1977) have undertaken a modelling of the U. S. Federal Trade 
Commision employing comparatively, a traditional management model and VSM, and stating the 
advantages of the latter. 5 
Tripp and Rainey (1983,1986) 52 55 and Tripp, Pearson and Rainey (1983,1986) 53 54 
have employed VSM in their studies of the U. S. Air Force Logistics Command. 
Britton and Callion (1985) have used VSM in assessing the deficiencies of the trade 
training network in New Zealand. 56 
4.3.2.3. VSM and the Design of Management Information Systems 
Beer's model assists the design of MIS, as it pays attention to the communication 
links and the flow of information within the organization and between the organization and 
the environment. The proposition for the design of a Management Information System based 
on cybernetic principles underlies Beer's design for Allende's Government in Chile. Beer's 
concern was designing a comprehensive regulatory system for the Chilean economy. His 
conception was not of a management information system for top decision -makers, but a 
comprehensive design of information flows, communication channels and transducers for the 
multiple layers of management in that complex situation. 
Detailed descriptions of this design are provided by Beer 57 58, Schwember 59 and 
Espejo 60. Here, the main features will be outlined. 
Real Time Information 
According to Beer, even in the world's most advanced countries, economic data arrive 
very late, nine months late in average, before the total picture is seen. 
Thus, most economic decisions are taken out of phase with economic reality. The 
advanced countries spend a great deal of money in trying to offset the errors thereby induced: they engage in econometric studies aimed at projecting data -not indeed into the future- but only into the present. It is perfectly possible, these days, to capture data 
at source in real time, and to process them instantly. 61 
The time-scale of managerial problems is one of the most vital parameters involved. Thus, a management science that ignores the fact is not a science at all. 62 
The idea of real-time information had been strongly uestioned, even before the Chilean experience, most characteristically by Dearden 
03" 
64 65 
. Jankowicz 
66 
, studying an alternative issue of management control, where the manager is fed information direct from the input and analysing the time delays inherent in such a system, points out that inevitably decisions will be delayed and perfect control is not possible. 
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However, Beer has shown with his work that it is feasible to design and construct a 
system providing real-time information. On the other hand, real-time control is related 
with the time-lag mediating between the reception of information and the decison-taking. 
Obviously, this phase is associated with human skills and cannot be guaranteed by any 
artificial system. 
Central to the idea of real-time information is, according to Beer 67, the - 
concept of Cyberfilter, which is taken to mean the use of Bayesian statistical theory, 
according to the Harrison -Stevens protocol 68 69, to examine streams of data flowing 
within the enterprise for any alerting signal that might enable a manager to take action 
to avert trouble before it results in damage to the enterprise. In this sense, cyberfilter 
breaks the time barrier. It aims not at remedial action after the trouble has manifested 
itself, but rather just before the trouble occurs. 
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The Harrison-Stevens protocol was conceived as a tool for short-term forecasting. In 
cyberfilter it is used to recognise the likelihood of significant changes in the behaviour 
of streams of data. For each new datum added to a time series, four probabilities are 
computed. These probabilities are whether the new datum implies a chance variation, a 
transient, a slop change or a step change in the behaviour of the measured variable. 
If there is a high probability that the new datum may imply step or slope changes the 
exception reports are transmitted to the relevant managers. Chance variations and 
transients are filtered away. This notion entails the surveillance of data streams on real 
time. The solution is not to wait for the periodic report which indicates that trouble 
exists and has existed for however long it took to prepare the periodic report. 
According to Espejo 70, two problems in the typical enterprise make difficult the 
implementation of the cyberfilter. 
The first is that data are collected and processed by epochs, not continuously. 'We 
know the state of affairs daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, yearly, but not in 
continuum. Nor is it reasonable to expect that any enterprise would convert its 
data capture and data processing to a real time format. The costs would be 
prohibitive". 
The second problem is that within the existing epochal data capture, processing and 
reporting system, most attempts to invigilate the data streams demand expensive 
equipment to convert the existing protocol into a Harrison -Stevens protocol. The 
best way of developing cyberfilter is by the use of micro-computers. However, there 
is a severe problem at the interface between the established system with its 
periodic reporting and the micro-computer which seeks to operation'in real time. 
The solution to the second problem is to de-couple the two systems, the existing and 
the projected, by the creation of indices. 
Creation of Indices 
According to Espejo and Watt (1979) 71, Beer's design is very powerful as long as it 
is understood how to design meaningful indices. In Beer's framework, they are the 
elementary bricks supporting the building of information for organizational management. 
They have the meaning of physiological measures like the body temperature or the blood 
pressure; they have a profound systemic meaning. 
Beer's indices are measures of performance relevant to any organizational operation. 
Figure 12 provides a diagrammatical definition of these indices. 
What is done today, the actuality, is compared with what could have been done, 
considering present level of resources and operational constraints, if everything 
had been optimally organized, i. e., the capability. This gives the so-called index 
of productivity. 
By removing constraints and allocating resources, a better value than capability 
should be achieved. This is potentiality. The index of latency is a measure of 
Possible organizational development, considering resources that are present but not 
yet active. 
Finally, the index of peformance integrates present behaviour with future 
Possibilities. 72 
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Figure 12: Beer's Indices for Performance Measurement 
The notion of capability as a "systemic" concept is central to the definition of 
indices. While potentiality is basically a normative value, and actuality is a fluctuating 
value, capability is a measure of the present organizational resources. Its value can only 
be defined once it is understood the way other systemic activities affect the particular 
activity being measured. 
Thus, the life of a system may be realized, in respect to the indices above, as a 
continuous process of adjustment to potentiality, as Figure 13 illustrates. 
potentiality 
capability 
actuality 
Figure 13: The Continuous Process of Systemic Adjustment 
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According to Beer, there can be no argument about the numbers used to measure 
actuality. However, there will be severe arguments about the other two sets of numbers. By 
means of operational research, agreement may be gained that the numbers used are sensible. 
What matters is that capability and potentiality measures, though somewhat arbitrarily 
fixed, cannot then be arbitrarily changed. Hence, although the absolute values of the 
productivity and latency indices provide only approximate assessments, movements of these 
indices over time provide the information really needed. 73 
The VSM as the Basis of the Cybernetic MIS 
Beer's model of the viable system is employed for the definition of the recursive 
structure of the organization under concern. 
FIRM 
DIVISIONS 
PLANTS 
Figure 14: Organizational Modelling 
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For instance, for a firm a first level of recursion may be defined by the divisions, 
"doing* what the firm is all about. Within each division there may be several plants, 
defining the second level of recursion. Within each plant there are several sections 
"doing" what the plant is supposed to do. The breakdown is done as many times, as 
necessary for design purposes, as Figure 14 illustrates. 
Operational modelling aveach level of recursion is then undertaken, focusing on the 
different processes producing organizational output. These models are expressed by 
or quanlified flowcharts", and their usefulness depends upon the definition of indices that 
give true measures of internal activities. 74 
4.4. CRITIQUE TO BEER'S MODEL 
"Those who have been induced by their culture to act to further its survival 
through design must accept the fact that they are altering the conditions under 
which men live and, hence, engaging in the control of human behaviour. Good 
government is as much a matter of the control of human behaviour as bad ... " 
Prof. Skinner: "Beyond Freedom and Dignily" 
The heading of this section, as extracted by Adams' (1973) critique to the Chilean 
experiment 75, summarizes the fundamental opposition to Beer's model. Apparently this 
opposition is based on philosophical grounds and is the first to be discussed. 
4.4.1. "Neutral" Science and Social Systems 
As Athanaslou (1979) 76 points, we know from Beer"s post-Chile writings that he left 
the Cybersyn project a good deal less naive politically than he began it. "Prior to Chile 
we were confronted with a man who seemed somewhat unaware of the true nature of the 
'social meta-systems' that dominate our society, and who clearly thought that the 
revolution he desired could be made by enlightened scientists and technologists" 77. After 
Chile we hear no more the confident assertion that the problems which face humanity "are 
not in essence economic or political problems at all; they are cybernetic problems" 78. He 
is no longer so naive. In 1974 we hear instead that *science and technology are driven 
forward towards a society of conspicuous consumption, since this is the only development 
that our economic machinery can countenance* 79. 
A detailed discussion of the issue of Beer's "political naitivity" goes far beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The task is further complicated by the fact that the development of 
Beer's thinking over the years makes the job of citing in his work statements favouring 
this or the other point of view easy, but, nevertheless, morally unjustifiable. Beer is 
well aware of this acusation and has tried to defend himself. His post-Chile work has 
demonstrated a political awareness well above of that of the average practising manager 
or consultant. 80 81 
Literature on Beer's work returns again and again to this starting point, namely the 
attempt to implement formal systems models or cybernetic models directly in social 
systems. 
According to Thomas (1980), to try to conceptualize and actually build social 
cybernetic control systems is in fact dangerous as well as being virtually impossible. 
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It is dangerous because the requirement for a pre-determined goal cannot be met 
without assuming that it is possible to find an agreed definition of the "general 
good% unless the application is to limited areas with existing unitary power 
structures and to cases where the people being controlled take a purely instrumental 
attitude towards their participation. 
It is virtually impossible, because it requires knowledge of the transfer function, 
i. e. the mechanisms by which the control "levers" have their effect. "Unfortunately 
-or perhaps fortunately- a purposeful, system will not remain passive in the face of 
attempts to control it. Individuals are able to choose a variety of reactions 
to the attempt to control behaviour. 82 
On the same grounds, Ulrich (1981) argues that the cybernetic systems concept, despite 
its grasp of the idea of intrinsic control, appears to be inadequate to social systems 
design, for it is still oriented towards a merely extrinsic concept of motivation. The 
fact that such a system may be given some built-in choice is largely irrelevant, because 
such choice is exercised merely in reaction to externally determined inputs (namely, 
purposes 'given" to the system, and environmental "perturbations" to be eliminated). 83 
4.4.2. Organic Systems and Social Systems 
Gharajedagbi and Ackoff (1984), advocating the need for a new systems model, have 
postulated that, traditionally, in efforts to acquire information, knowledge and 
understanding of social systems, two types of model have been used: mechanistic and 
organismic. 
Mechanistically modelled organizations, manifested by adherents to the so-called 
classical or traditional school of management, are structured hierarchically and are 
centrally controlled by a completely autonomous authority. Such an authority can 
affect any part of the system without being affected by any of them. This separates 
the ultimate authority from the system, making that authority an external 
controller. 
Organismically modelled organizations (and they take Beer's work to be 
characteristic of this type of modelling) try to exercise control by specifying 
desired outputs, leaving the selection of means to the parts (management by 
objectives). The environment and organizational performance are kept under 
surveillance to determine whether they are behaving as expected. Thus, management 
engages in feedback control, which facilitates both learning and adaptation. 
However, they argue, to treat an organization or other type of social system as 
an organism is to fail to recognize the way in which these differ significantly. In 
contrast to an organism, which cannot change its structure more than a limited 
amount and still survive, a social system has almost complete control over its 
structure. Furthermore, an effective social system requires agreement among its 
Parts and between its parts and the whole. It requires consensus; an organism does 
noL 94 
A similar criticism to the analogy between mechanisms/organisms and organizations has 
been expressed by Checkland (1980): "Any enterprise set up to carry out some purposeful 
activity may in part be regarded as a machine. But since its components can attribute 
meaning to their situation, it will have to be regarded as many other things as well: 
social grouping, appreciative system, power struggle". 85 
Riven (1977) states, that Beer's model fails to understand human reaction and the way humans behave. "It is not sufficient to draw all these diagrams showing feedback loops, 
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algedonic loops, esoteric boxes, polystable systemic levels and metasystemic levels, and 
assume that the people who occupy these esoteric boxes and so on are going to behave in 
the way which the diagrams assume. Professor Beer has in the past, rightly, been scornful 
of management's assumption that people in organizations behave as organization charts 
indicate. But is there any reason to suppose that if we take the new systems for 
communication and control that are proposed, then these will be the way that groups of 
people will behave or even should behave ?" 86 
4.4.3. Cybernetics and Organization theory 
Morgan (1982) identifies a major conflict between the epistemology which underwrites 
cybernetics and the epistemology of goal-oriented rationality that provides the basis for 
much of organization theory. 
Organization theory provides an inadequate basis for understanding the nature of 
evolved contexts, and, as a perspective for guiding management and human action, can 
actually disrupt and destroy the relationships which give meaningful form to the 
context within which that action is set. The insights of cybernetics challenge the 
premises and, utility of goal-oriented rationality as a mode of understanding and as 
an effective technology of action. 
However, used as a technique, cybernetics facilitates the design of systems which 
use the principle of negative feedback as a basis for self-regulation and control. 
To the extent that such systems are geared to the achievement of predetermined ends, 
then cybernetics is used as an instrument of goal-seeking activity, and as such 
contributes to the pathological consequences which such purposive modes of action 
may generate for the wider system. 87 
Arguing this point Jackson (1985) assumes the emphasis on stability at the expense of 
change to be a characteristic of the early period of the development of cybernetics. "At 
that time. the excitement generated by the discovery of the negative feedback process as 
an ubiquitous mechanism of control, meant that interest centred on deviation -counteracting 
systems' 88. Adopting Maruyania's (1968) distinction between 'first' and 'Second 
cybernetics' 89, he sees no reason why cybernetics could not deal with structure 
elaboration and change as successfully as it has dealt with system maintenance. 
4.4.4. Conclusion 
The adequacy of the framework for organizational study and design offered by Beer in 
terms of the model of any viable system (VSM) has to be examined at three levels: 
4.4.4.1. The Model as a Tool for Organizational Diagnosis 
This is the most obvious and justifiable use of the model., Many researchers have 
reported on the model's diagnostic power. Britton and McCallion (1985) find the model "an 
extremely powerful diagnostic and predictive tool for analyzing deficiencies in 
organizations and inter-organizalional networks" 90. Mitchell (1977) accepts that Beer's 
model offers a large number of powerful hypotheses about communication and control in 
social organizations, offering very interesting possibilities for further investigation, 
though the propositions are short of a well-integrated theory 91- 
4.4.4-2. The Model as a Theory of Organizational Design 
Mitchell's argument on the absence of a well-integrated theory takes us to the second level of examination. Can Beer's model develop as a framework for Organizational Theory ? 
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It seems to be, early yet to predict, though many scientists have reported on the 
independent validation of the model 92. 
There seems to be to a great extent lack of communication between researchers in 
various schools of thought in the field of Organizational science. Attempts to bridge 
these gaps appear in the literature at an increasing rate: 
Mitchell (1977) wonders why Beer being so well known for his scholarliness, his 
scientific zeal, his political commitment and his concentrated focus on the major 
problems of our time has so little been used. 
Clemson (1977) assigns this limited use not to lack of interest or appreciation but 
to the lack of an adequate language to discuss complex, dynamic processes in general 
or in the abstract. 93 
Espejo (1987) believes that there is a group of scientists whose formalised 
conceptions appear equivalent to Ashby's Law, but who have failed to recognise the 
universal significance of requisite variety. He reports this to be the case, among 
others, of Simon in the field of human information processing, Galbraith in 
organizational design and Weinberg in systems theory. 94 
Tomlinson (1987) states that Beer's concept of the "Brain of the Firm" is a, seminal 
concept, which is increasingly making its impact on the understanding of what are 
the important structural elements in a progressive organization, and thus how 
improvement can be achieved. 95 
4.4.4.3. The Model and the Design of Information and Control Systems 
Probably this is the area mostly requiring further development before any concrete 
conclusions concerning the usefulness of the model can be drawn. 
Besides the fact that operational problems have yet to be resolved, e. g., an agreed 
upon methodology for defining 'molecular' indices of performance out of 'quantified' flow 
charts, there always remains the problem of model's misuse. Ulrich (1981) argues that it 
is enough for the model to be at fault if it provides tools which are capable of being 
misused and are likely, therefore, to be misused. For him, design tools must be so 
constructed that they are impossible to subvert for authoritarian usage. 96 
4.5. SYNOPSIS 
The main assumption underlying Beer's model is that, there are Invariances in the 
behaviour of all viable systems. Any viable system contains and is contained in a viable 
system (principle of recursion). 
Any viable system has to achieve requisite variety with the complex environment with 
which it is faced. The variety engineering strategies must be designed to fulfil two 
requirements: 
that th 
-e 
organization should have the best model of the environment relevant to its 
Purposes; and 
that the organization"s structure and information flows should reflect the nature of 
that environment, so that the organization is responsive to it. 
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Beer's model of any viable system (VSM) consists of five sub-systems/elements, the 
existence and proper functioning of each of which is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for viability and effectiveness. 
The five sub-systems may be labelled: 
(1) implementation, 
(2) co-ordination, 
(3) control, 
(4) intelligence, and 
(5) policy. 
The model may be used either for 
the design of new organizational systems, or for 
the diagnosis of deficiencies in existing organizational structures, or 
as a part of the design of management information systems. 
A number of theoretical issues related with the model still remain unresolved. These 
issues, reflecting contemporary lack of consensus in the fields of Management Science, 
Organizational Design and Systems Theory, limit at the moment the validity of the model to a 
powerful diagnostic tool. 
This thesis will make use of the diagnostic power of the model, placing it, at the same 
time, under a further test of theoretical validity. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RAILWAY ENTERPRISE 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
-A railway produces , the availability of transportation of people and - freight between distinct geographical points. From this point of view, railways do not differ from other 
modes of land, air or sea transport. What makes a railway company unique in a national 
context, in most countries of the world, is that the same enterprise undertakes various 
kinds of transportation, each with its own characteristics and market. Thus, the types of 
railway services offered may be: 
Freight transportation services, varying from services to large customers, probably 
owning their own wagon fleet, or specific loads, to transportation of small items 
such as parcels. 
Passenger transportation services, which may be either high-speed and quality 
interurban services, or frequent commuter services facilitating the flows to and 
from the centres of connurabations, or even rural services, providing a'transport 
connection to isolated populations. 
Each of the above types of railway services requires a specific treatment. On the 
other hand, each of these types is confronted with different aspects of competition. 
In the case of freight transport, for bulk commodities, the main competitors may be 
(according to the historical development of the modes of transport in a country, the 
physical layout, etc. ) sea transport, road transport and pipelines. For other commodities, 
competition arrives either from road transport companies, or from the development of road 
transport fleets owned by the manufacturing companies. 
Similarly, concerning passenger transport, competition in interurban transport comes 
primarily from aeroplane and motor-car, and, to a lesser extent, dependent on national 
peculiarities, from the development of interurban bus transport. In suburban or rural 
transport, usually there is no alternative to rail transport other than the motor-car. 
The production of rail services demands the day-to-day maintenance of the availability 
of several subsystems, most significant amongst which are: 
The traction sub-system, both in the form of the tractive power, i. e. the 
'locomotives, including the provision for energy, either being fussile fuel (notably diesel oil) or requiring the operation and maintenance of energy 
production and transmission installations (electrification) and the coaches or 
wagons receiving the passengers or goods to be transported. 
The permanent way sub-system, including both buildings and mechanical equipment 
through which traffic is transfered to and from the railway system and the track, 
the 'iron road' on which trains move, including subgrade and technical works such as bridges, tunnels, supportive walls, etc. 
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The signalling and telecommunications sub-system, through which traffic is scheduled 
and controlled, aiming at permitting the optimum utilization of the other resources, 
under a strict regime of safety in operations. 
This holistic nature of a railway system, with the geographical extent, the 
multiplicity of products and the requirement for the co-ordination of several sub-systems 
makes it unique. No other transport undertaking engages in so many types of activity, 
having, at the same time, the obligation to develop and maintain its infrastructure. A 
succesful railway, therefore, provides a paradigm of the feasibility of a planned and 
co-ordinated series of, activities, with consequences beyond the narrow topic of .- 
transportation, contrasting individualistic options, common in contemporary society. 
The same holistic nature makes railway a first candidate for the introduction and, 
application of cybernetic principles. Besides the various applications of cybernetics in 
technology (shared by the railway and other technological products), there seems to be a 
belief, in the feasibility of running the enterprise cybernetically 1. Wyckoff (1976) has 
noted this characteristic, though he mainly realises it as a negative feature of - 
increasing centralization. 2 
Three major themes concerning railway enterprises have to be examined, before a 
framework for railway management control can be developed in the next chapter. These 
themes relate to: 
- the ownership of the railway enterprise, 
- the objectives of the railway enterprise, and 
- the external control over the railway enterprise. 
5.2. OWNERSHIP OF THE RAILWAY ENTERPRISE 
Most railways in the world are ran by state-owned enterprises. According to Nove 
(1973), there could'be two types of answer to the question why should anything be 
nationalized 3. The first concerns ideology'and the class war. The other economy and/or 
social efficiency. 
This distinction is not very clear to the extent that the latter type of answer is 
included (or, at least, should be included) in the former. Throughout this thesis, the 
second type of answer is examined, with the belief that, thus, the clarification of the 
practical consequences of the first type is facilitated. This limitation is additionally 
justified by the fact that, in western sociefles,. the greatest part of nationalizations 
did not take place under the influence of ideological terms, but rather under 
considerations of economic and social efficiency 4 
5.2.1. The Need for a Regulated Environment,, , 
The present historical period is characterised'by an attempt to revitalise the 'liberal' model of economic development, both in ideological, political and financial 
terms. The consequences of this model on the companies of the transport sector could in 
general be described as a move towards the abolition of regulations and limitations (deregulation). This move, implying increased competition and transport activities 
governed by market laws, is usually accompanied by the privatisation of large state-owned transport enterprises (e. g., British Airways). 
However, though there is this tendency to adopt the 'liberal' (in contrast to the Keynesian) model of development in western societies nowadays, very little has been said 
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about deregulating railway transport. ýThe only experience comes from recent policies in 
the United States 5 butýrefers to a specific environment, characterised by the existence 
of a multitude of competing railway companies. Futhermore, in this environment, 
deregulation refers only to freight traffic (which is by and large the main traffic of 
American railroads) and, though it is very early to make predictions, it seems that will 
lead to: 
- Further mergers 
6, potentially facilitating monopoly conditions. 
-A rationalization of the size of the network, with the abandonment of multiple 
connections between terminal points. 
On the other hand, a number of important issues remain unresolved with deregulation 
legislation, most important of which are: 
- how- high a rate level should be allowed; 
- to what extent should new firms (rail or nonrail) be allowed to enter the most 
lucrative markets of coal transport; 
- what will taxation and subsidy policies towards railways and competing modes be; 
- how will institutional problems as merger policies, labour practices, etc., be 
tackled; 
. 
gy conservation, environmental protection - which way will external issues, as ener 
and national defense, be considered. I 
In financial terms, state regulation of private business activities (extreme case of 
which is the nationalisation) is justified in case of the existence of a natural monopoly. 
According to Baumol (1982), when it is easy to enter or to exit a market, even a 
natural monopoly-has the characteristics of a competitive market, minimising thus the need 
for state control. Baumol calls, this kind of monopoly a 'contestable' monopoly. 8 
Adopting this view, Keeler (1983) argues, that if railway was a contestable monopoly, 
the function of its regulation could be simplified, because the market would be able to 
undertake a great part (if not all) of the task of achieving efficient pricing and 
resource allocation to the industry. However, he insists, railway industry is not a 
contestable monopoly. Entry to the market entails a long and tedious process of bying up 
parcels of land. Engineering and building a railway line also require considerable time 
and expense. Exit is also difficult, largely because of public regulatory policies, but 
also because of heavy sunk costs, often financed with debt, incurred to serve a specific 
market, without opportunity to transfer them to other markets easily. - "While bridges, 
ballast, rails, and ties can be moved from one route to another, they can be moved only at 
great expense" 9. Hence a need to regulate railway activities. Alternative options of 
regulation exist or are proposed, belonging generally in one of the following categories: 
5.2.1.1. Nationalisation of the Infrastructure: Public Track'System 
Wyckoff (1973) has proposed -for the case of US rail system that the federal government 
should undertake a project to purchase major segments of railway track and right of way, for the purpose of developing a modern, high-speed rail system for public use. 10 - 
- The private railways would be allowed to continue to, own and operate any of their 
private tracks. They would also be responsible for development of classification yards and 
track connecting,, their own lines with the federal track system. 
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Operations on the Public Track-System would be in conformance with federal operating 
regulations. Traffic control through signalling systems would be provided by federal 
traffic controllers, in a role similar to that of the air traffic controllers. 
Charges for the use of this track system would be made on a user-tax-basis, shifting 
fixed costs of railroading into variable costs, more like the cost structure of the motor 
carriers. 
The main-objections to this proposal arrived from the railway companies, themselves. 
The AsuKlation, of American Railroads 12 argued that the federal ownership of the tracks: 
(1) Complicates the problem of optimizing track construction and maintenance 
standards, the result being some increase in the overall cost of, rail 
transportation. I 
(2) Presents problems in train control and operations, problems that will 
necessarily increase the cost associated with the installation and operation of 
train control systems and additional trackwork. 
(3) Presents special difficulties in terminal design and operations, which will 
further increase both capital and operating costs. 
(4) Generally insures an increase in the cost of providing railroad fixed plant, 
because of the intrusion both of politics and of bureaucratic inefficiencies 
into management decisions. 
(5) Generally politicizes decisions on: 
Fixed plant improvement and maintenance. 
Abandonment of uneconomic and redundant rail-lines. 
Railroad operating rights. 
Use of terminals. 
Level crossing elimination. 
Railroad labour contracts. 
(6) Opens up the use of railroad fixed plant to private and restricted - commodity 
carriers, who will enter into rail operations under the guise of providing 
*competition' for existing common carrier railroad operating companies. These 
new carriers will skim the cream (heavy, long-haul, base-load traffic) off the 
railroad common carrier market, all to the direct benefit of the largest 
industrial corporations. 13 
5.2.1.2. Private Railway Companies - Stale Regulation 
This regime characterised the period from the introduction of railway services till, 
approximately, the World War II. It was also retained in the USA until recently, (deregulation) and is still in use in a few other countries, in several forms 14 . 
According to Keeler (1983) 15, much of the important regulation affecting railways 
today originates in mediival British common law, subject to which were the railways, as 
common carriers. At that time, stagecoach, and later canal and turnpike, operators were 
given operating franchises, called certificates of public convenience and necessity. These franchises, issued by the government, initially reflected widespread economic 
cartelization practiced through the system of medieval guilds. But the notion of common 
carriage, and of certificates granting firms franchises for common carriage, survived even as guilds disappeared. 
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Reasons explaining the continued government controls of transportation through the 
16th, 17th and l8th centuries in England and then in the United States were: 
Travelling through dangerous areas. The government felt that in return for franchise 
protection and the profits that afforded, traqnsportation companies should be ready 
to bear the risks involved and assume liability for losses and damages. 
Need to maintain a regularly scheduled and reliable transportation. This ýneed was so 
important, that recluired the protection of legal sanction beyond what the 
marketplace might supply. 
Power to acquire a right-of-way. The carrier required powers over otherst not 
usually needed by commercial firms, in order to force, with a reasonable 
compensation, owners of land along its right-of-way to surrender the land. 
The notion, therefore, behind common carriage was that the government would grant the 
carrier certain powers and privileges, and, in return, the carrier was expected to assume 
certain obligations, i. e. that: 
- The carrier may not refuse to serve. 
- The carrier must serve at reasonable price. 
- The carrier must serve all equally. 
- The carrier is responsible for the safe delivery of the goods or persons 
'committed to its care. 
Another aspect of public policy towards railways, consistent with the notion that 
firms were granted considerable privileges for which they in turn had responsibilities. 
was that of subsidisatlon. 
Furthermore, the pricing behaviour of the railways during the middle and late 19th 
century made consistent control of rail rates politically more and more imperative. On 
monopoly routes, rates tended to stay extremely high by comparison. The railways disliked 
the rate wars and attempted to form cartels and collude on services and rates to prevent 
them. Shippers on monopoly routes also disliked the structure of rates, because they found 
themselves paying rates far higher than those charged on competitive routes, for 
equivalent services. 
These occurances made it evident that state regulation of railway fares and services 
would be necessary. Thus, both the British Canals and Railways Act of 1854 and the US 
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 attempted to make explicit and achieve consistent 
enforcement of a number of legal principles already embedded in common law. This legislation was revised in the following period, both in United States and Britain. However, the basic characteristic, i. e., the state regulation, was always, to the one or the other extent, retained. 
Very broadly, the relative historical phases Of railway regulation, both in United States and Britain, are: 
United States 16 
The Commerce Act of 1887 established the Interstate Commerce Commission, to rule upon the law. By 1910, the ICC had in actuality all the powers the 1887 act intended it to have, and it used these Powers in a Politically effective way. 
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The policies, resulting from the 1997 act and its pre-World War I amendments worked 
well politically as long as the railway industry had a virtual monopoly. But with the 
advent of highway, barge and air transportation, regulation designed to function under a 
rail monopoly had to adapt. The story of regulatory policies from 1920 to the present 
indicates continuous and generally inadequate attempts to do so. 
During World War 1, the federal government took over the operation of the railways. 
When it was over, Congress worked out legislation returning, the industry to private 
ownership. The Transportation Act of 1920 not only did this, but it also amended the 1887 
act to broaden the ICC's powers significantly. 
It allowed the ICC to set minimum rates. 
It transferred the control of entry into and exit from rail routes from, the states 
to the Interstate Commerce- Commission. 
It gave the ICC the right to promote mergers among railways. 
It provided for direct subsidies in the form of guaranteed loans to weaker railways, 
if indirect or cross-subsidies were found to be inadequare for continued operation. 
As truck competition increased with the development of a national road system in the 
1920s and 1930s, the railways claimed for placing the trucking industry under the same 
regulation they were subject to. This resulted in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, which 
gave the ICC control of truck rates and entry. 
The ICCs power was increased by the Transportation Act of 1940, which brought certain 
barge transportation under the control of ICC regulation. It also made some changes in 
rate regulation: 
In a case in which a carrier proposed a rate reduction the act placed the burden of 
proof that such a rate was 'reasonable' for the carrier. ' 
The act also gave to the ICC the duty to pursue regulatory policies that would 
create a national transportation system adequate to the needs of commerce, defense 
and the postal system and that would bring about 'sound economic conditions' among 
the carriers. 
It also stated that these conditions were not to be used by the ICC to keep the 
rates of one mode high to protect the traffic of another. 
Because of the considerable relative advantage of truck transportation over rail after' World War II, the railways found themselves losing more and more of their high-value 
traffic. The tried to riduce rates to counter the better truck service and the lower barge 
rates, but, frequently, the ICC blocked railway rate cuts, on the grounds that they were 'unreasonable'. The pressure from railways resulted in the Transportation Act of 1958, 
which was geared in several ways towards making ICC regulation both more supportive of 
Competition and more favourable to the railways. 
It stated that rates of a carrier shall not be held up to a particular level to 
protect the traffic of any other mode of transportation. 
It allowed for guaranteed loans to railways, to help rebuild their plant and 
equipment. 
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It brought the power to grant discontinuance of passenger trains under the ICC, Srom 
the states were it was previously. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the railways were relieved from both passenger 
service and minimum-rate regulation. ,, 11 It I, III 
Passenger service was for the most part taken over by Amtrak. Although railways had 
to pay significant amounts to turn service over to Amtrak and although Amtrak 
probably does not fully compensate railways for all services used, it offered most 
railways eventual relief from almost all their passenger burdens. 
Relief from rates came from Inflation. Since the consumer price index rose by nearly 
, 50 % between 1967 and 1974 and fuel costs by much more than that, the railways could 
over-that period easily achieve any effective rate cuts they might want simply by 
failing to raise rates. Thus In the 1970s suddenly the Important constraint was not 
minimum rates, but ICC controls on maximum rates. 
At the same time in the 1970s the financial situation of many railways deteriorated. 
It had become evident that more legislation was urgently needed, which started with the 
formation of Amtrak in 1971 and continued with the Regional Rail Reorganization (3R) Act 
of 1973, the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (411) Act of 1976, and the 
Staggers Rail Act of 1980. 
The Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 established an agency, the Railway 
Association, to plan the reorganisation and transition to public ownership of railways in 
the Northeast. Based on economic and social criteria, it was to determine what parts of 
the. northeastern rail system were worth keeping, and to recommend how much money was 
required, both to operate the system in the near future and to revitalize it. Thus, the 
publicly owned corporation Conrail was formed, from the consolidation of the Penn Central 
and several other bankrupt companies in the Northeast. 
By 1976 it was evident that the railway problem went well beyond the Northeast, thus 
the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act was passed, aiming at: 
providing government subsidies to money ' -losing 
branch lines, grants for the r 
rehabilitation of main lines for financially weak companies, and guaranteed loans. - 
reforming regulative legislation towards deregulation, as already stated. 
Great Britain 17 
As stated previously, in Great Britain, regulation of charges began with the fixing of 
maximum rates in the enabling Acts, but gradually became More comprehensive and uniform as 
a result of the anti- discriminatory Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1854 and the 
appointment of a Railway Commission to implement it in 1873. Regulation finally culminated in the years, 1888-1893 with the drawing up of a standard freight classification and of the fixing of schedules of maximum charges for each type of traffic. The primary criterion for 
charging was the value of the goods transported, not the cost of transporting them. 
Effective machinery for the supervision of rates and facilities came into being in 1888, when the Railway Commission gave way to the Railway and Canal Commission, with 
extended powers to deal with complaints and decide whether charges and services were 
reasonable. 
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The Rallway'and Canal Traffic Act of 1894, had the effect of freezing freight charges 
at the existing levels, for it placed on the companies the onus of justifying any 
increases before the Commissioners. 
As time went on, the railways acquired other obligations of a social-service nature. 
The Act of 1844 had required the provision of one service a day on each line on which, 
passengers were carried at a fare of a 0.41 p per mile, but this obligation was ended when 
the Cheap TralnsýAct of 1883 placed on the companies a general obligation to provide 
workmen's tickets at reduced rates, in order to encourage workmen to move from congested 
areas to more salubrious neighbourhoods further from their place of work. 
Rate control was only one and perhaps not the'most important control of railway 
autonomy. By the time that road competition became significant in the 1920s, the railways 
had the following legal requirements, from which their rivals were free: 
'-'to publish their fares and charges, - 
- to carry all goods under their statutory conditions - often loosely called the 
'common carrier obligation, 
- to afford 'reasonable facilities', 
- to afford facilities for the through conveyance of traffic, 
- to show no undue preference, 
- to'Provide facilities for workmen and members of the armed forces at reduced 
rates, - 
to submit statutory regulation of wages and conditions of service, 
to submit, accounts and returns in the prescribed form. 
During the World War I, railways were centrally run by the Railway Executive 
Committee, comprising the managers of the ten largest companies. Thus, railwaymen and 
politicians were convinced that considerable economies of scale were available through 
further amalgamation. Immediately, after the war, as the nationalization of the system had 
been rejected, the 1921 Railway Act brought into existence four new groupings out of the 
120 separate companies. 
When railways were-faced with road competition in the 1920s, their reaction was 
largely defensive. Capital was short, since the companies in the inter-war period never 
managed to earn the 'standard revenue' which the new pricing structure had been expected 
to achieve, and there ws consequently little investment. Changes in the pricing structure 
under the 1921 Act merely produced stil more millions of 'exceptional' rate reductions, to 
compete with road hauliers. 
Responses of the railways to road competition were: 
- To buy into road operations. The railways were by far the biggest road hauliers 
and bus operators by the outbreak of World War IL' 
-To appeal for their road competitors to be given similar legal obligations. This 
question was examined by the Royal Commission on Transport, 1928-1930. The result 
was the Road TrafficAct of 1930, which created a bus licensing system, and the 
Road and Rail Traffic Act of 1933, which created a goods haulage licensing system. 
However, both of these acts did little to improve the position of the railways. 
During the World War II, the railways, already suffering from net disinvestment in the inter-war period, were strained to the utmost by the war effort. Although they performed 
extremely well, both financially and in amounts carried, their physical condition was very 
poor by 1945, and it was clear that large amounts of money needed to be spent on 
modernisation. The only obvious source of this finance was the State itself. For this 
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reason, nationalization might have been necessary whatever the Government, but the 
election of a Labour Government made it certain. 
5.2.1.3. State-Owned Railway Enterprises 
Under conditions similar to those mentioned above, most countries in the world have 
arrived to the model of a state-owned railway enterprise. In tfie case of European 
countries (both East and West) there is usually one public enterprise operating over the 
national network. However, in some cases there may be as well small local enterprises, 
private or public. 
This type of state-owned, nationwide railway enterprise will be examined in this 
thesis. Here belong Greek Railways, but also every other railway enterprise in the 
European Community. 18 
5.2.2. Inherent Disadvantages of State Ownership 4ý", I 
As already shown, state ownership is the extreme case of regulation. Assuming that 
principle reason (or one of the principle) of the state ownership of enterprises is that 
thus they operate more efficiently respectively to what Nove (1973) calls "public interest 
under nazionalization', obviously, unless the term "public interest' has some meaning, 
there reaUy is little point in state ownership of railways. The meaning, if any, surely 
relates to possible conflict between profitability and some apparently desirable act or 
omission. Because if the question was purely one of private -profitability, any individual 
or firm could produce railway services and there would be no problem and economic case for 
state ownership. Therefore, the analysis has to investigate the existence of substantial 
financial or social externalities stemming from railway operations, and to prove that 
under these externalities the pursuit of private profitability becomes a misleading 
criterion. This analysis has to be performed very carefully and honestly, because state 
ownership is not recommended from the point of business activity. Some of the 
disadvantages of state ownershipý compared to private ownership under commercial criteria, 
are presented below. 
5.2.2.1. Monopolistic Implications on Market 
Nove (1973) argues that a public monopoly, if told to operate "commercially% will 
tend to behave in exactly the same-way as a private monopoly. Indeed, it can be argued 
that it would be worse. The reason is that a private monopoly is generally supervised by 
some sort of regulating body, to prevent abuse of its position. In some instances, there 
are imposed statutory duties. If the monopoly is based on legal enactment, it is 
considered normal to bind it with various conditions. Private monopolies, which are not 
based on law of franchise, are always conscious of being monopolists on sufferance, since 
failure to give some minimum satisfaction to customers could lead to the invation of their 
"territorym by a competitor. 
ý -By contrast, a public "commercial" monopoly is subjected to few constraints. It is 
told to make money (or, at least, not to lose money), and the state deliberately refrains from interfering with its day-to-day operations. It must therefore be expected to behave 
as a Private unsupervised monopolist would, if in addition he was protected by law from 
competition. 19 
5.2.2-2. Public Managers Have Difficulties in Operating "Commercially* 
Sutherland (1978) argues that while the majority of decisions undertaken within the 
Private sector legitimately involve alternatives with clearly specified outcomes (being 
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matters mainly of precisely defined or even numericalized quantities), many decisions, that 
must be made by public administrators, operating even at the lower levels of the 
enterprise, involve "value" issues and have distinct policy and sociopolitical 
implications. Most managers within the private sector -except for those operating at the 
highest levels- are shielded from such considerations by the "umbrella of certainty" under 
which they operate. Thus, they may-behave as if the system of phenomena with which they 
deal are effectively deterministic, whereas virtually all problems emerging within the 
confines of public enterprise may involve elements of uncertainty that are largely 
*external" to the normal business decision-maker. 20 
Because public enterprise so often deals with issues involving the public welfare, the 
common good, the dignity of human beings, or other such elusive criteria, the public 
manager*must treat the consumer of his product as a "client" per se, with all the 
ambiguity and ethical responsibility that that entails. On the other hand, the business 
manager is largely freed from any fiduciary responsibility towards the consumer, and in 
many cases, the link between the operating manager'and the consumer may be a long and 
indirect one. In short, the business decision-maker more or less legitimately can consider 
only the welfare of his own firm, whereas the public manager (for admittedly political as 
well as philosophical reasons) must have a bifold calculus, which involves client as well 
as organizational welfare. 21 
5.2.2.3. Antithesis Between Organization and Evaluation 
Grubb (1977) states that perhaps the major constraint on evaluation is that programmes 
are conducted by organizations. Indeed, organization and evaluation may be antithetical. 
Organizations usually stand for stability, the status quo; evaluation seeks change. 
Organizations inculcate loyalty and commitment, evaluation is scrutiny and skepticism. 
Being evaluated, particularly with the prospect that the judgement of the evaluation will 
be disseminated to a large audience, is a threatening experience. 23 
Pavlidou (1978) argues that the aim of the public enterprise is to control the 
environment by affecting it in such a way as to make it correspond to the image that the 
enterprise has internally formulated of this environment. Therefore, serving society is 
one of the means of controlling it, since service is not readily provided according to the 
desires or demands of the environment, but according to patterns that are intelligible to 
the enterprise, i. e., match its internal representation of the environment. To the degree 
that the desires and demands of the environment are compatible with the patterns of the 
enterprise, the output responses satisfy these needs and grant the service. To the degree 
that they are not compatible, needs are not readily satisfied. The reason given for this 
denial of service is that regulations do not provide for such arrangements, or that such 
arrangements are'not consistent with the functions of the public enterprise, or that they 
are not for the best interests of the society. In other words, a public enterprise behaves 
in such a way as to satisfy to the greatest possible extent its conception of the 
environment. is thus capable of self-stabilization. 24 
5.2.2.4. Absence of Clear Goals to Illustrate Performance 
According to McLoughlin (1978), not only must the'public manager operate his 
enterprise to be productive and effective; he must do so in a manner that is politically 
rational, i. e., in a way that takes into account the political realities. The literature 
on public administration emphasizes the importance of clear goals. Yet most public 
Programmes are the results of unstable conditions that come together as the result of a 
Political understanding, often one achieved at the expense of raising the goals to a high 
enough level of abstraction, that all parties can agree. The net result is vague goals and 
a Programme that might lose its support if the manager tried to get all parties to agree 
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on concrete, operational goals. Thus, public managers may have to be repared to live with 
vague goals and the potential for lost efficiency that they imply. 
35 
De Neufville and Stafford (1971) argue that since total social welfare is almost 
certainly not a simple sum of the utilities of individuals, and since, unfortunately, an 
optimal distribution of society's output cannot be defined on any theoretical grounds, but 
rather on ethical or moral grounds, the overall determination of what kind of objective 
function is approp! rýlate for society and for a public system must therefore always remain 
somewhat vague. 
5.2.2.5. Influence of Political Considerations 
The Chicago School of Economics which has provided the theoretical basis of 
neo -liberalism, ý presents a theory of regulation according to which economic efficiency is 
not the primary task of the regulator and, consequenIty, a valid theory of regulation has 
to go beyond the, theory of public interest. 27 28 29 
According to Stigler (1971), there is a market for regulation through the political 
process, and for those ready to pay for it, the political system is ready to supply it. 
Stigler noted, for example, that the suppliers of goods and services should have an 
incentive to purchase regulation, because regulation can be used to block entry and raise 
prices, and hence profits and factors payments. Given these considerations, it is little 
wonder that regulators generally failed to pursue public interest goals such as overall 
economic efficiency. 
Extending, the work of Stigler and Posner, Peltzman (1976) presented a general, 
formalized theory'of regulation, according to which the regulator maximizes a political 
support function, for which prices and service levels for different services and users are 
arguments. According to Peltzman, a dollar's worth of subsidy money directed to any user 
or factor should generate the same amount of political support on the margin. 30 
Besides the fact that railways need a regulated environment (as shown in section 
5.2.1), one has rto admit the influence of political considerations as regards, decis 
ions 
concerning public enterprises. 
5.3. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RAILWAY ENTERPRISE 
Gray (1984) summarizes in the following list overnment's non-commercial objectives in 
establishing and maintaining public enterprises. 31 
Economic stabilization 
(1) Control of inflation; 
(2) Food security; and 
(3) Dampening economic downturns, with special reference to surges in 
unemployment. 
b. Economic growth 
(1) Expanding absolute levels of investment, output, exports, income, and 
employment; and 
(2) Accelerating industrialization. 
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(1) Promotion of small-scale producers through credit; 
(2) Other approaches to vertical redistribution of income; and 
(3) Geographical redistribution (promoting regional equity). 
d. Localization/ In digeni za tion 
(1) Supply sources; 
(2) Asset ownership and control; 
(3) Jobs; and 
(4) National policyrnaking. 
ý e. Miscellaneous objectives. 
This thesis will not examine whether the objectives mentioned (in their totality, or 
some of them) are facilitated by the existence and operation of public enterprises, 
because this problem relates to wider sociopolitical issues and is tackled, in each case, 
according to these issues. On the contrary, what should be mentioned is that every 
government, as far as it doesn't decide to privatise a public enterprise, will use it in 
order to pursue a set of these non-commercial objectives. 
It should, therefore, be expected that the formulation of the objectives of a 
state-owned railway enterprise would refer to its two principle characteristics: 
To its nature as a state-owned enterprise, i. e., instrument in government's hands 
for the pursuit of non-commercial objectives. 
To its'nature as a public interest enterprise, aiming at producing railway services 
and offering them to the public under the optimum combination of quality and price 
characteristics. 
Unfortunately, literature on public enterprisesý doubts strongly the feasibility of. - definition of such objectives via an explicit governmental formulation. According to 
Bryatt (1984), overall control of nationalised industries is concerned with three main 
objectives: I 
(1) Ensuring that nationalised industries conform to macro-economic policy 
objectives; in particular that they do not pre-empt too much of the nation's 
savings and investment. 
(2) Ensuring that nationalised industries contribute to the efficient allocation of 
resources; in particular that their pricing policies are properly related to 
their costs and that they earn an adequate return on investment. 
(3) Ensuring that nationalised industries are internally efficient, and provide 
adequate services while keeping their costs low. 
These objectives are obviously linked. What constitutes the "correct" allocation of investment resources to nationalised industries depends on the return achieved, which in 
turn depends on prices and costs. In principle it is possible to have a set of instruments 
which can be used to pursue these objectives in a coherent and consistent way. But, in 
practice, differing emphasis has been placed on the macro-economic, resource allocation 
and internal efficiency objectives at different periods of time. 32 
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Thus, due to the'governmental vagueness in formulating objectives for the railway 
enterprise, the enterprise itself constructs a set of objectives to pursue. 
Duval (1992) states that the two principle objectives of French Railways (SNCF) 
are: 33 - 
to offer the best service to national, regional and local communities, to improve 
the conditions of work, and to progress the human quality of those who constitute 
the enterprise; 
to have strict and challenging management on commercial basis. 
Hausler (1982) notes, referring to German Federal Railway (DB), 'that the statutory 
directive "DB is responsible for managing its elements as a commercial undertaking, with 
the aim of the best transport service according to business principles in such a way, that 
the proceeds cover the expenditure including the necessary replacements" led to the 
formulation of the following company objective: 
Effective safeguarding of the future of the DB as a transPort undertaking: 
f 
by limitation of the federal contributions to a proportion justifiable from the 
aspect of the whole national economy; and 
by stabilization and improvement of the financial results. 34 
Lapsley (1983) argues that BR's wider statutory obligation, "to provide railway 
services ... and to have due regard ... to efficiency. economy and safely'of operation (Section 3, Transport Act, 1962), is virtually a verbatim repeat of that contained in the 
1947 Act. Beyond this, BR has lacked an explicit statement from government on its 
non-financial objectives, which can readily be translated into measurable variables, to 
facilitate the assessment of its non-financial performance. 35 
Finally, Holtgrere (1982), recording the experience of the Dutch Railway (NS), states 
that phrases on company objectives are generally expressed in vague terms. The intentions 
to strive to continuity, to optimally use limited government funds, to offer the customers 
a fair level of service and to perform an adequate social function, cannot be tested by 
the company's annual results. Clear and measurable objectives are necessary. 36 
The examples above are compatible to McLoughlin's (1978) argument on absence of clear 
objectives in a'public enterprise. Therefore, is there a contradiction between railway 
reality and the, according to Morasky (1977), need to formulate clear objectives ? 
'... If we assume that some social systems are created by man for specific reasons 
or purposes, then it follows that planning and creating those social systems implies 
a measure of control. Evaluation and control exist in superordinate-subordinate 
relationships which are facilitated by goals... In the absence of goals, evaluation 
criteria and, therefore, control depend on value structures which, in turn, are 
often idiosyncratic, subject to thresholds and unpredictably dynamic in nature-. 37 
Goals are manifest statements describing the specific state a receiving system should 
obtain by a specified time. Goals facilitate two functions of organizations or systems: 
evaluation of programme effectiveness relative to receiving systems and control over 
system behaviour. In order to provide such facilitation, goals must exhibit four 
characteristics. Goals must: 
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(1) be manifest statements; .II I- I-%, 11 1 
(2) be specific enough to permit objective interpretation; 
(3) focus on the receiving- system; and ý,, 
specify a time dimension. 
4 
Each characteristic is necessary for the existence of a goal. Statement purportion to 
describe system direction which do not exhibit all four characteristics should be viewed 
as directional statements with limited function. A system operating with such statements 
should be viewed as moving towards some target(s). Evaluation and control of 
target-oriented systems should be viewed as based on implicit value structures, not on 
goals (Morasky,, 1977). 
A comparison between the above, ý according to Morasky definition of goals (or 
objectives) and the state requirements from a, public railway enterprise indicates that, in 
reality, objectives or goals of this kind do not exist. These characteristics of 
objectives, however useful in the context of a conceptual framework, are more a referenece 
for analytical purposes than necessary conditions to define a system. In fact for a given 
system, the problem might be to elucidate the underlying operational objectives. 
When studying systems (and a railway enterprise is a complex social system), a 
distinction is made between system objectives and purposes 38. While objectives are 
formally defined tasks that, the system should accomplish, the subjective interpretation of 
these objectives defines the purposes of the system. The nature of the system is a 
consequence of objectives; however, its boundaries are a function of the specific purposes 
that individuals, e. g. policy-makers or analysts, may ascribe to that system. Thus, 
according to Plerick (1982), "the operational position as regards the production of the 
railways has not changed in the 150 years of its existence and even today can still be 
described by the following target function: the transport offer, within the limits of a 
marketable price, must be adjusted to the demand in such a way, that as few as possible of 
the wishes of the market remain unfulfilled-. 39 
It follows from the continual change, that this problem cannot be solved once; it has 
to be solved every time, continuously. Thus, the fulfillment of the above mentioned target 
function becomes a problem of adjustment. - 
5.4. THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OVER THE RAILWAY ENTERPRISE 
To the degree that railway literature doubts the feasibility of existence of explicit 
and quantified goals or objectives for the railway enterprise, there should some other 
means, governing the resource bargain between the state-owner and the railway enterprise. 
5.4.1. Financial Criteria 
Financial control is the most widespread of the above mentioned means. According to Heald (1980), there has been a proliferation of systems of financial control over public 
enterprises without regard to the interrelationship between these systems and the pricing 
and investment rules. Examining five of these parameters, elements of a state system for the control of public enterprises, i. e., financial targets, self-financing, cash limits, 
accounting policies and capital structure, he argues: 40 
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(1) Financial targets have been much less popular with economists than with 
politicians, civil servants or the nationalised industries themselves, for the 
following reasons: 
Financial targets themselves Provide no guarantee of allocative efficiency, 
which, indeed, they may obstruct. 
Financial targets may distort investment decisions. 
Public enterprises view financial targets first and foremost as pricing 
criteria. 
The usual responses of public enterprises to failures to meet the financial 
targets have been applications for price increases. 
(2) As regards self-financing, a target rate of self-financing might encourage the 
adoption of relatively unprofitable projects, whereas the profits could be more 
productively invested elsewhere. On the other hand, a deliberately higher level 
of self-financing than would emerge from allocatively efficient pricing and 
investment policies is the equivalent of an indirect tax on consumers of the 
good. When the purpose is to finance investment, this means that today's 
consumers are subsidising future consumers. This raises issues of 
intergenerational. equity. 
(3) When a cash limit system is introduced to reinforce the existing system of 
public expenditure control, a cash limit is set for each nationalised industry's 
external financing requirements from all sources (i. e., loans, public dividend 
capital,, and grants) for the current financial year. The rigid application of 
the cash limit system, under which any increase in the cash limit, requires 
Ministerial agreement and an announcement to Parliament, has shortened the 
time-horizon of financial control over nationalised industries. It has raised 
the 'political' costs for the industries of external finance. 
(4) Besides the way in which net assets employed may be reduced by accounting 
Policies which do not capitalise interest on plant under construction or adopt 
too short lives for depreciation purposes, significant is the issue of 
supplementary depreciation. Sometimes it is urged that supplementary 
depreciation should be charged to cover the divergence between replacement and 
historic cost, and premature obsolence. However, when large price increases send 
the nationalised industries into profitability, it is difficult to resist the 
view that the major purpose of charging supplementary depreciation is to reduce 
the reported profit, both to avoid criticism of 'large' profits and to justify 
applications for price increases. 
(5) Unlikely privately-owned firms, nationalised industries are predominantly 
debt-financed. This has a number of important implications. First, as interest 
payments on debt capital are deductable from taxable profits, the corporation 
tax liabilities of nationalised industries have been negligible. Second, 
interest must be paid every year, regardless of trading performance. This 
contrasts with the position of equity-financed private firms which may reduce 
dividend payments in years of comparativelu low profitability. Especially in a 
national 
' 
ised industry markedly influenced by the economic cycle, the financial 
structure will exacerbate fluctuations in reported profits. 
The importance of financial criteria as key indicators which influence railway policy has been examined by Lapsley (1993). 
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He establishes this importance by reference to significant landmarks in the corporate 
existence of, British Rail 41. He tackles the criticism directed to the most recent 
document on UK railway policy, the Serpell Report (1993) 42, on the-grounds that financial 
criteria were paramount and, consequently, that they were too narrow to provide an 
effective basis for making decisions regarding the future of BR. This concern arises from 
the viewpoint that such criteria ignore the existence of considerable social benefits 
which stem from the continued operation of BR, in its present form. 
Indeed, there is evidence which suggests that social costs (of noise, of inflicting 
serious injury and loss of life, and of using excessive quantities of scarce energy 
resources) of railway operations are slight. It is also arguable (although not 
uncontested)'that the existence of the rail network is a major social benefit, which 
-maintains transport links with outlying regions of the economy, reduces congestion on 
roads, provides employment opportunities, and represents a straetgic investment which 
preserves society's choice of transport modes for present, and future, generations. 
However, Lapsley (1983) argues that much of the hostile reaction to Serpell is 
misguided, for two reasons: "I ., 
(1) As he shows, throughout the life of British Rail, governments of different 
political complexions might have made political statements to the contrary, but 
they all responded to financial or accounting information as a key 
indicator- in initiating policy changes. Therefore, much of thecriticism of the 
Serpell Report by politicians is unfounded. 
(2) He shows, that the reason for this reliance on accounting or financial criteria 
(regardless of the political party in power) is basically one of default. Thus, 
financial objectives (and results) have retained this key. role because of both 
government inaction on radical transport policies and intractable measurement 
, problems in the development of information of more relevance to the formulation 
and execution of railway policy. 
Given these circumstances, the remedy to redress the balance in the means by which 
railway policies implemented, might, according to Lapsley, appear to be self-evident. 
Thus, if policy-makers paid similar. attention to the wider aims of transport policy as 
they do to financial aims, it might be argued that this issue would be satisfactorily 
resolved. 
5.4.2. Non-Financial Criteria 
Lapsley (1983) concludes that there are numerous reasons for reliance on financial 
measures. Thus, while financial measures do not reflect the social benefits of the 
railway, they have other attributes which, might be expected to promote their use. i. e., 
they are readily available, easily verifiable, and widely used in both the, private and the 
public sectors of the. economy. The most evident means of improving financial measures 
would be a cost-benefit analysis of railway's operations. However, to date, the technique 
of cost-benefit analysis has been confined to project appraisal. The extrapolation of such 
techniques to the measurement of the social benefits of an entire industry, such as the 
railways, presents formidable difficulties. 
Given such difficulties and given the necessity of subsidising railways, pressures 
arise to regulate the subsidy by the use of non-financial indicators of productive 
efficiency. - Productive efficiency has been *broadly defined as the minimal use of physical inputs to achieve a given level of production or service. Therefore, this concept has an apparent direct relevance to the problem of ensuring efficiency in, and providing 
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management objectives for, subsidised railway services. A wider interest in the concept 
has arisen because of serious doubts expressed in the literature over a fundamental 
assumption of economic theory, i. e., that firms organise themselves as efficiently as 
possible, such that their costs are minimised. A critical influence on the challenging of 
this assumption has been that of Lelbensteln (1966). He argued that many firms do not 
operate at, or near, their production possibility frontier, but at some lower level of 
output. He attributed this to absence of pressures to be efficient. Leibenstein focused 
promarily on the use of (and not the prices paid for) production inputs and the pressures 
(internal and external) on management to organise efficiently. He designated the avoidance 
of such waste as W-efficiency. 43 
Lapsley (1984) argues that such ideas have gained support in the literature and as a 
part of government policy towards the state industries. However, reservations can be 
expressed, over. 
(1) its applicability to railways; 
(2) the quality of 'empirical evidence in support of X-efficiency; and 
(3) whether it is possible to construct an operational measure of X-efficiency for 
railway operations 44. 
Productive efficiency of -a railway, though it is practically not feasible to be 
calculated by means of an algorithm, may be estimated by the use of partial indicators, 
referring either to the inputs or to the outputs of railway operations. 
Table 2, as provided by Lapsley (1984), shows the performance indicators published by 
BR, in line with Government recommendations. 
These indicators reflect both inputs (labour and capital) and outputs ('quality of 
service'). As regards labour Inputs, Lapsley (1984) argues that indicators (15), (16), 
(19) and (20) are so crude as measures of labour inputs required for a given level of 
service, that their use by a regulatory authority would be likely to result in the 
employment of arbitrary standards. Furthermore, as a consequence of specifying what 
constitutes an efficient use of labour , the regulatory authority is drawn into the details of operational management. This would represent a radical change of emphasis in 
existing formal relationships between railways and governments. However, if this change of, 
emphasis were pursued, the degree of'detail and direction required in decisions on the 
best use of labour would be such, that there would be a virtual takeover of management's 
function by the regulatory authority. This outcome would also apply to capital inputs, as 
discussed below. 
As regards capital Inputs, the non-financial indicators in Table 2 highlight the load 
factor [(12) and (18)] and the use of the rail network (21). These are of crucial importance in determining the efficiency of a railway. However, Lapsley argues, the improved regulation of the railways cannot be achieved by simply linking a financial 
objective to specified levels of load factors and/or the use of rail network in a fashion 
which eliminates productive inefficiencies. The major difficulty in such an exercise is 
the specification of 'acceptable levels' of efficiency of capital inputs, as expressed by 
non-financial indicators (12), (18), and (21). There are several ways in which such 9acceptable levels' of efficiency might be determined: 
(a) Railway management might specify its view on attainable levels for these indicators; 
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Table 2: BR Performance Indicators 
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(b) Reference might be made to comparable ratios for other railways; and 
(c) Existing indicators might be supplemented with additional information on railway 
operations. 
Lapsley argues that none of these ways is without its defects. 
Table 3 provides output Indicators advocated by Baumol (1975) 45 for Amtrak in the 
USA 46. In this framework, quality of service has two components: passenger comfort and 
the timeliness of services provided. Two factors in this table require further 
explanation: 
Marginal Incentive 'bonuses' refers to 'bonus' subsidy payments of fixed amounts for 
every percentage point by which a given railroad exceeds its 'base standard' of 
timeliness. This base standard is a specified percentage of trains which arrive on 
time. 
The 'excess delay parameter' refers to an allowance for delays in journey times. 
Specifically, a train is defined to have arrived at its final destination on 
schedule, if it has fallen behind no more than five minutes for every hundred miles 
it has travelled, with a maximum tolerance of 30 minutes, no matter what distance it 
has covered. 
There are two criticisms which might be made against the usefulness of the Amtrak 
'quality of service' indicators. In the first place, a major resevation expressed 
regarding the partial measures of productive efficiency discussed in the previous part, 
also applies to these indicators. Specifically, the setting of standards always carries 
the potential cost of built-in organisational slack. Therefore, criticism is relevant to: 
(1) establishing a base standard for timeliness; 
(2) the 'excess delay' tolerance parameter; 
(3) scheduled trip times and R, the rate for the train; "and 
(4) the level of fleet required to meet peaks in demand. 
Lapsley argues that indeed, US railroads regulated by this scheme have built-in 
organisational slack. Thus, an investigation revealed that no railroads responded to the 
'schedule improvement' incentive and that incentives were predominantly paid for schedule 
adherence 47. This report found that railroads modified schedules to make them easier to 
observe. Thus, as punctuality was only measured in terms of final destination, railroads 
inserted 'slack' in the schedules approaching that destination, such that trains could 
arrive "on time. Indeed, Amtrak's average speed -fell from 51.5 mph in 1971 to just over 45 mph in 1977. 
A second, potentially more important, matter is the extent to which such indicators 
can meaningfully be used as a basis of subsidy payment. This is particularly because of 
the extent to which such subsidy payment is contingent upon factors beyond the control of 
railway management. This varies from the frequency with which trains are cleaned, which is 
controllable, to the effects of adverse weather conditions. A further aspect of this issue 
of the degree of influence which management can exert is the state of equipment used. This 
could significantly influence both the degree of passenger comfort and the timeliness of 
services provided. Therefore, the size of subsidy might depend upon the 'quality of 
service' but the 'quality of service' depends upon the size of the subsidy. Indeed, this 
type of interdependence is highly likely to arise where the subsidy received for such 
services is a major source of their finance. 
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Quatity of Service 
I 
Irdicator 
1. Carriage cteantiness 
2. Equipment operabiLity 
Passenger comfort I 
1. Schedule adherence 
2. Excessive delay 
Timeliness of 3. Schedule improvement 
services provided 
4. Equipment availability 
Table 3: Amtrak 'Quality of service, 
Basis of Subsidy Payment or Deduction 
The cost of cteaning a carriage. 
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(i). one carriage for a complete journey without breakdown. 
(li). Temperature t within, range: 
00 
62 >t> 82 
(M). Sufficient tight for reading. 
(1). Base standard for timeliness. 
00. Marginal Incentive $bonuses' 
(Actual time of trip - scheduled time 'excess delay' 
tolerance parameter). 
M 
x'T x-xR, where: 
Sch. T 
T no. of trips for train whose schedule is improved. 
M no. of minutes eliminated from schedule. 
Sch. T z scheduled trip time in mins. 
Ra rate for the train (as specified for given routes). 
A target for the number of spare locomotives and carriages 
required to maintain scheduled services. 
Indicators 
,I 
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Concluding, there is potential. for the use of a regulating policy by the use of 
non-financial indicators derived from notions of productive efficiency. However, it must 
be stressed that a policy of making subsidy payments contingent upon specified levels of 
non-financial indicators would entail a radical change in the relationship of railway to 
its regulatory authority. Thus, if this policy is to be effective, the regulators will 
become deeply involved in the details of operational management. Paradoxically, this 
course of action might serve to further undermine the very financial criteria which are 
the source of difficulty, as it would then become increasingly difficult to isolate the 
effects of managerial and regulatory influences on reported financial results. 48 
5.4.3. Abandonement of Criteria I 
Davies and McInnes (1982) argue, that since there is no danger for bankruptcy or 
takeover for any of the nationalised industries and as many of them operate in monopoly or 
near monopoly situations alternative mechanisms must be developed to control their 
activities and to make them accountable for their performance. Assessing the present 
framework of controls, they conclude that it does not provide a satisfactory foundation 
for a rigorous system of accountability. For those industries im. monopoly or near monopoly 
situations they recommend that financial targets and the measurement of income be 
abandoned. To achieve an improvement in accountability and control they propose 
consideration to be given to the publication of cash flow information and to the extension 
of the audit function. Information would of course still be required about each industry's 
economic resources and obligations at the end of the financialýear, to give an indication 
of the ability of the industry to continue to provide services 4, 
Discussing the case of non-financial criteria they state: "It appears that little 
thought has been given to the possible conflicts that can arise between performance 
measured by various indicators and a broad concept of social interest. For example, it 
might be more desirable to operate a railway line with unreliable rolling stock that is 
subject to delays than close the line altogether, even though this is likely to lead to 
deterioration of measured performance in terms of the numbers of trains arriving on time" 
5.5. SYNOPSIS 
Three major themes concerning railway enterpises and related to management control 
are: 
(1) the ownership of the railway enterprise; 
(2) the objectives of the railway enterprise; and 
(3) the external control over the railway enterprise. 
Public ownership of railways, discussed in this thesis, is the extreme case of state 
regulation. However, some kind of regulated environment is required by the railways, due 
to the very characteristics of the industry. 
There are inherent disadvantages under state ownership related to: 
monopolistic implications on market; 
(2). inability of public managers to operate "commercially"; 
(3). the antithesis between evaluation and organization; 
(4). the absence of clear goals to illustrate performance; and (5). the influence of political considerations. 
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The state-owner does not provide the'railway enterprise with a set of clear ý- 
objectives. Therefore, the enterprise seeks by itself its objectives, trying to adapt to 
the demand in such a way, that as few as possible of the wishes of the market remain 
unfulfilled. Thus, the realisation of this target becomes a problem of continuous 
adjustment. 
State exercises its control over the railways by means of financial criteria of 
performance. Literature doubts the rationality of such criteria. -- 
Non-financial criteria have been proposed, as a solution to the evaluation of the 
social benefit of railway operations. It has been argued that this kind of criteria 
(1) are inadequate, and 
(2) might lead to reverse results. 
The set of characteristics discussed in this chapter will be considered: 
(1)'in designing a framework for railway management control, and - 
(2) in designing the case-study, both in its descriptive and survey, form. 
5.6. FOOTNOTES 
1. "... Only the total conception of the railway as a comprehensive system, in'which all 
sub-systems and elements are mutually dependent, brings with it the possibility of 
wanting to explore these dependences in their conformity with a natural law and to 
bring them together to a systematic regulation in Norbert Wiener's sense". 
(K. Pierick, 1982: "Electroning Data Processing Models for the Support of the 
Production of Modern Railway Undertakings", Rail International, May, pp. 75-78). 
2. "... 1 have found a profound belief in Norbert - Wiener- like cybernetics in more than one 
railway executive". (D. Wyckoff, 1976: Railroad Management, Lexington Books, 
Lexington, Massachusetts, page 7). 
3. A. Nove, 1973: Efficiency Criteria for Nationalised Industries (Allen and Unwin, 
London). 
4. According to Short (1984), the main factors which contributed in the development of 
substantial public enterprise sectors in a large number of countries are: 
First, socialist policies have been of some significance in several countries and 
the dominant factor in a few, for example BUTma and Tanzania. In this group of 
countries, government intervention in public enterprise operations is often 
Particularly great, especially in pursuit of non-commercial objectives. 
Second, historical and other political factors have resulted in substantial 
extensions in public ownership. Many public enterprises were established as a result' 
of the political upheavals of World War 11 as, for example, in France and Korea. Others were set up following the financial collapse of large private companies, as, for, example, inArgentina and the United Kingdom, or were established to reduce foreign ownership of industry, especially of former colonial powers, as, for example, in Egypt and Indonesia. in principle, these enterprises could eventually have been 
sold to the private sector. Howeverjn practice, there have been few instances of 
Public enterprises being returned to private ownership, at least not on a large 
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scale, with-the exception of the denationalization program in Chile in'mid-1970s 
(which followed the abolition of Allende's government by the military dictatorship) 
and the privatisation program of the present British government. 
,,, Third, the'pursuit of economic objectives has been a major reason for the 
establishment of public enterprises. Probably the most fundamental, and certainly the 
most widespread, objective in this respect has been the promotion of allocative 
efficiency. Certain industries where economies of scale or externalities, are 
important are almost universally operated by public enterprises, because of the 
failure of private markets to satisfy the conditions for an optimum allocation of 
resources. 
(R. P. Short, 1984: "The Role of Public Enterprises: An International Statistical 
Comparison", in R. H. Floyd, C. S. Gray, and R. P. Short, 1984: Public Enterprise In Mixed 
Economies: Some Macroeconomic Aspects (International Monetary Fund, Washington, 
D. C. ), pp. 110- 196. 
5. The Railway Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) Act of 1976 and, mainly, the 
Staggers Rail Act of 1980, which provided the legislation for the deregulation of the 
US Rail Industry are discussed by T. E. Keeler (1983, Railroads, Freight and Public 
Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C. ). 
6. R. G. Harris and C. Grimm, 1985: "Revitalisation of the US Freight Industry: an 
Organisational Perspective", in K. J. Button and D. E. Pitfield (eds. ): International 
Railway Economics: Studies In Management and Efficiency (Gower, Aldershot), pp. 49-84. 
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9. T. E. Keeler, 1983: page 48. 
10. D. D. Wyckoff, 1973 : "Public Tracks, Private Users", Transportation and Distribution 
Management, April, pp. 38-40. I 
11. This Proposition refers to the specific US case, where there operate 68 Class I plus 
several hundred smaller railway companies (D. D. Wyckoff, 1976: Railroad Management, 
Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, page 20. The number is much smaller now, 
because of continuing bankruptcies and mergers taking place). Though this proposition 
has been expressed as an alternative to the otherwise unavoidable nationalisation of 
the US rail industry it has a theoretical value, especially when considering 
development under the 'liberal' paradigm. 
12. D. D-Wyckoffj 1976: pages 132-133., 
13. Association of American Railroads, 1974: "Government Ownership of Railroad Fixed Plant', Working Memorandum, 74-10, October 22, pp. 4-6. 
14. For example, in Canada operate-mainly two companies: the privately- owned Canadian Pacific (CP), introduced in 1885, and the state-owned Canadian National (CN), formed 
in 1923, when the government took over and consolidated the operations of several failing railway companies. In Australia operate seven public or private railway 
enterprises, etc. 
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15. T. E. Keeler, 1983: Chapter Two: A Capsule History of Railroad Regulation (pages 19-42). 
16. As provided by T. E. Keeler, 1983. 
17. As provided by A. W. J. Thomson and L. C. Hunter, 1973: The Nationalized Transport 
Industries (Heinemann, London), pages 125-130. 
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18. All railway, enterprises in the European Community are state-owned. However, the 
details of state-ownership vary, from fully state-owned (Great Britain-BR, 
Denmark-DSB, Portugal-CP), ý to autonomous, ý non -incorporated state properties (Federal Republic of Germany-DB), independent state-owned companies (Italy-FS, Greece-OSE-CH, 
Netherlands-NS, Belgium-SNCB, Spain-RENFE, Ireland-IE), and mixed companies where the 
State holds the majority of shares (France-SNCF). 
19. A. Nove, 1973: page 19. 
20. J. W. Sutherland, 1978: "Accountability in Public Enterprise", in J. W. Sutherland (ed. ): 
Management Handbook for Public Administrators" (Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York), 
pp. 689-719. 
21. Heald (1980: '"The Economic and Financial Control of UK Nationalized Industries", The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 90, June, pp. 243-265) questions the assumption implicit in most 
of public enterprise literature, that the public managers are social welfare 
maximisers, i. e., that they-are presumed to act altruistically, in the sense that 
their ulitity depends solely on, and increases with, social welfare. He argues, that 
in devising a state control system over the public enterprises, it is important to 
consider what the objectives of the public managers actually are. Since the control 
system must give appropriate incentives to efficiency at the enterprise level, the 
Gravelle and Katz (1976) 22 reformulation of the previous assumption has to be 
adopted, i. e., that the public managers are *semi- altruistic", in the sense that 
their utility depends upon both social welfare and (inversely) upon the amount of 
effort they devote to the enterprise. Thus, they may fail to minimise the costs of the 
public enterprise or tho choose wrong output level, adding to the debate on the 
desirability of financial targets in assessing the performance of public enterprises. 
22. H. S. E. Gravelle and E. Katz, 1976: "Financial Targets and X-Efficiency in Public 
Enterprises", Public Finance, Vol. 31, pp. 218-234. 
23. C. T. Grubb, 1977: Program Evaluation and Local Administration, University of North 
Carolina, Institute for Social Services Planning, School of Social Work. 
24. M. Pavlidou, 1978: "Dynamic Control of Hierarchic Public Systems", in G. Klir (ed. ): 
Applied General Systems Research: Recent Developments and Trends (Plenum Press, New York), pp. 8 11-819.1 0ý -I 
25. C. P. McLoughlin, 1978: "Productivity and Effectiveness in Government", in 
J. W. Sutherland (ed. ): Management Handbook for Public Administrators (Van Nostrand 
Reinhold, New York)j pp. 626-662. 
26. R. de Neufville'and J. H. Stafford, 1971: 'Systems Analysis for Engineers and Managers (McGraw-Hill, New York), page 227. 
27. G. J. Stigler, 1971: "The Theory of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 2, Spring, pp. 3-21. "I I' - 
Chapter 5 -108- Railway ýnterprise 
28. R. A. Posner, 197 1: 7axation by Regulation", Bell Journal of, Economics, Vol. 2, Spring, 
pp. 22-50. 
29. R. A. Posner, 1974: "Theories of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 5, 
Autumn, pp. 335-358. 
30. S. Peltzman, 1976:. "Towards a More General Theory of Regulation", The Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 19, No. 2, August, pp. 211-240. 
31. Ci. Gray, 1'984: "Towards a Conceptual Framework for Macro-Economic Evaluation of 
- 
Public Enterprise in Mixed Economies", in R. H. Floyd, C. S. Gray,. and R. P. Short: Public 
Enterprise In Mixed Economies: Some Macroeconomic Aspects (International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, D. C. ), pp. 35-109. 
32. I. C. R. Bryatt, 1984: "The Framework of Government Control". in J. G. Smith (ed. ): 
Strategic Planning In Nationalised Industries (Macmillan Press, London), pp. 67-87. 
33. P. Duval, 1982: "Elements of Information Processing Policy and Personnel Management at 
the SNCF", Rail International, June, pp. 41-50. 
34. U. Hausler, 1982: "Contribution of 'Operational Planning' to the Planning and Control 
of an Undertaking, on the Example of the DB", Rail International, May, pp-33-46. 
35. I. Lapsley, 1983: "The Influence of Financial Measures on UK Railway Policy", Journal 
of Public Policy, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 285-300. 
36. A. A. T. Hoitgrefe, 1982: "Aids and Means for Planning and Control in a Railway Company", 
Rail International, August, pp. 79-86. 
37. R. L. Morasky, 1977: "Defining Goals: A Systems Approach", Long Range Planning, Vol. 10, 
no. 2, pp. 85-90. 
38. C. Davis, A. Demb, and R. Espejo, 1979: Organization for Program Management (Wiley, 
Chichester), page 74. 
39. K. Pierick, 1982. 
40. D. A. Heald, 1980: "The Economic and Financial Control of the UK Nationalized 
Industries", The Economic Journal, vol. 90, June, pp. 243-265. 
41. I. Lapsley, 1983: "The Influence of Financial Measures on UK Railway Policy", Journal 
of Public Policy, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 285-300. 
42. Department of Transport, 1983: Railway Finances: Report of a Committee chaired by Sir David Serpell (HM Stationery Office, London). 
43. H. Leibenstein, 1966: "Allocative Efficiency versus 'X-Efficiency'", American Economic Review, vol. 56, pp. 392-415. 
44. I. Lapsley, 1984: "Financial Objectives, Productive Efficiency and the Regulation of a Subsidised State Monopoly% Accounting and Business Research, Summer, pp. 217-227. 
45. W. J. Baumol, 1975: "Payment by Performance in Rail Passenger Transportation"i Bell 
Journal of Economics", Spring, pp. 281-298. 
Chapter 5 -109- Railway Enterprise 
46. These indicators are specially aimed at the quality of service of subsidised passenger 
operations provided by US railroads on behalf of Amtrak. Under this arrangement, 
standards are set for specific aspects of 'quality of service', and payment of 
subsidies is dependent upon their attainment. 
47. General Accounting Office, 1977: Amtrak's Incentive Contracts with Railroads: 
Considerable'Costs, Few Benefits (Report No. CED-77-69). 
48. I. Lapsley, 1984: p. 227. 
49. J. R. Davies and W. M. McInnes, 1982: "The Efficiency and the Accountability of UK 
Nationalised Industries% Accounting and Business Research, Winter, pp. 29-41. 
CHAPTER 6. 
RAILWAY MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Railway enterpises are complex social systems. Management control in such enterprises 
has to be conceived under a cybernetic model, since, in any case, neither top management 
nor intermediate managerial'Ievels have the ability to possess detailed knowledge of 
complex operations performed over an extended geographical area. 
This chapter attempts to outline the characteristics of a cybernetic model for the 
management control in railway enterprises. The following issues are, in turn, discussed: 
(1) the analysis of railway activities; 
(2) the planning process in the railway enterprise; and 
(3) the organizational structure of the railway enterprise. 
The framework resulting from this analysis will be used in the remainder of the thesis 
as a basis for the examination and diagnosis of a real-life situation, i. e., that'of the 
Greek Railways. 
6.2. ANALYSIS OF RAILWAY ACTIVITIES 
A railway enterpise may be conceived in Beer's terms as a viable system embedded in a 
wider system, i. e., 'the national'transport system, ýand consisting, in turn, of viable 
systems, doing what the enterprise is supposed to do. Four principle systems ONE may be 
identified within any railway enterprise: 
6.2.1. System ONE: Operations 
The Operations System (sometimes referred to as the Transportation System) contains 
all the activities directly concerned, with the transportation of people and goods between 
points of the railway network. Two distinct sub-systems may be identified within System 
ONE Operations: train operations and terminal operations. 
Sub-system Train Operations consists of movements of trains, engaged in transporting 
the traffic between origins and destinations. The following distinct activities may be distinguished within this sub-system: 
Train Preparation, Le, train composition, ' cleaning, servicing, inspection and 
fuelling (for non-electric trains). All these activities are standard, 
repetitive day-to-day activities and take place in railway depots, except for 
the composition of freight trains, which may take place in marshalling yards. 
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Train Driving. Technology- in- use requires the existence of a person 
responsible for directing the train during all its movements. The degree of 
discretion allowed to the train driver varies between networks, depending on 
the degree of development of communication systems, traffic control systems 
and train automation. 
Train Crewing. Certain duties on a moving train have to be performed by 
personnel other than the train driver. These include ticket inspection 
(sometimes and ticket issuing), train guarding, passenger information, etc. 
The number of the crew of a train varies with the type of train and the 
technology in use, and may consist of train guards, conductors, sleeping car 
attendants, and catering services personnel. The crew of a train reports to 
the train inspector. 
Sub-system Terminal Operations, includes the following operations associated with 
the functioning of a railway. 
Traffic Controlling: Usually a railway line is either double (one track for 
each direction of movement) or single. In both cases there is a need to 
control movements of trains over the line, since various types of trains are 
simultaneously travelling, hence there is a need for overtakings etc., either 
prescribed in the schedule, or resulting from delays, emergencies etc. The job 
of traffic controlling has traditionally been that of the stationmasters. 
Gradually, due to innovations in communications and control systems, the 
concept of central traffic control (CTQ has developed and been implemented in 
the form of operations rooms, having control over an extended part of the 
line, minimising thus the need for traffic to be controlled by local 
stationmasters. Nevertheless, in most railways, CTC has been introduced only 
to main lines. Thus, in a number of cases, stationmasters still have the duty 
of traffic controlling. 
Clerical Operations: Include a number of terminal operations concerning 
booking and consigning, inspection and collection of tickets, sheeting and 
securing, freight parcels charging and documentation and public. information. 
Load! n g/Unloading: Concerns all operations by means of which freight/parcels 
are loaded and unloaded to the trains. Apparently, the complexity and 
sophistication of this sub-system is a function of the type and quantity of 
freight transported and the technological innovation adopted. Thus, within 
this sub-system may be identified automated parcel sorting systems, container 
depots, etc. 
Marshalling and Shunting: This sub-system is concerned with classification or 
re-classification, of wagons into freight trains or with the classifications of 
passenger trains at the origin depot. 
6.2.2. System ONE: Traction and Rolling Stock 
Trains consist of locomotives and passenger coaches or freight wagons. Due to the 
strict safety regime in railway operations, railway equipment is inspected/examined in 
predetermined intervals. Usually, inspection and light repairs take place at the depots. General repairs, damages, etc. are the duty of railway workshops. Therefore, two main 
sub-Systems may be identified within System ONE Traction and Rolling Stock: Rolling Stock Maintenance and Rolling Stock Repair. The distinction of duties between these two 
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Type of 
Rotting 
Stock 
kind of 
inspection 
or repair, 
frequency 
duration 
of repair/ 
maintenance 
Location 
responsibte 
department 
safety controL every 48 hours 6-8 hours. Loco's station operations 
preventive maintenance every four weeks two days workshop Rotting Stock 
A. B. every 10 000 mites two days workshop Rotting Stock 
Jocos, C every 3rd A. B. two days workshop Rotting Stock 
E every 6th A. B. two days workshop Rotting Stock 
F every 120 000 mites three days workshop Rotting Stock 
H every 360 000 miles three days workshop Rotting Stock 
K every 600 000 miles workshop Rotting Stock 
L every 1 200 000 miles worksh4 Rotting Stock 
cteaning every day 1-2 hours depot operations 
A. B. every 48 hours 4-6 hours depot operations 
C every month one day depot operations 
coaches2 D every six months 1-2 days depot operations 
E every two years workshop Rotting Stock 
every 120 000 miles workshop Rotting Stock 
Generat Repair every thirty months workshop Rotting Stock 
wagons3 
D every six months 1-2 days depot operations 
Generat Repair every six years workshop Rotting Stock 
1: Locomotives type GM 01. 
2: Coaches type Mk 111. 
3: Wagons bogle ftat type. 
Table 4: Rotting Stock Periodic Maintenance/Repair. 
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sub-systems is not always very clear;, Table 4 provides a way in which this distinction has 
been implemented, in the case of Irish Railways (IE) 1. Three types of rolling stock are 
shown (01 General Motors locomotives, Mk III BREL passenger coaches, and bogie flat 
freight wagons), though the same procedure applies to the whole fleet. 
The way of dealing with the complexity of the System ONE Traction and Rolling Stock 
defines, to a large extent, the succesful operation of a railway. Thus, inevitably, 
day-to-day routine rolling stock duties and light repairs have to be seen as belonging to 
the System ONE Operations. The duty of System ONE Rolling Stock is to receive, at 
predetermined intervals, rolling stock from Operations for periodical maintenance/repair 
and to return this rolling stock to Operations at predetermined times. In Table 4, the 
last column illustrates this distinction. 
Concluding, Two main sub-systems may be identified within System ONE Traction and 
Rolling Stock: 
Sub-system Rolling Stock Maintenance, containing frequent periodic maintenance and 
light repair duties, taking place at depots and locos' stations. This sub-system may 
be further broken-down into: 
Locomotives Maintenance, 
Coaches Maintenance, and 
Wagons Maintenance. 
Sub-system Rolling Stock Repair, concerned with heavy repairs, refurbishment, and 
damage recoveries, taking place at depots, similarly broken down to: 
Locomotives Repair, 
Coaches Repair, and 
Wagons Repair. 
6.2.3. System ONE: Permanent Way and Installations 
Three main sub-systems may be distinguished within System ONE Permanent Way and 
Installations: 
Sub-system Track consists of the "iron-road" on which trains are moving. Railway 
track consists of ballast,, sleepers, rails switches, and connections between rails 
and between rails and sleepers. 
Sub-system Technical Works contains all works summing up to track's infrastructure 
and consists of bridges, tunnels, supportive walls, earthworks, track drainage, sea 
protection works; etc. 
Sub-system Buildings and Installations has the provision for terminals, freight 
depots, stores and all kinds of buildings of the railway system. 
Main purpose of the Permanent Way and Installations System is to maintain the infrastructure, enabling thus the movement of trains and people and the'succesful 
completion of railway operations. 
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The magnitude of civil engineering construction/maintenance- work, required for the 
fulfillment of the tasks of this system varies from network to network, and relates to: 
the physical layout and the infrastructure technical works associated. A mountainous 
line proceeding over bridges and supportive walls and under tunnels usually has 
increased maintenance requirements than a line on even ground. 
the climate and associated snowfall, rainfall and temperature variations, all of 
which exert various kinds of tensions both to the infrastructure and the track 
itself. 
the quality of construction/maintenance work of post periods. When, in the past, 
capital shortages or poor technology have accumulated problems, maintenance 
requirements in the present are much severe. 
the volume of traffic over the line. The more a line is used, the more frequently it 
has to be maintained. 
This thesis will adopt a further sub-division of the three sub-systems comprising the 
Permanent Way and Installations System ONE. Each of them will be conceived as consisting 
of two sub-subsystems: One concerned with routine maintenance and the other with new 
constructions. The division applies to all networks, even when, in some of them, the 
construction phase has terminated. Some kinds of construction projects are always 
developing, either they relate to construction of new lines, doubling of existing lines, 
or, more frequently, installations construction projects such as new terminals, buildings, 
etc. Thus: 
Sub-system Track consists of. 
Track* Maintenance, i. e., periodic repair of the line infrastructure to meet 
predetermined standards. Usually this kind of work in all networks is 
undertaken by railway staff. Patrol gangers are inspecting the line daily 
(walking a distance of approximately 10 km), locate problems, and mobile gangs 
undertake maintenance work. Usually, track geometry and standards are recorded 
periodically by track recording cars, providing thus the fundamental 
information on which track maintenance is planned on an annual basis. An 
extended maintenance project over a segment of line including all or some of 
works related to rails replacement, sleepers replacement, ties 
replacement, ballast renewal, and continuous welding constitutes a renewal 
project. Usually, renewal projects aim at upgrading a set of track 
characteristics (e. g., journey speed, axle load). Therefore a track renewal 
project is a kind of new track construction project. 
New Track Construction is either the building of a completely new track, or 
the substantial improvement of an existing track by extended renewal works. 
Construction/renewal projects require a much different organization from that 
of the routine maintenance, mainly in that they cannot be undertaken by local 
mobile gangs, since they require a quite detailed plan and specific skills. A 
cons truction/re newal work may be viewed as an autonomous civil engineering 
project, which may be undertaken either by the railway itself or by a 
constructions company. 
In the same way, subsystem technical works may be subdivided in two parts: 
Technical works maintenance, i. e., minor scale maintenance works on bridges (notably iron bridges), tunnels, track drainage, retaining walls, fences, 
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etc., undertaken bY railway staff, eitheron a pre-planned basis,. or as 
occuring from adverse climatic, etc. conditions. 
Technical Works Construction, which again are major civil engineering 
projects, associated with the construction of a new line (i. e., new bridges, 
tunnels, 
letc), or with the substantial upgrading of an existing 
line. Usually 
such projects are sub-contracted to third parties. 
Finally, sub-system Buildings and Installations, consists of: 
Buildings and Installations Maintenance. Though this kind of work is quite 
simple (redecorating, painting, furniture renewal, central heating 
installation, gardening, etc. ), the problem is caused by the fact that, again, 
it extends over the multiplicity of a railway's buildings and installations in 
a whole country. Usually routine works are undertaken by railway staff, 
whereas major, specific, or urgent works are being subcontracted. 
Buildings and Installations Construction refers, to big projects such as a new 
passenger terminal, a new freight depot, marshalling yard, maintenance depot, 
etc. Almost always this work is the job of specialised construction companies. 
6.2.4. System ONE: Signalling and Telecommunications 
The more modernised a network, the more it relies on sophisticated signalling and 
telecommunications systems. Hence a need to distinguish a separate system ONE, concerned 
only with the installation and maintenance of such systems, because, obviously, their 
operation is part of the duties of other systems, notably System ONE Operations. Four 
sybsysterns of this kind will be distinguished in this thesis: the signalling system, the 
communications system, the central traffic control systems and the level crossings 
guarding systems. Each of them will again be seen as consisting of two parts: an 
installation sub-system and a maintenance sub-system. 
The basic purposes of a railway signalling system are: 
(1) to keep a safe distance between trains following each other on the same line; 
(2) to cross trains safely at junctions; and 
(3) to regulate trains to meet service requirements. 
Two, basic types of signalling systems are in use: 
Mechanical signalling systems, where points and signals are operated by rods and 
signal wires from a lever frame. The levers are mechanically interlocked with each 
other in the frame, Ao prevent conflicting moves being made. 
Electromechanical signalling systems, where the signalman operates a lever frame as 
before, but some , or all, of the signals and points may be elecrically operated. The mechanical locking is still retained. 
A third ý type, Le., the power signalling system, which is still electric but all 
points and signals are controlled electrically from a control panel, there being no 
mechanical connections between the cabin control centre and the ground equipment is 
examined separately (Central Traffic Control System). 
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Sub-system Signalling System Installation refer .s to the introduction of 
electromechanical signalling over a segment of line, which was previously controlled 
by mechanical signalling or lacked any kind of conventional signalling. 
Sub-system Signalling System Maintenance refers to day-to-day maintenance of the 
elements of installed mechanical or electromechanical signalling systems. 
The Telecommunications System consists of all those systems permitting the 
transmission of verbal or typed information between points of the network. Such systems 
may be: 
radiotelephones, facilitating the communication between train drivers and the 
traffic controlling staff. 
conventional telephones' frequently, a railway network possesses its own 9 telecommunications system, developing parallel to the railway line. 
modern telecommunications systems, such as telex, facsimile, computer networks, etc. 
Again, the Telecommunications Systems Installation subsystem is concerned with the 
selection, the acquisition and the installation of the proper system, whereas the ,- Telecommunications Systems Maintenance sub-system is concerned with day-to-day 
maintenance. 
The Central Traffic Control (CTC) system has been distinguished, in this study, from 
conventional signalling systems, because: 
(1) It is becoming more and more common throýghout the world. 
(2) It leads to a radical change in conventional division of tasks- among the railway 
labour. 
It basically means that large areas of track are controlled from one control centre. 
In the control room, the signalman has a panel which shows the running lines and loops. 
the system is completely track circuited throughout. These track circuits are indicated on 
the panel, as well as signals and points. The signalman sets a route for a train instead 
of changing points and clearing signals. I 
The Level Crossings Guarding System 'consists of 'all mechanical, electromechanical or 
electrical equipment employed at manned or unmanned level crossings, in order to guarantee 
a safe separation of road and railway traffic. 
The proper functioning of. all systems mentioned is a prerequisite for a proper 
functioning of the railway enterpise as a system. Employing the division of tasks, 
outlined in this part of the thesis, Figure 15 may be drawn, which illustrates the 
unfolding of systemic complexity of the railway enterprise into recursive levels. 
6.3. THE PLANNING PROCESS IN THE RAILWAY ENTERPRISE 
From the very beginning of this thesis, the strong relationship between planning and 
control has-been stressed. In Koontz's words, control-is the reverse side of the coin of 
planning. One cannot control what has not been planned. Especially in the railways, 
present-day decisions have consequences until a distant future. Decisions about the 
F, 
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infrastructure influence the position of the railways in the next decades or even the next 
century. Today's new rolling stock will still be used in the first years of the next 
millenium. The present composition of staff and the number of employees determines the 
production possibilities in future years. Beer defines planning as the 'glue' of 
organizational cohesion 2. He makes two points: 
(1) Planning is a continuous process. The continuity arises from the constant 
readjustment of rational expectations against shifting scenarios. , 
(2) The only planners are managers, namely those people who are entitled to commit 
resources., 
In Chapter 5, Beer's indices of systemic capacity were ilustrated, namely actuality 
(what we are doing now, with existing resources and constraints), capability (what we 
could do now, under existing resources and constraints, by organizing optimally), and 
potentiality (what we ought to be doing by developing our resources). These indices were 
used to provide three Indices of performance, i. e., productivity, latency and overall 
performance. Beer uses the same capacity indices to define three stages of planning 3. 
Planning on the basis of actuality he calls programming. This is simply a programme 
because it accepts the'inevitable shortcomings of the situation, and does not admit that 
anything can imminently be done about them. Planning on the basis of capability he calls 
planning by objectives. A move to genuine planning'requires the setting of new objectives 
and the attempt to achieve them. This is the strategic planning level. Planning on the 
basis of potentiality he calls normative planning. Normative planning sets potentiality as 
its target and incurs major risks and penalties, although it also offers major and perhaps 
decisive benefits. 
Long-term planning in a state-owned railway enterprise, when it is not merely fiction 
(i. e., maps full of railway lines and high-speed futuristic trains), becomes a very 
dangerous exercise, since it has to rely on external (mainly governmental) funding, which 
not only is not guaranteed, but might eliminate in the middle of a major project. On the 
other hand, rapidly changing environment poses the requirement of a relevant adjustment of 
the services offered. This continuous adjustment is not a simple exercise for a system so 
complex as a nationwide railway, but, nevertheless, is a condition for viability in the 
long run. 
6.3.1. Preparing Alternative Scenarios for Future Development 
Since the environment is rapidly changing, the railway enterprise must possess a 
planning tool, producing alternative organizational futures corresponding to alternative 
values of environmental parametres. The more realistic the model, the better 
prognostications it will make. An example of a corporate model of this kind'used by the 
Dutch Railways has been provided by Holtgrefe (1982) 4. The model was abandoned in the 
1970's for producing, according to top management, irrelevant results. At a time when the 
company's deficit was 200 million guilders, the model forecasted for the year 1981 a deficit of 691 million. -The actual deficit in 1981 turned out to be 1 017 million. HoItgrefe draws some conclusions from the sad'destiny of this promising tool: 
the construction of a model is not the exclusive job of a mathematical researcher; 
things go wrong when the 'black box" produces unexpected and unpleasant results, 
while the users, i. e., top management, have no idea of how these results have been 
produced; I 
the logic of a model has to be accepted by the managers and staff of the company. 
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These assumptions are frequently met in corporate modelling literature 567. 
6.3.2. Setting Operational Objectives 
Planning should be environment oriented and should set clear objectives in respect 
with: 
Sectors of transport market which the enterprise decides to enter or to maintain its 
presence. 
Features of services to be offered. 
"This is stressed because-the commercial dimension is not always taken very seriously 
in a state-owned enterprise. The very strong technological characteristics of a railway 
company further relegate commercial initiatives in favour of technological development. 
Thus, it is quite easy for a technical project to become an end in itself, while it should 
only be a means for the pursuit of a commercial or social (but quantitative in financial 
terms) set of objectives. 
6.3.3. Participative Planning 
The two previous conditions can only be satisfied when planning in a railway is viewed 
neither as an authoritarian activity nor as a formal once-a-year exercise. The totality Of 
the enterprise should get involved in the continuous corporate planning process. Several 
examples of how this is implemented in a railway enterprise may be cited in 
literature 99 10 11. 
6.4. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE RAILWAY ENTERPRISE 
In general, there are' two basic variations of railway organization: 
extreme functional (departmental) organization, and 
functional, regionalized within operations, organization. 
Figure'16 depicts these forms, referred to by Wyckoff as Type I and Type II. 
, The Type I organization is basically a strict departmental structure, where line 
authority flows from the chief officer of a functional department directly to the field 
group, without significant integration with other departments at less than the executive 
level. 
The Type II organization integrates all operating departments on a regional (or 
geographical divisional) basis. Under such an organization, the regional maintenance of 
way officer is responsible to the regional operations officer for repair of track and 
structures, but receives staff direction in matters pertaining to standards and practices from the chief officer of maintenance of way and structures. 12 
There may also be cases of hybrid organizations, in which some operating functions are 
regionalized (or divisionalized) and other functions retain the departmental relationship 
more typical of the Type I organization. 
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The differences between Type I and Type Il structures are not as great as might be 
imagined, since: 
they both center around the level and degree of integration or differentiation of 
only the operating functions of the company., 
they both result to a natural tendency for operating and commercial or marketing 
functions to be isolated from each other. 
Wyckoff (1976) shows that the development of railway organization has been determined 
by the environment and strategies of early railway companies. 
When the present form of railway organization evolved, the companies were considerably 
smaller in size, faced less intermodal competition, had fewer technological innovations 
(particularly in the communications area), and had been less exposed to diverse. - 
alternative forms of organization. The main task of the railroad was operation. The 
primary task of the commercial function was wdetermine "what the traffic would bear". 
As intermodal competition developed, it became increasingly more necessary to refine 
and modify the product to fit the marketplace better. However, the commercial function, 
which has tended to be subordinate to the operating function in seniority and social 
ranking, was given the task of primarily selling what operations elected to produce. Of 
course, this was partially justified by the massive investment and momentum of the 
physical plant and operations of a railway. It was also believed that since the "sale" was 
often made at a point other than where the operations were performed, there was good cause 
for these functions to be separated organizationally as well as geographically. 
As railway industry entered the twentieth century, the now familiar patterns of'large 
organizations in maturing industries began to appear. Railway Organizations became 
massive, and management became diffused among an army of individuals of lesser ability at 
the lower levels of the bureaucratic structures. As employment levelled and opportunities 
for rapid promotion dwindled, a system - of advancement by seniority developed. Initiative and vigour were replaced by on-the-job apprentice- master training, greater 
security in rules, and patience. Because of the large-system nature of railways, - the input 
of one person in the system was difficult to identify with a discrete and recognizable 
output. But breaking a rule, or acting in way that is outside the social constraints could 
be immediately spotted and punished. Also, as traditions of functional organizations 
continued over the years in increasingly larger firms, the likelihood of a young manager 
gaining or holding a meaningful appreciation or sympathy for the viewpoint or problems of 
the other functional groups was small. Functional specialization, not general management 
across functional lines, was desired, and its-development was rewarded by promotion. 
Concurrent with the solidification of the functional organization, there has been a 
tendency towards an increasing degree of control to be exercised by central organizations. 
This tendency has been strongly reinforced by improved rapid communications and the 
computer. Throughout the world, railways were among. the earliest users of nearly every 
communication and data processing innovation. This was encouraged by the geographic dispersion of operations and the volume of transactions. However, the adoption of these innovations, instead of leading to a greater independence of the decentralised local 
operating and commercial units, has resulted to the opposite, mainly for two reasons, 
according to Wyckoff: 
(1) Railways are highly systemic, and there is a great temptation to seek system 
optimization through centralisation of control under a "master-mind" 
organization; and 
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(2) A marked distrust of field managers by many railway executives exists, stemming 
from a basic insecurity among the executives, who remember the sense of hopelessness 
they felt as junior managers relative to the massiveness of the system. 
Thus, the traditions of a period when control of operations was the primary task of 
management, when commercial functions were of secondary significance, are still powerful. 
The solidification of values and employee development produce managers , who are ill-prepared for integrative management, either by personality or by training. 
Wyckoff concludes that this situation has discouraged control or incentive systems, 
which attempt to identify the revenues and costs of specific activities as profit centres 
at a level below that of the firm itself, familiar in many other industries. Heýconsiders 
the following scenarios as alternative probable courses of action: 
(1) Decentralising the organizations of existing railways around profit centres. 
(2) Reconfiguring existing railways into smaller companies that can be effectively 
managed by existing organizations and managers, by breaking up present railways 
or by separating track ownership and operating companies. 
(3) Minimising local operating and commercial functions by developing railways as 
wholesalers of intercity transportation, abdicating local operations to, other 
institutions. 
(4) Minimising need for local management of operating functions by accelerated 
development of and investment in communications and data processing innovations. 
(5) Restructuring railway properties so as to submerge the intense local operations 
problems of short-haul operations into railways with predominantly more of the 
easily managed and profitable long-haul operations. 
(6) Accepting existing management organizations and "forcing" integrative behaviour 
by means other than decentralised profit centres. 
Refeffing to the case of privately-owned American railroads, Wyckoff finds any of the 
propositions above as preferable to the nationalization of railroads, mainly because 
nationalization reinforces management organization and behaviour of the past: "In the 
large nationalized railroads I have studied, centralised, functional organizations have 
been retained and even stregthened 10 ill-effecl- 13. 
In a western -european state-owned -railway context, most of Wyckoff's propositions are being implemented by British Rail. However, it seems that there will be no opportunity to 
be judged in a nationalized industry environment, as they are strongly related to British 
government's denationalization programme,, which has already involved: 
Privatisation of Sealink and other BR subsidiaries, 
Privatisation, of BREL, and 
moves towards privatisation of intercity sector and other profitable parts of the 
rail business. 
Irrespectively to the future of this privatisation. project, BR's organizational innovations have provided a new perspective to the state-owned railway enterprise, a key 
element in which is the identification of business sectors within the company and the 
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attempt to allocate costs of rail operations to each sector. Detailed descriptions of both 
this organizational change and the methodology of cost allocation have been provided 
elsewhere 14 15 16. In summary, in addition to the traditional regional (five regions) and 
functional (operations, civil, mechanical and electrical, and signalling engineering, 
finance, personnel, etc. ) organisation of the enterprise, five business sectors have been 
identified, each with its own sector director who holds full delegated responsibility from 
the chief executive for his own bottom line result. Two of these sectors are social 
(London commuter, provincial) and three commercial (intercity passenger, freight, 
parcels). Sectors' costing is made by employing the rule of primer user for every railway 
route. Thus, clear commercial objectives are set for the commercial sectors, whereas the 
exact cost of social services offered may be isolated and more pricesely identified, 
returning to the government (where it naturally belongs) the responsibilty for decisions 
regarding social policy. 
6.5. MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN A RAILWAY ENTERPRISE 
Having. discussed the recursive structure, the planning process and the organization of 
the railway enterprise, management control may now be conceived in terms of managerial 
cybernetics. The principle Systems ONE of the enterprise have already been identified. 
Obviously, some variations of this general structure may exist from country to country 
(notably the amalgamation of systems ONE operations and signalling and telecommunications) 
which will not been considered in the developing general model. On the other hand, the two 
principle organizational variations discussed will be considered, since they define 
whether the identified systems ONE belong to the first or second levels of recursion. 
6.5.1. The Impact of Organization Structure on Management Control 
Figure 17 depicts the railway organization labelled as Type I in terms of Beer's model 
of the viable system. 
In a Type I organization, the first level of recursion consists of the four systems 
ONE as already described, namely: 
operations, 
rolling stock, 
permanent way and installations, and 
signalling and telecommunications. 
Each system-ONE is managed by a functional manager with delegated responsibility for 
this-function over the totality of the network. Co-ordination of various systems ONE is 
achieved via the coprorate system TWO, which may be summarised as the company's Information centre. Management of each system ONE is engaged both in setting functional 
norms, standards and programmes, and in monitoring sub-systemic performance through a functional regulatory centre. 
System THREE controls operating performance on the basis of information it receives from system TWO, relating to achieved values of indices in respect with preset tasks, during the periodical resource allocation process. 
An example of the functioning of a such system has been offered by the Dutch Railways 17 18 19. A monthly bulletin is published giving the relevant quantified data (financial and non-financial) for past, present and future operations, on a yearly basis, 
providing information about: 
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Figure 17: VSM of Type I Railway Enterprise 
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(1) Production: 
passenger traffic, and 
freight traggic, 
(2) Sales: 
pasenger traffic, and 
freight traffic, 
(3) Main supporting systems: 
Personnel, 
Infrastructure, 
Rolling Stock, and 
Finance. 
(4) Environment 
subsidiary companies, 
relationship with the state, 
general economic development, and 
miscellaneous. 
This bulletin, extending over 40 pages, is reduced to a one- page- per-month exception 
reporting, covering 40 identified control points. Not all of these 40 points give rise to 
exception- reporting every month. Reported are those which tend to move (in a favourable or 
unfavourable way) outside predetermined ranges. Tieleman (1975) offers some rules for the 
functioning of Corporate System TWO (i. e., Information Manager), which are very closely to 
managerial cybernetic concepts: 
(1) A MIS for control collects much information especially from other information 
systems. Hence the need for a very good liaison between the MIS manager 
(corporate System TWO) and the managers of the different logistic information 
systems (local systems TWO). 
(2) Once a MIS for control is in operation, company officers should be prevented 
from sending periodical control information to top management directly (system 
THREE overloading). They should forward such information via the MIS (system 
THREE monitors performance through system TWO). 
(3) A MIS for control should produce a complete but not too detailed survey of 
current company operations (information filtration). 
(4) Top management should always maintain a dialogue with the MIS manager about 
those topics considered relevant to the management process (information - 
relevance). The information manager must, accordingly, adapt continuously the 
contents of the MIS output. If he fails to do so, MIS is of no use to the 
management any more. I 
(5) If one or more processes regarded as vital for the functioning of the company in 
its environment give continuously rise to exception -reporting, the standards 
should be altered. The information manager must continuously ensure that the 
company standards remain consinstent despite the modification carried out 
(systemic regulation). 
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(6) The original sources of information remain responsible for this information. 
Hence, the names of officers producing the information have to be mentioned in 
all publications offered to top management (compare with Beer's concept of 
algedonic signals and response timing, which has generated so much debate on 
issues concerning freedom, autonomy, etc. ) 
Since, as already mentioned, in this type of organisation there is both a natural 
tendency for operating and commercial departments to be isolated from each other, -and for 
focusing only on the operating functions of the company, organizational integration, at a 
level lower than that of the chief executive may be achieved by a matrix structure. Figure 
18 illustrates such a matrix organization, at corporate level, as adopted by Dutch 
Railways (NS). The horizontal organization extends to long- and short-term planning, 
automation and information issues and cuts across the formal vertical functional 
organization. Similar structures are employed at lower levels. 
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Figure 18: Matrix Organization at Corporate Level 
Type I funtional organization (with or without matrix integration) is achieved when 
relatively small enterprises, or enterprises operating within small and homogenous 
countries are concerned. In the example mentioned, Holland is a very small, densely 
polulated and homogenous country. The railway is by and large a passenger transport 
railway. Passenger services aim at providing a hourly linkage between any two major cities 
within the country. The situation is much more complex in the case of multi-product and lagre railway enterprises. In this case a sort of Type II organization is adopted, to 
allow for local (regional) co-ordination and control of functional activities. The introduction of an intermediate level of recursion (i. e, regional management) between 
corporate level and functions seems to be inevitable, to allow for a management control 
process closer to the location of operations. 
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Regional structure, besides facilitating control of operations, may produce a lot of 
problems as far as there is no clear definition of the status of the regional management. 
When conceived as a first level of recursion, that is regional management is a system ONE, 
a viable system in its own right in the geographical area it covers, it follows that the 
dichotomy between centralization- autonomy has to be resolved in a way which passes to the 
regions managerial accountability for a lot of issues and minimises headquarters function 
to a role assuring corporate identity. The degree to which this may, at first, be 
achieved, relates to the characteristics of the rail product within a certain enterprise. 
When there is a natural separation between regions and not substantial inter-regional 
transactions in terms of traffic, regional management can be held accountable for results 
of operations, hence its system ONE status has to be recognised and reinforced. Figure 19 
illustrates this case in terms of Beer's VSM. 
However, in nationwide railway companies, usually principle type of traffic is 
passenger and freight intercity traffic; that is, a train originates in one region and 
terminates to another, probably crossing some more regions. Hence a difficulty to allocate 
profits and costs of railway operations among regions. In this case, either a set of 
algorithms for intra-regional cost-profit allocation is developed (however arbitrary this 
set might be in complex rail operations), or regional management loses its system ONE 
status and becomes a local coordinating unit. 
In any case, either in the nationwide enterprise or in the regionalised, the actual 
implementation of railway operations is achieved through the functioning of the four 
systems ONE mentioned, i. e., operations, rolling stock, permanent way, and signalling and 
telecommunications. ý 
6.5.2. A Framework for Management Control 
Having identified the systems ONE of the enterprise, either in the first level of 
recursion (Type I enterprise) or in the second (Type 11), management control in terms of 
Beer's model of the viable system requires the identification and the proper functioning 
of the rest four systems comprising the VSM. The physical location of these systems may be 
identified in terms of accountability for certain managerial activities within the 
company's structure. For the purposes of this thesis, a list of managerial activities has 
been constructed and used in the survey. The list is displayed in the Survey Questionnaire 
(Appendix C). Thus, both at corporate level, and within the management of each functional 
system ONE, four sets of activities may be identified: 
6.5.2.1. Research and Development 
Research and Development activities, comprise a continuous scanning of the environment 
of the enterprise (or the respective functional system ONE), in order to identify 
opportunities and threats. 
At corporate level these activities involve monitoring international trends in the 
development of the railway and other mode's of transport, monitoring trends in national 
development, monitoring relationships with the State and other stakeholders and preparing 
alternative scenarios for future development, related to alternative directions of the 
overall development of the country. 
At functionitl level, R&D activities focus mainly on monitoring trends in technological innovations and are balanced with functional operations by the preparation of functional 
plans, further intergrating within the overall corporate plan. The commercial sector of 
the enterprise is engaged, at this stage, with the monitoring of financial activities in 
various sectors of the national economy, activities and-methods employed by competitors 
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within the transport business and with the identification of alternative possible means of 
increasing traffic volume and market share of the enterprise, producing, simultaneously, 
favourable financial results. Apparently, the conclusions of the marketing function should 
serve as a basis for the assessment of any corporate or functional plans; however; this is 
not the usual case in a state-owned, railway enterprise. 
6.5.2.2. Planning and Organizing 
Plannin g- Organizing activities'at corporate level consist of. 
Identification of sectors of transport market which the enterprise decides to enter, 
as deriving from the adopted general direction for the development of the company. 
Identification of the characteristics of services to be offered. 
Identification of 'required investment, in order to succeed in entering the desired 
market sectors and in offerring the planned railway services. 
Identification of required organizational change. 
Similarly, ý the Operation's System ONE Planning- Organizing stage is characterised by the: 
Identification of requirements in new railway installations, or 
mo, dification/extension of existing. 
Identification of requirements in new rolling stock, or mod ification/refurbishmen t 
of existing. 
Identification of requirements in line"s capacity configuration (single/double, type 
of signalling, central traffic control). 
Identification of requirements in technical configuration of the track (required 
axle loads, journey speeds). 
Definition of passenger services characteristics (first/standard class, 
couchettes/sleeping cars, buffet services, comfort/cleanliness requirements). 
Definition of freight services characteristcs (block trains, containerization, 
combined transport* 'door-to-door' services). 
Finally, Planning -Organizing at Functional Level involves: 
Issuing of methods and rules defining the maintenance/repair regime, for rolling 
stock, permanent way, installations, signalling and-telecommunications. 
Preparation of technical and economic studies for certain functional projects, 
related to the overall development strategy (e. g., requirements in rolling stock 
repair/maintenance installations and equipment,, civil engineering studies, selection 
of signalling, telecommunications, etc. systems, installation studies, etc. ) 
Identification of requirements in materials, spare parts and equipment for the 
fulfillment of functional operations. 
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6.5.2.3. Annual ProgramminglBudgeting 
Annual Programming/Budgeting activities involve, at Corporate Level, the preparation 
of the Annual Budget and the Annual Investment Programme'. Since the principle source of 
income for a railway company is the one resulting from the selling of the services, annual 
budget is related with the Railway Operations System by means of. 
The railway traffic forecasts, reflected ýin the service timetable, which makes 
provision for available capacity and principle features of services (journey times, 
frequency, connectivity, etc. ) 
The pricing policy implemented, including both marketing activities for commercial 
services and identification and state subsidy compensation for social services. 
Since the activities of the three Supporting systems (i. e. -, rolling'stock, permanent 
way, and signalling/telecommunications) may be viewed as inputs to the Operations system, 
the latter should define at this stage a set of requirements from the supporting 
functions, aiming at permitting the offering of the prescribed services. Such requirements 
might be: I 
From the Rolling Stock sub-system: Rolling stock availability, operational ity, ý 
cleanliness, comfort, etc. requirements. 
From the Permanent Way and Installations sub-system: Track availability, track 
quality and terminals and installations operationality requirements. 
From the Signalling/Telecommunications sub-system: Operationality of the specific 
systems within this sub-system (signalling, telecommunications, CTC, level crossings 
guarding). I 
Functional systems, at the annual programming/budgeting stage, are expected to prepare 
(preferably in an integrated within the company manner): 
Their annual functional maintenance/repair programmes with associated expenses and 
aimed results. 
Their annual investment programmes with associated completion times and cash-flow. 
Thier annual materials/spare parts/equipment purchase programmes. 
6.5.2.4. Performance Monitoring 
The fourth set of activities, identified is the set of Performance Monitoring 
activities. Five priniple areas of performance monitoring may be identified at corporate 
level: 
Commercial Performance monitoring, i. e., monitoring the development of the traffic 
volume achieved and the market share gained within the market sectors of interest. 
Financial Performance monitoring, i. e., monitoring the development of the annual budget which involves: 
- revenue monitoring, , 
- expenditure control, and 
- cash-flow control. 
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Investment Programme development monitoring, involving: 
monitoring the rate of completion of investment programmes, and 
monitoring the rate of absorbtion of investment funds. 
Enterprise'-Personnel Relationship development monitoring, associated with: 
monitoring the relations with the trade unions, and 
monitoring employees morale by adopting some kind of, aPprorpiate index 
(e. g., absenteism). 
Monitoring Relationship with the State, which is a continuous informal activity, 
involving: 
- Informing the enterprise on state's requirements from the railways. 
- Informing the state on conditions for the fulfillment of these requirements. 
- Informing the state on the company's performance. 
- Negotiating with the state the funding of investment plans. 
- Negotiating the general features of the annual budget. 
Similar performance monitoring activities associated with operational performance, 
financial results, personnel morale, 'etc., should develop at functional level. These 
activities are reported at the relevant parts of the Survey Questionnaire. 
6.6. SYNOPSIS 
Four system ONE elements, doing what the company is supposed to may be identified 
within the railway enterprise: 
Railway Operations, 
Rolling Stock, 
Permanent Way and Installations, and 
Signalling and Telecommunications. 
At subsequent levels of recursion these systems may be viewed as consisting of further 
sub-systems and sub. -ýsubsystems. 
Management control of the railway enterprise under a managerial cybernetics modelling 
requires the recognition of the VSM status of the mentioned elements. This status usually is not reflected in the formal organizations of the railways, which tend to view the 
enterprise as a sum of technical functions, either coordinated and controlled at the very 
top of the enterprise (Type I), or through regional management with unclear bottom line 
responsibilities (Type II). 
The examination of the managerial status either at corporate or at functional or 
subsysternic levels may be attempted via the search for accountability for activities belonging in general in one of the following sets: 
Research anf Development activities, 
Plan n ing/Organizing activities, 
Annual Programming activities, and 
Performance monitoring activities. 
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The full set of these activities is displayed in the Survey Questionnaire (Appendix C) 
and constitutes the basis for the identification of the actual VSM in the case-study 
enterprise. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CASE STUDY BACKGROUND 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 7 is the first part of the research implementation. Theory on management 
control, public enterprise and railways -previously developed is combined with information 
concerning an actual organization, Greek Railways, to provide a clear picture of what is 
in a real situation the railway management control problem. Since the emerging picture 
will inevitably be subjective, as it reflects the author's perception of the reality, a 
survey within the case-study will further be undertaken, in which acting managers of the 
enterprise will be requested to express their opinions on railway management control 
issues. Thus, Chapter 7 may be seen as a connective chapter, between the framework 
developed, and the survey which follows. 
The chapter develops in five parts, each of which is, in turn, concerned with: 
(1) A very brief description of the history of the enterprise; 
(2) Its principle characteristics; 
(3) The ownership and external control over the enterprise; 
(4) The performance of the enterprise; and 
(5) The organizational structure of the enterprise. 
7.2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GREEK RAILWAYS ORGANIZATION 
Railway history in Greece starts with the publication of the Law TZ/28.12.1855, 
concerning the establishing of the "Athens to Piraeus Railway", and the opening of this 
line 14 years later (17 February 1869). Provided that, at that time, a big part of 
mainland Greece was under Ottoman occupation, the formation of a nationwide network was 
not feasible. Thus, a standard gauge (1435 mm), single-tracked line from Piraeus/Athens to 
the then border (Papapouli, north of Larissa) was built (350 krn long), together with a 20 
km branch to Khalkis, on the island of Euboea. (Law YMST/20.07.1881, construction 
1889-1909). This network was operated by a state-owned company under the name Greek State 
Railways (SEK). 1 
During the same period, the private Thessaly Railways was formed and operated on a 160 
km narrow gauge (1000 mm) single-tracked line, connecting the principal towns of Greece's 
biggest plain, Thessaly, with the main line (at Paleofarsalos) and with the city and port 
of Volos (Law AMH/22.06.1882, construction 1881-1896). 
Further still during the last part of the 19th century, the private Athens-Plraeus- 
Peloponnese Railways (SPAP) started operating on a network constructued in South 
mainland Greece, the Peloponnese. This network, 800 krn approximately long, starts from 
Athens and, after crossing the Korinth Canal and reaching the city of Korinth, diverges. One branch follows the north and, then, the west coastline, via Patras; the 
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other proceeds mainland south, via Argos and Tripolis. The branches merge at Zevgholatio, 
near the south-coast city of Kalamata (Law AMS/22.06.1882, construction 1882-1902). 2 
The formation of a nationwide rail network was interrupted by the Balkan Wars 
(1912-1916), by the end of which, when a further part of the Greek territory was liberated 
(forming the contemporary Greek State, with the exception of the Dodhekanese Islands which 
entered after World War 11), the Athens - Larissa- Papapoull railway was connected with the 
part of the Ottoman Railways' network, which had been constructed in the liberated lands. 
The first train from Athens to Thessaloniki Tan on March 1918. 
The network of the 1920's remains almost unchanged (Figure 20). Besides the physical 
and financial constraints, historical conditions obstructed further expansion.: 
Soon after Balkan Wars, World War I started. By the end of this war, Greece 
participated with her western allies in the Middle East military operations, forced 
by the will to liberate further Greek populations, living by the West (Aegean) coast 
of Asia Minor. The operations ended in a disaster (1922). At the time when Kemal 
Attaturk was fighting against both the European allies and the Ottoman 
monarchy to form the first Turkish Republic, 1 500 000 Greeks from Asia Minor, 
Black Sea and Constantinople had to abandon their homes and to follow to the west 
the defeated Greek army. 
This enormous number of refugees, 20 % of Greece's population at that time, helped 
to reshape the country drastically. A significant development and industrialisation 
was achieved during the period which starts soon after the "Asia Minor Catastrophe" 
and ends with the outbreak of World War 11. 
The end of World War 11, which, nevertheless, ruined almost the whole of Europe, was 
not followed by peacetime in Greece. The evacuation of the country from the allied 
German, Italian and Bulgarian forces was to be followed by the British military 
involvement (1944-1946) and the Greek civil war (1946-1949). 
In 1935, SEK, Thessaly Railway (STh) and other small companies to the north of Athens 
merged into one company, SEK, administered directly as a government department. 
During the early 1950's, the totally destroyed railway network had to be rebuilt. A' 
Railway Reconstruction Committee (SAS) was set up to decide on its future (May 1945). 
Several options were discussed. 3 Modernisation thoughts were expressed, which could be 
financed by funds of the Marshall Plan. Finally, under the influence of political, 
military and financial interests, only the restoration of the existing network to its 
pre-war condition was decided. On the other hand, a lot of investment was made on 
roads, ports, and 'airports. It was the era of the automobile and the aeroplane. 
In September 1962 SEK took over the 'A the ns- Piraeus -Peloponnese Railways' (SPAP), the 'North-West Greece Railway (SVDE)' and the 'Pyrgos-Katakolon Railway' (SPYK), which had 
already come under state control (Law 4246/1962). 
In September 1970 (Law 674/19.09.1970) SEK becomes 'an organization operating for the 
public interest, accordingly to the rules of private economy, in the form of a company having managerial and financial autonomy". The new name of the enterprise is OSE, standing for 'Hellenic Railways Organization'. Today, OSE is the only operating railway in the 
country, apart from the Athens-Piraeus urban electric railway (ISAP). It is an autonomous 
Public enterprise, run by a Board. Till recently (1983) the members of the Board were 
appointed by Government. Since 1983, under the legislation for the Socialization of the Public Enterprises, the following innovations were introduced: 
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(1) Employees representation in the Board of the 
Railways. Three of the nine members of the Board are elected by the personnel 
through a general election. 
(2) Social Control of the activities of the enterprise. The same legislation makes 
provision for a Social Control Represeniative Assembly (ASKE), consisting, 
in the case of OSE 4, of 27 members, 9 of which are appointed by the government, 
9 by interested parties'(chambers of commerce, local goivernments, export 
organizations, technical chamber, trade unions confederation, etc. ) and 9 are 
elected by the railway employees. 
(3) Decentralised social control. In addition to ASKE, a regional assembly for 
social control (PESKE) is set up'in each of the nine major regions of the 
country (provided railway network exists within the region), with similar duties 
to ASKE at regional level. 
Experience from the short life of these innovations has shown that, in the case of the 
Railways, these bodies have not exploited the rights stated in the legislation, partly due 
to government intervention and partly due to their strongly political character. 
7.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GREEK RAILWAY 
7.3.1. The Layout of Rail Connections 
Greek Railways offer passenger and freight transportation services. Trains, in 
general, originate from two focal points: Athens, the capital, and Thessaloniki, the 
second biggest city of the country, in North Greece. 
Standard-gauge passenger -trains departing from Athens every day and arriving in Thessaloniki, 
either terminate, 
or are directed to the Greek -Yugoslavian border (Idomeni/Gevgelija), from where 
yugoslavian (and then austrian, german or italian) locomotives take them to Western 
Europe (Akropolis Express to Munich, Hellas Express to Dortmund, and Venezia Express 
to Venice; the train to Venice conveys up to Belgrade coaches to Wien and Budapest), 
or are directed eastwards, either to the north-eastern point of the network 
(Ormenion), or to Turkey. At Strymon, coaches are taken to the Greek-Bulgarian 
border (Promachon/Kulata) and from there to Sofia, Bucharest, and Moscow. 
Narrow-gauge passinger'trains depart from Athens (Peloponnese) railway station towards Korinth. Half of them continue westwards to Patras and then south to Pyrgos and Kalamata. The rest travel mainland from Korinth to Argos and Tripolis and terminate also at Kalamata. 
A- 
Local trains travel daily from Athens to Inoi and from there on the branch line to Khalkis. 
Local trains travel on parts of the netwotk or branch lines. Figure 21 provides a Picture of daily journeys of passenger trains over the network of the Greek* Railways. 
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YUGOSLAVIA BULGARIA 
BULGARIA Ormenion 
'Florina Strymon 
THESSALONIKI 
Amynteon Plati 
Kozani LLAARRIISSA 
Kalampaka 
VOLOS 
Paleofarsalos 
Inoi Khalkis 
-lo-JURKEY 
Alexandroupolis 
I 
r 
k, 
ATHENS 
PATRAS Diakopton 
Korinth 
Kyllini Kalavryta 
Katakolo-n Olympia 
PYRGOS Tripolis Argos 
Kalonero Zevgholatio 
Kyparissia Kalamata 
Figure 21: Greek-Railways: The Layout of Passenger Services 
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A number of freight,, trains travel mainly between Piraeus/Athens, Thessaloniki and the 
Greek/Yugoslavian border, providing thus a transport link, via Yugoslavia, with the 
European Community,. which is by and large the main origin/destination of the Greek 
import/export trade. Gradually, the importance of the Yugoslavian route as a link between 
Greece and the Community tends to become smaller, as the port of Patras (in the 
Peloponnese) and the frequent ferry service to Italy (Brindisi, Bari, and Ancona) 
develops. However, in any case. - the way through Yugoslavia will always be the only' land 
connection, for both railway and the automobile. 
7.3.2. Characteristics of Services Offered 
The quality of railway services has been seriously influenced by the condition of the 
network, which, till recently, could be described as completely outdated. Indeed, it was 
only during the 1970's that, as a consequence of -the oil crisis, the growth of pollution 
and congestion problems, and the very poor condition of the railways, a rail modernisation 
plan was introduced. The plan refers mainly to the updating of the 'axis' of the network, 
the 600 krn long Athens- Thessaloniki-Yugoslavian border main line, and includes track 
renewal, construction of a second track, electrification, and central traffic control, to 
allow for speeds of the range of 200 km/h 5. Further plans refer to the modernisation of 
part of the Peloponnese narrow-gauge network, namely the construction of a high speed 
standard-gauge line between Athens and Patras (the third biggest city of the country), 
and, with, partial financing from Community funds, the construction of a direct west-east 
rail link from the port of Igoumenitsa in North-West Greece (opposite to the island of 
Corfu) to the port of Volos on the Aegean coast. A rail freight ferry service is being 
introduced from the port of Volos to the port of Lattakia in Syria. Therefore, there is an 
obvious will within the community for the construction of an integrated link for freight 
transport between Europe and the Middle East, by employing two ferry services 
(Italy-Greece, Greece-Syria) and the greek railway network. 
Principle causes of the poor quality of services offered are: 
(1) the single track which, in relation with developing infrastructure projects 
accounts for delays and deviations from the schedule. 
(2) the maintenance standards of the rolling stock, related both to the outdated and 
poorly organised maintenance installations (depots, workshops) and to the 
extreme multiplicity of employed equipment, defined by external conditions. 
Almost every kind of rolling stock may be identified within the Greek Railways: 
American, Canadian, Japanese and Romanian locomotives; Hungarian, German and 
Italian dmu's. Romanian, East German coaches, etc. Bear in mind that: 
there is no railway equipment constructing company based in Greece; and 
a big part of national agricultural production is directed to Eastern Europe. 
Until recently this international trade was balanced with the clearing method. 
Le., agricultural products were exchanged for technological equipment, 
notably railway equipment, power generators, etc. 
7.3.3. The Rolling Stock of the Greek Railways 
Rolling stock repair and maintenance work is undertaken by the network's workshops and depots. Heavy repair and maintenance work is undertaken by the network's principle 
workshop in Piraeus (EP), which serves standarg gauge trains originating from Athens and 
the biggest number of Peloponnese narrow-gauge rolling stock. A second major workshop in Thessaloniki (ETh) serves the Thessaloniki originating local trains to North-West and 
Chapter 7 -140- Case Study Background 
North-East Greece. Finally, a small workshop at Volos (EV) is engaged with duties 
concerning the narrow-gauge Thessaly line trains. 
Light repair and day-to-day maintenance and servicing is undertaken by the network's 
three principle depots: 
Aghios loannis depot (MAI) near Piraeus serves the Athens originating standard 
c gauge 
trains. 
Piraeus depot (MPR) serves the Athens originating Peloponnese network trains. 
Thessaloniki depot (MTh) serves the Thessaloniki originating trains. 
A few more local depots have responsibilities over branch-line trains maintenance and 
servicing, as well as local coaches or wagons periodic inspection, and are situated at 
Lianokladi (ML), Larissa (MLr), Drama (MD) and Alexandroupolis (MA) for the standarg-gauge 
line, and Diakopton (MD), Patras (MP), Kalamata (MK) and Volos (MV) for the two 
narrow-gauge parts of the network. 
Tables 5-7 provide the numbers and types of the rolling stock of the Greek Railway, as 
well as the average out of service percentage due to breakdowns for the year 1984. Though 
in some instances this percentage is artificial, in the sense that certain types of 
rolling stock have become obsolete but still appear in official tables, the poor 
production of the Rolling Stock maintenance/repair system is quite apparent. 
Type serlat 
no. 
construction year HP units % out of 
servlceý 
standard gauge 
KRUPP V60 A. 100 FR GERMANY 1963 650 30 33.0 
ALCO A. 200 USA 1963 1 050 8 31.2 
ALCO A. 300 USA 1964 1 950 a 45.0 
ALCO A. 320 USA 1966 2 150 6 46.7 
ALSTHOM A. 350 FRANCE 1967 2 400 26 62.7 
SIEMENS A. 400 FR GERMANY, 1966 2 000 io 94.0 
FAUR A. 150 ROMANIA 1973 700 12 100.0 
FAUR A. 170 ROMANIA 1979 750 7 84.7 
MLW A. 450 CANADA 1974 2 700 20 32.6 
MLW A. 500 CANADA 1975 3 600 10 46.0 
GENERAL ELECTRIC A. 220 USA 1974 1 050 13 80.0 
ELECTROPUTTERE A. 550 ROMANIA 1982 3 600 10 41.0 
GANZ-MAVAG A. 250 HUNGARY 1983 1 800 11 22.7 
1 000 mm gauge 
ALCO 9.100 USA 1965 1 350 12 31.6 
ALSTHOM 9.200 FRANCE 1967 1 600 10 56.0 
MITSUBISHI 9.400 JAPAN 
1. 
1967 
-- 
640 
I- 
20 24.5 
Table 5: Greek Railways, 1984: Diesel arid Diesel Electric Locomotives 
ýI 
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' i f % Type seriat construction year HP un ts out o 
no. -service 
standard gauge 
FIAT il-26 ITALY 1949 450 15 70.0 
FIAT 27-36 ITALY 1957 590 a 33.7 
FERROSTAHL 71-90 FR GERMANY 1962 600 18 60.0 
GANZ-KAVAG 91-101 HUNGARY 1976 1 140 11 61.8 
1 000 m gauge 
BREDA 2500 ITALY 1952 390 13 83.0 
KAN 2100 FR GERMANY 1937 210 6 70.0 
MAN 4200 FR GERMANY 1937 420 7 91.4 
DE DIETRICH 6400 FRANCE 1952 640 13 50.0 
ESSLINGEN 6000 FR GERMANY 1959 1 000 7 45.7 
GAWZ-KAVAG 6450 HUNGARY 1977 1 140 4 45.0 
GANZ-KAVAG HUNGARY 1985 10 
750 m gauge 
BILLARD 3000 FRANCE 1959 350 3 25.0 
DE CAUVILLE 3000 FRANCE 1967 500 3 25.0 
Table 6: Greek Railways, 1984: Diesel Multiple Units 
Typ 
Passenger Coaches 
Buffet Cars 
Post 
Wagons 
Service cars 
standard gauge 
326 
6 
120 
8 909 
229 
1 000 m gauge 
143 
5 
56 
1 687 
30 
I 
Table 7: Greek Rai tways, 1984: Coaches and Wagons 
7.3.4. Track Maintenance In the Greek Railways 
Table 8 provides lengths of railway line (in km) per regional department in terms of 
track gauge. Railway line consists of a single, track, with the exception of three 
. 
double-track segments (Athens-Inoi 61 km and Plati-Thessaloniki 36 krn on the 
standard-gauge network, Athens-Eleusis 27 krn on the Peloponnese network). Recently (1988), 
as a part of the modernisation project a further segment of second line, 95 km long 
(Inoi-Tithorea) has been opened to traffic, whereas another part of double line 
(Domokos -Larissa, 61 km) is near completion. In the Athens -Thessaloniki line, the 
construction of the second track is being accompanied with the upgrading of the existing' 
one (heavy rails, concrete sleepers, continuous welding, elimination of level crossings, 
local alignments). Further, a major part of the Thessaloniki- Alexandroupolis north-east 
line has been upgraded. A project for the conversion of the narrow gauge-line Thessaly 
line to a standard gauge one is under development, aiming at a second north-south link 
after the construction of the Kalampaka-Kozani connecting line. 
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track, gauge 
Athens 
Region 
(DPA) 
Thessaloniki 
Region 
(DPTh)' 
Peloponnnese 
Region 
OPP) 
Total 
standard gauge (1 440 mm) 980 1 565 
narrow gauge 0 000 mm) 162 - 730 892 
narrow gauge 750 mm) -- 22 22 
totaL (km) 747 980 752 2 479 
TabLe 8: Greek Raltways, 1984: Length of network in km. 
Track maintenance in Greek Railways is the responsibility of area engineer units 
(TM. GR). Under an organizational structure comprising of three regions (mentioned in the 
previous table), within each region a chief civil engineer (YGR) is reported by area 
engineers (four for each of the Athens and Thessaloniki regions, and three for the 
Peloponnese). The elementary track maintenance unit is the mobile gang. Each gang is' 
responsible for a segment of line (approx. 10 km in double- and 20 km in single-lines). A 
track maintenance foreman has responsibility for a wider area within the area unit. 
Foremen report to the area engineer. An illustration of this organization is provided in 
Table 9, which refers to the structure of the First Permanent Way Area Unit of the Athens 
Region (DPA/A'TM. GR). The responsibilities of this unit, as shown in the table, extend 
over 153 km of the main line track, i. e., from the port of Piraeus (km 0.000) to km 
153.000. 
I 
area 
distance mob ile gang staff foreman's enginner's 
railway from composition (TM. GR) 
origin base and base and 
station (km) responsible responsiý responsf- 
base between km chf dep wrk bitity bitity 
............... ......... .... .... 0.000-- zx=O. 000= ZZZO. 0002= Piraeus 0.734 
Aghios loannis 4.107 12 13 
............... ......... .... .... 5.000 .. ........... 
Athens 10.290 * 12 14 
--------------- --------- ---- --- 14.000 .. ........... Acharnae 21.021 12 11 
========= ==== rz=25.000=a r-===-=zzzz ==25.000= 
Oeon 33.485 * 12 11 
--------------- --------- ---- --- 36.000 .. ........... 
Afidnae 40.048 * 12 11 
----------- --- --------- ---- --- 46.000 .. ........... Sfendhali 50.878 * 12 10 
............... ......... .... ... 55.000 .. ........... 
Avton 59.215 * 12 11 
==zzzczzz zm=z zz=65.000=z ==65.000= 
Oenol 71.394 * 129 
--------------- --------- ---- --- 75.000 .. ........... 
Tanagra 75.248 * 12 10 
=======zz xzzz ca=93.000== azzmz=zxx=x ==93.000x 
Thevae 100.448 * 12 11 
............... ......... .... .. 113.000 .. ........... 
Aliartos 121.085 * 12 10 
............... ......... .... .. 133.000 .. ........... 
Levedia 141.947 * 12 10 
z===zzzmzm=zz = 3c=zmmzzzz zzx= z=153.000zz z========== =153.000= =153.000= ; 
i thorea 153.260 * 12 12 
Table 9: Greek Railways: The Structure of a Typical Permanent Way Area Unit. 
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The line is patroled by patrol gangers. Track geometry and standards are recorded 
periodically by track recording cars. Under the moderisation plan a substantial number of 
track renewal/maintenance mechanical equipment was purchased (ballast cleaners, ballast 
regulators, tampers, etc. ). The introduction of this equipment in day-to-day track , 
maintenance duties will, inevitably, require major changes both in the organization and 
the skills of the track maintenance staff. 
Buildings and Installations maintenance within each area unit is undertaken by the 
unit's building maintenance group, consisting of a small number of skilled workers of 
various specialisations and reporting to the buildings maintenance foreman. Larger 
building maintenance or construction projects are subcontracted. 
Finally, within a region, an Iron Constructions Unit (TMK) is responsible for. 
the maintenance of iron bridges, which are quite numerous; 
the maintenance and construction of track switches, level crossings fences, etc.; 
and 
the maintenance of the track maintenance/renewal mechanical equipment. 
Construction jobs are undertaken at two shops. The Athens shop serves both Athens and 
Peloponnese region, whereas the Thessaloniki shop servmthe local region. - 
On-site maintenance is undertaken by mobile gangs. 
7.3.5. Signalling and Telecommunications 
The narrow-gauge part of the network lacks any kind of conventional signalling. 
Traffic is controlled by radiotelephones, and, provided that the line is single, crossings 
take place at manned stations. A project for the installation of an electromechanical 
signalling system in the Athens-Patras part of the Peloponnese network is under way. 
Standard-gauge lines employ a mechanical signalling system. Modernization plan 
involves also modernization of signalling. Plans for Central Traffic Control systems have 
been adopted for the main line, whereas the first CTC system, controlling traffic on the 
Tithorea-Domokos single-tracked segment of the main line (121 km), which will still 
remain single-tracked after the completion of this phase of modernization due to very 
difficult terrain, is already operating. 
In addition to making use of the national telecommunications network, Greek Railways 
possess their own telecommunication lines, running parallel to the track. Modernisation of 
this system is also under way on the main line and the Athens to Patras line. 
The responsibility for the maintenance of signalling and telecommunications systems, 
as well as of electrical installations and level crossings guarding systems rests within Signalling, Electrical and Telecommunications Units (TTHE). Till recently, these regional 
units were contained within the regional structure, the head electrical engineer of the 
unit reporting to the head of the regional department. Since 1987, a vertical organization has been employed, these three units reporting now to the signalling, electrical and telecommunications division (YSTHE), which formerly was a headquarters unit. 
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7.3.6. Railway Operations II 
Responsibility for both transportation and commercial activities lies, according to 
the formal organizational structure, within the regions. A regional division of operations 
(YEK), headed by a transportation engineer, manages a structure consisting of: 
(1) Area inspectors (EPITH), each of which is broadly responsible for commercial 
activities and terminal operations over an area broadly coinciding with that 
covered by the-Permanent Way Area Engineer (TM. GR)., 
(2) The Train Crews Control Central Office (KGPA). 
The area inspector (EPITH) supervises the activities of stationmasters, travel 
offices, and freight depot masters. The crews control central office (KGPA) controls and 
co-ordinates crew utilization through local crew offices (GPA). 
A major characteristic of terminal operations in the Greek Railways is the 
disproportional number of manned stations respectively to the traffic they handle. This 
relates to the characteristics of the network already described, i. e., to the single track 
and the inadequate signalling, which place the traffic controlling duty to local, 
stationmasters. It also relates to the population distribution within the country, where, 
in a total population of approx. 10 000 000, half of it is living either in the Athens (4 
000 000) or the Thessaloniki (1 000 000) metropolitan areas, whereas only three more 
cities have a population in excess of 100 000 (Patras, Larissa, Volos). 
A second characteristic is the large number of level crossings, which imposes to the 
railway both direct (manning requirements) and indirect costs (accidents in unmanned level 
crossings). 
Overall, the function of the operations system of the organization may be viewed as 
purely technical. No commercial activities are undertaken within this structure. Although 
the formal organization assigns this duty here, it is difficult to believe that local - 
stationmasters have either the skills or the time to act as local agents of the railway 
company. 
7.4. OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF GREEK RAILWAYS 
Until September'1962 two railway enterprises existed in Greece: , 
The Greek State Railways (SEK), operating on the standard gauge network and the 
narrow gauge network of the former Thessaly railways (ThS). This enterprise was ran 
as government department, directly subordinate to the Minister of Transport. 
The conglomerate of the former distinct private companies Athens - Piraeus-Peloponnese Railway (SPAP), Northwest Greece Railway (SVDE) and Pyrgos-Katakolon Railway (SPYK), 
operating as a private company, independent from SEK. This independence was 
reinforced by the physical and operational (different gauges) separation of the two 
networks. 
In September 1962, under the 4246 Law, -the two companies merged into one, with the 
status and the name of Greek State Railways (SEK). This company changed it status (from 
government department to autonomous public enerprise) and its name to Greek Railways Organization (OSE) in 1970, forming what is the contemporary under study company., 
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OSE, as an enterprise, belongs 100 % to the Greek State. The president, vice-president 
and four more of the nine members of the Board'are appointed by the Government. 
Like most railway enterprises, ý OSE lacks a precise definition of objectives from the 
state-owner's point of view. External control over the enterprise is attempted mainly by 
financial control. Since the enterprise's financial results produce continuously a 
deficit, and since the investment plans draw heavily on state support, governmenes 
financial control has gradually extended to such operational issues as personnel 
recruitment, personnel salaries, pricing policy, purchase of equipment and materials, etc. 
To be precise, rather than recording a move towards the direction of increased state 
intervention, one could identify the absence of a move towards the implementation of the 
legislation which produced an autonomous enterprise (OSE) in the place of a government 
department (SEK). Thus, in practice, not much has changed since the pre-1970 period, 
though official records indicate the contrary. 
7.5. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ENTERPRISE 
Table 10 provides a picture of the 12 networks within the European Community, as 
emerging from International Union of Railways (UIC) data, for the year 1985. Since 
comparisons cannot readily be made by the use of the information, in this table, Table 11 
produces comparable indices. Thus, as may be seen, though OSE has one of the low 
' 
est ratios 
of number of personnel per km of railway line (which, at first might be seen as justifying 
frequent requests for permission to employ additional staff), at the same time OSE has 
výery low productivity indices, both in terms of production per employee and in terms of 
production per km of railway line. Though productivity is strongly related to 
technology- in-use as well (which cannot be revealed by these indices), the poor 
performance of the company is quite clear, especially in comparison with networks of 
similar population densities and size. 
Poor performance of the under study company is reflected in its market share, both in 
the passenger and the freight traffic businesses. Figures 22 and 23 display the market 
shares of selected European Railways for the year 1983 (data from European Conference of 
Ministers of Transport). The share of the Greek Railways (4% in passenger and 8% in 
freight transport respectively) is probably the lowest in Europe. Besides organizational 
characteristcs leading to poor performance, the follo*wing notes should be made, to provide 
for a more clear picture: 
(1) Traditionally, freight in Greece has been the duty of sea transport. Recall that 
a large number of ships carry the Greek flag, which by the way, is not an 
opportunity flag, in that almost all of these ships belong to Greeks. 
(2) As a result of the geographical position of the country, transit traffic is 
almost negligible. 
(3) The majority of substantial industrial units are located either next to a port 
(i. e., bauxite mines, aluminium, cement factories) or next to production (coal 
mines adjacent to electricity production units). 
(4) Greek Railways do, not operate any urban or suburban passenger services, which, 
in most cases, account'for a large part of the reported performance statistics. 
Figure 24 shows the development of the traffic transported by Greek Railways during a 
period of 15 years (1970-1985). After a period of continuous decline, traffic volume has ' 
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started increasing slightly since 1985 but, nevertheleis, it still fluctuates around the 
values of early 1970's. Considering that during these 15 years overall traffic has 
substantially increased (e. g., the numbers of cars in operation in 1970 and 1979 were 226 
893 and 744 692 respectively, i. e. 3 282 % increase in eight years), the market share of 
Greek Railways is steadily decreasing. 
Table 12 displays the annual deficit of the company expressed in both current and 
constant prices (base year 1977). The difficult financial position of the company is 
clear. However, no conclusions concerning financial performance can be drawn, since the 
railway holds the government partly responsible for these financial results, for not 
complying to the articles of the existing financial agreement (i. e., not paying interest 
payments, not subsidising financially non-viable lines, enforcing unfavourable pricing 
policy, etc. ) 
Finally, Table 13 shows the numbers of personnel employed between years 1978 and 1985. 
Considering that in years 1984-1985 1 859 people were employed in order to cover needs 
arising from the five-day week implementation and that, in the same years, staff employed 
in modernization projects and salaried against investment budgets has been included (which 
was not the case till 1983), no significant changes are recorded. On the other hand, the 
large number of seasonal staff exerts a pressure (requiring a permanent job), which in 
Greece is usually resolved in periods immediately prior to general elections; i. e., every 
party in power exchanges political support with a permanent job, validating the 
conclusions made in Chapter 5 (influence of political considerations) and recycling the 
problem of preferability between social ease'(judged in this case by the rate of 
unemployment) and public enterprise's performance. 
RAILWAY COUNTRY Area Popltn 
Charact eristics Railway Tra ffic 
(km2) Win) Length Personnel Passengers Passenger-km Tonnes Tonne-km 
(km) (million) (mil lion) (million) (mill ion) 
BR Great Britain 244 046 56 760 16 670 171 400 689.4 30 800 138.4 16 565 
CFL Luxemburg 2 586 360 270 3 785 10.6 224 14.6 543 
CH-OSE Greece 131* 944 9 970 2 461 14 596 11.7 1 950 4.1 689 
CIE Ireland 70 283 3 540 1 944 5 000 21.7 1 075 3.1 574 
CP PortugaL 92 082 10 290 3 603 21 433 224.5 5 803 5.3 1 328 
DB FR Germany 248 577 61 050 27 490 272 790 1 023.0 41 397 277.2 9 581 
DSB Denmark 43 069 5 120 2 471 21 437 144.3 4 536 7.4 1 791 
FS Italy 301 225 57 220 16 088 214 947 397.0 40 500 51.7 17 476 
NS Holland 40 844 14 560 2 817 27 474 210.5 8 919 19.1 3 107 
RENFE Spain 504 782 38 760 12 721 66 509 193.4 
I 
15 646 29.4 11 077 
SNCR Belgium 30 M 9 910 3 618 55 193 139.1 6 069 63.3 7 442 
SNCF France 337 032 55 390 
ý34 
441 233 04 769.0 59 618 144.5 51 016 
Table 10: The Twelve Railways: Principle Characteristics 
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RAILWAY 
popLtn 
density 
inhbts/ 
sq. km 
employees 
per km of 
railway 
Line 
passenger- 
km 
per 
employee 
tonne- 
km 
per 
employee 
passenger-km 
per km of 
railway 
Line 
tonne-km 
per km of 
railway 
Line 
BR 233 10.28 179.69 96.64 1 847.63 993.40 
CFL 139 14.02 59.18 143.46 $29.62 2 011.11 
CH-OSE 76 5.93 133.60 47.20 792.36 279.96 
CIE 50 7.72 71.67 38.26 552.98 295.27 
CP 112 5.95 61.96 368.58 
DB 246 9.92 151.75 35.12 1 505.89 348.53 
DSB 119 8.68 211.59 83.54 1 835 69 724.81 
FS 190 13.36 188.42 81.30 2 517.40 1 086.27 
NS 356 9.75 324.63 113.09 3 166.13 1 102.95 
RENFE 77 5.22 235.25 166.55 1 229.93 870.76 
SNC8 329 15.26 109.95 134.84 1 677.45 2 056 94 
SNCF 164 6.78 255.43 218.57 1 731.01 1 481.26 
Table 11: The Twelve Railways: Productivity Ratios 
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Figure 22: Railway Share in Passenger Land Transport in Selected Countries (1983) 
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Figure 24: Greek Railways (OSE-CH): Development of Traffic Volume 1970-1985 
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real prices constant prices (1977). 
year 
miltion drs. % change mRLion drs. % change 
1979' 1 872 1 109 
* 24.1 + 0. ý 
1980 2 323 1 116 
* 38.8 + 20.0 
1981 3 224 1 339 
* 59.8 + 22.9 
1982 5 154 1 646 
* 20.9 - 3.1 
1983 6 232 1 595 
* 26.0 - 6.8 
1984 7 853 1 486 
* 43.3 + 9.2 
1985 11 252 1 623 
k 
Table 12: Greek Railways: Arnual Deficit 1979-1985 
Year 
personnet 
1978 1979 19so 1981 1982 1983 
I-permanent 
offices personnet 1 383 1 355 1 325 1 310 1 287 1 234 
operations 2 951 3 Oll 2 904 2 851 2 9BO 2 873 
rotting stock' 3 22S 2 849 3 055 2 791 2 859 3 039 
permament way 3 394 3 301 3 169 3 085 2 995 2 974 
other operationat 330 589 350 565 345 356 
Permanent totat 11 313 11 105 10 803 10 602 10 466 10 476 
2. seasonat 1 670 1 367 1 337 1 516 1 400 1 708 
totat 12 983 12 472 12 140 12 IiS 11 866 12 184 
1984 1 
1 238 
2 T15 
3 237 
2 779 
313 
10 342 
1985 1 
1 226 
3 174 
3 262 
2 670 
314 
10 646 
3 074 4 434 
13 416 15 080 
Tabte 13: Greek Raitways: Staff Emptoyed 1978-1985 
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7.6. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE -GREEK RAILWAYS " 
Today's organizational structure of the company is the best image of ambiguities 
concerning its objectives, capabilities and relationships both with the state/owner and 
the environment. A brief historical explanation is provided, since, without this 
explanation, much of the structure seems irrelevant. The following periods will be 
considered: 
The period prior'to the SEK-SPAP merger (1962); 
The period of nationwide government ran railway (SEK, - 1962-1970); 
The period of state-owned autonomous enterprise (OSE, 1970-1983); and 
The 
-recent period, after the 'socialization' of the railway enterprise 
(1983-today). 
Organizational structures for each of these periods are displayed in Appendix B 
(Figures BI to B4). 
7.6.1. The Period Prior to the SEK-SPAP Merger (1962)' 
As stated, till 1962 two major companies were operating: state-owned SEK, ran as a 
governmental department, and private SPAP (and SVDE over a 75 km line from Kryoneri, 
opposite to Patras, to Agrinio). As gradually both SPAP and SVDE went public,, discussions 
started for the merger of all railways into one company. With the exclusion of the third 
Regional (Peloponnese) Department (DPP), Figure BI corresponds to the organizational 
structure of SEK at that time (1958). The structure consists of two regional departments, 
Athens Region (DPA) and Thessaloniki Region (DPTh), reporting directly to the General 
Manager. Within each of the two regions, three principle divisions operated: Operations 
Division (YEK), Track and Permanent Way Division (YGR), and Rolling Stock and Materials 
Division (YEL). Tasks of each division were carried out as follows: 
Operations Division Manager (YEK) was reported by four Operations Area Inspectors 
(EPITH), each of whom was responsible for a number of stations and traffic bureaus 
on a geographical basis. 
Track and Permanent Way Division Manager (YGR) was reported by four Track Area 
Managers (TM. GR), one Area Manager for Bridges and Ironworks (TNIK), and one Area 
Manager for Telegraphs/Telecommunications (TT), the two later having 
responsibilities over the whole region. Each Track Area Manager (TM. GR) was reported 
by a number of foremen, responsible for parts of the network. Similarly, Bridges 
Manager (TMK) was reported by bridges/ironworks shop foremen and foremen of the 
mobile maintenance units. Finally, Telecommunications Manager (TT) was reported by a 
number of maintenance foremen. 
Rolling Stock and Materials Division Manager (YEL) was reported by the Regional Workshop Manager (ERSIA), controlling his unit with the help of workshop foremen, and the main regional depot manager (MHXSIA), responsible for his depot (through foremen) and for small local depots (through their managers). 
The Regional Department had its own administrative, financial control, 
operational control, etc. offices. 
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Outside the decentralised structure. - five headquarters 'departments were reporting to the 
General Manager 
Financial Affairs (DOY), 
Permanent Way'(DG), 
Operations (DEK), 
Traction and Materials (DEL), and 
New Projects (DMK); 
The last one (New Projects Department) reflects within the railway environment an old 
national tradition, according to which national development is viewed as an aggregation of 
projects, notably civil ei)gineering projects. Though in early periods of the country's 
independence this view might be justified by the lack of the necessary, infrastructure, it 
has always eversince been like that. Thus, at a government level, a Ministry of Public 
Works has always existed, with responsibilities extended to whatever might be assessed as 
major project: hydroelectric stations, motorways, ports, airports, hospitals, etc 
(unfortunately railway's infrastructure never happened to come under the wings of this 
gigantic Ministry, hence the underdevelopment). 
Besides this irrelevant New Projects Department (DMK), the rest of the headquarters 
structure seemed rational. The role of these departments was merely that of monitoring, 
coordinating and planning at corporate level, without having any organizational power over 
the regional structure., ý11.1 
At the same time, the organization of SPAP was similar, but simpler, in that it lacked 
a regional structure, since the company was in fact contained within one geographical 
region, the Peloponnese. , 
7.6.2. The Nationwide SEK Period (1962-1970) 
The merger added to SEK's organizational structure a third region, the Peloponnese 
(DPP), beyond which no other major change in structure was recorded. Headquarters 
departments and offices accounted only for 1.9% of the total personnel number, with 252 
employees. Organizational structure of that time is displayed in Figure BI. 
Sofrerall 6, which undertook at that time a study of Greek Railways on behalf of OECD 
(1966) 7, made a number of proposals concerning, amongst other, the organizational 
structure, and noted: ' 
'The present decentralised organization of SEK is fully compatible with the physical 
layout of the network; the three regional departments correspond to distinct - 
geographical units, having specific charcteristics as regards transport economy in 
the country... 
As a general rule, Regional Departments assure complete accountability over the 
day-to-day railway operations. Headquarters departments and units should remain as 
coordination and planning units, with no direct control over regions. Control is 
achieved via the general manager... . 1, 
We find this solution the best possible and propose to be retained 
As we have already noted, the manpower, of the headquarters departments and units 
should be increased. However, it is essential in our opinion, to avoid any trend of 
these units to intervene in regional administaradon issues, as this trend might 
result from an increase in their manpower... 
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Directions should always be given from the general manager to regional managers. 
Under the framework of these directions, regional managers should retain full 
managerial control". 
As a result of Sofrerall's advices, a major reorganization of headquarters units took 
place, the most significant changes being: 
The creation of a new department (DOMP) in the place of the old DOS, with 
responsibilities over short- and long-term planning, statistics, costing, 
investment,, computer applications and personnel education. 
The recognition of the significance of commercial operations, reflected in the 
dichotomization of the Operations Department (DEK) into two parts: Technical 
Operations (DET) and Commercial Operations (DEM), the former being a synonyme to 
Transportation. I 
An increase in the manpower of headquarters units. 
In order to avoid misunderstandings and to obtain a more integrated picture, the 
following characteristics under which the railway reorganization was taking place must be 
stressed. II 
(1) The railway still lacked any quantificative set of operational objectives. Major 
objective was (and probably still is) the modernization, realised mainly as the 
updating of an old infrastructure. It was hoped (and, in some ways, still is) 
that a modern and fast railway will inevitably produce better financial results. 
Thus, the modernization effort was realised as a series of mainly civil 
engineering projects. I 
(2) The whole country was undergoing a reconstruction. Roads, ports, airports were 
under construction. House building was probably the major financial activity as 
the country was undergoing a rapid transition from agricultural to industrial 
and the cities (notably Athens and Thessaloniki) were growing very fast. 
(3) Within this context, the role of the engineer, notably the civil engineer, was 
assessed as being central to the issue of development. Being so at a national 
level, it was even more within the railways, were, traditionally, engineers had 
been the 'ruling class. Thus, all innovations proposed by Sofrerall in practice 
came under the hands of engineers, who in fact had not much to do with costing, 
statistics, computers and investment. On the other hand, sinmno pressure 
existed for a commercial orientation of the company, the commercial operations 
department (DEM) never gained a, significance within the organizational structure 
and never obtained neither a group of specialists nor a 'loud voice' within the 
enterprise. ,I$ 
7.6.3. The 'Autonomous Enterprise' OSE period (1970-1983) 
All above statements extend into the period starting at 1970, with the creation of an 
autonomous public enterprise (OSE) in the place of the government railway department (SEK). In fact, Sofrerall's intervention was related to government's wish to cope with the 
problem of the poor-performing state-owned nationwide railway, and the report it produced 
was taken as basis for the design of the new enterprise. Sofrerall's consultancy, 
extending as already stated to a number of company's issues, ended as late as 1977. 
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As Sofrerall had forecasted, the increased power of headquarters units (increased in 
fact both in quantitative and qualitative, Le, status teTMS) resulted to a gradual 
alteration of the balance of power between headquarters and regional departments. 
A first reason was that since the enterprise lacked any commercial orientation and its 
performance'was related to the completion of a series of modernization projects, it was 
assumed that these projects could be better supervised centrally. For example, since the 
introduction of track continuous welding required some specialised knowledge, and since 
this knowledge existed (to the degree that existed) within the headquarters Permanent Way 
Department (DG), and since most of the Permanent Way system operation was a series of such 
modernization projects, the control of the regional Permanent Way Division (YGR) passed, 
in reality, from the regional manager (DPER) to the Permanent Way manager (DG), though 
this was never reflected in the existing organization structure. Indeed, the Permanent Way 
(DG) manager had no reason to ask for formal control over regional Permanent Way Divisions 
(YGR), as far as this kind of control is always associated with accountability and 
performance assessment. Headquarters departments gained gradually total control of what 
should be done, when and how, without having any responsibilities for the actual results. 
A second reason relates to the bad financial position of the railway and results, 
paradoxically at a first glance, to the multiplication of headquarters departments. Till 
very recently (1985), salaries within OSE were related to organizational position. 
Obviously, the highest salaries corresponded to the rank of the Head of Department. The 
bad financial possition of the railways (and the state control over salary policies) did 
not allow for salary increases. Thus, the enterprise had to find a way of compensating its 
upper level employees, and this was achieved by dichotomizing almost any Department which 
could produce a minimally acceptable reason for this dichotomization. A careful look at 
the Figures BI, B2; and B3 (Appendix B) will reveal the way in which the four headquarters 
departments of the 1960s became fourteen, in late 1970s. Besides the formation of DONIP and 
the dichotomization of DEK into Commercial (DEM) and Technical (DET), the following took 
place: 
A Personnel Department (DP) was formed, which, gradually, took a lot of personnel 
responsibilities out from the regional structure. This department in 1980 produced a 
counterpart, the Administrative Affairs Department (DD), which tries hard to define 
beureaucratic duties in, order to justify its existence. 
Financial Affairs Departrment (DOY) produced two more: Financial Control Department 
(DOE) and Receipts Control Department (DEE) under broadly the same process. 
Responsibilty for materials was taken from the Traction and Materials Department 
(DEL) and a Materials and Stores Department (DYL) was formed, further broken down in 
1980 into Purchases Department (DIP) and Stores Department (DAP). 
A New Projects Department appears from time to time under different names, either. as 
DNIK, or DK, or, recently, as DNE. 
This organizational confusion relates also to pressures of the, non-engineering personnel 
over a structure, which, under the 1960s organization, provided only one (1) place for promotion 
to upper managerial jobs for not engineers., i. e., the Department of Finance (DOY). 
Ending up with fourteen headquarters departments, a way of co-ordinating and controlling 
them should be invented. Thus, since the former rank of General Manager had been replaced by the Governor and the deputy Governor, provision was made for three"general managers, with 
responibilities over Personnel and Finance, Rolling Stock and Materials, and Permanent Way and operations respectively. Three more top level jobs were created, increasing thus the 
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opportunities for better paid upper personnel, and minimising the possibilities for 
management control over the enterprise. Figure B2 illustrates this counter- productive 
structure, Under such a structure there is little wonder why actually accountability 
terminated at the regional divisional level (YEK, YEL, and YGR). ýI 
7.6.4. The 'Sociallsed' Railway Enterprise (1983-today) 
The election of a new government in 1981 produced hopes that things might change. A 
first move, i. e., the elimination of the three general managers places was promising 
further changes. However, the new management didn't prove to be much more thoughtful than 
the one it replaced, though it engaged in a lot of non- professional attempts to put this 
structure into move. Thus: 
A sort of matrix corporate management was attempted in 1983, by the formation of two 
groups, a long-term (strategic) planning group and a short-term (tactical) planning 
group. Both groups had a sort life, mainly because their members lacked a 
corporate status within the company (particularly the tactical planning group 
consisted of willing-to-help rather young employees, without 
decisive positions within the vertical functional structure), but also because top 
management had not set clear objectives. 
A Co-ordination Department (DIS) was formed in 1984 and abandoned three years later, 
without anyone taking in fact notice of its existence. Indeed, within an enterprise 
where everyone is "coordinating", since, as explained, neither headquarters nor 
regional management-had, for a long time, botom-line responsibilities, it would be 
strange to assess that what was lacking was a coordinating department. 
Before discussing further organizational changes, having resulted to the contemporary 
structure (which are of importance since managers of this structure are the subject of the 
survey to follow), a few notes should be made on the developing general climate during this 
period, which is relevant to this study, since it had a lot of implications on both the 
character and the structure of the enterprise. 
General elections of, 1981 brought in power the Socialist Party, with a strong public support 
(48 % of the votes), which support was renewed in 1985, though somewhat reduced (45 %). This was 
the first time that a non- conservative party was forming a government in this country. Great 
expectations were grown among the majority of the population (recall that another 10-12 % vote 
for the Communist Party). These expectations related also to emotional factors, taking into 
consideration events in recent history of the country such as the Resistance (1941-1944) guided 
by the Left, the Civil War (1946-1949) and the military dictatorship (1967-1974). These 
emotional features were exploited to the end by the rather populistic: character of the Socialist 
Party, and, indeed, were one of the keys to its electoral victory. Thus, issues like 
self-management of public enterprises, central role of trade unions to the development, and the 
like, were very popular, though not at all defined and planned in any details. At the same. time, 
since all - over- the -world civil servants and public enterprises personnel are the very first, 
among the working population, to declare their support to the ruling party, not surprisingly 
public sector trade unions "went socialist" (though this argument draws on personal experience, 
it would be injust to assume that support to the government was limited to the public sector; as 
already stated, the ruling party holds a strong majority of votes). A central element in the 
party's electoral programme was that of the 'soclalisation' of basic sectors of the national 
economy. The term was in fact an invention to replace not very popular definitions such as 
nationalization, state- ownership, etc. The clear meaning of socialisation was never realised as 
far as private sector of the-economy is concerned. In this sector, things proceed in the way 
they have always been, during the long pre-socialists period, Le, under a framework of state 
paternalistic capitalism, where government's intervention varies in magnitude in different 
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periods, defined primarily not by ideological/political terms., but by the overall 
performance of the national economy. However, since something should be done about 
"socialisation", as it constituted a major pre-electoral promise, it was applied to the 
public sector of the economy, precisely to three public enterprises: the railways, the 
telecommunications, and the electricity. The socialisation of the public sector was not 
strongly supported by either the personnel of the enterprises, or the public opinion 
formulators, since it was disgraced from the very beginning. Indeed, the Law for the 
Socialisation of Public Enterprises, passed in Summer 1983, consisted of four articles, 
from which only the fourth became immediately active, i. e., the one posing restrictions to 
industrial action in the public sector. The other three articles had to wait for two more 
years. Nevertheless, when implemented, "socialisation" of the Railways involved the 
creation'of a number of social control bodies, referred to earlier in this chapter, 
personnel's participation in the Board, and the creation of four assistants to the General 
Manager, with duties similar to those of the three general managers abolished by the 
ruling party, when it came in power in 1981. 
Figure B3 illustrates the actual organization at the time of the survey (summer 1988). 
Social Control Central (ASKE) and Regional (PESKE) bodies, or Work Conditions Monitoring 
Committees (KES), introduced by the socialisation, 'are not displayed, otherwise the chart 
should not be readable. During this last period, top management arrived at the opinion 
that an organizational solution to the problems should involve the formation of a vertical 
Type I functional structure, to replace regions, which, anyway, had in practice lost any 
managerial -power. Figure B4 illustrates the proposed structure, which, having been 
approved by the Board awaits ministerial approval (controversially, in an 'autonomous' 
public enterprise, even organizational changes are subject to the approval of the 
minister). Though not yet officially introduced, Type I structure is gradually being 
implemented. Thus: 
Any kind of responsibility for rolling stock repair/maintenance has been taken away 
from the regions and belongs now to a vertical organization (Department of Rolling 
Stock-DISTY). 
Signalling, Electrical and Telecommuni cations Regional Units (TTHE) report now to a 
functional division (YSTHE), not having yet the status of a department, for which 
provision is made in the new organization (DHST). 
The actual organization of OSE, may, thereofore, be defined, according to Wyckoff, as 
hybrid: some functions (rolling stock, signalling) are managed vertically, some other 
(operations, permanent way) are managed regionally. Indeed, this is not exactly the real 
case, since regional management, awaiting its from day to day abolition, refrains from interfering in functional matters and just plays a figurehead role at a geographical 
basis, indeed not very convincingly. 
The lack of any proper foresight for the kind of organization that top management 
wishes to implement is also reflected in the way in which the managing team is working. Thus, there is a technical division of duties between the four assistants to the general 
manager, each"of whom has responsibilities over the following broad areas: 
operations, 
rolling stock, 
Permanent way, and 
personnel and finance. 
Each of the assistants to the general manager has been promoted from the functional 
area for which he is, today responsible. Thus, ' in general, he tends to favour the'views of 
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his function, as contrasted to views of other functions, whenever conflict arises. In this, 
cases, conflict resolution is achieved by the intervention of the general manager, whose 
role is central in this structure, since, according to the legislation he has been 
appointed directly by the Prime-Minister (considered having consulted the Minister of 
Transport), and is the only 'political' person in the managerial hierarchy. 
No provision for an assistant with commercial responsibilities has been made. This 
duty has been allocated to the operations assistant, who is an engineer. Thus, at top 
level, the company returns to the pre-Sofrerail period, as regards the formal rercognition 
of the significance of commercial operations. 
7.6.5. The Future 
When implemented, the new organization, besides having the problem to think of a 
possible way of discharging the commercial function, will also have to solve a number of 
technical problems: 
(1) What will the duties of the four assistants to the General Manager be. Obviously 
the present structure cannot Survive, since it inevitably leads to duplication. 
For example, what will the duties of the operations or the rolling stock 
Assistant be, since, under the new structure, only one relevant functional 
manager reports to him. Note that some duties have been left to the Permanent 
Way Assistant, since the new organization still makes provision for three 
relevant departments: permanent way, signalling and telecommunications, and new 
projects. 
(2) Which way will functions be coordinated locally ? Though some provision has been 
made for a sort of a horizontal organization consisting of the heads of the 
respective local functional units, coordination seems doubtful in the absence of 
a commercial function. 
(3) What is the rationale for the existence of a New Projects Department in a Type I 
structure ? Since the enterprise is organised functionally, which are these 
projects which cannot be contained within functional departments? 
7.6-6. Conclusion 
ý The up-to-know poor performance of the under study company may, partially, be assigned 
to its inadequate or wrong organization. However, this is not the only limiting factor. 
Management control problems in public enterprises, discussed in Chapter 5, and related to 
public ownership seem to constitute the core of the problem. Beer's model may be used in 
order to identify organizational failures or deficiencies. Moreover, the rationale of the 
cybernetic methodology itself may be adopted as a guide, in order to assess the future of 
the company as deriving from managerial opinions on key issues. 
7.7. FOOTNOTES 
A brief history of the Greek Railways is provided, amongst other publications, in: Greek Railways (OSE), 1984: A Synoptical History of the Hellenic Railways (OSE, Athens). 
2. The history, operation, problems and future of the Peloponnese narrow-gauge railway are discussed in: I. Paradissopoulos, 1986: The Peloponnese Railway: Problems and 
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Perspectives (M. Sc. Thesis, Institute for Regional Development, Pantios Graduate School 
of Political Science, Athens). 
3. 
'Options, 
concerning the immediate post-war period, are contained in the following 
publications (in Greek): 
D. Efstratiades, 1954: "The History of the Railway Reconstruction", Synkoenonia 
(Transport), October, pp. 1-42. 
D. Efstratiades, 1957: "A General Plan for a Nationwide Rail Network", Synkoenonia 
(Transport), March-December, pp. 1-61. 
D. Efstratiades, 1959: "Thoughts about the Rail Problem", Synkoenonia (Transport), 
August, pp. 3-1 1. 
E. Frohne, 1959: "A Study of the Condition of 
, 
the Greek Transport System with Specific 
Reference to the Railways", Report to the Greek Government, Athens, January. 
Greek State Railways, 1959: "Railway Management's Opinion on Mr. Frohne's Proposals", 
SEK, Athens, April. 
D. Efstratiades, 1959: "The Five-year Plan for the Reconstruction of the Peloponnese 
Railway and the Benefits from its Implementation", Synkoenonia (Transport), December, 
pp. 3-7. I 
K. Trikoupis, D. Sinis and N. Momferatos, 1959: "Report on the Condition of the Greek 
Railways and Proposals for Its Improvement", Report to the Greek Government, Athens, 
October. 
T. Marinos, 1960: "Moder'nisation and Financial Improve'ment of the Greek Railways", a 
study preliminary to the preparation of the Five-year Economic Development Plan, 
Athens. 
4. Similar legislation applies to the Electricity and Telecommunications enterprises. When 
introduced, the legislation was supposed to be shortly extended to all public interest 
state-owned enterprises,. but it has not yet. 
A detailed description of 
' 
the modernisation project is contained in: Greek Railways 
Organization, 1985: Strategic Planning and Programming for the Improvement of the 
Railway Transport Services and the Overall Performance of the Company (1983-1997), 
Planning and Programming Department (OSE, Athens), September (in Greek). 
6. Sofremil is a subsidiary of the French Railways (SNCF), acting as an international 
railway consultant, in a role similar to the BR-owned Transmark. 
7. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 1966: A General Study of 
the Railways of the Greek State (SEK), Report prepared by Sofrerail, Paris. 
CHAPTER 13 
CASE STUDY CYBERNETICS 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous parts of this thesis have provided information concerning both the 
theoretical framework (Chapters 2-5), and the way in which this framework relates to a 
railway enterprise (Chapter 6). Background information concerning the subject of this 
research, i. e., the Greek Railway, has also been provided (Chapter 7). It seems, 
therefore, that this is the time to undertake an investigation of the specific enterprise 
under the selected methodology. This investigation draws mainly on the author's perception 
of reality, being a result of a long-term actual participation within the company. It also 
draws on published material concerning the enterprise, Le, the legislation defining its 
duties and organization, statistical information, etc. 
Thus, the present chapter, providing a detailed account of the application of the 
viable system's model in the specific organization, reflects an 'ethnographic' type of 
research, which might constitute an objective in itself and mark the end of this thesis. 
However, this is not actually the way in which the findings of this chapter will be 
employed. 
This chapter should be perceived as a preliminary, or pilot, study, highlighting 
organizational problems, the real dimensions of which will derive by interpreting the 
views of the 'actors, of the management control issue, i. e., the managers of the 
enterprise themselves. The general layout and the characteristics of the survey within the 
case study which follows draw heavily on the findings of this chapter. By making this 
explicit, the evaluation of both the survey design and findings is facilitated. 
According to Espejo (1980), the response of the enterprise to the complexity of the 
environment is achieved through its implementation function, i. e., the subsystems which 
are doing what the enterprise is supposed to do . Thus, the organization of these subsystems is of central relevance in studying effectiveness. However, this is not enough; 
even if their organization is good, if the subsystems are not integrated to the company 
then the organization of the whole may not be effective. Moreover, even if this 
integration is achieved but the company as a whole does not have a capacity to assess 
whether it is 'doing' the right things, it may well be the case that the company may not 
survive in the long run. 1 
Thus, the cybernetic study of the Greek Railways, undertaken in this chapter, may involve the following three steps: 
(1) studying the organization of the implementation function; 
(2) studying the way in which this function is controlled by corporate management; and 
(3) studying corporate management itself. 
Chapter 8 -159- Case Study Cybernetics 
9.2. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION FUNCTION 
The implementation function of a railway enterprise consists, as discussed in Chapter 
6, of four systems ONE, i. e., operations, rolling stock, permanent way and installations, 
and signalling and telecommunications. Whether these systems appear as systems ONE at 
the first or the second level of recursion relates, as shown, to the existence or not of 
regional organization. The resulting Type I and Type II structures have been presented. 
However, in trying to identify the implementation function in the case-study at the first 
level of recursion, a difficulty arises, which has to do with the unclear character of 
regional management. 
Since the organization of the company is undergoing a change, the role of regional 
managers is further 
' 
minimised, as they are expected shortly to be abolished after the 
introduction of a functional vertical structure. However, at the time of the survey. 
regional management (DPER) still existed and was supposed to preside over a regional 
organization consisting of operations (YEK) and permanent way (YGR) divisions. The study 
will first provide some reasons for the failure of regional management in terms of 
managerial cybernetics, and proceed in examining the four elements of the implementation 
function at the third level of recursion. 
8.2.1. The Failure of Regional Management (DPER) 
At the first level of recursion, the implementation function of Greek Railways used to 
consist of four systems ONE. Three of these systems were organized on a geographical basis 
and contained all operations, permanent way, day-to-day rolling stock maintenance, 
signalling, and telecommunications activities taking place within this area (Region). 
Three such regions existed: 
Athens Region (DPA), 
Thessaloniki Region (DPTh), and 
Peloponnese Region (DPP). 
A fourth system ONE, the Mechanical Engineering Department (DER, and then DISTY) 
was responsible for the production of the network's rolling stock workshops (Athens 
Workshop-EP, Thessaloniki Workshop-ETh, and Volos Workshop-EV). This structure is 
displayed in the VSM of Figure 25. 
The principle legislation defining the organization of OSE and the duties of its parts 
is the 1975 Law "On amending, supplementing and coding in a unique text legislation 
concerning the organization of OSE". This Law, though further amended, especially each 
time a new headquarters department was formed (as discussed in Chapter 7), may serve as a 
basis, since, fundamentally, it has not been altered. 
According to this legislation, the Head of each of the three regional departments 
manages the part of the network under his command, being accountable for the 
implementation of commands, rules and directives of corporate management, and the proper 
functioning and optimum performance of the divisions under his command. Specifically: 
(1) Acts as head of the region's personnel. 
(2) Co-ordinates the activities of regional divisions or makes proposals to top 
management for the improvement of this co-ordination. 
(3) Monitors and controls the performance of the divisions and units within the 
region. 
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(4) Monitors transport trends within the region and makes decisions or proposals in 
order to attract or increase traffic volume. 
(5) Monitors financial results of operations and makes proposals for alterations of 
pricing policies. 
etc. 
Though this legislation seems to realise the region as a system ONE in its own right 
at the first level of recursion, from the very beginning poses constraints to this 
managerial freedom. Thus regional management's freedom is limited in that in most cases it 
is rather allowed to make proposals to the top rather than making its own decisions. 
Combining this feature with the inherited characteristic of the public manager, who will 
not very usually engage in proposals, especially when considering that these proposals 
will come under the scrutiny of an autopoietic bureaucratic corporate structure, we meet a 
major constraint in performance improvement within the first article concerning the duties 
of regional manager, that is, the lack of bottom line responsibility. 
The same legislation does not make provision for any way in which the regional 
manager, even under these constraints, might discharge the stated duties. It doesn't 
provide for any sort of system TWO via which the regional manager should co-ordinate and 
monitor. In the formal organization, no unit or office directly reporting to the 
regional manager apart from the management of the functional divisions can be identified. 
In fact there is one more unit, the Administration Unit (DY), which is engaged in clerical 
duties, personnel affairs, etc. Thus, the regional manager is supposed to monitor the 
performance of a regional division, e. g., the permanent way division (YGR), either on the 
basis of information he personally receives and analyses or, more frequently, on the basis 
of complaints of the other regional divisions (operations, rolling stock, signalling) 
or headquarters departments (Permanent Way-DG, New Projects-DNE) related to the 
performance of this division. A sort of coordination might have been achieved if the 
planning process was intergrated within the region, and, further, within the company. 
However, this is not the case. Planning is an annual functional formal exercise with not 
at all regional integration. It is very usually the case, for example, for a major rolling 
stock maintenance build ing/installation construction project to be accepted and included 
in the annual plan, without the regional permanent way unit, which in fact will undertake 
all activities related with the completion of this project having the slightest idea, or 
having included the project in its annual programming, approved also at corporate level. 
Similarly, regional system ONE lacks any sort of system FOUR, involved in continuous 
scanning of the environment in order to realise the future of the company within the 
region. Anything concerning the future of the company as a whole or as a sum of regions, 
is studied, analysed and decided at corporate level. Thus, regional management is cut off 
its environment. 
Not possessing any sort of system FOUR operations and lacking any system TWO 
mechanisms, obviously Regional system ONE cannot perform any system THREE or system 
FIVE duties, apart from trying to resolve on a crisis basis, operational matters arising, 
by presiding over informal and not periodical meetings with divisional regional 
management. This situation is illustrated in Figure 26. 
Thus, regional management's inherited inability to function properly has in fact led 
to its abolition, shortly to be formally expressed in the new organization structure. 
However, a number of real reasons which produced this outcome have already been postulated 
in the previous chapter. 
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Before reorganization, regional system ONE contained, at the next level of recursion, 
four systems ONE: operations, permanent way, rolling stock and signalling and 
telecommunications, which will, in turn, be examined. 
Two of these four systems, Le, operations (YEK) and permanent way (YGR) are still 
today contained within the regional structure. 
8.2.1.1. Regional Railway Operations Division (YEK) 
Figure 27 provides a flowchart-like illustration of the activities within system ONE 
railway operations. This illustration rests on the analysis provided in Chapter 6. 
The flowchart is very simplistic in that it involves only one train and one terminal. 
Therefore, in the discussion that follows a whole set of running trains and operating 
terminals within a region should be considered. 
The legislation under which the operations regional division (YEK) functions assigns 
to this division the 'care, 2 for the implemenation of train services, for the attraction 
of traffic and the assurance of undisturbed and safe circulation of trains. Two principle 
offices report to the engineer, head of this division: 
Commercial Operations Office (YEK/EM), having the following duties: 
- to take care for the offering, by all means, any kind of services to 
passengers (buffets, buffets cars, sleeping cars, etc. ); 
- to monitor the efficiency of stations and freight depots; 
- to handle matters related with customers complaints, press publications, 
etc. public relations; 
- to make proposals for construction of new sidings. 
undertakings; 
- to perform market research and to gain the maximum possible traffic by 
making appropriate decisions or proposals to top management; 
- to cooperate with other transport companies in order to provide combined 
transport services; 
- to monitor optimum utilization of rolling stock; ' 
- to propose the establishment of agencies or travel offices and to monitor 
and control their performance; 
to monitor financial activity in all sectors of national economy; 
to monitor activities and services offered by competing transport 
Technical Operations Office (YEK/T) with duties: 
- to prepare train timetables, on the basis of demand as assessed by the 
Commercial Operations Office; 
- to decide on train composition; 
- to decide on terminals staff and trains crews shifts, etc. 
- to monitor punctuality and to make decisions to improve it. 
- to monitor lighting, central heating ad cleanliness of trains and stations. 
- to regulate train operations. 
Thus, considering the formally prescribed duties of the operations system ONE at the 
second level of recursion, legislation provides for the realisation of operations division (YEK) as a system ONE in its own right, since it is supposed to possess: 
a local system FOUR, in the form of commercial operations office (YEK/EM), and 
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a system TWO function, divided between commercial and technical operations offices. 
However, though the flowchart of Figure 27 identifies eight systems ONE at the third 
recursive level, supposed to be managed by system ONE operations, three of them, i. e., 
train cleaning/servicing, train fuelling and train driving, in practice do not report to 
the operations division (YEK) but to the depots (MHXSIA), being thus parts of the rolling 
stock system ONE. This has always been a major problem in the proper functioning of the 
Greek Railway, which, paradoxically, instead of being solved by bringing depots under the 
wings of the operations division, has followed the extremely opposite way. Thus, on the 
way to the implementation of the vertical functional organization, depots do not belong 
anymore to the regional structure, but to the functional rolling stock repair and 
maintenance department (DISTY). Thus, problems arising, which in the past were resolved at 
regional level, by the cooperation of the regional operations (YEK) and the regional 
rolling stock (YEL) managers, or by the intervention of the regional manager (DPER), now 
they formally require interdepartmental cooperation. 
The v6ray in which this problem is solved in real life, i. e., by the development of 
informal communication, is expected to be revealed by the survey. The survey will also 
show whether systems TWO and FOUR of the operations subsystem possess adequate potential 
to carry out their tasks in the formally correctly prescribed way. 
The remaining operations within this system ONE (i. e., terminal operations and train 
crewing) are managed by the regional operations manager (YEK) via a structure, consisting 
of. 
TERMINAL 
OPERATIONS 
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Figure 27: Railway Operations 
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the area inspectors (EPITH), responsible for terminals operations. Three or four 
area inspectors exist within each region, with duties extended over a geographical 
area, containing stations, haults, freight terminals and yards. 
the train crews central office (KGPA), co-ordinating and controlling the train 
crewing function through local train crews offices (GPA). 
8.2.1.2. The Permanent Way Regional Division (YGR) 
According to the formal organization, the duties of this division are: 
to organize, in general, and to control duties related to the maintenance of the 
track, the track subgrade. buildings, technical works, bridges and other 
installations within the region; 
to undertake construction projects or to supervise such projects when subcontracted; 
and 
to take any measure related to the safety and the insurance of the assets of the 
enterprise. 
As a system ONE in its own right, the regional permanent way division is headed by the 
chief civil engineer (YGR). System TWO activities within the division are handled by the 
technical office (YGR/T), which, according to the legislation: 
- monitors the quality of construction projects undertaken within the region; 
- monitors the quality of track and permanent installations maintenance works; 
- proposes to the chief engineer works to be included in the annual programme; 
- monitors the expenditure of projects undertaken; 
- proposes to the chief engineer acquisition of materials and mechanical equipment; 
and 
- monitors the implementation by the operating units of issued rules, directives, 
etc. 
The technical office of the regional Permanent Way Division is probably the less 
problematic unit within the whole organizational structure. Probably it is the only 
functioning unit within the contemporary Regional Department (DPER). This is related to 
the following issues: 
it reflects traditional attention payed within Greek Railways to civil engineering 
operations, as explained in previous section. 
it is adequately staffed. Usually, within a permanent way technical office, four 
civil engineers are employed and a relative number of technicians, draughtsmen etc. 
As legislation assigns to this unit a further duty *to prepare studies referring to 
minor projects", and since headquarters civil engineering units are usually either 
overloaded or inefficient, a lot of, technical studies work is finally undertaken by the 
technical office, since almost any work within the railway may be described as minor 
project. Thus, a civil- engineering- study tradition is emerging within the regions, which 
tends to lead to deviation from the principle character of the technical office as the 
Permanent Way Division's system TWO. 
A further characteristic of the regional Permanent Way Division (YGR) is that it lacks 
an autonomous system FOUR function. As decisions about infrastructure development and 
materials/equipment acquisition are made at corporate level, the regional division has 
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Figure 28: Regional Permanent Way Division (YGR) 
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lost any incentive in continuously maintaining any relationship with its technological or 
physical environment. Contacts with modern technology and relevant permanent way issues 
are supposed to be subjects related to the Permanent WAY (DG) and New Projects (DNE) 
corporate departments. From time to time, regional civil engineers participate in such 
technology- injection courses, either by accompanying their headquarters colleagues in 
educational journeys abroad or by undergoing seminars within the company. 
In the absence of system FOUR activities within the division, its management (i. e., 
the chief engineer) collapses to a system THREE role. Thus, in practice, apart from 
seniority there are not distinguishable managerial limits between the chief engineer (YGR) 
and the head of the technical office (YGR/T). Figure 28 illustrates this situation. 
System ONE operations within the division are undertaken by the Permanent Way Area 
Units (TM. GR). There are three or four such units within each region (headed by a civil 
engineer), each of which is responsible over an area broadly coinciding with that of the 
operations inspector. Additionally, an engineering unit with responsibilities over the 
whole region undertakes maintenance works in bridges, switches and other ironworks (TMK). 
In Chapter 6, three sub-systems within system ONE permanent way and installations were 
identified; namely, track, technical works, and buildings and installations. Each 
sub-system was further broken down to maintenance and new construction duties. Not all of 
the thus resulting six types of duties are undertaken by the regional permanent way 
division. A whole department, as earlier stated, the New Projects Department (DNE) is 
engaged in supervising either subcontracted technical studies or subcontracted major 
projects. Further reference to this paradox will be made when discussing the corporate 
structure. 
8.2.1-3. The Signalling and Telecommunications Regional Unit (TTHE) 
This unit is responsible for system ONE signalling and telecommunications operations 
within the region. Its status is not that of a regional division but of an area unit. 
Thus, it lacks a technical office, or, more pricesely, its technical office standards are 
those of the respective permanent way area unit. The increased needs arising from the 
modernization of the network, involving the introduction of electromechanical signalling 
or central traffic control, modern telecommunications etc., are expected to alter 
dramatically the status of this unit, as far as intraorganizational power considerations 
will permit it. 
Recently, the three regional TTHE units have been taken away from the regional 
structure and report now to YSTHE, a former headquarters unit without the status of a 
department, which existed in order to provide a sort of functional closure to this type of 
organization. YSTHE has in the past engaged in a lot of studies concerning modernization 
of signalling and telecommunications systems. However, in the existing structure, this 
unit does not seem to have any power over the study, selection and installation of 
technological systems in this area. 
The signalling and telecommunications area of operations within the Greek Railways is, 
at the moment, very complicated organizationally. The survey is expected to reveal the way in which accountability is diffused between YSTHE, DET, and the Signalling and 
Telecommunications Division of the New Projects Department (DNE/YMESTH). Figure 29 
attempts to show that many operations belonging to this system are performed outside, 
usually at the next higher level of recursion. 
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Figure 29: Signalling/Telecommunications Division (YSTHE) 
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8.2.1.4. The Regional Rolling Stock Division (YEL) 
Again this unit does not exist any more within the regional structure. Until recently, 
i. e., when existed, it was headed by a chief mechanical engineer (YEL), controlling the 
performance of regional depots and locomotives stations via a technical office (YEL/T), 
similar organizationally to that of the Permanent Way Division but much less staffed and 
effective. The main reason why the regional rolling stock technical office was 
underestimated in practice has to do with the overall organization of this division. Thus, 
within each region a depot was reckoned as principle. All local depots and locomotives 
stations were reporting to the principle depot. Under this organization, system TWO and 
THREE duties were performed by the principle depot. Thus, not only the technical office 
but the chief mechanical engineer himself (YEL) could not justify his existence. His 
function, if any, was to facilitate communication flows between his principle depot and 
the other two regional divisions (operations, permanent way) by means of his head of 
division status. In other words, this artificial organizational balancing could have been 
saved by offering to the manager of the principle depot the rank of chief regional 
mechanical engineer. An alternative solution, i. e., to offer to all regional depots the 
same status, might be preferable, but in the specific case of the under study company 
would require major changes, concerning: 
the allocation of duties to regional depots. Today the principle regional depot 
undertakes the vast majority of train servicing, periodic examination and light 
maintenance work. 
the manning of local depots with personnel of respective skills and knowledge. 
As mentioned, a major incentive for organizational changes has, in the past, been the 
wish to increase the number of high-rank positions. Thus, the organization of the Regional 
Rolling Stock Division, though it seems irrelevant as just described, was absolutely 
rational in the organization of the 1960s. Recall that at that period the chief mechanical 
engineer had also power over the materials regional unit. Thus, his role in the 
homeostatic relationship between needs for materials, spare parts and equipment as arising 
from day-to-day rolling stock servicing/maintenance operations of depots on the one hand 
and the capabilities of the supplying unit on the other was crucial. 
Further description of depots' duties and operations will be provided in the following 
section, which depicts the organization of the rolling stock system as it is today. 
8.2.2. Rolling Stock Repair and Maintenance (DISTY) 
This new department is a major attempt to depart from a regionalised to a functional 
structure. At the moment it contains all activities undertaken in the past by either the 
regional rolling stock divisions (YEL) or the workshops' department (DER). An office 
concerned with train drivers shifts and control has been retained within the regions, 
under the name rolling stock division technical office (YEL/T). 
In Chapter 6, two major subsystems were distinguished within the rolling stock system ONE, and were defined as rolling stock repair and rolling stock maintenance respectively. It was also shown that the limits between these two subsystems are not very clear and they 
rather relate to the amount of the work undertaken on a unit of the fleet and to the time it has to be taken from operations. 
Even before the formation of this global functional department, general rules, 
periodicity of examinations, directives etc. were decided within one department, the 
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Workshops' Department (DER). The organization of this department is still in use, with the 
addition of the depots. 
Maintenance organizing office (DISTY/YOSTY): 
Deciding on rolling stock modification, maintenance and repair issues. 
Unifying directions in rolling stock repair and maintenance issues. 
Co-ordinating operations of workshops/depots. 
Defining rolling stock maintenance duties and periodicity. 
Assigning maintenance duties to various workshops/depots and organizing the overall 
maintenance function. 
Producing detailed programmes for the duties of workshops/depots and monitoring the 
implementation of these programmes. 
Preparing and distributing maintenance rules and normes. 
Studying and reporting to top management issues related to installations/equipment 
of workshops/depots. 
Preparing the annnual rolling stock repair/maintenance budget. 
Preparing technical studies 
Studying the annual workshops/depots reports on rolling stock behaviour and 
co-ordinating units on the basis of findings of these studies. 
Stock controlling principle materials and spare parts. 
Technical Office (DISTY/TY): 
Supervising operations and performance of workshops/depots. 
Defining standards and costs of rolling stock repair/maintenance jobs. 
Monitoring the implementation of rolling stock repair/maintenance rules and 
directions. 
Studying and proposing methods and means of improving the efficiency of 
repair/maintenance activities. 
Monitoring the expenditure of repair/maintenance activities. 
Monitoring the flow to workshops/depots of mate rials/spares and their consumption. 
Studying issues related to workshops/depots equipment acquisition. 
Participating in rolling stock purchase studies, together with other involved departments (DEL, DET). 
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No clear distinction of duties between these two offices exist. In fact, both engage 
in system TWO and system THREE activities. In the absence of prescribed system FOUR, 
duties, the head of the department (DISTY) gets also involved in day-to-day operations. 
Thus, almost everyone in this department is entitled to manage workshops/depots everyday's 
work. Hence the constant failure to regulate the performance of the Rolling Stock system. 
8.3. CONTROL OF OPERATIONS: CONTROL AND COORDINATION FUNCTIONS 
Before proceeding in examining the way in which corporate management controls the 
implementation function we should recall the overall organization of the enterprise and 
try to realise it in terms of recursive levels. Figure 31 shows the actual organization 
extended over five levels of recursion. At the fifth level we have the units producing the 
company. They are: 
stations, controlling terminal operations, 
crews offices (gpa), controlling train crews, 
permanent way foremen, controlling track, technical works, and 
buildings/installations maintenance, 
movement offices, controlling the train driving function, 
signalling and telecommunications foremen, 
workshops' foremen, and 
depots' foremen. 
At a wider geographical or local basis, these activities are controlled, at the fourth 
level of recursion, by-. 
area inspectors (EPITH) and regional crew offices (KGPA), - 
permanent way area managers (TM. GR/TMK); 
movement offices; 
signalling/telecommunications regional managers (TTHE); 
workshops' managers (ERSIA); and 
depots' managers (MHXSIA). 
The third level of recursion consists of regional operations (YEK), permanent way 
(YGR) and rolling stock (YEL, with the limited function of controlling train drivers) 
managers. At the same level lies, at the moment, the signalling and telecommunications 
unit (YME), whereas, as already stated, no rolling stock management may be identified at 
this level of recursion. This level marks the termination of clear accountability 
allocation. Further up, accountability is lost somewhere between regional management and 
headquarters departments. 
9.3.1. Structural Obstacles of Operational Control 
An assessmefit of the effectiveness achieved by corporate management in its task to 
control ongoing operations involves the examination of linkages between systems ONE, TWO 
and THREE, i. e., between implementation, coordination and control functions in terms of 
requisite variety. A major constraint has already been identified in the unclear 
subsysternic status of regional management (DPER) and has been discussed in details. The following organizational deficiencies also affect the way in which control is exercised in 
the company- 
(1) The non-recognition of 'signalling/telecommunications' activities as a subsystem. As 
the company introduces modern technology, the emphasis is gradually shifted from the 
Chapter 8 -173- Case Study Cybernetics 
Board 
General Manager 
AGMEL AGMEK AGMGR AGMPR 
DEL 
DP DD DEE DAP 
DPER 
DISTY 
_j 
RAILWAY 
-S-S-" 
I 
I 
S 
I 
stations 
qpa 
foremen 
offi 
L-El 
i 
foremen 
L-E] 
i 
foremen 
5 
------------------------------------------0-a-, -0 ---. 
Figure 31: Formal Organization vs. Recursive Levels 
i L 
................ 0 
Chapter 8 -174- Case Study Cybernetics 
permanent way area towards signalling and telecommunications systems, involving as 
divergent projects as introduction of electromechanical signalling, central traffic 
control systems, telecommunication networks involving systems for the transmission and 
reception of messages by means of traditional telephones, radiotelephones, computers, 
etc., installation and operation of sophisticated automated level crossings warning and 
guarding systems, and so on. Activities related to decisions concerning technological, 
operational, financial, organizational etc. dimensions of these problems are, therefore, 
consuming a large amount of managerial variety at corporate level. However, the existence 
of a signalling/telecommunications subsystem would facilitate both the absorbtion of a far 
larger variety concerning this kind of activities and the allocation of corporate variety 
more effectively elsewhere. Additionally, in the absence of an accountable managerial 
structure for this set of activities, no reference levels exist against which the 
performance of this subsystem could be assessed. This condition is limiting organizational 
learning. I 
(2) The division of control for activities of the operations system between three types of' 
units; i. e., regional operations divisions-YEK (controlling terminal operations and the 
function of train crewing of the train operations), regional traction divisions-YEL 
(controlling train driving), and depots-MXSIA (reporting to the rolling stock department 
and undertaking train cleaning and servicing). Under this arrangement, the part of 
operations system activities managed by YEK and YEL is co-ordinated, at regional level, by 
the regional manager (DPER), who, as shown, tends to lack any other kind of managerial 
duties. However,, under present organization, overall control of operations (including 
depots' function) can only be attempted at corporate level. Again, the recognition of the 
full set of activities of the operations system and the respective organizational 
rearrangement would facilitate both a more effective managerial control and the allocation 
of corporate variety to more demanding areas. 
(3) The existence of the controversial new projects department (DNE). By its very nature, 
this department adds largely to the organizational confusion, and not only in respect to 
the control of ongoing activities. Concerning the latter, discussion has been made in 
earlier sections and has been surnmarised in the diagrams of Figures 28 and 29, where, as 
shown, to what relates to permanent way constructions and signalling/telecommunication 
installations subsystems, functional units lack any kind of actual relation to this type 
of activities. The decision for the formation of an independent managerial unit, 
exclusively concerned with the bulk of problems incorporated in a major plan for the 
modernization of the infrastructure is not always wrong, since the variety of these 
problems in no case can be matched by the variety of the operating functional divisions. A 
series of major modernization projects involve technical decisions, technical studies, 
technico- economic appraisal, tender documents preparation, project allocation, project 
engineering, and project management (technical and financial monitoring and control). 
Howeverý any organizational decision concerning this issue has to consider both the impact 
on the oýgoing operations and on future possibilities. Concerning the under study 
enterprise, as regards the new projects department (DNE), any of the following two 
solutions might be adopted and produce an improved outcome: 
it should either be set up as a subsidiary, specialising in infrastructure 
projects studies and construction. Thus, a much larger part of the huge amount of 
environmental variety associated with railway infrastructure technology could be 
absorbed. At the same time, being an 'outsider', the subsidiary, when performing its duties, could be in a more direct way obliged to conform to regulations, as 
regards the impact of these works on day-to-day railway operations. Further, as 
the bulk of the modernization phase will be terminated sooner or later, the 
subsidiary would hopefuly acquire the skills to propose and/or implement railway's 
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proposals concerning further aspects of, not exclusively technological, innovation. The 
subsidiary should also be prepared to safeguard its future, considering cases of domestic 
capital shortage, prohibiting rail investment plans, by developing a purely commercial 
function in the form of an international railway consultancy/construction company. Similar 
subsidiaries have been set up not only by advanced enterprises such as the British 
(Transmark) or the French (Sofrerail) but even in countries possessing a much less 
impressive railway, as Romania (Contransimex) or Ireland (CIE-Consult). 
The alternative would be the abolition of DNE by sharing its duties to two 
functional departments: the existing Permanent Way Department (DG) and the proposed 
Signalling/Telecommunications Department, as discussed in the previous page. The negative 
impact of such a decision on the functioning of the operating divisions is an argument of 
the magnitude of the modernization projects. The existing and undesired emphasis on the 
technological function of the company might be further reinforced. However, the enterprise 
would have hopefuly acquired definite functional control references and saved the risk 
associated with fluctuations of investment funding in future. 
Concluding on this third structural obstacle which was taken up in more detail as it 
is assumed to reflect the main contradiction in a contemporary railway attempting to 
modernize, two prognostications will be made, as why the enterprise will not proceed in 
adopting the first proposal (subsidiary formation). 
The first concerns power considerations. The dominance of the technological function 
within the enterprise has been discussed. Therefore, it is rational to expect that this 
function will resist any attempt implying that engineering should, sooner or later, be 
pushed outside the railway. 
The second reflects the consequent neccesity to set up criteria for assessment of 
the quality of output. The management of the enterprise will be 
i 
in difficulties when, not 
possessing a technological function, will have to demonstrate performance achievements in 
terms other than those it has been used to, i. e., investment absorbed, projects completed, 
plans prepared, etc. 
8.3.2. Corporate Control of Operations 
Corporate control of operations is the duty of the General Manager. In the pursuit of 
this task he is supposed to be assisted by not less than four Assistants and thirteen 
Headquarters Departments. Trying to identify the duties of each of these departments 
should be pointless, since, to a large degree, they merely reproduce themselves attempting 
to justify an existence, which, as shown in Chapter 7, was not decided on the grounds of 
corporate coordination and control requirements. An alternative procedure follows; 
coordination and control of operations are assumed as involving four managerial areas: 
production, sales, personnel, and finance. Production and Sales, considering the company 
as a whole, are realised via the Operations system. Production, Finance and Personnel 
components of managerial activity have also a functional dimension as regards the three 
supporting subsystems, i. e., rolling stock, permanent way, and 
signalling/telecommunications. 
8.3.2.1. Railway Production 
The production of a railway company may be conceived as the number of train-krn 
offered. For passenger services, this production is scheduled in the form of train 
timetables, arrived at after an appropriate knowledge of the market demand. Since a 
railway company has the obligation to publish in advance the passenger services timetable, 
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twice a year; that is, there is a summer and a winter timetable. For freight/parcels 
services, usually there is no published timetable obligation. The enterprise tries to 
accomodate within the network as many trains as possible, provided that this accomodation 
is commercially justified. In this case, the technological configuration of the network 
(sidings, types of wagons, loading/unloading facilities, road vehicles, etc. ) constitutes 
the principle de facto variety attenuator. 
Production control, in the form of monitoring the offering of announced passenger 
services and making optimum use of freight transport capabilities, is not a formal duty of 
any of the thirteen headquarters departments. This responsibility, according to the 
legislation, belongs to the regional manager (DPER). The same manager is responsible, 
according to the legislation, both for production co-ordination and quality control of 
services offered. 
Planned productionmay be influenced mainly by the inability of the rolling stock 
subsystem to offer in the appropriate condition the locomotives and the vehicles 
programmed, or by interruptions of the permanent way and signalling/telecommunications 
subsystems, resulting either from a poor organization of their functional production, or 
from external factors (i. e., adverse climatic conditions). Thus, production control 
inevitably extends to all four systems ONE of the enterprise. The regional structure, as 
initially conceived, was facilitating production control. Each of the three regional 
managers (DPER) had control over all four functional subsystems, as regards day-to-day 
operations. Rolling stock repair (workshops) was the only centrally organised function. 
However, under recent rearrangements, as a lot of related operations has been taken off 
the regional structure, regional manager cannot control the principle element of railway 
production, that is the trains themselves. Neither can he co-ordinate, since not all the 
elements to be co-ordinated maintain with him formal and regular information flows. 
Co-ordination and control of railway production are, therefore, not properly achieved at 
regional level. Neither are they attempted or achieved at any level lower than the General 
Manager himself. since a Production Manager, with a role similar to the former Regional 
Manager but responsibility extended over the totality of the network cannot be identified 
within the existing structure. 
Therefore, production control is a duty of the General Manager, attempted either 
during meetings with his four assistants (AGM) or by directly intervening as low as to the 
fourth level of recursion. Indeed, during the time of the survey, as a major problem of 
the company was rolling stock breakdowns, related either to the lack of technical 
assistance of headqurters units to workshops/de pots, or to shortages of supplies/spares 
(resulting from the controversial organization and legislation), the General Manager 
(being at the time also Chairman of the Board) had daily meetings with the Athens area 
workshop and depots managers (EP, MAI, MPR), to attempt to resolve operational problems. 
At the same time, a structure consisting of the Assistant General Manager Traction 
(AGMEL), and the whole Departments of Traction (DEL), Rolling Stock Repair (DISTY), 
Materials (DIP) and Stores (DAP), supposed to exist exactly in order to resolve such 
problems, was merely an observer of this peculiar arrangement, which provided the most 
explicit statement of organizational failure. 
Central to railway production is the role of the three functional Assistants to the 
General Manager. As shown in Figure 31, each of the three Operations (AGMEK), Rolling 
Stock (AGMEL), and Permanent Way (AGMGR) Assistants attempts a vertical co-ordination 
and control of the respective function (indeed, Permanent Way Assistant had power over two functions, i. e., Permanent Way and Signalling/Telecoms). The need for this functional 
co-ordination and control at corporate level was partially justified by' the confusion 
caused by the unclear status Of regional management (DPER). Thus, for example, since 
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neither regional manager (DPER) in practice, nor Permanent Way manager (DG) according to 
the organizational structure, were responsible for the functioning of the regional 
permanent way divisions (YGR), an ultimate person to blame had to be introduced, and was 
found in the face of the Assistant GM Permanent Way (AGMGR). He should also be 
responsible for the coordination between maintenance (DG, YGR) and constructions (DNE) 
units. However, allocating accountability for the control of 'level 3' activities to a 
'level V unit results in the actual elimination of the recursive 'level 2, structure. 
This structure, consisting of functional headquarters departments, has no reasons to 
complain. For as far as it retains its privileges, that is, status within the company and 
statutory right to intervene irresponsibly from time to time in the 'doing' of the 
implementation function, has only 'lost' the obligation to bother about the outcomes of 
its proposals. Because what the functional AGM probably fails to realise is that he is 
constantly employing the requisite variety of the units he pretends to 'write-ofr. He 
does so by adopting the bulk of their proposals in the form of budgets, plans, reports, 
and suggestions. His limited, due to his human nature, variety handling capacity, instead 
of being employed for the evaluation of these proposals, is spent in attempts to directly 
impose their not evaluated, and, hence, doubtful, implementation. In terms of variety, the 
task is overwhelming. 
In the absence of a Production Manager, production control, as shown, is supposed to 
be ultimately achieved by the General Manager himself. Numerous indications that effective 
control is not achieved may be cited. Achieved rolling stock reliability is one. Delays 
in projects completion or significant deviations from budgeted costs is another. However, 
it seems that the least obvious, in the eyes of the management of the enterprise, reason 
may be offered in terms of variety. No human being has the capacity to handle effectively 
the variety associated with all three Toles of Production Manager, General Manager, and 
Chairman of the Board of a nationwide railway. This is hardly achievable in a small size 
family business. 
8.3.2.2. Sales 
Contrary to production, where main problems are located in technology and supplies, - 
environmental complexity as regards sales is matched via the marketing function, i. e. the 
capacity to sell. It should be stressed that production is also out of control when its 
capabilities are not matched by a parallel capacity of the company to put the product, in 
the market; in other words, to convert train-km offered into passenger-km and tonne-krn 
transported, under the desired combination of price and quality characteristics. In the 
railway enterprise, sales is interacting with the environment through the Operations 
system of the implementation function, which, in turn, is decisively influenced by the 
output of the three other supporting systems. 
Sales is a mechanism which amplifies the capacity of the enterprise to interact with 
its environmental variety and a mechanism to filter this variety. However, every dimension 
of the sales function has been underestimated within the case-study enterprise. This is a 
main deficiency of state-owned enterprises which, not having profitability as clear 
objective, fail to realise alternative measures of quality of output and of overall 
effectiveness. No elements of a sales organization may be identified at any level other 
than corporate. In fact, legislation assigns this duty to stationmasters and area 
inspectors (EPITH). However, it is certain that these people have neither the 
qualifications nor the time to act as "salesmen'. Thus, the enterprise lacks 'sensory' 
organs to 'understand' the e nvironment- operations interaction. Apparently, such 
interaction, though not programmed. does take place, as the environment, in this case the 
purchasers of railway services, i. e. the general public, transmits 'signals', in the form 
of either verbal suggestions, proposals or complaints to the operating staff (train crews, 
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terminals staff), or via the mass media, or through its representatives (local government, 
members of parliament), or, in more serious cases, by directly contacting headquarters 
units. However, in most cases these environmental signals are rather attenuated than 
amplified, mainly because they are dealt with by the same structure, which, not having 
the capacity to match the variety of the environment alone (product design) cannot match 
the variety of both the environment and the channel (complaint). 
A measure of the enterprise's capacity to interact with its environment via the sales 
function may be provided by a comparison of train timetables of subsequent years. An 
analysis of this kind has not been undertaken within this thesis, thus, a perception 
drawing on personal experience and suggesting that the timetables over the last ten years 
remain virtually unchanged, except for when a service is withdrawn, is of limited value. 
However, when a rare introduction of a new service proves a success (as the 
introduction of a 'sleepers only" night train between Athens and Thessaloniki a year ago), 
the main wonder is not who is the 'marketing brain' who conceived the service, but why a 
so obviously marketable product took that much time to enter the market. Usually, the 
answer involves technological capability. That is, in the example, a sleeper service 
cannot be offered when sleeper coaches are not available. Since capability as a systemic 
measure of organizational performance directly relates to planning, this example, and not 
only this, provides a possible explanation of the way in which the present/future 
interaction is balanced within the case-study enterprise. 
This kind of explanation implies someone's balancing activity either over the Systems 
THREE-FOUR interaction or over the Production -Sales interaction within System THREE. 
As the THREE-FOUR-FIVE metasystem is discussed in a following section, there is a scope to 
focus now on the monitoring of the production -sales interaction. Following the logic of 
the viable system's model, if Production Manager is the General Manager himself as 
previously demonstrated, then he has also to be the Sales Manager. Because in no case can 
anyone act as a referee in a debate involving himself and another person. Either there is 
no debate or the other person does not exist. Further, if there is no debate, i. e., if 
production- sales homeostatic relation does not exist, what is the role of the other person 
as Sales Manager? 
The identification of the actual Sales Manager of the enterprise may be obtained on 
more traditional grounds. Thus: 
For subsequent years, annual budgeted revenue from rail traffic has been the 
previous year's result corrected for inflation. 
The recently prepared 'operations five-year plan' (i. e., plan concerning issues 
other than infrastructure modernization), which sets the goals of 22 % increase in 
passenger and 61 % in freight traffic volume (within five years) has been prepared 
by the 'technical" Department of Planning (DOMP). 
The bulk of prime-interest freight traffic 'specific customers' contracts refer to 
either public sector transportation needs (nationalised industries, army, etc. ) or 
to bilateral agreements at government level (e. g., exporting agricultural products 
to Eastern European countries). 
The company does not engage in any planned advertising of services offered. The bulk 
of railway's 'designed' appearance in the mass media refers to future benefits of 
modernization in progress. It aims to a lesser degree at improving the company's image, and mainly at gaining political support on behalf of the each time ruling 
party, by demonstrating national development achievements. 
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Market research activities during the last ten years consist of one questionnaire 
survey conducted amongst train, passengers in 1983. 
Concluding on Sales, the formation of a Commercial Operations Department (DEM) at 
headquarters level in the early seventies did not result in a proper organization and 
discharging of this function. 
8.3.2.3. Finance 
Properly conceived, Finance is adding the dimension of viability to whatever is done 
by the implementation function, not because financial viability is an end in itself, but 
mainly because most of practical levels of reference to assess performance are expressed 
in financial terms, as discussed in Chapter 5. Therefore, the support that this area can 
offer to the control function is easily understandable. 
Finance (and Personnel, as will be shown later) at system THREE level is controlled by 
the Assistant GM Finance/Personnel (AGMPR), who, in carrying out his tasks, seems to 
have more freedom than the other AGMs and to maintain more regular contacts with the 
environment of the railway. An explanation could be offered in terms of functional 
specialization. That is, the GM, being himself a mechanical engineer, refrains from a lot 
of intervention in other areas of knowledge, in the same way in which, being he not an 
engineer, functional AGMs might have enjoyed greater freedom. Another explanation, related 
to the previous, has already been offered in terms of GM's variety, which is virtually 
exhausted over a set of other activities. However, it seems that the principle reason may 
be expressed in terms of the railway's metasystem's variety handling capacity. According 
to the public railway literature, extensively discussed in Chapter 5, what mostly matters 
the government as regards public enterprise is financial performance. Thus, the unit 
controlling this function from within the enterprise must have the ability and the 
willingness to collaborate, especially because controversial government policies (dictated 
by wider considerations) frequently seriously affect developing railway plans. The same is 
valid in the case of the Personnel function, where the principle element of state's 
interest is the management's capacity to control trade unions, in order to avoid the 
political cost of industrial action. This ability and willingness to collaborate is 
interpreted, all over the world, as synonymous to close political relationship. When 
demanding implementation of policies, the bureaucratic government of any existing, however 
democratic, society, has no time to discuss options. The person must be there to guarantee 
implementation. 
The same is not valid in the case of 'functional' managers, since, for them, finance 
and personnel are, to a large degree, inputs with externally decided characteristics. 
Thus, the requirement of political relationship is not in this case compulsory, being an 
argument of the overall political freedom in the country. In practice, however, even the 
'functional' manager realises that much debate and unease over policies dictated from the 
top is resolved by his substitution. 
Within the case study, there are serious symptoms of ineffective financial management, 
which do not only relate to internal functioning. That is, as the Investment budget is 
exclusively funded by-the Government, and as, in the Operations budget, revenue from 
customers is only a fraction of the overall expenditure (e. g., approx. 7: 21 in 1985), much is decided by State's ability to pay against the budgeted deficit at the agreed periods. 
Moreover, as Operations Budget has not been thoroughly prepared (as already mentioned, 
when discussing planning activities and sales forecasting), it is probably 
over-optimistic. The enterprise does not have the ability to reduce expenditure, being 
predominantly labour intensive (the proportion of wages/salaries expenditure to overall 
expenditure was, in 1985,18: 21), where the labour is fully protected and guaranteed the 
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job by'the legislation. Lacking as well the ability to increase revenue (both because, as 
discussed, the commercial function is missing, and due to government's control over 
pricing policy), attempts to overcome cash flow problems by transferring funds from the 
Investments to the Operations budget under invented explanations, or by negotiating 
short-term loans with commercial banks under the State's guarantee. 
A measure of the enterprise's failure to control the Finance function, which is also 
an indication of top management's realization of this failure, is the recent application 
(Summer 1988) to the Ministry of Transport for the recruitment of upper level personnel, 
outside the hierarchical structure and with much improved salary terms. This application 
involved 16 managers, covering almost the totality of non-technical head -of- department 
and other upper level positions (Financial Affairs, Operations Commercial, Purchases, 
Information Systems). Functional small trade unions, e. g., engineers and other university 
graduates, opposed strongly this application, which has not yet produced an outcome, as 
they realised a threat to their status within the company. Their preoccupation that the 
'specialists' would not be recruited on the basis of their ability to solve problems but 
on that of their political relationship with the ruling party may not be totally wrong, 
especially when considering that not many capable and common-sense managers should risk 
a name and a career in an attempt to tackle problems of a nature, which has more to do 
with the State/Public Enterprise relationship than with 'traditional' management. 
8.3.2.4. Personnel 
The most obvious way of controlling this function has to do with the control over 
trade unions. Workforce in the public sector enterprises is concentrated and demanding, 
for two main reasons: 
the first reason relates to the predominance of history. Railways, being in any 
country among the oldest industries, incorporate strong trade unions, the members of 
which are aware of a history of labour movement, in particular of the 'heroic' 
period. 
the second is that nowadays, in most countries, railwaymen and other public sector 
employees function under the certainty of the permanent job, which has transferred 
the unemployment stress to upper hierarchical positions. 
The Enterprise/Personnel interaction within the case study is monitored, as already 
noted, by the Assistant GM Personnel/Finance (AGMPR). However, the greatest part of 
homeostasis as regards this interaction is achieved at a higher level of recursion, the 
political level, in terms of the government/people interaction. It seems that political 
parties, being amongst the most bureaucratic organizations in contemporary society, have 
limited variety handling capacity. Therefore, they constantly attempt to attenuate 
environmental variety by controlling the labour movement through the control of trade 
unions. Thus, in a public sector enterprise, the variety of the Enterprise/Personnel 
interaction is an argument of the ability and willingness of the trade union to 
collaborate, which, again, may be expressed in terms of political relationship. 
In the case study example, this political relationship exists. Thus, the job of the 
AGM Personnel is simplified, in that the 'sensory' organs he requires are provided by the 
opposite side of the interaction. However, in a democratic society, and the case study 
enterprise is embedded in a democratic society, the trade union leaders are elected. 
Besides the fact that their election is decided by variety attenuating mechanisms, i. e., 
political relationship, which do not assess the leaders' variety handling capacity as 
regards the wishes of the working people in the enterprise's level of recursion, a control 
of the enterprise/personnel interaction is readily translated to the control of the trade 
union leaders/personnel interaction. 
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Both the Personnel manager and train union leaders being political relatives, i. e., 
having attenuated their perception of the society and the future through the mechanisms of 
the same political party, have an interest in facilitating the t. u. leaders/personnel 
homeostasis, at the minimum expense defined by the overall political conditions. 
This variety handling arrangement, as regards the case study, has proved effective, as 
the measure of this effectiveness, i. e., industrial action within the enterprise, 
indicates. However, this effectiveness depends on the ability of the each time ruling 
party to extend its control over the whole spectrum of social reality within a country. 
This is not always easy, mainly because when a ruling party leaves government, it might 
be 
accompanied by the top management of the enterprise but not always by the trade union 
leaders as well. However, this has not been the case during the last eight years in the 
case study, thus, over this period, this variety handling mechanism has built up and 
stregthened. 
Controlling an interaction, as in this case, through the mechanisms of the opposite 
side of the interaction, however desirable for the metasystem, i. e., the government, has 
disastrous effects on the enterprise, and, hence indirectly on the metasystern itself. 
First, it has resulted to an inability of the company to build up an administrative 
organization engaged in the handling of this variety from within. 
Second, in the case study example, trade union leaders become a reference for the 
assessment of the effectiveness of the managerial structure as regards the 
enterprise/personnel interaction, and take full advantage of this status, by 
intervening at all levels of this structure. In the absence of the organization of 
the type just mentioned, much of the time of the 'functional' management at all 
levels (i. e., from area management to regional manager) is consumed in meetings with 
trade unionists, discussing various demands, however rational. 
Third, no other measures of the enterPTise/personnel relationship, apart from 
industrial action, develop. Absenteism, assumed by Beer an indirect measure of the 
Personnel morale, is not monitored, neither can be controlled, since, a large degree 
of tolerance is a prerequisite for this type of homeostasis as regards both the 
enterprise/trade unionists and trade unionists/personnel interactions. 
9.3.3. Corporate Coordination 
In the Viable Systems' Model, coordination is a systemic mechanism supporting 
self- regulation, and limiting the need for managerial intervention in the details of the 
implementation function. In the case study, there is a risk of confusing the need for 
coordination between the managerial units engaged in Production, Sales, Finance, and 
Personnel control, and the coordination of managers of the four subsysternic operations 
(Operations, Roll. Stock, Perm. Way, Signalling/Telecom). 
The first type of coordination is a mechanism to increase, to amplify the variety of 
the control function. System THREE of the enterprise has to be in possession of much 
information regarding these four areas (i. e., Production, Sales, Personnel, and Finance), 
since this type of information constitutes the material which it has to process, in order 
to define an operational policy and to monitor both its implementation and the inevitable 
need for readjustments. 
The second type of coordination, i. e., the coordination of the four subsystems, is a 
mechanism to attenuate, to filter the variety reaching the control function (system 
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THREE), because the variety of the implementation function is far larger than the variety 
of the control function. 
However, it has been shown that the existing organizational structure of the company, 
under the influence of the public enterprise 'culture' and historical conditions, has 
resulted in both: 
a wrong interpretation of all Production, Sales, Finance and Personnel areas of 
managerial interest at corporate level, where the only area under control (by means 
of a peculiar mechanism, continuously generating problems, and endangering future) 
is the Personnel function, and in 
a complete lack of recognition of the need for subsystemic autonomy, expressed in 
the form of continuous system THREE interventions in the details of the 
implementation function, reinforced by a wrong perception of organizational reality 
and, hence, of an irrelevant organizational design (dispersion of managerial duties 
of the Operations subsystem, not reckognition of the Signalling/Telecom subsystem, 
confusion related to the New Projects Department (DNE)). 
Consequently, both interdepartmental and subsysternic coordination lack a physical 
embodiment, or, more precisely, elements of such coordination are confused with elements 
of control, and are all exercised either directly by the GM (Production, Sales), or the 
AGM Personnel/Finance (Finance, Personnel) or by the functional Assistants (Operations, 
Rolling Stock, Permanent Way and Signalling) under frequent interventions of the General 
Manager. 
Effective coordination and control, especially when considering nationwide enterprises 
as in the case study, can only be achieved by effective information management. Modern 
companies have paid attention in the building of relevant management information systems, 
and this issue has been quite detailed discussed in Chapter 2, where it was also shown 
that the main dimension of systems of this kind is organizational. Chapter 4 has discussed 
the fundamentals of a management information system based on the Viable System's Model. 
Chapter 6 has illustrated the features of a system of this kind in a railway enterprise 
environment (Dutch Railways), which seems to draw very much on VSM principles, though it 
nowhere refers explicitly to Beer. 
The equivalent of such a management information system, producing 'algedonic', 
exception -reporting information on sub-systemic performance and detailed information for 
planning purposes does not exist in Greek Railways. What exists is a computer department 
(DOMP/MK) producing uncritically piles of printouts of data on receipts and traffic 
volume, which in themselves do not constitute information. Recall (Chapter 2), that 
information is data that have been processed into a form of real preceived value in 
current or prospective decisions. Contrary, 'information' produced by DOMP/MK merely 
conforms to imposed regulations, as the obligation to provide statistical data to the Government, the National Statistical service, the International Union of Railways (UIC) 
and possibly other bodies, at regular intervals. 
The physical location of a centre collecting data and transforming them to information 
for corporate coordination and control purposes depends on the adopted organizational 
design. However, whatever the design, there must be a point within the corporate 
management, where all this information is put together and evaluated. However, no other 
managerial unit 
* 
in the service of this purpose may be identified within the existing 
organizational structure, apart from the General Manager himself. 
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8.4. THE 3-4-5 METASYSTEM 
As discussed in Chapter 4, - Beer's model assumes a distinction between control, 
intelligence, and policy functions at corporate level within the organization. Whereas the 
control function (System THREE) is concerned with the 'inside-and-now' of the enterprise, 
attempting to 'steer' operations towards desired outputs arrived at during the planning 
process, the intelligence function (system FOUR) is concerned with the "outside -and -then', 
i. e., with the task to realise the future of the enterprise within the changing 
environment, and to materialise this future. The interaction between 'inside-and-now' and 
'outside -and -then', i. e., the systems THREE-FOUR interaction, is monitored by System FIVE, 
the policy function. System FIVE is responsible for the direction of the whole enterprise. 
It is assumed to be the thinking part of the organization, formulating policy on the basis 
of all the information passed to it by System FOUR and communicating this policy downwards 
to System THREE for implementation by Systems ONE. System FIVE must also represent the 
essential qualities of the whole organization to any wider system of which it is part, 
acting in this case simply as the localised management of a particular system ONE of the 
wider system. Systems THREE, FOUR and FIVE need to form a THREE-FOUR-FIVE 
metasystem, to encourage 'synergy' and interactivity. Without a constant interaction and 
exchange of information between them, System THREE is vulnerable to 'narrow tunnel' 
syndrome' and System FOUR is exposed to the perils of 'flights of imagination. 
9.4.1. System FIVE 
It is very difficult to personalise a system FIVE at corporate level within the 
case-study enterprise. Contrary to the usual case in a private firm, where the overall 
character and 'ethos' of the company is assigned either to the owner (in early stages, or 
in small firms), or to the managing board, Greek Railways seem to lack a system FIVE of 
this kind. 
Unambiguously, the central figure within the company, at the time of the survey, was 
the General Manager, who also happened to be Chairman of the Board. He seemed to hold all 
the relationships with the state-owner, either directly or through the Assistant General 
Manager Personnel/Finance, and to act as a mediator between the government and the 
company. This is not strange since: 
the other members of the Board, probably with the exception of the employees' 
delegates, have neither any railway enterprise experience, nor any sort of wider 
acceptable status, by being, for example, some kinds of authorities in related 
fields or by representing interests of broad segments of the society. 
the General Manage r/Chai rman was the only 'political' person within this structure, 
since he had been appointed by the prime minister, that is, he maintained 
relationships with the ruling party, facilitating thus contacts at governmental 
level. 
However, it is questionable whether the Chairman/GM could himself function as a 
9variety sponge9 according to Beer, since he too, when appointed, had neither any specific knowledge of the railway industry, nor any experience of running public or private sector 
enterprises. Provided that he started his top career within OSE at a time just after a 
major government change (1981), he had the additional duty of attempting to implement a 
new concept of the public railway enterprise, which concept was not clear even at the highest levels of the government. 
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Besides, any bureaucratic organization maintains its own ways of doing things, which 
are not seriously influenced by attempts of external appointees, as far as these attempts 
are not planned and organised in some detail, and, at the same time, require the support 
of the bureaucratic structure in order to be implemented. Therefore, in some way. system 
FIVE in the case study enterprise may be identified within this bureaucratic structure, 
which has continuously defeated any more or less serious attempt implying change. It is 
the process through which young, ambitious and capable university graduate employees 
(mainly engineers) end up as corporate bureaucrats (heads of departments, etc. ), denying 
any change of the kind they themselves were advocating, when younger. 
Even though, as regards the public enterprise, most of these conclusions are products 
of interactions at higher levels of recursion, i. e., the political, the societal, the 
national economic, etc., their examination at a public railway level is justified, since, 
in turn, the ineffective functioning of the public enterprise provides arguments to the 
wider system for further interventions. The elimination of the bureaucratic spirit 
(in conceptual, not physical terms) implies, at least, the establishment of a formal 
System FIVE possessing this anti -bureaucratic quality. Such a system FIVE, would generate 
serious tensions both within the company's managerial structure and, mainly, while acting 
as a system ONE of a wider system, the public sector, system FIVE of which is the 
government. 
To avoid this sort of tensions, the government employs a Railway Board, both with 
limited variety handling capacity, i. e., incapable of realising disastrous effects of 
certain government policies and capable and willing to participate in the implementation 
of these policies. The latter is achieved via the attenuating mechanisms of political 
relationship, already discussed. However, in a democratic society, at the next higher 
level of recursion, the government is just the system ONE of a viable system, the country 
itself, system FIVE of which is no other than the People. Paradoxically, therefore, people 
elect a government, which deliberately employs a railway board incapable of realising 
their will, which resulted in the government's election. 
The explanation that this outcome of the people/politics interaction is seriously 
deformed by the functioning of a complex of variety handling mechanisms (amplifiers and 
attenuators) provides some clues, self-defeated, in turn, in the light of the historical 
experience, where the constant failure to materialise people's wishes has very much 
disgraced in their eyes both politics and politicians. Whether a solution might be sought 
in the further reinforcement of the central authority, or in the achievement of a more 
participatory democracy is a matter of political science achieved through political 
practice, and, hence, associated with the historical and cultural experience, that is, 
seriously affected in its development both by people's values, perceptions, and customs, 
and by the society's wish to ensure the viability of its prevalent institutions. 
The overall equilibrium achieved, therefore, as regards the enterprise, the country 
and their relationship, is the outcome of these multiple interactions. The level at which 
this equilibrium is achieved is defined, and defines in turn, an index of the performance 
of the country as a system, a version of Beer's 'capability', measured against a complex 
and not universally agreed-upon scale, usually termed 'level of development'. 
8.4.2. System FOUR 
In a Previous paragraph, when discussing the Sales Function, it was shown that since 
the General Manager of the Enterprise was also playing the role of the Production Manager, 
either he himself was the Sales Manager too, or there wasn't a Prod uctio n/Sales interaction. 
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By analogy, an assessment of System FOUR activities within the company may directly 
derive when considering that the dominant figure of the formal System FIVE structure, 
i. e., the Chairman of a Board, the rest members of which have very much reduced capability 
and willingness to define the company's policy, happens also to be the System THREE 
figurehead (General Manager). 
A direct consequence of this arrangement is that System FOUR activities are tailored to 
the company's needs, as perceived by System THREE, that is the Operations Directorate. 
Hence, they are 'inside -oriented'; instead of attempting to realise the future they try to justify the present. 
A second consequence is the resulting organizational confusion in respect to 
operational, strategic and normative plans, the inability to distinguish between means and 
ends and to assess investment made in operational terms. 
However, the third and most dramatic consequence is, that any assumption made by this 
System FOUR concerning the future reaches the top of the company (Board) or the higher 
level of recursion (Government) after being filtered by the 'inside-and-now' figurehead, 
the General Manager. In a thus deviced organizational structure, there is no need to 
monitor the System THREE-FOUR interaction, since homeostasis is 'achieved' within System 
THREE. As the 'intelligence' function reports to 'implementation' it is both discouraged 
to scan the future, and obliged to justify the present. 
Within the case-study enterprise, the bulk of System FOUR activities is formally 
assigned to the Department of Planning and Organization (DOMP). The quality of output of 
this Department, assessed in terms of requirements from a corporate System FOUR, has been 
decided by- 
Its subservient role to the actual System THREE. DOMP is directly reporting to the 
General Manager. Hence, even if the Chairman of the Board was a different person 
and/or the other members of the Board possessed the properties requested as 
Previously defined, any action of the department should seriously consider this 
power relationship. 
Its strongly 'technical' character. The management of DOMP consists exclusively of 
engineers, specifically of civil engineers. Consequently, they tend to overestimate 
the 'permanent way and installations' problem of the company's development, and, to 
put aside other issues, which they do not feel adequately qualified to tackle. 
However, such issues concern information tecnology, major projects appraisal, 
organizational design, future transport trends forecasting, manpower capabilities 
enhancement, etc., plus the operations, rolling stock and signalling/ 
telecommunications elements of the functional character of the enterprise. Formally, 
anything related to planning activities with respect to these issues is assigned to DOMP. 
Its dual 'inside-outside' character. Besides these research areas, the same department contains the respective operating units, such as the Statistics and Costing Division (DOMP/YSK), the Informatique and Organization Division (DOMP/YO), 
the Computer Centre (DOMP/MK), the Investment Budget Preparation and Monitoring Division (DOMP/YP), and, until recently, the Infrastructure Studies Division and the Personnel Education Division. The output standards of these activities, as 
continuously perceived by the enterprise as a whole, directly reflect the limited 
variety handling capacity which has governed the inputs. 
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Within the case-study enterprise, DOMP is assumed responsible for any aspect of 
planning, either it refers to distant-future scenarios of the railway network, or to the 
preparation of strategic plans, or even to the annual investment programme, which, as 
already stated, is prepared and monitored by this department. All this type of planning is 
of poor quality, both because of shortage in equipment and specialised staff, but, 
predominantly, because it is prepared without the participation of the implementation 
units. Thus, either the plans are prepared under wider political and other non-railway 
considerations, or reflect the best intention of the 'planners' and their care for the 
enterprise, the outcome is the same: they are not implementable. They do not reflect 
actual priorities, they lack justification, and, therefore, no quantified aspects of 
performance improvement are really expected upon their implementation. 
The decision for the formation of a proper System FOUR serving the needs of the 
railway enterprise is a quite difficult one in a public enterprise environment. It 
reflects the contradiction between government's desire to offer a sort of autonomy to the 
enterprise, in order to overcome the bureaucratic rigidity, and its inability to 
refrain from intervening and using the enterprise as a tool for the pursuit of goals, not 
necessarily compatible with the enterprise's best interests. 
9.5. CONCLUSION 
The cybernetic study of the railway enterprise undertaken in this Chapter has 
highlighted organizational problems responsible for the poor performance of the company. 
The problems are both structural and 'cultural'. Alternative options for the solution of 
the structural problems are available and may be proposed by organizational design 
specialists. However, the building-up of an appropriate organizational culture is more 
difficult, since it directly relates to the character of the company as a public 
enterprise, the requirements of the state-owner from this company and the level of 
development, defining the characteristics of the company, the government, the country, and 
their interrelations. 
However, though based on a long-term participation within the company and on the study 
of related material, the 'aphorism' remains, inevitably, subjective. Thus, this chapter, 
instead of marking the termination of an application of the management cybernetics 
methodology in a railway enterprise, provides the initiative to obtain a more objective 
view, by interpreting opinions of the acting managers of the company. The way in which 
this task was designed and undertaken, as well as the view of the company it produced are 
the subject of the remaining part of this thesis. 
9.6. SYNOPSIS 
The following fundamental faults in organizational design were diagnosed: 
8.6.1. Implementation (System ONE) 
8.6-1-1. Implementation Units 
The activities of the Operations sub-system have not been properly conceived. Hence 
managerial responsibility for these activities is divided between Operations (YEK), 
Traction (YEL) and Rolling Stock (MXSIA) units. 
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The Signalling/Telecommunications sub-system has not been realised as such. Hence it lacks 
a status within the company similar to those of the other three sub-systems. 
The part of the Permanent Way and Installations sub-system activities which relates to new 
constructions is performed outside the structure of this sub-system by the New Projects 
Department (DNE). 
The same is true for the new systems selection and installation activities of the 
Signalling and Telecommunications sub-system. 
8.6.1.2. Management of Implementation 
The gradual reorganization of the company from Type 11 to Type I has minimised the role of 
the Regional Management (DPER). At the moment, it is still reported by Operations (YEK) 
and Permanent Way (YGR) regional divisions. However, not having discretion over all 
components of railway production within his area, Regional Manager is rather playing only 
a limited figurehead role. 
8.6.2. Coordination and Control of Operations (Systems TWO and THREE) 
8.6.2-1. Operations Directorate (System THREE) 
Coordination and Control of each function was vertically attempted by each of the three 
functional Assistants to the General Manager. However, the GM himself was also frequently 
intervening. 
Corporate Production coordination and control was exercised, in the absence of a corporate 
managerial unit to substitute the devaluated Regional Manager, by the General Manager 
himself. However, corporate production has not been properly realised and, hence, 
ineffectively controlled. , 
The enterprise lacks a Sales organization, mainly because it has emerged as a government 
department, still retaining many of these characteristics. The company seeks principle 
potential customers (freight) mainly in the wider public sector, under the government's 
protection. 
Financial management within the company is ineffective. Revenue from operations is only a 
fraction of overall expenditure, more than three quarters of which correspond to salaries 
expenses. 
Personnel management is attempted by agreements with trade union leaders on the basis of 
political relationship. The enterprise lacks a proper personnel administration function. 
The trade-unionists have become the referees of managerial performance. 
8.6.2.2. Corporate Coordination (System TWO) 
The enterprise lacks a corporate information collection and processing centre. Information 
collection and processing, wherever happens (corporate, functional, regional levels), 
refers to a formal procedure, neither properly evaluated nor realised as a prerequisite of 
corrective action and adaptation. 
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8.6.3. The Metasystem (Systems THREE- FOUR- FIVE) 
8.6.3.1. System FIVE 
The Board is in practice overrriden by the General Manager, both because of his dual role 
(being also the Chairman of the Board) and due to the actual characteristics of its 
members. However, neither the Chairman/GM impersonates a System FIVE, which may rather 
be identified within the bureaucratic upper hierarchical echelons. 
8.6.3.2. System FOUR 
The System FOUR status of the Department of Planning and Organization (DOMP) is seriously 
constrained by. 
its subservient role to the GM, as prescribed in the organization. 
its strongly technological characteristics. 
its dual role as both a 'future, scanner' and an 'operations planner'. 
Many of the diagnostic points made above relate strongly to the public enterprise 
character of the under study railway and to the specific way in which successive 
governments have realised this character. A survey within the case study was assumed 
necessary, in order to evaluate these assumptions and to provide a more objective picture. 
8.7. FOOTNOTES 
1. R. Espejo, 1980: "Information Management: the Cybernetics of a Small Company", in Lucas 
et al. (eds. ): The Information Systems Environment (North-Holland Publishing Co., 
Amsterdam). 
2. In the legislation defining organization and duties within OSE, words like 
accountabilitv. bottom-line resDonsibilitv. etc.. are verv rarelv met. if traced at 
all. On the contrary, vague definitions such as care, provision, etc., are very 
frequently met to permit for both frequent corporate interventions and the 
dissapearance of accountability, which is dilluted within a spectrum of undefined 
responsibilities. 
CHAPTER 9 
SURVEY WITHIN THE CASE STUDY 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
The 'ethnographic-type' cybernetic study of the company under investigation, 
undertaken in Chapter 8, has identified several reasons of poor performance, i. e., 
symptoms of inadequate management control, in the incorrect design of the organizational 
structure. However, both in Chapters 7 and 8 it has been shown that much of this incorrect 
design is a result of a certain organizational culture, reflecting both the character of 
the specific railway as a declining industry and a public enterprise. 
The management cybernetics area of knowledge may be employed in order to further 
elucidate structural problems, by facilitating the construction of the actual 
organizational model of the enterprise, i. e., the one that corresponds to the real way in 
which, in life, management control is attempted. The weaknesses or inadequacy of this 
organizational arrangement may be consequently demonstrated, and, hopefuly, result in an 
organizational redesign. 
The same area of knowledge, management cybernetics, may lend its underlying principles 
in order to examine cultural problems within the organization, i. e., problems that are not 
readily resolved by the introduction of a more rational organizational structure. Problems 
of this type are more likely to constitute the core of the problem, besides the fact that 
they are further amplified by an irrational organization. 
A management cybernetics analysis of the enterprise implies, therefore, a bi-calculus 
approach, in order to deal with both realised dimensions of the organizational problem. 
The material for both stages of the organizational analysis will be provided by 
answers of members of the actual managerial structure 
, 
to questions posed during a survey 
within the case study. This chapter provides details concerning the design, the 
objectives, the methodology, and the sample characteristics of this survey. 
9.2. SURVEY OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this piece of research, as defined in Chapter 1, i. e., 
to attempt to identify structural and cultural reasons of ineffectiveness in a 
state-owned railway enterprise, in the light of the management cybernetics area of 
knowledge, and 
to assess the capacity of this area of knowledge, especially in its abstract and 
coded form (VSM), to provide adequate explanations of organizational performance and 
organizational failure, 
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have demonstrated, in the light of the preliminary analysis, the need to seek the 
following targets, by conducting a survey within the case study: 
(1) To Identify the actual VSM of the enterprise, i. e., the organization of the 
subsystems producing the company (systems ONE), and the way in which these 
subsystems are integrated to the company. Since a major part of the cybernetic study 
has been undertaken in Chapler 8, and has resulted in certain conclusions concerning 
the ineffectiveness of the organizational structure, as deriving from the formal 
assignment of responsibilities and duties, managers' responses will provide the 
actual picture, with respect to the following issues: 
- which units constitute, in practice, Beer's Systems ONE to FIVE in the case 
of Greek Railways; 
- which way the actual functioning attempts to overcome deficiencies inherited 
from poor organizational design, as described in the previous chapter, and 
whether it succeeds or further violates management cybernetics principles; 
- which are the actual information flows within the enterprise and between the 
enterprise and the environment; 
- to what degree do these flows provide for variety handling and effective 
performance. 
(2) To examine the cohesiveness of the enterprise, and the content of this 
cohesiveness'(or lack of cohesiveness), since, as has been argued, even if the 
organization is perfect, if the company as a whole does not have a capacity to 
assess whether it is 'doing' the right things, viability is in danger. This type of 
assessment, in this thesis, is considered to extend over the following issues, as 
will be further explained: 
- the reason(s) of the company's existence; 
- specific goals to be sought; 
- the internal character of the enterprise (planning, budgeting, 
participation); 
- the performance of the enterprise; 
- the reasons constraining performance improvement; 
- the methods to be employed in order to improve performance. 
Cohesiveness may be interpreted as the degree of managerial agreement on these issues and will be tested statistically. Whether cohesiveness is a favourable or 
unfavourable sign relates to the content of this agreement. 
9.3. SURVEY DESIGN 
. The method employed in order to achieve the targets mentioned was that of obtaining information through interviews with managers of the Greek Railways, requested to fill a 
questionnaire, specifically designed for this purpose, in the light of the preliminary 
analysis and under the theoretical approach, as described in earlier chapters. 
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A copy of the questionnaire on which the survey has been based is provided in Appendix 
C. This part of the thesis offers details on information requirements which the 
questionnaire has been designed to serve. 
9.3.1. Constructing the Actual VSNI of the Railway Enterprise 
Data for the first research theme were obtained from answers to the questions of 
Section Three and Section Four of the survey questionnaire. 
In Chapter 8, a management cybernetics study of the Greek Railways has been provided, 
drawing on personal interpretation of the reality, and on published material, especially 
the legislation defining the organizational structure and the duties of various parts. 
Certain structural deficiencies have been identified, whereas the fulfillment of other, 
properly designed, managerial activities has been assumed to rest on informationnows of 
questionable adequacy. 
This part attempts to set up the actual VSM of the enterprise, i. e., the management 
control function within the company as understood by the managers themselves. For this 
purpose, according to the framework discussed in Chapter 6, a detailed list of managerial 
activities was constructed, to reflect what railway managers were supposed to do in order 
to control the enterprise. - 
Listed activities may be grouped either by railway function or by managerial function, 
or managerial content, according to the following three tables: 
(1) Subgrouping of Activities by RAILWAY FUNCTION 
No. of activitles 
Corporate 
Levet 
Raitway 
Operations 
Rotting 
stock 
Permanent 
Way 
Signatting 
Tetecoms 
totat 
23 37 27 33 48 168 
(2) Subgrouping of Activities by ?, IANAGERIAL FUNCTION 
Relations 
with State 
Research & 
Development 
Planning/ 
Organizing 
Annua t 
Programming 
Performance 
Monitoring 
total 
NO. Of activities 
- 
5 11 21 46 30 66 168 
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(3) Subgrouping of Activities by MANAGERIAL CONTENT 
I 
No. of activities 
I 
Relations 
with State 
Research & 
Development 
Production Sales/ 
Pricing 
Materials Finance Personnel total 
5 21 86 4 22 16 14 168 
The analysis in this part of the research is mainly descriptive 1 and involves the 
following steps: 
(1) Identification of responsible manager (or managers) for each of the listed 
activities. 
(2) Recording of actual information flows, associated with the listed managerial 
activities, in terms of type, frequency and assessed quality. 
(3) Graphical illustration of the actual VSM in terms of systems ONE to FIVE, in the 
three first levels of recursion. 
(4) Conclusions on the efficiency of the actual organization, as interpreted in 
terms of the management cybernetics methodology. 
To a large degree, elements of phases (3) and (4) of the above methodology have been 
provided in the preliminary study (Chapter 8). In addition, details of the structure of 
the Viable System's Model and diagnostic prescriptions have been offered both in general 
(Chapter 4) and in details (Appendix A), as well as in the general case of a railway 
(Chapter 6). 
Therefore, only two methodological points require further clarification and are 
discussed in this section. These points refer to phases (1) and (2) above , 
i. e., to 
accountability allocation and information flows handling. 
9.3.1.1. Accountability Allocation 
Each of the managers interviewed was asked to indicate whom he thought to be 
responsible for any activity, in front which a black square was marked. That is, in order 
to avoid misunderstandings and mistakes which might have occurred if a manager was asked 
about accountabilities for activities outside his managerial area, accountability 
allocation for every activity was requested only from the manager in the broad area of 
this activity. E. g., questions related to permanent way activities were asked to permanent 
way managers, etc. Two notes should be made here: 
(1) Activities for which, as revealed by the preliminary study, accountability was 
not clearly allocated, or required explicitly the cooperation of functional 
areas were discussed with all managers assumed to be, in one way or the other, 
responsible. 
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(2) As a rule, managers at corporate level such as assistant general managers, 
planning and budgeting managers etc., were requested to answer an extended set 
of questions. 
: riterioni 
p 
(accountabiLity interviewed 
alLocation) 
II nM 
accepted ("noone + 
responsibitity "not kr*wn") 
y 
p 75 
1 
bIp> 67 
N 
V 
N 
y 
cp> 50 
N 
y 
dp> 50 
N 
eevery 
N 
I 
10 
20 
n ., - 20 
ercase 
Table 13: Acountabitity Allocation Criteria 
The task of accountability allocation implies the adoption of an appropriate 
methodology. Since, as explained, questions were posed only to relevant managers in a way 
which minimises possible errors due to irrelevance 2, a percentage criterion seems to be 
an appropriate heuristic. Thus, three levels were distinguished: 
Level 1: More than three quarters (75 %) of the managers interviewed agree on who is 
responsible for a certain activity. 
Level 2: More than two thirds (67 %) of the managers interviewed agree. 
Level 3: More than half (51 %) of the managers interviewed agree. 
Combining these three levels of agreement with three more conditions, i. e., 
(1) whether the manager indicated as responsible has been interviewed, 
(2) when interviewed, if he accepts responsibility, and 
(3) whether there is a significant percentage of "don't know" and "no one 
responsible" answers to the question about accountability for a certain 
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activity, a set of five criteria (a to e) was established, where "A" corresponds to an 
almost unanimous agreement on accountability allocation and "e" to a lack of a manager 
accountable for a certain activity. Table 13 summarises the definition of these criteria. 
Obviously the above set of criteria were not used rigidly, but in order to facilitate 
the VSM construction. 
9.3.1.2. Information Flows 
Since the essence in Beer's model is the emphasis in information handling, a further 
stage of data collection and analysis was required, in order to identify the actual 
information flows between managerial units or between units and environment. Thus, for 
each activity for which a manager was declaring responsibility, he was requested to 
provide the following information (Section Four of the Questionnaire): 
Sources, type, frequency, and assessed quality of information received, related to 
this managerial activity. 
Destination, type, frequency, and assessed quality of information sent. 
An extended data-base on actual information flows was thus constructed and is 
displayed in Appendix D (Survey Data). However, though this data-base may assist in 
assessing the adequacy of almost any of the recorded information flows, not all of the 
information contained has been utilised for the purposes of this thesis. Besides 
illustrating a complete network of recorded flows, and providing some conclusions for the 
type and quality of principle managerial activities, the material awaits further detailed 
analysis at a level, which could not have been undertaken within this work, without 
generating the danger of getting involved in micro-consultancy issues. 
9.3.2. Degree and Content of Managerial Cohesiveness 
As stated, a management cybernetics study of an enterprise, should not be limited to 
the anal)-sis of the organizational structure; neither can a work of the type undertaken in 
this thesis end up with suggestions about organizational rebuilding, without considering 
the way in which fundamental issues are realised by the acting managers of the enterprise. 
The cybernetic model of the organization in its abstract form is based on a series of 
hypotheses, which cannot be tested by merely allocating accountability for activities and 
assessing information flows. Besides organizational structure, management control requires 
planning, aiming at goals arrived at in order to fulfil objectives. Management control, 
especially under a cybernetic paradigm, also requires performance measurement and feedback 
leading to corrective action. In summary, VSM assumes a cohesive enterprise, precisely 
'positively cohesive', i. e., one in which people are not only generally in agreement, but 
in which this agreement guarantees viability in the long run. 
The second part of the case-study research deals, therefore, with the cohesiveness of 
the enterprise. To the degree that information analysed arrives from managers" responses 
this part deals more specifically with managerial cohesiveness. 
Cohesiveness is examined in relation with the following issues: 
(1) The objectives of the enterprise; 
(2) Operational tasks to be achieved; 
(3) Contribution of units in achieving these tasks; 
Chapter 9 -195- Case Study Survey 
(4) The planning process; 
(5) Ovemll view of the company; 
(6) Performance assessment; 
(7) Objectivity of performance assessment; 
(8) Reasons constraining performance improvement; and 
(9) Measures assisting performance improvement. 
These issues are examined by analysing managers' answers to questions of Section Two 
of the Survey Questionnaire. Before showing which way managerial cohesiveness will be 
tested and assessed, the relation of these issues to opinions discussed in earlier 
chapters, concerning the specific characteristics of a state-owned railway enterprise, 
will be presented, together with an explanation of the rationale of the specific questions 
asked. 
9.3.2.1. Objectives of the State-Owned Railway Enterprise 
Managers were asked to indicate on a five-interval scale from I (strongly agree) to 
5 (strongly disagree) their rate of agreement to the following seven stated objectives, 
referred to hereafter as variables objectl to objecV. Managers were asked to state what 
OSE does by existing as a public enterprise, not what is required or supposed to do. 
objectl: 'OSE exists mainly in order to offer railway services better than those to be 
offered by a private railway enterprise". 
This question, obviously, relates to the very character of the railway as a public 
enterprise and attempts to reveal whether, in the managers' opinion, real life justifies 
state-ownership of the railway for the pursuit of some sort of public interest constrained 
by private ownership. 
object2: 'OSE exists mainly in order to serve transportation needs of the lower income 
classes". 
objectI 'OSE exists mainly in order to serve excess transport demand during peak periods, 
since this kind of demand cannot be undertaken by the rest of the transport 
system". 
objecM "OSE exists mainly in order to help the state in achieving wider policy goals 
(development goals, e. g., regional development, social goals, e. g., employment 
maintenance, inflation control), via the spectrum of public enterprises under its 
control. 
object7: "OSE exists mainly in order to assist in tackling some sort of wider national 
problem in future". 
These variables comprise four forms of public interest to be pursued by the existence 
of the state-owned railway enterprise. 
objectS: "OSE exists mainly in order to maintain a complex of relations, associated with 
financial and political interests of individuals". 
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0 
This variable may be used as a measure of the realization of the impact of political 
considerations (or othert sorts of external interest) on the fuctioning of a railway. 
object6: "OSE exists mainly in order to assure the survival of the railway as a means of 
transport, which, being technologically outdated, could not survive in free 
competition conditions". 
Obviously, this reason could not stand by itself as an objective of railway 
state-ownership and functioning. This variable was employed to check whether the 
interviewees followed the logic of the questionnaire and provided rational answers. 
The questions posed relate both to the contradictory character of the public 
enterprise, as discussed in Chapter 5, and to the actual characteristics of the 
under-study enterprise, as presented in Chapters 7 and 8. For example, a statement of the 
type "OSE exists mainly in order to provide an effective means of commuting". or "OSE 
exists mainly in order to relieve motorways from freight transport" could not be contained 
in a question, since, as shown, OSE does not offer such services, at least at the moment. 
9.3.2.2. Operational Tasks to be Achieved 
Managers were asked to indicate on a six-interval scale, from 0 (unimportant) to 5 
(vital), their impression on the importance of the following seven operational tasks 
(variables taskl to task7). 
Three of these tasks are customer-oriented (compare to non-financial criteria of 
performance). They are: 
task3: "to improve service reliability"; 
task5: "to reduce journey times"; and 
task6: "to improve quality of services" (aspects other than reliability and journey 
times). 
Two tasks relate to financial performance: 
taskl: "to reduce total expenditure"; and 
task2: "to reduce staff expenditure*. 
Finally, two tasks relate to overall railway performance assessed by a nationwide 
viewpoint: 
task4: "to increase traffic volume"; and 
task7: "to increase market share". 
The questions of this section have to be understood as a measure of the ability of 
public- en te rprise managers to realise the "commercial" dimension of railway activities. Recall (para. 5.2.2.2) that literature doubts this ability. 
9.3.2.3. Contribution of Units in Achieving Operational Tasks 
Again, on a six-interval scale (0-negligible, 5-vital), managers were asked to assess their unit's contribution in achieving the tasks stated in the previous paragraph. Variables contrI to contr7 of this section are employed as: 
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a measure of managers' realisation of their unit's significance, from a corporate 
viewpoint, and 
a measure of actual capability of various units. 
9.3.2.4. The Planning Process 
Three variables measure managers' impression of the actual planning process in the 
under-study enterprise: 
Variable plan ("which way do you think planning is organized in OSE? "), is measured 
on a five-interval scale, with the following values: 
"1": There is planning and is strictly implemented. 
"2": There is planning adapting to changing conditions. 
"Y: There is planning but so imperfect that becomes not implementable. 
W: There is no planning. Everyone tries to serve the interest of the company as he 
realises it, and 
W: There is no planning: Everyone tries to avoid being charged with duties, which are 
not definitely his responsibility. 
Variable budget ("which way do you participate in your unit's budget preparation 
taking values from the following five-interval scale: 
"I": I sum up the proposals of the units reporting to me. 
"2": 1 examine the proposals of the units reporting to me and ask for justification of 
expenses. 
W., examine the proposals of the units reporting to me in relation with directives from 
my superiors. 
W: I exhaust the capabilities for discussion with units & superiors prior to unit's 
budget preparation, and 
W: My unit's budget is the outcome of discussion and agreement between all involved 
headquarters, production and supportive units. 
Variable freqbudg ("How often is your opinion asked, before your unit's budget is amended 
? "), with values: 
"1": Almost never, 
"2": Rarely, 
"3": Sometimes, 
W: Often, and 
"5": Almost always. 
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These variables were expected to reveal the participative or authoritarian character 
of the planning process and the degree to which planning constitutes a fully intergrated 
organizational activity contrasted to a merely formal periodic process. Recall (Chapter 6) 
that according to Beer "planning is the 'glue' of organizational cohesiveness". 
9.3.2.5. Overall View of the Company 
Variables in this question ("What kind of view do you think that the following 
managerial levels hold for the company ? ") measure managers' impression of the way in 
which certain managerial levels (vlewl: top management; vlew2: headquarters departments; 
vlewI production departments; and view4: production units) view the company. A 
five-interval scale is employed, where 
"I" : View the enterprise as a whole: They are mainly interested in the performance of the 
totality. 
"2" : View the enterprise as a set of activities in close interrelationship: The 
performance of parts is significant to the extent that defines overall performance. 
"Y : View the enterprise as a set of activities relatively interrelated: The performance 
of parts is equally significant as overall performance. 
"4" : View the enterprise as a sum of relatively independent activities: They are more 
interested in the performance of parts than in overall performance. 
"5" : View the enterprise as a sum of independent activities: They are only interested in 
the performance of each part. This will define overall performance. 
Value "1" corresponds to an integrated or "holistic" view and value "5" to a 
"reductlonist" view of the company. 
9.3.2.6. Performance Assessment 
Nine measures of railway performance were employed: 
opinl: OSE's traffic volume (in absolute figures); 
opln2: OSE's market share; 
oplnI Service reliability; 
opln4: Track quality, concerning train punctuality; 
opln5: Track quality, concerning quality of journey; 
opln6: Rolling stock quality, concerning train punctuality; 
opln7: Rolling stock quality, concerning quality of journey; 
opln8: Terminals' capabilities, concerning traffic handling; and 
opln9: Terminals' capabilities, concerning quality of services offered. 
On a five-interval scale with values from wl" ("has significantly improved") to "J" (*has significantly deteriorated"), managers were asked to state which way they think that 
each variable has developed during the last three years. 
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Managers' responses would provide a measure of: 
(1) The internal communication of information on achieved performance; and 
(2) The tendency to overevaluate "our" performance and to underevaluate the 
performance of "others"; 
9.3.2.7. Objectivity of Performance Assessment 
It is likely that opinions expressed by managers on railway performance may either: 
(1) be based on information without personal knowledge of the situation; and/or 
(2) be based on a geographically partial knowledge of the situation, i. e., judging 
for the whole of the network based on experience gained from a part of it. 
Variables in this section ("How often have you travelled by train during the last three 
years ? ") refer to - 
Journl: the Athens-Thessaloniki "main line", 
Journ2: the North Greece network, and 
journ3: the narrow gauge (Peloponnese) network, 
and take values on a six-interval scale reflecting frequency of visits, where value '11' 
corresponds to weekly frequency and *6" to less than once yearly. 
The same variables may reflect the importance which headquarters assign to several 
parts of the network, as assessed by the number of visits they pay. 
9.3.2.8. Reasons Constraining Performance Improvement 
This part of the questionnaire has to be examined in close relation with the part of 
Chapter 5 referring to inherent disadvantages under state ownership. Nine principle 
reasons constraining performance improvement have been stated: 
reasonl: OSE's old technological equipment; 
reason2: OSE's inflexibility as a result of State's interventions; 
reason3: Lack of planning; 
reason4: Lack of control; 
reason5: Limited capacity of the managers themselves; 
reason6: Indifference of operating staff, 
reason7: Absence of incentives for the personnel of all levels; 
reason8: Loss of proper orientation on behalf of the trade unions; and 
reason9: Pro-workers legislation within and outside the railways. 
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Variables were measured on the same five-interval scale as variables objectl to object7, 
i. e., "I" corresponds to "strongly agree" and "J" to "strongly disagree". 
9.3.2.9. Measures Assisting in Performance Improvement 
The goal of performance improvement was expressed in the form of six sub-goals: 
sub-goal 1: Improved quality of services offered; 
sub-goal 2: Optimum utilization of resources available (i. e., rolling stock, track and 
installations); 
sub-goal 3: Improved co-operation between sub-systems (i. e., operations, rolling stock, 
permanent way, and signalling and telecommunications). 
sub-goal 4: Improved performance of the Rolling Stock sub-system. 
sub-goal 5: Improved performance of the Permanent Way and Installations sub-system. 
sub-goal 6: Improved performance of the Signalling and Telecommunications sub-system. 
Seven methods of achieving these goals were stated, i. e., 
methodl: reorganization; 
method2: change of respective managers; 
method3: improved planning; 
method4: effective control; 
methodS: intensive staff training; 
metbod6: improved work conditions; and 
method7: salary increases. 
Managers were asked to produce six rank orders of these methods, each corresponding to 
one of the sub-goals mentioned. 
9.3.2.10 Testing Cohesiveness 
The major hypothesis in this part of the research is that if the company's character 
and strategy are clear, and if they have been communicated throughout the organization, 
managers will agree which are the main objectives sought by the enterprise, how important 
various tasks and activities are to the company, which are the ways to overcome major 
difficulties. The managers' answers to listed objectives, activities and methods should, 
therefore, be analyzed, to provide evidence of a common understanding. The research 
questions posed can be answered in a positive/negative fashion: Do the managers agree or 
do they disagree ? 
Statistical tests may be employed to test several 'statistical hypotheses', providing 
thus a basis upon which to answer the research questions. For each question, the 'null 
hypothesis', symbolised as Hog states that the managers do agree. If a statistically 
significant relationship between managers' ratings is found, the null hypothesis will be 
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rejected and the conclusion will be that the managers do not agree. The extent of thus 
identified managerial disagreement will provide a measure of managerial cohesiveness 
within the under study enterprise. 
A first derivation of the degree of cohesiveness involves the examination of 
descriptive statistics concerning the whole sample, such as frequencies distributions and 
standard deviations. 
Cohesiveness may be further examined respectively to subdivisions of the managerial 
structure, since for at least some of the variables, significant disagreement is expected. 
This disagreement may be attributed either to different ages of managers, or to different 
managerial level, function, or jobtype. The following subgroupings will be considered. 
(1) subgrouping by AGE of managers 
IAGEgr0up 
1 2 3 4 5 
-30 
years 
30-40 
years 
40-50 
years 
50-60 
years 
+60 
years 
(2) subgrouping by managerial LEVEL 
LEVEL9roup 
234 
Top Heads Heads of Area 
Management of Depts Divisions Managers 
(3) subgrouping by FUNCTION of managers 
FUNCT10Ngroup 
2345 
Operations Rotting Permanent Signating other 
Stock Way Tetecom 
1 
-1 - 
(4) subgrouping by JOBTYPE of managers 
J0BTYPE9roup 
12 
HeadquartersProductIon 
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Since the sample population (from the nature of this research) will be quite limited 
to allow for assumptions about the normality of distributions, nonparametric tests will be 
employed in order to determine whether the managers in the under study organization agree 
with each other. 
The nonparametric test appropriate for this study 3 is either the two-sample or the 
k-sample median tests, depending on the number of subpopulations involved. 
The rationale for the median test is as follows: 4 
Let n, random quantitative observations be obtained from Population 1, n2 similar 
observations be obtained from Population 2...... and nk observations from Population k. 
if MI, M2, ... ' Mk denote the medians for the first, second , ..., kth sample 
respebtively, then the differences between the sample medians can be used to make an 
inference about differences in the population values. Thus, one can test the hypothesis: 
HO: M, = M2 `2 ... 0 Mk 0 MO 
against the alternative 
Hl: Ml ' M2 0 *** 0 1ýlk 
Under H )q it is hypothesized that there is no statistical difference between the 
medians of tge populations from which the samples are drawn. As a result, the k samples 
can be combined into one sample. For the combined observations, it is possible to find the 
common median, M09 determine the number of observations in each sample that are above 
and below the common median, and then test the hypothesis 
HO: Ml = N'2 c 0- = Mk * 
HO can be tested by use of the Karl Pearson's statistic : 
2k 
X2 
Xik -E (Xik)12 
E(Xik) 
1=1 k=l 
which can be computed simply as 
2k 
X2 
X2 ik 
- 
E(Xik) 
1=1 k=l 
or, in terms of the cell and marginal frequencies, by: 
2k 
X2 
X2 lk 
X1. X. k 1=1 k=l 
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If the cell frequencies in the expected frequency table are all greater than 
five 5, then X2 can be approximated by a chi-square variable with v- (K - 1) degrees of 
freedom. 
9.3.2.11. Content of Cohesiveness 
The described test of managerial cohesiveness provides a measure of managers' 
agreement on the issues examined. However, the degree of managerial agreement does 
not provide by itself a measure of organizational effectiveness The content of this 
agreement or disagreement must, further, be examined. Thus, after performing the 
statistical tests, an interpretation of the values obtained will proceed, to reveal 
whether the existence or lack of cohesiveness provides an indication that the under-study 
organization, as far as its managers are concerned, is capable of pursuing viability and 
development. I 
9.4. SURVEY POPULATION 
A detailed organizational description of the Greek Railways (OSE) is provided in 
Appendix B (Figure B5). As can be seen, listed from left to right are the following five 
managerial levels: 
Level 1: Top Management, 
consisting of the Board (nine members, including the Chairman and the 
vice-Chairman), the General Manager, and his Assistants (four Assistants). 
Level 2: Heads of Departments 
(18 Heads of the respective Departments of the company). 
Level'3: Heads of Divisions; 
each Department consists of several divisions, each managed by the Head of Division 
manager. As an exception, two divisions [the Signalling, Telecommunications and 
Electrical Installations Division (YSTHE) and the Road Transport Division (YA)] are 
not contained within a Department but report directly to the General Manager and his 
assistants. 
Level 4: Heads of Area Units; 
each Division consists of smaller units, termed here under the general title Area 
Units. Actually, referring to Divisions within Production Departments [i. e., 
Regional Departments (DPA, DPP, DPTh), Mechanical Engineering Department (DISTY) 
and Signalling/Telecommunications Division (YSTHE)], the term 'area unit' has an 
exact geographical meaning, denoting, in the case of Divisions within Regional 
Departments, the Operations Area Managers and the Permanent Way Area Managers, in 
the case of Mechanical Enginering Department Workshops Managers and Depots Managers, 
and in the case of Sign all in g/Tel ecom mu nications Division S/TCM Regional Area 
Managers. However, in the case of Headquarters Departments the term 'head of area 
unit' denotes merely the manager of a small office within the division, reported 
usually by a few members of the personnel. 
Level 5: Heads of Local Units; 
the term refers only to Area Units within Divisions within Production Departments 
and denotes: 
Stationmasters, 
Depots and Workshops foremen, 
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Permanent way maintenance foremen, 
S/T maintenance foremen. 
The survey was designed to interview managers of levels I to 4. Table B2 (Appendix B) 
displays the numbers of managers in these levels, the total population being 112. 
Considering both the resources available and the scope of the research, the following 
sampling was arrived at: 
1. Headquarters Administrative and Clerical Departments (DOY, DOE, DEE, DP, DD, DNY, 
DIP, DAP) should be excluded from the survey, because: 
They exert quite limited influence on the overall performance of the company, as 
revealed by the preliminary cybernetic study (Chapter 8). 
- They represent a very small percentage of the total personnel employed 
(0.90+0.13+0.88+0.41+1.79+0.34+0.65-5.10 %, see Table BI, Appendix B). 
2. North Greece Region (Thessaloniki Regional Department - DPTh) should be excluded due to 
limitations in resources. Equally excluded should be the Thessaloniki based workshop, 
depot and S/T unit. 
3. From the remaining managerial structure, the achieved response should enable the 
obtaining of a clear picture in all four managerial levels examined. For the purposes 
of the actual VSM construction, this involved that any gaps resulting from a manager's 
unwillingness to participate should be filled by interviewing managers above and under 
him. Similarly, in order to examine organizational style, the target population should 
be of the magnitude of 50% of the sample, as already defined. The same minimum 
percentage should be achieved within each of the four managerial levels. 
9.5. SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION 
The questionnaire was presented to the Chairman of the Board (who, at that time, 
happened also to be the General Manager) and his permission was requested to conduct the 
survey. A recommendation letter was not requested, as it was thought that the respondents 
might consider top management being behind the survey, expressing, thus, opinions 
favourable to top management. Obviously, this danger could only be reduced, not totally 
avoided. However, an advantage in the survey procedure was that the interviewer happened 
to be a railwayman for more than ten years, and that he personally knew most of the 
interviewees, who in turn, trusted his promise of confidentiality. 
After permission was obtained, interviews were arranged, at a rate of 2-3 per day. 
Average interview duration was 1 1/2 -2 hours, though a few lasted much longer. 
No time for preparation was given to the interviewees, i. e., they did not have prior 
knowledge of the contents of the questionnaire. 
Table 14 provides details about the rate of response to the survey. As can be seen, 
there was a very high rate of response amongst the managers contacted (50 out of 53, or 
94.4 %). The overall achieved number of responses was also high, compared to the size of 
the sample, as defined in previous paragraphs (50 out of 73, or 68.5 %). 
Managers not interviewed fall within one of the following categories: 
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1. Vacant places: 2 (nos. 6 and 55 in Table 14). 
2. On sick leave: I (no. 73). 
3. Outside the Railway, not frequently calling: 3 (nos. 3,4 and 5). 
4. Based outside the Athens/Piraeus area: 9 (nos. 42,43,44,49,50,51,56,57, 
63). 
5. It did not become possible to contact, within the time available, managers nos. 
28 and 29. 
6. Finally, managers nos. 1,2, and 10 was planned to be contacted and interviewed 
during the last week of the time available, which coincided with changes in OSE's 
top management (a new GM was appointed), discouraging, thus, contacts for 
interviews. 
ist of Target Sample Members i 
Board 
1. Chairman 
2. Vice-Chairman 
3. Member 
4. Member 
S. Member 
6. Member 
7. Member 
8. Member 
9. member 
10. General Manager 
11. Assistant GM, Operations 
12. Assistant GM, Pem. Way 
13. Assistant GM, Traction 
14. Assistant GM, Personnel, 
15. Dept. of Planning (DOMP) 
16. DOMP/YM 
17. DOMP/YP 
18. DOMP/YSK 
19. DOMP/YO/TO 
20. DOMP/MK 
21. Dept. of Traction (DEL) 
22. DEL/TY 
23. DEL/TK 
24. DEL/YM294 
25. operations Technict (DET) 
26. DET/TY 
1 
27. Operations Conmrct (DEM) 
28. DEM/YEpM 
29. DEN/YEn« 
30. Permanent Way (DG) 
31. DG/YG 
32. DG/YKTE 
33. DG/GEME 
ontacted interviewed remarks 
1-1 1 
N N 
N N 
N N 
N N 
N N 
N N 
Y Y 
Y 
y V 
N N 
y 
y 
y 
y 
N accepted; not avaltable 
y 
y 
y 
dec Ii ned 
dec II ned 
y 
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(cont I mied) 
34. New Projects ONE) 
35. DNE/YK 
36. DNE/YME 
37. DNE/YMEEKE 
38. DNE/YMESTH 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
39. Athens Region (DPA) y 
40. DPA/YEK y 
41. DPA/YEK/AIEPITH y 
42. DPA/YEK/BIEPITH N 
43. DPA/YEK/CIEPITH N 
". DPA/YEK/DIEPITH N 
45. DPA/YEK/KGPA y 
46. DPA/YGR y 
47. DPA/YGR/T y 
48. DPA/YGR/AITM. GR. y 
49. DPA/YGR/BITM. GR. N 
50. DPA/YGR/CITM. GR. N 
51. DPA/YGR/DITM. GR. N 
52. DPA/YGR/TMK y 
53. Peloponnese Region (DPP) y 
S4. DPP/YEK y 
55. DPP/YEK/AIEPITH N 
56. DPP/YEK/BIEPITH N 
57. DPP/YEK/C, EPITH N 
58. DPP/YEK/KGPA y 
59. DPP/YGR y 
60. DPP/YGR/T y 
61. DPP/YGR/AITM. GR. y 
62. DPP/YGR/BITM. GR. y 
63. DPP/YGR/CITM. GR. N 
64. DPP/YGR/TMK y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
65. RoIL. Stock Repair (DISTY) y 
66. DISTY/TY y 
67. DISTY/YOSTY y 
68. DISTY/EP y 
69. DISTY/KAJ y 
70. DISTY/MPR y 
71. SignaLLing/TLem (YSTHE) y 
72. YSTHE/TTHE/A y 
73. YSTHE/TTHE/P NN 
70TAL 20 53 23 
Notes: 1. ALL managers Listed are based within 
Area, unLess otherwise stated. 
2. For an expLanation of abbreviated ti 
based at Lamia 
based at Larlssa 
based at Volos 
based at Lamfa 
based at Larissa 
based at Volos 
y 
y 
y 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
vacant 
based at Patras 
based at Tripolis 
based at Patras 
based at Tripotis 
y 
-1-50 1 
73 
the Athens Metropolitan 
ties see Chapter 7. 
Tabte 14: Sanpte Menbers of the Survey 
Chapter 9 -207- Case Stud), Survey 
A graphical/visual illustration of survey sample and achieved response are provided 
respectively in Figures B5 and B6 (Appendix B). 
Table 15 provides the sub-division of the managers interviewed into the previously 
defined subgroups. 
1 2 3 4 5 
AGE 
-30 
years 
30-40 
years 
40-50 
years 
50-60 
years 
+60 
years 
total 
No. of respondents 0 6 17 23 4 50 
Percentage 0% 12% 34% "% 8% 100% 
LEVEL 
Top 
Management 
Heads 
of Depts. 
Heads of 
Divisions 
Area 
Managers 
total 
No. of respondents 6 7 20 17 50 
Percentage 12% 14% 40% 34% 100% 
1 2 3 4 5 
FUKCT10N 
operations Rotting 
Stock 
Permanent 
Way 
Signattng 
Telecom 
Other 
total 
No. of respondents a 10 18 3 11 50 
Percentage 16% 20% 36% 6% 22% 100% 
1 2 
J0BTYPE 
Headqrtrs Production 
total 
No. of respondents 21 29 50 
Percentage 42% 58% ID0%- 
TabLe IS: Subgrouping of Respondents by Age, LeveL, Function and Jobtype 
Finally, all information collected during the survey is displayed in subsequent tables 
of Appendix D. 
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9.6 SYNOPSIS 
A survey involving managers within the-case-study was undertaken. The survey was 
designed to provide data in order to: 
Identify the actual VSNI of the enterprise, and 
Examine managerial cohesiveness in the enterprise. 
The identification of the actual VSNI involved the examination of. 
(1) Accountability allocation; 
(2) Information flows network. 
On the basis of the description provided in Chapter 8, a cybernetic analysis of the 
actual functioning of the Greek Railways was undertaken in order to reveal: 
Which way do managers, in practice, overcome disadvantages inherited from the 
poor design of the formal organization. 
(2) Whether, in the course of overcoming these disadvantages, they further violate 
cybernetic principles of organization. 
(3) Whether the principle characteristics of actual flows (type, frequency, quality) 
provide adequate information for management control. 
The examination of managerial cohesiveness involves testing managerial agreement on 
issues concerning: 
(1) The objectives of the enterprise, 
(2) Operational tasks to be achieved, 
(3) Contribution of units in achieving these tasks, 
(4) The planning process, 
(5) The integrated view of the company, 
(6) Performance assessment, 
(7) Reasons constraining performance improvement, and 
(8) Measures assisting performance improvement, 
and assessing the content of this agreement (or disagreement). 
A first test of managerial cohesiveness involved the analysis of descriptive 
statistics, such as frequencies distributions and standard deviations, concerning the 
survey sample. 
Managers interviewed were further subdivided into groups by age, level, function and 
jobtype. Managerial agreement was tested by contrasting opinions of subgroups within 
groups, providing, thus, more details concerning the degree of managerial cohesiveness. 
Finally, the meaning of this cohesiveness (or lack of cohesiveness) was examined, by 
interpreting the findings of the survey. 
The survey was designed to be extended over the totality of managers in four 
managerial levels, with the exclusion, mainly due to limitations in resources, of. - 
(1) A number of headquarters clerical and supportive departments. 
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r 
(2) One of the three regional departments, the most remote. 
Managers interviewed comprise 68.5 % of the designed sample (50 out of 73) and the 
94.4 % of the managers contacted (50 out of 53). The magnitude of the response achieved 
satisfies almost completely the requirements of this thesis. 
The analysis of information collected is undertaken in following chapters. 
9.7. FOOTNOTES 
1. G. A. Britton and H. McCallion (1985) have proposed that to assist potential users in 
correctly applying the model, case studies demonstrating valid uses of the model should 
be published. Furthermore, they suggest, the studies should be primarily descriptlve. 
"Our experience with the model indicates that significant organizational deficiencies 
can be 'discovered' using the model at the descriptive level. More importantly though, 
if the mathematics is to come out right, the analogy must first be appropriate". 
2. Table El (Appendix E) provides a functional analysis of managers interviewed for each 
of the 168 listed activities. 
3. S. Siegel, 1956: Non-Parametric Statistics for the Behavloural Sciences (McGraw-Hill, 
New York). 
4. L. A. Marascuilo and M. McSweeney, 1977: Non-Parametric and Distribution- Free Methods for 
the Social Sciences (Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., Monterey, California). 
5. "Actually, there is some evidence that this assumption can be weakened without 
violating the integrity of the Karl Pearson form of the test. However, extreme 
violations cannot be tolerated" (L. A. Marascuilo and M. McSweeney, 1977: page 133). 
CHAPTER 10 
VSNI OF THE ENTERPRISE 
10.1. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 8, the VSM structure of the enterprise was discussed, as resulting mainly 
from the legislation, which assigns specific duties to various parts of the company, and 
various deficiencies were identified. Further, the ability of various sub-systems and 
units to absorb the emerging environmental, operational and managerial varieties was 
questioned, but could not be evaluated without performing a survey, to show which way was, 
in practice, this variety engineering attempted. 
This chapter illustrates the findings of the survey in terms of Beer's model of the 
viable system. The picture it provides is more objective, than the one offered in Chapter 
8, as it draws on the opinions expressed by the managers themselves, but probably less 
rich, as it is based on responses to a structured questionnaire. Somehow, the relative 
merits and disadvantages of two types of social research, i. e., 'ethnography' and 'survey' 
are both reflected in this thesis. Therefore, a parallel evaluation of the respective 
chapters is recommended. 
The cybernetic model of the enterprise is constructed in two stages: 
First, an identification of systems ONE to FIVE at various levels of recursion is 
attempted by examining accountability for listed in the questionnaire managerial 
activities. 
Then, by assessing recorded information flows the above model is enriched. 
10.2. PRELIMINARIES TO ACCOUNTABILITY ALLOCATION 
10.2.1. Variety Engineering 
Accountability allocation was attempted on the basis of the cybernetic modelling of 
the railway enterprise, which was provided in Chapter 6, taking into account the specific 
organizational characteristics of the under-study enterprise, as discussed in Chapter 8. 
Thus, a list of 168 managerial activities at various levels and areas within the railway 
enterprise has been constructed and contained in the survey questionnaire. The methodology 
adopted for the allocation of accountability for each managerial activity has been 
described in Chapter 9. Table 16 illustrates the relation of the activities listed in the 
questionnaire to the recursive levels of the enterprise. The table summarises the 
methodology for the derivation of the actual VSM of the enterprise, by providing a means 
of visually interpreting actual managerial discretion, to be shown by managers' responses 
to questions about accountability for activities. 1 Two notes, concerning this table, 
should be made here, related to limitations in space: 
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(1) Each activity at any level of recursion is, obviously, related also to any 
higher level, though, in the table, this has only been shown for activities for 
which this was explicit. For example, in the extreme case, all of the 168 
activities are related to recursive level I (railway enterprise). 
(2) Activities nos. 1-5 of the survey questionnaire (Relations with the State) are 
the only not to be shown in the table, since they obviously relate only to 
recursive level I and they require an additional column, not available for 
practical reasons. 
The way in which variety is handled in real life, that is, the way in which managerial 
accountability is allocated within the enterprise, will provide the real version of this 
table, enabling thus the identification of the VSM. 
10.2.2. Some General Findings of Accountability Allocation 
Detailed information on the 'accountability allocation' methodology is contained in 
Appendix E, where: 
Table El provides a functional analysis of managers interviewed for each of the 168 
listed activities; 
Tables E2 to E6 illustrate the results of the adopted methodology as regards the 
five functional areas of managerial activities, i. e., Corporate (Table E2)' 
Operations (Table E3), Rolling Stock (Table V), Permanent Way (Table E5), and 
Signalling/Telecommunications (Table E6); and 
Table E7 summarises the findings of accountability allocation by criterion and 
functional content of activity. 
Figures El to EB provide graphical interpretation of accountability allocation, 
either in terms of Type of activity, Content of activity and Specific Content 
(as regards Production, Materials, and Finance content) in respect to the 
allocation criteria (a to e), 
or in terms of the accountable managerial units in respect to Type, Content 
and Specific Content of groups of activities. 
Prior to departing to the construction of the VSM of the enterprise at certain levels 
of recursion, it is, therefore, possible to arrive at general conclusions by interpreting 
some of the information carried by the processed data. Information concerning the total 
sample is contained in Figures El, E2, and E3, which provide the rate of precision of 
accountability allocation (according to the described criteria a to e) and the managers 
accountable for the activities contained in the survey questionnaire. 
A first interesting finding (Figure EI) is the substantial overall percentage (12 %) 
of activities, for which no manager was found accountable (criterion e). Concerning the 
separation of activities in five types (Relations with State, Research & Development, 
Planning/Organizing, Annual Programming, Performance Monitoring) and five contents 
(Production, Sales, Materials, Finance, Personnel), the most problematic areas in the 
case-study enterprise were by type of activity Annual Programming (19 % non-acountable) 
and Performance Monitoring (13 %) and by content of activity Personnel (29 %), Finance 
(25 %) and Production (13 %). Within activities of the Production content, 22 % of 
activities related to Production Rules were found not having manager accountable. The 
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respective percentages for Production Plans and Budgets were 17 % and 12 %. Within 
activities of the Finance content, 29 % of managerial activities related to Financial 
Expenditure were not performed by an accountable manager. 
A second revealing finding is the minimal role of Regional Management (DPER) in the 
overall functioning of the enterprise. Thus, as illustrated in Figures E2 and E3, Regional 
Managers perform only the 0.5 % of the activities listed in the questionnaire, which 
relate, by type, only to Performance Monitoring (I % within this type), by content to 
Production (again I %) and by specific content within production to Quality Control (4 % 
of such activities). This finding validates the assumptions made in Chapter 8, i. e., that 
besides the formal regional structure the enterprise tends, in fact, to be organised 
vertically functionally. It consequently justifies the modification of the intially 
assumed recursive structure. This modification, employed in the remainder of the thesis, 
reflects a Type I railway enterprise, as discussed in Chapter 6, the Systems ONE of which, 
in the first level of recursion, are the four functional sub-systems, i. e., operations, 
rolling stock, permanent way, and signalling/telecommunications. This assumption, though 
explained in details in the remainder of this chapter, has to be mentioned at this stage, 
where the analysis starts to examine each of the sub-systems actually 'producing' the 
case-study enterprise. 
10.3. ACCOUNTABILITY ALLOCATION 
10.3.1. Recursion No. 2: System ONE Operations 
Table 17 provides the actual managerial discretion for the activities of the System 
ONE Operations. As illustrated, almost the totality of these activities are performed at 
the top of the company, outside the regional structure. Indeed the regional manager (DPER) 
was assumed by the interviewees accountable only for activities nos. 38 and 57, i. e., with 
defining the standards of services on trains and with monitoring the offering of these 
services. This was a rational assumption, as the Operations Manager within the Region 
(YEK) has no power over a number of activities, performed outside his area of 
responsibility (train cleaning/servicing, train fuelling, train running), as shown in 
Chapter 8. On the other hand, the only activity accountability for which was assigned to 
the Operations Manager (YEK) was no. 58 (monitoring the standards of services offered at 
terminals), which obviously relates to his power over the terminals staff. Accountability 
for activities concerning the trains crews and terminals staff (nos. 59 and 60 
respectively) was not clearly allocated, in that it lied somewhere between the Regional 
(DPER) and the Operations (YEK) managers. 
Any other managerial activity of the Operations System ONE was either performed 
outside the regional structure or not performed at all. Thus: 
Research and Development activities (nos. 24-27) were performed by the headquarters 
departments of Planning (DOMP), Operations Commercial (DEM), and Operations 
Technical (DET). However, it should be noted that managers interviewed were not very 
definite in allocating accountability for these activities, as Figure E6 (top graph) in Appendix E illustrates. 
Planning/Organizing activities (nos. 28-33) were again performed by headquarters 
operations departments (DEM and DET), but again not very clearly (almost in any case by criterion c). An interesting finding in this section is that noone is responsible for identifying requirements in technical configuration of the track, i. e., required 
axle loads, journey speeds, etc. (activity no. 30). Combining this finding with the 
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next one concerning activity no. 31 (identification of requirements in line's 
capacity configuration, i. e., single/double, type of signalling, CTC), which was 
marginally allocated to DET (criterion c), an early assumption made in this thesis 
(Chapter 7) is validated. That is, that modernization of the infrastructure has not 
been related to any operational objectives, but has been realised as a series of 
civil engineering projects, hoped to inevitably produce improved financial results. 
Annual Programming Activities of the questionnaire consist of four parts. 
Overall Programming Activities, concerning Timetable Preparation (no. 35) and 
Pricing Policy (no. 34) were assumed to be performed by DET and DEM 
respectively. Timetable preparation, i. e., production planning, outside the 
operational (regional) structure reveals the bureaucratic and intolerant 
character of the under-study enterprise, and offers an explanation of the 
inadequacy of the Sales function, as discussed in Chapter 8. On the other 
hand, it is questionable whether the Operations Commercial Department (DEM) 
has any real power to define and implement a pricing policy, since this is 
subject to interventions and regulations from outside the enterprise 
(compliance to State's policies), also discussed in the same chapter. Thus, 
such decisions, though probably bearing the signature of the Head of the DEM 
department are almost in any case made at the very top of the enterprise, if 
not outside. 
The rest three parts of Annual Programming activities relate to the definition of 
the requirements posed by the Operations System ONE to the three other main 
supporting systems. 
Regarding the Traction and Rolling Stock System ONE, availability (no. 36) 
and operationality (no. 37) requirements, i. e., rules, are posed by DET. 
Cleanliness, comfort, etc. rules (no. 38) by the Regional Manager (DPER), as 
already stated. 
Rules for the Track component of the Permanent Way System ONE, concerning 
availability (no. 39) and operationality (no. 40) are not posed by any 
managerial unit of the Operations system. That is, the Permanent Way System 
ONE is not assumed to have any obligation to comply, while functioning, to the 
Operations System requirements. This is a probable explanation of the serious 
deviations from train schedules caused by the infrastructure updating 
projects. It also reveals the priority assigned to infrastructure 
modernization, in relation to day-to-day operations. Rules for Terminals and 
Installations operationality (no. 41) are responsibility of DET. 
DET is also responsible for rules concerning the operationality of the Signalling Systems (no. 42) and Telecommunication/Rad iotel e phones (no. 43) 
elements of the Signalling/Telecommunications System ONE. Rules for the Level 
Crossings Guarding and Warning Systems (no. 44) are the job of the Permanent 
Way Department (DG), since, traditionally, in the absence of a recognised Signalling/Telecoms functional structure, Level Crossings, though part of the Signalling System, have been managed at any level by the Permanent Way 
managers. Finally, noone has been identified as responsible for posing rules for the operationality of the Central Traffic Control recently installed 
systems (no. 45). This lack of accountability will be reexamined when discussing the Signalling/Telecommunications System ONE. 
Performance monitoring activities are subdivided to the following groups: 
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Commercial performance, i. e. traffic volume (nos. 46 and 47) and receipts (nos. 48 
and 49) development, is monitored by the Operations Commercial Department (DEM). the 
former marginally (criterion c). 
Operations expenditure (nos. 50,51 and 52) is very doubtfully monitored by the 
Financial Affairs Department (DOY), since accountability for these activities has 
been allocated in terms of the least precise criterion (criterion d). 
Schedule reliability (no. 53) is definitely monitored by DET. DET is also assumed to 
monitor the behaviour of the supporting systems on behalf of the Operations System 
ONE, but this is not very convincing as: 
Traction/Rolling Stock system is judged to be monitored by DET by the 
criterion c (no. 54) 
Permanent Way (no. 55) by the criterion d, implying a very doubtful monitoring, 
made more doubtful by the fact'that, as stated earlier, there are no rules 
against which the performance of this system should be judged (activities 
nos. 39 and 40). 
Signalling/Telecommunications system (no. 56) is not monitored. 
Finally concerning the standards of services offered (nos. 57 and 58) and the 
operations staff (nos. 59 and 60), accountabililty lies somewhere between the 
Regional (DPER) and the Regional Operations Divisional (YEK) managers, as stated in 
the beginning of this section. 
Figure E6 (Appendix E) provides an illustration of the precision of accountability 
allocation within the Operations sub-system and reflects the overall lack of this 
precision. Figure E7 illustrates both the substantial percentage of non-accountable (or 
non-performed) managerial activities within this System ONE of the enterprise, as well as 
the dominance of the headquarters departments of Operations Technical (DET) and Commercial 
(DEM) in the management of this sub-system. 
On the basis of the information discussed in this section, the VSM of the Operations 
System ONE, displayed in Figure 32, was constructed. The three system ONE elements, i. e., 
YEK, YEL, and MXSIA are reproduced within each region. Thus, because of space limitations, 
they are shown as overlapping. The most significant diagnostic points concerning this VSM, 
which have been made in Chapter 8, have been validated during the survey. Thus: 
(1) A part of train operations is performed and managed outside the managerial 
structure of this sub-system. 
(2) The subsystem is actually managed functionally. The role of regional management 
(DPER) is minimal. 
(3) However, since the vertical structure has not yet been officially introduced, 
there is a lack of a clearly responsible system THREE for this kind of 
operations. System THREE duties are divided between the two headquarters 
operations departments (DEM and DET), the regional management (DPER) and the 
Financial Affairs Department (DOY). 
(4) An integrated information centre as regards this subsystem does not exist. 
System TWO duties are again distributed between the independent units which 
undertake system THREE activities. 
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Figure 32: Recursion No. 2: System ONE Operations 
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(5) System FOUR activities are also divided between DEM and DET. However, part of 
such activities is undertaken by DOMP. 
(6) Probably, system FIVE in the VSM of this function is the Assistant General 
Manager Operations (AGMEK). However, he too gets involved in day-to-day 
operational matters, whereas the confusion concerning system THREE and system 
FOUR duties does not help in interpreting what kind of system THREE-FOUR 
interaction he is monitoring. 
Further points related to the information links between these units will be made in a 
later section. 
10.3.2. Recursion No. 2: System ONE Rolling Stock 
Actual managerial discretion for the activities of the System ONE Rolling Stock is 
provided by Table 18. Phenomenically, responsibilities in this area are more clearly 
allocated, since, in practice, they are almost exclusively contained within one 
department, the department of Rolling Stock (DISTY). 
Most of the managerial activities concerning this subsystem have been definitely 
allocated by the criterion a. However, as Table E4 indicates, there seems to be some 
unease when allocating accountability for alternative scenarios preparation (activity 
no. 65, criterion b), or expenditure, personnel, and subcontracted services quality 
monitoring (activities nos. 82-87, criteria b or c). The dominance of DISTY as the 
principle and almost exclusive managerial unit in this area is also illustrated in Figure 
E9. However, this fact has not prevented rolling stock sub-system from being the most 
problematic part of the enterprise. 
The reasons producing this unfavourable outcome are partly illustrated in Figure 33, 
which depicts the VSM of this sub-system. Since almost any activity has been clearly 
allocated to DISTY, an alternative procedure follows in an attempt to highlight 
organizational problems in this area. 
10.3.2.1. Rolling Stock Acquisition 
Any decision made for the acquisition of certain types of rolling stock defines the 
outcome of the rolling stock sub-system and, hence, the overall performance of the 
enterprise, via the influence it exerts on the train operations sub-system. A principle 
method for the attenuation of the variety of the technological environment is the 
standardisation of the types of rolling stock within the company's fleet. For example, the 
less the types of locomotives in possession, the less the need for understanding various 
components and 'translating' them into rules and directions, to be implemented by the 
operating staff engaged in the job of upkeeping these units. Similarly, the easier it is 
to 'educate' staff and to distribute relatively few pieces of technological knowledge over 
big numbers of, thus, skilled workers. 
In most railway networks, a de facto attenuator of environmental technological variety 
is the capability of the domestic manufacturing production. Thus, when a domestic 
manufacturing industry exists, the railway favours its products, mainly because, this way, 
further problems are minimised (i. e., technological support, spares availability, on-site 
solution of problems in operation). 
When this is not the case, either the railway builts; up its own manufacturing 
sub-system (e. g., BREL), or arrives to long-term agreements with foreign manufacturers to 
guarantee a continuous cooperation in future. 
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However, in the case-study, as discussed in Chapter 7, rolling stock acquisition 
policy virtually does not exist. Rolling stock is in most cases purchased under direct or 
indirect interventions of the State. These interventions relate mainly to the balance of 
payments. Thus, both because domestic manufacturing industry does not exist (and hence the 
required rolling stock has to be imported), and because the international trade with some 
countries has to be balanced, the railway is constantly used by the State as a 
facilitator. Note, that the same is not true for the national airline. The choice in this 
area is limited to the products of 3-4 international manufacturers and noone imagines to 
use this public enterprise as a means of solving the country's international trade 
problems, by purchasing aircrafts of not universally guaranteed quality. 
Thus, a first conclusion is either that the system FOUR of the Rolling Stock 
sub-system does not carry on its duties properly, or that the thoughtful proposals it 
produces are overriden at the next level of recursion. Probably both conclusions are 
valid, because if a long-term rolling stock policy existed, many of the State's 
interventions would have been avoided. Recall, that the government's variety handling 
capacity, as regards the railway enterprise, is even smaller. Thus, no minister in a 
democratic society should, in principle, insist in a certain decision, when the enterprise 
has the ability to demonstrate the disastrous effects of its implementation. However, the 
enterprise communicates with the state/owner at the next level of recursion, where the 
respective system FOUR, i. e., the Department of Planning (DOMP), as shown in Chapter 8, 
has nothing to do with rolling stock, being mainly civil-engineering-oriented. Hence, it 
has neither the ability, nor the knowledge, the willingness, or the incentives to oppose 
government's decisions. 
10.3.2.2. Rolling Stock Upkeeping: Rules and Directives 
Since the environmental technological variety has not been attenuated at the stage of 
acquisition, there is an increased need to study the various types of rolling stock and to 
produce rules and directions for the upkeeping of the units. Formally, within DISTY, this 
task is allocated to the Maintenance Organizing Unit (DISTY/YOSTY). A part of the poor 
performance of the rolling stock of the enterprise may be attributed to the inadequate 
output of this unit. 
However, as the same unit is also responsible for judging the overall needs in 
repair/maintenance installations and equipment and making proposals for certain projects, 
it seems that it has been defeated by the complexity of the task. The general condition of 
workshops/de pots buildings, installations and equipment within the case study enterprise 
reflects this not balanced attention paid by the top of the company to the alternative 
functional areas. Hence, while the modernization of the permanent way and signalling is 
well under way, the rolling stock is looked after in very old and inadequate 
installations. 
10.3.2.3. Rolling Stock Upkeeping: Periodic Maintenance (WorkshopsIDepols) 
Within a railway, overall operational performance is defined by the performance of the 
various sub-systems. Thus, the technological characteristics of the Signalling system 
define the capacity and the journey speeds over a line. The same is true as regards the Line configuration (single/double) and Track's geometrical (curves, slopes) and technical (axle loads, etc. ) characteristics. The Operations installations/equipment (terminals, 
yards, stations, sidings, etc. ) limit the type and quantities of traffic that can be 
transported. Overall, the extent of the Network itself within the country, i. e., railway lines and terminals/yards, governs the traffic handling capability of the system. 
However, the characteristics of the sub-systems mentioned define 'once and for ever, 
the capacity of the enterprise. Certain 'bottlenecks' cannot be erased unless more or less 
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substantial projects are undertaken. Further, the condition of any of these sub-systems is 
a priori considered and reflected in the service timetable. For example, speed limits are 
lowered when the condition of the track over a segment of line is not proper. Hence the 
customer does not 'feel" so strongly the impact of this deterioration, in that a journey 
between any two points may take much more time than what a customer would like, or than 
what would be possible if the infrastructure was of a better quality, but the customer is 
from the beginning aware of this situation, when deciding to board on a train. Therefore, 
he/she does not expect the journey to take less time than advertised. What really bothers 
him is when he suffers long stoppages or poor quality of journey due to rolling stock 
condition. There is no way of incorporating the poor quality of the rolling stock in the 
timetables (as it is, as shown, for the other subystems). Hence the perception, within the 
enterprise and among the customers, that the principle 'bottleneck' is the rolling stock 
condition. 
The principle quality characteristics of the rolling stock have already been defined, 
as demonstrated, at the acquisition phase. The multiplicity of types has resulted in 
difficulties for maintenance rules and directives preparation and digestion. The poor 
condition of repair/maintenance installations and equipment has also been discussed. A 
further problem relates to the organization of the rolling stock repair/maintenance. 
Figure 33 reflects an attempt to illustrate the complexity of the operations of the 
rolling stock sub-system. In principle, as discussed in Chapter 6, railway equipment is 
inspected/examined in predetermined intervals. In the same chapter, an example of this 
periodic preventive maintenance has been offered, where, according to the type of 
inspection or repair, different period of time is required. Locomotives safety control and 
fuelling and vehicles inspection and cleaning constitute what was defined as the trolins 
cleaning and servicing part of the trains operations sub-system, in system ONE Operations. 
These duties are undertaken within railway depots and are not meant to last for longer 
than few hours. This phase of the implementation function has been distinguished in the 
diagram of Figure 33, and constitutes the operational circles definitely belonging to 
depots, and, further, in a properly designed organization, to system ONE Operations. 
More detailed examinations and repairs are required at subsequent phases and 
constitute what has initially been defined as periodic maintenance. The way in which these 
tasks are divided between workshops and depots is not clear. Usually both shops engage in 
this kind of repairs, where the more demanding are attributed to workshops. This phase is 
illustrated by the operational circles within the intersection of the repair and 
maintenance circles. 
However, real life is even more complicated than this complex diagram illustrates. The 
ability to follow the prescribed phases of rolling stock inspection and repair presupposes 
other abilities which, as shown, do not exist. Thus, beyond the formal 'task schedule' 
hanging from the wall, the real job of the depots is that of trouble -shooting. Under a 
shortage of technical knowledge, skilled staff, and spares, the depot manager is 
continuously under pressure attempting to offer the equipment required for the composition 
of scheduled trains. Sometimes he succeeds. Sometimes the equipment breaks down either 
before arriving to the origin station or during the journey. 
The top management of the enterprise, not having the capacity to handle the variety of 
this situation via a Te-examination of the whole Circle of rolling stock system ONE 
activities, attempts an 'artificial' improvement of the reliability index by a method 
which does not solve the problem and is, at the same time, very costly. That is, it 
purchases more locomotives and diesel multiple units and throws them into the same circle. 
Locos' availability index is thus improved for a while. When it starts deteriorating 
seriously, and this does not take more than two or three years to happen, a new order is 
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already under way. Beer (1981). commending on- Lord Beeching's proposals in early 1960s for 
the reduction of the size of the British railway network has shown that, thus, "a machine 
for eating the railways" was defined 2. Greek Railway's rolling stock policy is, by 
analogy, 'a machine for eating locomotives*. 
10.3.2.4. Rolling Stock Upkeeping: Repairs (Workshops) 
The third set of operational circles definitely belonging to workshops relates to 
rolling stock repair and involves: 
(1) Rolling stock reconditioning and general repairs, i. e.: 
bogies overhauls, 
traction motors and genarators general repairs, 
body general repairs, 
wheel turning and wheel changing, and 
painting. 
(2) Rolling stock refurbishment and conversions, e. g., 
coaches interior refurbishment, 
fitting new technical systems (heating, air-brakes), 
conversions of coaches to sleepers, etc. 
(3) Casualty repairs. 
While the first two sets of workshops' output may well be programmed and undertaken 
within the unit, its production becomes complicated to the degree that the number of 
casualty repairs rises. This number is proportional to the poor organization of periodic 
maintena. nce, which, as shown, originates from the phase of acquisition and is further 
influenced by the inadequate technical knowledge both at headquarters and staff level, the 
inappropriate standards of repair/maintenance installations and equipment and difficulties 
in purchasing spares and materials needed. However, since the production of a workshop is 
inevitably serialised, there is a limit as to the number of casualty repairs that the unit 
can undertake. This 'bottleneck' is interpreted at headquarters levels as a constraint to 
overcome 'inside -and -now" by further rolliýg stock purchase, with the disastrous effects 
already mentioned. 
Summarising this discussion in terms of the VSM of this sub-system, displayed in 
Figure 33, the following points should be made: 
(1) The Enterprise has not succeded in devicing a rolling stock policy, both because 
its corporate system FOUR is exclusively Permanent Way-oriented and because 
rolling stock acquisition complies to externally defined requirements. 
(2) The multiplicity of types of rolling stock and the inadequate repair/maintenance 
installations and equipment make difficult both the preparation of standard 
repair/maintenance rules and the implementation of these rules. 
(3) The task of the principle regional depot (MXSIA) to offer in the apprporiate 
condition the equipment, required for scheduled train operations, which is 
constrained by inadequate technical knowledge, poor instal I ations/equ i pme nt. 
inadequately trained staff and shortages in spares and materials, is further 
complicated by its dual role, i. e, as a sub-system of both the Operations system 
(engaged in train inspection, cleaning and servicing) and the Rolling Stock 
system (engaged in Rolling Stock periodic maintenance and repair). 
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(4) Though the principle workshop and the three principle regional depots (shown 
overlapping in the diagram) constitute the systems ONE of this sub-system, they 
lack properly conceived system TWO and system FOUR functions. Much of the DISTY 
structure based at the company's headquarters should move outside this building 
and become part of the workshops/depots structure. Thus, much more activity will 
be operations oriented and at the same moment the task of structuring proper 
systems TWO and FOUR for the whole sub-system will be facilitated. 
(5) Under present arrangements, the roles of both the Heads of DISTY and DEL 
Departments and the Assistant General Manager Traction (AGMEL) as systems THREE 
or FIVE of this sub-system is strongly questioned. 
10.3.3. Recursion No. 2: System ONE Permanent Way and Installations 
Table 19 illustrates the actual way in which managerial accountability is allocated, 
as regards the Permanent Way and Installations system ONE. A first interesting finding is 
that the Regional Management (DPER), to which the Permanent Way Division (YGR) is assumed 
to report, has nothing to do with the management of'this sub-system. A second finding, 
illustrated in Figure E10, is that the precision of accountability allocation is reduced 
in the areas of Performance Monitoring, Finance and Personnel. A third finding, 
illustrated in Figure Ell is that accountability is almost equally shared between the 
functioning units (YGR) and the two headquarters departments in this area; i. e., the 
Permanent Way Department (DG) and the New Projects Department (DNE). 
Table E5 summarises the findings of accountability allocation. For most of the 
activities of this area accountability for one activity is allocated to more than one 
organizational units. When the units have a vertical relationship, Le, Department of 
Permanent Way (DG) and Regional P. W. Division (YGR), this is a good sign, as it 
demonstrates an integrated perception of the sub-system. However, in a horizontal 
relationship (Le, DG and DNE) shared accountability implies either waste of resources or, 
indeed, lack of accountability. 
10.3.3.1. Research and Development 
Technological development in track issues (no. 98) is monitored both by DG (criterion 
a) and DNE (criterion c). However, though not reflected in the questionnaire, DG is more 
interested in track structure and components, as it technically supervises and directs 
both track maintenance and laying of new track, whereas DNE is more concerned with track 
infrastructure, as this unit is associated with the study and supervision of subgrade 
construction projects. 
For the same reason, technological development in tunnels, bridges and other technical 
works is monitored by DNE (no. 89). 
Terminals issues monitoring, i. e., buildings, accessibility, sidings, layout (no. 90) 
is allocated to DNE and Operations Technical (DET), both by the criterion a. 
Finally, both DG and DNE seem to engage in civil-engineering-projects -management developments monitoring (no. 91), but the less definite allocation (criteria b and c 
respectively) implies rather that they should engage than that they are really tackling 
this issue. 
Though decisions concerning the overall layout of the network are made at the next 
higher level of recursion, the Permanent Way subsystem has developed more or less a 
perspective of the future it wants to pursue. This perspective is also reflected in the 
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company's corporate plans, although, as stated, the modernization of the permanent way has 
not been associated with any sort of expected financial, social, etc. results. 
10.3.3.2. PlanninglOrganizing 
Anything associated with rules and methods of permanent way maintenance (activities 
nos. 92-95) is clearly allocated to DG (criterion a). 
Studies preparation concerning technical projects (nos. 96-100) is shared between DG 
and DNE in a way reflecting the division of tasks within the sub-system, as illustrated in 
Chapter 8 (Figure 28). 
Requirements in materials, tools and equipment (nos. 100-105) are decided by the 
Regional Units (YGR) and, further, by DG. 
10.3.3.3. Annual Programming 
The preparation of the, annual programme of track and installations maintenance/renewal 
(no. 106) is clearly allocated to DG (criterion a). 
The new projects annual programme (no. 107) is marginally allocated to DNE and YGR 
(criterion c), reflecting, thus, an argument provided in an earlier part of the thesis 
(Chapter 8), i. e., that plans, especially modernization plans, are decided at the higher 
level of recursion. 
The preparation of the annual programme for machniery, equipment and materials for 
p. w. renewal/maintenance (nos. 108,109) is allocated to the regional divisions (YGR) and 
the Permanent Way Department (DG), both by the criterion a. However, this initial 
preparation is subject to corporate and, further, government truncation. The degree to 
which the units participate in budget's reformulation, i. e., after State's suggestions 
have been considered, is discussed in Chapter 11. 
As all projects are subcontracted, the role of the New Projects Department (DNE) is 
supervisory. Therefore, no programmes for materials, equipment or machinery acquisition 
are associated with this part of the implementation function. 
10.3-3.4. Performance Monitoring 
Though accountability for up-to-now examined activities within this sub-system has 
been, more or less, clearly allocated, in the last part referring to performance 
monitoring problems associated with the wrong organizational design are reflected. Thus, 
The monitoring of the condition of the track and the quality of renewal/maintenance 
works (no. 110) is definitely allocated to Regional Divisions (YGR), but it is less 
clear that the Permanent Way Department (DG) engages in a kind of quality control (criterion b). In fact this is the only case where DG appears to have some 
participation, since 
the monitoring of the condition of technical works and constructions (no. II I) 
terminates within the region (YGR-criterion a, TM. GR-criterion b), and 
the same is true for the condition of buildings, terminals and other 
installations (no. 112, YGR-criterion b, TM. GR-criterion c). 
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The monitoring of the quality of subcontracted projects (no. 113) is allocated to 
DNE and to YGR, since the regional divisions are too supervising smaller projects, 
or projects not directly associated with the main-line modernization plan. The least 
precise allocation in this case (crilerion c) implies rather a not proper 
formulation of the question (i. e., the lack of distinction between these two types 
of projects), than ambiguities in accountability allocation. 
The monitoring of the development of the annual renewal/maintenance programme 
(no. 114) is a job of both DG and regional divisions (YGR). The less precise 
allocation (criteria b and c respectively) is rather associated with the 
incompleteness of this programme, reflecting an inadequate planning phase, as 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
The same is true in the case of materials/tools availability monitoring (no. 116). 
Contrary, the new constructions annual programme (no. 115) is definitely monitored 
by DNE (criterion a), both because it is more structured, and because top management 
is interested in its development, since, as discussed in Chapter 8, the 
modernization plan development has become the principle criterion for the overall 
assessment of the company's performance. 
The wrongly conceived 'public enterprise' character of the railway is direcity 
reflected in answers concerning financial control within the permanent way 
sub-system. Thus, 
No unit is responsible for expenditure monitoring of permanent way 
renewal/maintenance works (no. 117), and 
The control of the expenditure of subcontracted projects (no. I IS). though 
easier, since it refers to contracts with third parties, expressed in the form 
of detailed budgets, is alocated to DNE by a less precise criterion (criterion 
c). This reflects both a poor planning phase and an inadequate production 
control, which leads to significant deviations from both budgeted expenditure 
and expected completion time, as discussed in Chapter 8. 
Finally, the less precise allocation (criterion c) of accountability for the 
permanent way personnel (nos. 119 and 120) reflects the characteristics of the 
enterprise/personnel relationship, discussed, in Chapter 8, in details. 
The VSM structure in Figure 34 summarises the principle organizational characteristics 
of the Permanent Way sub-system. 
(1) Implementation duties within this system ONE are divided between the three 
regional divisions (YGR) on the one hand, shown overlapping in the diagram, and 
the Constructions Division (DNE/YK) of the New Projects Department on the other. 
(2) This division is maintained all the way up the organizational pyramid. On the 
one hand, DNE develops as a 'projects-specialist' department, possessing its own 
coordination, control, and intelligence functions. On the other hand, DG 
develops as a 'track specialist', not having the ability to control properly the implementation function, i. e., the regional divisions (YGR), since this function 
still reports formally to regional management (DPER). This is shown in the 
diagram with the dotted rectangles in the areas of P. W. maintenance financial 
and personnel control. However, as DG is also possessing a system FOUR function, 
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Figure 34: Recursion No. 2: System ONE Permanent Way 
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duties in this area cannot properly distinguish and this is also shown in the 
system FOUR area of the diagram. 
(3) An overall system THREE unit for this sub-system cannot be identified within the 
hierarchical structure. Probably this role is played by the Assistant General 
Manager Permanent Way (AGMGR). 
(4) The same person plays also a system FIVE role, especially by representing the 
Permanent Way sub-system to the wider system of which he is member (corporate 
management). However, the arguments provided in Chapter 8, concerning the 
naturally limited human capacity, hold and in this case, especially when 
considering that 
- most of the infrastructure modernization in the company takes place within 
the Permanent Way functional area, 
- consequently, ' increased system FOUR needs exist, 
- the organizational confusion (as a result of the existence of DNE) does not 
facilitate the solution of problems at a head-of-department level, and 
- the same manager (AGMGR) probably had system FIVE responsibility for the 
Signalling/Telecommunications sub-system, as will be discussed later. 
10.3.4. Recursion No. 2: System ONE Signalling and Telecommunications 
Actual managerial discretion for the activities of the system ONE Signalling and 
Telecommunications is illustrated in Table 20. This table indicates also the big number of 
non-accountable activities in this area. Figure E12 illustrates the lack of precision of 
accountability allocation, especially by Type of Activity. The same lack of precision is 
detailed presented in Table E6, according to which, most managerial activities were 
allocated by the criterion c. Figure EI3 shows that accountability for activities within 
this sub-system is divided between the functioning part, i. e., the signalling and 
telecommunications division (YSTHE) and a part of the New Projects Department 
(DNE/YMESTH), recently set up to undertake modernization projects in this area, on the 
respective Permanent Way example. - 
In Chapter 8, it has been shown that the system ONE Signal I in g/Teleco mmu nicatio ns has 
not been realised as such in the under study enterprise. However, its inevitably 
increasing significance in relation to the developing modernization project starts being 
gradually understood. Thus, in the new organization to be implemented (Appendix B, Figure 
B4), provision has been made for a Signalling and Telecommunications functional Department 
(DHST). However, the narrow 'technical' perspective which has governed this proposal is 
reflected to the full set of activities of this unit, which has been perceived as 
Electrification, Signalling and Telecommunications Department. Obviously, electrification, 
apart from external similarities (wires and electricity), has not much to do with 
signalling and telecommunications. Besides, the separation of electrification as a project 
from its natural context, that is, traction, might result to future problems when 
electrified lines become operational. 
Though Permanent Way, and, to a lesser degree, Rolling Stock may be understood as 
almost independent subsystems supporting operations, the signalling and telecommunications 
subsystem lies at the heart of operations. Thus, the distinction employed in this thesis, 
as explained in Chapter 6, has to do with the certain modernization phase that the 
enterprise is undergoing and refers to the technical (installation and maintenance) 
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dimension of technological systems within this subsystem. Apparently, signalling and 
telecommunications systems operation is exercised within the Operations system by staff 
which either directly belongs to the Operations function (terminals staff, controllers, 
etc. ), or should belong to this function in a properly designed organization (train 
drivers, level crossings keepers). 
10.3.4.1. Research and Development 
As this subsystem lacks a proper reckognition, and, consequently, a relevant status and 
organization within the enterprise, several units engage in environment scanning 
activities, as Table E6 illustrates. However, such activities are undertaken 'as it 
happens'. and this is reflected in the less precise allocation criteria (criterion c, in 
any case). 
Accountability (if any) is shared between the Operations Technical Department (DET), 
the Signalling/Telecommunications autonomous Division (YSTHE) and the Signalling/ 
Telecommunications Division of the New Projects Department (DNE/YMESTH). The 
Permanent Way Department (DG) also engages in studying Level Crossings issues, since, 
traditionally, this sub-system has been managed from within the Permanent Way function. 
10.3.4.2. PlanninglOrganizing 
For each of the four subsystems comprising the Signalling/Telecommunications system 
three principle questions were asked: 
- Who decides which technological product will be purchased and installed; 
- Who decides the technical details of the system's installation; and 
- Who defines the rules and regulations for the maintenance of the installed system. 
Managers' responses did not allow for a definite allocation of accountability for the 
types of decisions mentioned. Thus, always under the less precise criterion c, it was 
shown that, in general, DNE/YMESTH and DET were mainly engaged in the selection and 
installation of a technological product and YSTHE in its maintenance. However, as 
DNE/YMESTH is a very junior unit and as DET's personnel lacks the experience and the 
qualifications to make such decisions, it is implied that either a lot of informal 
communication with YSTHE is taking place or that, in the end, exact criteria for choosing 
certain technological systems do not exist. -Within the survey, both these implicit 
assumptions were expressed by managers interviewed. Thus: 
one manager insisted that, in real life, most decisions were made at YSTHE level. By 
not allowing this reality to be expressed organizationally (i. e., by forming the 
DN'E/YMESTH unit), top management was complicating management process within the 
signalling and telecommunications area. 
one corporate manager, having by status a more integrated view of this area, filled 
the part of the questionnaire next to activities nos. 126-127,129-130, and 132-133 by writing gno one is responsible", and explained that decisions for the selection 
of a technological system relate more to the manufacturer's capacity to sell it to 
the railway than to the company's ability to assess among alternative products. 
In maintenance issues, accountability is clearly allocated. Thus, the responsibility to identify required maintenance resources, i. e., materials, tools, and equipment (activities nos. 138-141) belongs definitely to YSTHE (criterion a). 
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Figure 35: Recursion No. 2: System ONE Signalling and Telecommunications 
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10.3.4.3. Annual Programming 
Annual maintenance plans (nos. 142-145) are prepared by YSTHE. 
New systems installation plans are either prepared by DNE (telecommunications, no. 147) 
or DG (levels crossings warning systems). The absence of a unit accountable for signalling 
and CTC systems installation plans preparation (nos. 146,148) favours the argument 
expressed by the corporate manager interviewed; i. e., that such plans are contained within 
the tender, and, in the end, are prepared by the manufacturer. 
10.3.4.4. Performance Monitoring 
The condition of the technological systems and the quality of maintenance works (nos. 
150-153) is clearly a job of YSTHE (criterion a). In what relates to level crossings 
systems, accountability is less precisely allocated (criterion c), because, as discussed, 
permanent way units are also involved. 
However, it is peculiar that the only unit to assess the quality of works is the unit 
undertaking these works. This implies ineffective control and reduced performance 
standards. 
New projects are formally supervised by DNE/YMESTH (no. 154). Besides the precise 
accountability allocation (criterion a), the argumnets provided in previous paragraphs 
should also be considered. 
Maintenance materials/equipment stock control (nos. 160-162) is clearly allocated to 
YSTHE (criterion a). 
Finally, to what relates to sub-systemic finance (nos. 156-159) and personnel (nos. 
163-168), either there was no manager accountable or accountability was marginally 
allocated (criteria c and d). Explanations of this outcome had been provided when 
discussing the Permanent Way sub-system. 
The emerging picture of the Signal Ii ng/Teleco mmunications sub-system is illustrated in 
Figure 35, in terms of Beer's VSM and may be summarised in the following points: 
(1) The Signalling/Telecommunications system ONE is not realised as such in the case 
study enterprise. Thus, it lacks the status of a functional department. 
(2) The tasks of this unit are carried out, partly by the regional S/T units (TTHE), 
controlled at national level by the autonomous Signalling/Telecommunications 
Division (YSTHE), partly by the New Projects S/T Division (DNE/YMESTH) and 
partly by Permanent Way Units (TMK). 
(3) Systems TWO and THREE of this sub-system do not exist. Part of these duties, to 
what relates to DNE/YMESTH, are carried by the New Projects Department (DNE). 
Overall S/T Manager cannot be identified. 
(4) System FOUR duties are undertaken by almost the totality of corporate, P. W., Operations Technical and S/T units (DOMP, DET, DNE, DG, YSTHE). In the absence 
of organizatioal clarity system FOUR activities are largely unprogrammed. 
(5) The S/T sub-system lacks also a system FIVE. The Assistant General Manager 
Permanent Way (AGMGR) was playing for a while this role, but, at the time of the 
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survey, -he had quited this responsibility, overwhelmed by the complexity of the 
task. 
10.3.5. Recursion No. 1: Railway Enterprise 
Having examined the Systems ONE of the company, i. e., the four elements which produce 
what the railway enterprise is producing, the discussion may now turn to the next level of 
recursion and study the THREE-FOUR-FIVE metasystem. 
Infomation concerning accountability allocation at corporate level is provided in 
Table E2 and Figures E4 and E5 of Appendix E. As shown, achieved allocation criteria are, 
on average, not better than those encountered when examining the four Systems ONE. 
10.3.5.1. Relations with the State 
This set of activities (nos. 1-5) is the only (together with Rolling Stock sub-system 
activities) for which accountability was definitely allocated to one unit, in this case, 
the General Manager. In the Rolling Stock case it was shown that clear accountability 
allocation does not provide by itself for good results. The same argument also holds here. 
Unfortunately, the General Manager was not interviewed. Therefore, details on the way in 
which he discharges accountability for these activities were not recorded. However, this 
exact allocation validates the respactive discussion in Chapter 8, concerning the limited 
role of the Board of the Railways and the type of the actual State/Enterprise 
relationship. 
10.3.5.2. Research and Development 
Research and Development, from a corporate viewpoint, refers to: 
possessing a rich picture of the technological capabilities as regards the product 
of the enterprise. This implies monitoring international trends in the development 
of the railways and other modes of transport. (no. 6) 
- obtaining an understanding of the way in which certain characteristics of the 
physical environment of the company are developing over time, that is, monitoring 
trends in national development (no. 7) 
- preparing alternative scenarios of the company's development, related to 
alternative forecasts concerning the development of the country (no. 8). 
From these three managerial activities, national development trends monitoring (no. 7) 
is not the duty of any managerial unit. Hence, both the allocation to DOMP of the 
accountability to monitor technological trends (no. 6), and, mainly, the marginal 
allocation (criterion d) to prepare development scenarios (no. 8) become self-defeated and 
pointless. 
The answers of corporate managers interviewed to these three questions summarise in great 
clarity what was attempted to be meant in Chapter 8, when discussing the role of system 
FOUR. 
10.3.5.3. PlanninglOrganizing 
Not knowing to which environment the poorly prepared scenarios corrrespond, it is not 
strange that 
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neither the sectors of transport market which the enterprise decides to enter (no. 9) 
nor the featUTes of seTVices to be offered within these sectors (no. 10) 
are identified by any sort of accountable manager. 
These two answers fully summarise the discussion on the inadequacy of the Sales 
function, undertaken in details in Chapter 8. 
Given the above, and still concerning Planning/Organizing corporate activities, the 
clear allocation to DOMP (criterion a) of managerial accountability to identify required 
investment (no. 11) and organizational change (no. 12) briefly validates the assumption 
frequently made up to now, referring to the lack of any realised outcome of technological 
and organizational innovation. 
10.3.5.4. Annual Programming 
However, within this context, routine activities like annual Investment Programme 
(no. 13) and Annual Budget (no. 14) preparation are clearly allocated (criterion a) to DOMP 
(Department of Planning) and DOY (Department of Finance) respectively. 
10.3.5.5. Performance Monitoring 
The dual role of DOMP, as discussed in Chapter 8, is also reflected in this section. 
Thus, DOMP is assumed as responsible for monitoring 
traffic volume development (no. 15), 
market share development (no. 16), 
rate of absorbtion of investment funds (no. 17), and 
rate of completion of investment projects (no. 18). 
In other words DOMP is assumed to be the enterprise's system, TWO, as regards both 
Operations and the development of the modernization project. However, almost all these 
activities, as Table E2 indicates, have been allocated by the criterion c. Considering 
that this part of the questionnaire has been answered only by corporate managers (that is, 
members of Board, Assistants GM and DOMP managers), there does not seem to be any 
substantial agreement at corporate level as regards DOMP's role. 
Accountability for corporate Finance (nos. 19-21) has been allocated to DOY 
(Department of Finance). Considering both the lack of financial accountability encountered 
when examing the four sustems ONE, and the description of the company's finances as 
offered in Chapter 8, this exact accountability allocation reflects rather an allocation 
according to functional specialisation than proper carrying out of these activities. 
The enterprise/personnel relationship, as regards relations with trade unions (no. 22) 
has been detinitely allocated to the AGM Personnel/Finace (criterion a). This was also 
assumed in Chapter 8 and an explanation was offered. Other indicators of the 
enterprise/personnel relationship, e. g. absenteism (no. 23) are not subject of any exact 
managerial monitoring and are rather assumed to be the job of any head of department, 
though not definitely (criterion c). 
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Figure 36: Recursion No. 1: Railway Enterprise 
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10.3.6. Conclusions on Accountability Allocation 
The findings of the accountability allocation phase of this thesis are summarised in 
the VSNI of the enterprise in Figure 36. This illustration is almost identical to the 
description provided during the 'ethnograph ic- type' analysis undertaken in Chapter 8. 
Therefore, there is no reason to reproduce here the conclusions contained in the Synopsis 
of that chapter. 
10.4. INFORMATION FLOWS 
10.4.1. Introduction 
The identification of the actual management control structure in the under-study 
enterprise as illustrated in the previous section (Accountability Allocation) has given 
the opportunity to demonstrate weaknesses and faults in the organizational design. In 
general, no major differences between the organization, as perceived in terms of the 
descriptive study (Chapter 8) and as emerging from managers' responses were encountered. 
This is quite natural, because 'who is actually doing what' is not a secret to anyone 
participating in an organization for a long period. However, what is difficult to achieve 
by means of 'observing' an organization is the actual way in which any unit carries out 
the managerial tasks it is assumed to perform. This implies information handling. The 
final part of the VSM structuring deals, therefore, with the examination of the 
information network. 
Section Four of the survey questionnaire has provided the basis for data collection 
for this subtheme. The thus constructed data base is displayed in Appendix D (Table D8). 
On the basis of this information, twenty information flows diagrams were constructed and 
are displayed in Appendix E (Figures E14 to E33). That is, there are four diagrams 
corresponding to the four Types of Managerial Activities (Research and Development, 
Planning/Organizing, Annual Programming, Performance Monitoring) for each of the five 
components of the Railway Enterprise already discussed (Corporate, Operations, Rolling 
Stock Permanent Way, Signalling/Telecommunications). These diagrams may assist in 
understanding the type of information connections that each unit of the enterprise 
maintains with the enterprise and the environment. In fact, they constitute the only way 
to understand the enterprise/environment interaction as explained by the managers 
themselves, since, the up to now study, apart from assuming a type of interaction did not 
possess the information required in order to evaluate this interaction. 
Before proceeding in an interpretation of this diagrams, it should be stated that they 
provide only recorded flows. That is, where a manager was not interviewed, the respective 
flows are missing. In fact, the most important missing information is this which relates 
to the activities allocated to the General Manager and to the Assistant General Manager 
Operations (AGMEK). 
A second point which must be stated is that the recorded information flows were not 
cross -validated; i. e., the diagrams contain all information flows declared by the 
managers, as contained in Table D8 (Appendix D), without attempting to ensure whether the 
information a unit declares that sends is actually understood at the other end of the flow 
as received. The reason why this cross - validation was not undertaken is that, in order to 
properly decide which flows actually exist and which not, a further series of interviews 
should be required, otherwise any decision should be either arbitrary or result to a poor 
picture. 
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Before departing in an examination of this material, which will proceed in the same 
way as previously, i. e., when discussing accountability allocation, the following points 
should be made as regards the geneml layout of these twenty diagrams and the way 
in which 
the discussion proceeds. 
The Tight-hand part of the diagrams, i. e., the railway enterprise, provides an 
illustration of the organization both in terms of formal structure and recursive 
levels, as discussed in Chapter 8 (Figure 31). However, as proved by the 
accountability allocation section of this chapter, the intermediate level 
corresponding to regional management (recursive level 2 in the diagrams) does not 
actually exist. 
The left-side part of the diagram (the environment) provides environmental elements 
resulting from managerial answers. That is, the specific elements were neither a 
priori hypothesised, nor the managers were in any way guided towards them. They 
correspond to answers to questions 15.1.1 and 15.4.1 of Section Four of the Survey 
Questionnaire (Appendix C), where information origins/destinations were requested 
under the general heading 'outside the railways'. 
Finally, frequent references are made to Table D8 (Appendix D), which displays the 
data of this part of the questionnaire. The table extends over 19 pages and 
classifies information flows in terms of activity, respondent, origin/destination 
and flows characteristics (form, frequency, quality) under a coding, explained in 
the last page of the table. 
10.4.2. Information Flows: System ONE Operations 
Figures E18 to E21 correspond to recorded information flows related to activities of 
the System ONE Operations. 
Research and Development activities (Figure E18) are mainly undertaken by the 
Department of Planning (DOMP) and the Department of Operations Technical (DET). These 
two units, as illustrated in the diagram, are those which maintain contacts with the 
railway environment, and this has also been illustrated in the VSM of this system (Figure 
32). The system FOUR informational activities of the Operations Commercial Department 
(DEM), also hypothesised in Figure 32, were not validated, since the only manager 
interviewed as regards this unit, i. e., the head of the department (DEM), did not answer 
the last part of the questionnaire. 
Both DOMP and DET are assumed to maintain contacts with both the environment and 
the'functional' organization (DEL, DISTY, DPER, DEM, DG, DNE, YSTHE). However, as 
regards the environment, the principle managerial unit of this system ONE, i. e., the 
Department of Operations Technical (DET), maintains exclusively 'technological' relations 
with the international railway context (UIC normes, standards etc., railway literature). 
However, even this limited information exchange (Table D8, activities 24 and 27. 
respondent 30) has neither periodicity (frequency-7, i. e., 'whenever happens) nor is 
assessed to be of adequate quality (3-'almost adequate). DOMP seems to maintain more 
frequent relations with the railway environment. However the information processing 
capacity of this unit is questionable, especially when considering the arguments provided 
in Chapter 8. 
Figure E19 depicts information flows associated with Planning/Organizing activities of 
the Operations sub-system (Survey questionnaire. Appendix C. activities nos. 28-33). DET 
seems again to be the central information node. However, this self-claimed central role 
becomes again very doubtful, when considering that 
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accountability for these activities has been allocated to DET under a less precise 
criterion (usually by criterion c), and 
the frequency of the resulting information flows, as regards DET, is always of the 
'whenever happens' type. 
The same diagram illustrates an information link developing between the Regional 
Division of Operations (YEK) and the Rolling Stock Department (DISTY), i. e., outside the 
formal structure, in order to overcome organizational deficiencies, i. e., the allocation 
of accountability for part of activities of the Operations sub-system to the Rolling Stock 
sub-system. 
Similar links are depicted in Figure E20 (Operations, Annual Porogramming), between 
YEK/DISTY and Regional Managers (DPER)/depots (MXSIA). As regards information flows 
in this area, associated with, the implied central role of DET, the remarks made previously 
with respect to the frequency (and hence the reliability) of the flows still hold, as 
Table D8 indicates. 
Concerning performance monitoring activities, Figure E21 illustrates, for the first 
time as regards this sub-system, the informational significance of the regional structure 
(DPER and, mainly, YEK). Besides the fact that, here, the only perceived link of the 
Regional Division (YEK) with the environment was identified (relating to answers to Press 
publications concerning, probably, inadequate performance), the diagram illustrates the 
development of a horizontal information network. This network, centering around YEK, 
embraces the operating functional units (YGR, YEL, YSTHE, DISTY). This sort of 
geographical integration, achieved informally in practice, since no more the Region 
contains all functional units, illustrates a problem resulting from the intended vertical 
design and demands a kind of solution. 
The same diagram illustrates the actual content of the activities of the Operations 
sub-system, which, as discussed in other sections, is not reflected in the organizational 
design. Thus, certain types of information flows develop between alternative recursive 
levels, in order to tackle day-to-day problems of the system ONE Operations (e. g. YEK/YEL, 
YEK/DISTY, DPER/MXSIA, KGPA/MXSIA). 
10.4.3. Information Flows: System ONE Rolling Stock 
Figure E22 illustrates the sort of organizational simplicity initially assumed when 
discussing the VSM of this sub-system. Two organizational units engage in Traction and 
Rolling Stock Research and Development activities: 
the headquarters Department of Traction (DEL), engaging in monitoring international 
trends in Traction and Roling Stock issues and in preparing alternative scenarios 
for future decisions of the enterprise concerning the fleet; and 
the Rolling Stock Repair/Maintenance Department (DISTY), mainly interested in 
repair/maintenance issues, the study and decisions on which are inevitably related 
with the former kind of activities. 
Both DEL and DISTY maintain information exchange with the Operations Technical 
Department (DET), since, in the end, decisions concerning rolling stock acquisition and 
scheduling have to conform to requirements of the Operations sub-system. 
Both DEL and DISTY have to acquire technical information from a technological 
environment, which, since Rolling Stock manufacturing industry does not exist within the 
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country, involves exclusively international publications, journeys abroad and information 
exchange with manufacturers. 
Recently, under State's bilateral agreements with German Democratic Republic, a 
manufacturing industry is setting up, utilizing the installations of the bankrupt, and 
hence nationalised, Elefsis Shipyards in the Athens area. This decision had a two-fold 
task: 
to guarantee employment of the numerous staff of the shipyards, and 
to, gradually, assist in the building of a domestic railway manufacturing industry. " 
Much of the work associated with studying and supervising these contracts is 
undertaken by a unit of the Department of Traction (DEL), which was set up specifically 
for this reason and which is referred to within this thesis as DEL/YM294. Thus, increased 
Research and Development needs have arised, very doubtfully fulfilled by the actual 
organization of DEL. 
The relatively uncomplicated nature of the Rolling Stock sub-system, implied by Figure 
E22, has to be rejected, when considering the whole set of information flows associated 
with its functioning. Thus, Figures 23,24 and 25, illustrate the direct relation of the 
Departments of Purchases (DIP) and Stores (DAP) with a lot of managerial activity 
concerning this sub-system. They also indicate that the decision, made in the early 
seventies, to separate organizationally managerial responsibility for spares, materials, 
and equipment purchase from managerial activities related to the utilization of these 
spares, materials and equipment was not a wise one. The division, at a later stage, of the 
thus formed department of materials (DYL) into Purchases (DIP) and Stores (DAP) was 
further decreasing effectiveness. Interaction with this units takes place at both top 
level (DISTY) and implementation (depots, workshops). It should also be noted that: 
Since managers from DIP and DAP departments were not interviewed, their inevitable 
interactions with the environment (i. e., market and manufacturers) is not displayed 
in the diagram. 
The diagram is quite simplistic to what relates with the enterprise/government 
interaction, as regards this sub-system. The DISTY/government information flow 
depicted in Figure 23 is actually a much complicated one. It also involves DIP and 
DAP and the volumes of state's rules and regulations governing the process of 
contract allocation, qualitative and quantitative control of the order, custom 
clearance, government's permittion for imported goods, legislation for the 
protection and encouraging of domestic production, etc. 
Figure 25 illustrates the actual network of information flows for the monitoring of 
the performance of this sub-system. The complexity of the diagram reflects the failure of 
the control of the implementation function. Note, that the 'producing' units i. e. the depots (MXSIA) and the workshops (ERSIA) are subject to any kind of interventions. Contrary to their relatives in other functional areas (e. g., YEK/EPITH/KGPA in Operations, 
YGR/TM. GR in Permanent WAY, YSTHE/TTHE in Signalling/Telecommunications), which, 
as a rule, apart from 'horizontal', i. e., local interactions, communicate vertically 
almost exclusively with the unit to which they report, depots and workshops actually qreport' to the totality of the vertical structure. Thus, apart from their 'official boss', that is, DISTY, they maintain direct relations with DOMP. DEL, DIP, DAP, DOY, the 
Assistant General Manager Traction (AGMEL), and the General Manager himself. A comment 
on this last intervention was provided in Chapter 8, as an explicit statement of 
organizational failure. 
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10.4.4. Information Flows: System ONE Permanent Way 
Information flows associated with Research and Development activities of this 
sub-system, depicted in Figure E26, involve: 
the Operations Technical Department (DET), since decisions on Permanent Way and 
Installations issues relate with the functioning and the performance of the 
Operations sub-system; and 
the two functional departments, i. e, the Permanent Way Department (DG) and the New 
Projects Department (DNE), which share between them responsibilities for activities 
in a way, discussed in details in Chapter 8. 
DET's environment scanning activities, as Table D8 indicates, relate only to 
terminals' issues (no. 90) and are quite limited, both in variety, frequency and quality. 
Contrary, the two functional units in the Permanent Way area (i. e., DG and DNE) 
maintain more adequate contacts. In many respects, the P. W. function of the enterprise 
possesses a much more complete picture of the technological environment, than any other 
part of the company. As stated, this reflects both: 
the traditional attention paid by the enterprise to the Permanent Way sub-system, 
and 
the relative technological simplicity of this sub-system in comparison to the three 
other functions. 
Planning/Organizing activities center around the Permanent Way Department (DG) as Figure 
E27 shows, and this has also derived from the descriptive study. Two further notes should 
be made on this diagram, as they also relate to the description provided: 
the first is that no information exchange between the New Projects Department (DNE) 
and the functioning units (YGR) has been recorded at the planning stage. This 
reflects both the vertical division of duties discussed earlier and the 
non- participative character of planning activities. 
the second illustrates the absence of a system THREE for this function. The 
Assistant GM Permanent Way (AGMGR) is shown as attempting an integration between 
the, formally reporting to Regions (DPER), P. W. Divisions (YGR) and the Permanent 
Way headquarters structure. 
Annual Programming information flows are illustrated in Figure E28 and refer to 
activities nos. 106-109, i. e., to the preparation of the annual maintenance/constructions 
plans and the purchase of materials/equipment required. The diagram shows that these 
activities are somehow integrated within the P. W. function, though this integration refers 
mainly to the preliminary plan's preparation, i. e., to the one which is subject to 
government's approval. After government's opinion on the budget has been taken into 
account, usually resulting to truncations, the thus produced final budget may not involve 
similar participation. This subject is examined in Chapter 11. 
What is also indicated by this diagram is that P. W. maintenance/constructions 
requirements do not reflect any sort of actual needs as realised by the Operations system, 
unless the P. W. /Operations link is an indirect one, involving the Department of Planning (DOMP). However, as illustrated in Table D8, DOMP's participation in this set of 
activities refers only to no. 107 (annual new constructions programme) and involves a 
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once -eve ry-six -months formal exchange of written information with production and 
headquarters departments. 
Finally, performance monitoring activities (nos. 110-120) center around the 
functioning units (YGR) and are largely self-contained within the Permanent Way 
sub-system. Some sort of 'external' assessment implied by the DPER/YGR and DOMP/YGR 
links exaggerates visually the reality. In fact, as shown in Table D8, the regional 
manager (DPER) receives information from P. W. divisions (YGR) only in what relates to 
subcontracted projects within the region (no. 113), whereas DOMP's information exchange is 
also limited to new constructions (nos. 115,118). 
Note that the doubts concerning the monitoring of the P. W. activities from the 
Operations sub-system (no. 55), assigned marginally to DET (criterion d) are validated in 
this diagram, since no information link has been recorded. 
10.4.5. Information Flows: System ONE Signalling and Telecommunications 
Figure E30 depicts Research and Development information flows concerning the 
Signalling/Telecommunications sub-system and corresponding to activities nos. 121-125. The 
diagram illustrates the dispersion of tasks as a result of the lack of recognition of this 
sub-system as a system ONE in its own right. Table D8 signifies the resulting 'anarchical' 
type of the enterprise/environment interaction in this area, in terms of frequency and 
assessed quality of information transmitted. 
The inadequate planning/OTganizing and annual programming information exchange is 
depicted in Figures E31 and E32 respectively. Note the absence of DOMP in planning 
activities in this area. Note also the lack of corpoprate involvement, signifying the 
absence of a sort of functional system FIVE. 
Finally, the prformance monitoring information network, though poor, is complicated 
because: 
S/T activities are shared between S/T and P. W., units, and 
S/T activities are directly related to Operations. 
Performance 
(DOMP, AGMs, 
concerning new 
this function. 
measurement of this sub-system does not reach the corporate structure 
GM), since the only such flow recorded refers to the DNE/AGMGR interaction, 
projects and dating back to the phase when AGMGR had responsibility over 
10.4.6. Information Flows: Corporate Level 
Figures E14 to E17 provide information flows at corporate level, corresponding to 
activities nos. 1-23. Indeed, since the General Manager was not interviewed, and since, as 
shown, he personally holds accountability for many of the activities in this area, the 
diagrams provide an incomplete picture. However, even this incomplete picture allows to 
draw a general conclusion concerning the role of the Department of Planning (DOMP). 
Information flows in all four diagrams center around this Department. Thus, DOMP seems to 
hold within the company a large part of system FOUR (as Figure E14 indicates), system 
THREE (Figures E15, E16) and system TWO (Figure E17) roles. Details of the limited 
capacity of DOMP to fulfill the requirements of a so complex task have been provided in 
earlier parts of the thesis. Table D8 illustrates this limited capacity in terms of actual 
information exchange. 
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The same diagrams illustrate the absence of the three functional AGMs from corporate 
level activities. Thus, their not inclusion in the 3-4-5 part of the coprorate VSM (Figure 
36) is justified, since they exhaust their managerial activity within the respective 
functional area. 
10.4.7. Conclusions on the Information Network 
At first, it should be stated that this brief desrciption of information exchange 
within the case study enterprise was not meant to produce a complete analysis, though much 
of the material required for such an analysis has been collected during this research and 
is contained in Table D8. 
Main objective of this part was to further test the VSM structure of the enterprise, 
as conceived in Chapter 8 and assessed in the 'accountability allocation' phase. Thus, the 
following additional conclusions may derive from this brief examination of the information 
flows network and further enrich the management cybernetic analysis of the railway 
company. 
(1) The enterprise is very much inwards oriented. Much of its information exchange 
activity is consumed within the organizational structure, without significant 
relation with the environment in which the company is embedded. A main reason 
producing this outcome is the irrelevant organizational structure. Thus, since 
the great part of this structure, above the third recursive level, has neither 
clearly defined responsibilities nor duties, it attempts to justify its 
existence by devicing and requesting formal informational exchange, which is not 
'information' under a strict definition of this term, in that it is not utilized 
in the making of any decisions. The thus reproduced bureaucratic behaviour 
seriously influences the productive part of the enterprise, Le, its 
implementation units. A tradition to neglect 'external' signals develops and is 
readily identified in the way in which these units too perceive their relation 
with the environment. 
(2) The specific elements of the environment identified by the interviewed managers 
as origins/destinations of information flows further justify the argument 
provided above. From the eight quoted elements, three are exclusively 
-functional/technological (seminars/education, UIC/Railways/conferences, Railway 
literature), and one is imposed by the very character of the enterprise 
(Government and Public Sector). From the remaining four, 
interaction with the mass media is exclusively defensive, i. e., attempts 
to apologise or to disprove remarks on dimensions of poor performance, 
one is again technological (trade/manufacturers) and refers to the 
acquisition of materials, spares and equipment, and 
the last two, which for any functioning enterprise constitute the focus of 
interest, Le, customers and competitors, have not received any serious 
attention. Thus, for example, the customers/enterprise interaction as 
emerging from the data contained in Table D8 is limited to an abstract 
DET/customers interaction related to the activity of timetable 
preparation. Even this limited interaction is of the 'whenever happens' 
type, since, as has also been shown in Chapter 8, the company does not 
engage in any sort of market research activities. 
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(3) A final point which should be made relates to the informational role of the 
Department of Planning (DOMP). For certain historical reasons, discussed mainly 
in Chapter 7, DOMP has acquired within the company a status of the type of 
'brain of the firm'. The performance of the enterprise over the years has 
demonstrated the inadequacy of this 'brain'. The 'information flows' diagrams in 
this section assist in interpreting the reasons of this inadequacy. It is 
virtually impossible for one organizational unit to act as the collector and 
disseminator of any sort of information demanded at corporate level, and, at the 
same time as a processor of this information for both future, long-term and 
operational activities. Beyond the enormous variety handling capacity implied by 
this ambitious task, this arrangment violates cybernetic principles. 
First, it introduces the concept of 'planning specialists' within the 
company and constrains the autonomy of the sub-systems at both regional 
and functional basis. 
Second, it does not allow for an independent validation of decisions made. 
Since DOMP collects the environmental information, DOMP prepares the plans 
and DOMP assesses the results of operations (inevitably influenced by the 
plans), no one else in the enterprise knows whether undesirable output is 
the outcome of wrong interpretation of environmental signals, of poor 
planning based on correct interpretation, or of operational inability to 
implenent rational plans. 
10.5. SUMMARY OF THE VSM ANALYSIS OF THE ENTERPRISE 
The management cybernetics analysis of the enterprise, initially undertaken in Chapter 
8 and further discussed here, has provided the opportunity to identify certain origins of 
poor performance in the inappropriate organizational structure. Many of the diagnostic 
prescriptions contained in the VSM literature and discussed in Chapter 4 have proved 
useful in this study. In summary: 
(1) The implementation function of the enterprise has not been properly conceived. The 
following serious mistakes in articulating the different levels of recursion have been 
identified, so that the company is not logically organised at each of its levels of 
operation. - 
There is a confusion as to what constitutes the second level of recursion as 
regards the Operations and Permanent Way sub-systems. Thus,. though officially 
a regional structure is supposed to exist, the study has shown that these two 
sub-systems are in fact organised vertically functionally. 
Activities normally belonging to the Operations system are in fact undertaken 
within mainly the Rolling Stock (train cleaning, servicing) or the Permanent 
Way (level crossings keeping) systems ONE. 
The Signalling and Telecommunications system is not recognised as such. 
Therefore, it is not treated as a viable system in its own right and lacks a 
localised system ONE management to attend to its affairs. 
Much of the organizational confusion in the Permanent Way and Signalling/ 
Telecommunications sub-systems is related to the existence and functioning of 
the New Projects Department. 
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(2) The ability of the Systems ONE of the enterprise to operate successfully is threatened 
by the absence of all the necessary five functions of every system ONE. Thus: 
Systems TWO at sub-systemic level were not at all established. 
System THREE duties, in the absence of organizational clarity were in most cases 
undertaken by the functional AGMs, who, at the same time, were playing a system FIVE 
role within the functional sub-system. 
Consequently, no actual distinction of duties within the sub-system's 3-4-5 
metasystem exists. Therefore, functional systems FOUR were equally unorganised and 
ineffective. 
(3) At corporate level, System TWO was not at all established. Therefore, co-ordination 
between the various activities of the systems ONE was in jeopardy. 
(4) Corporate System FOUR was weak. Its communications with both the parts of the 
enterprise and the environment were not adequate. Further, since corporate system FOUR 
(DOMP) was, organizationally, reporting to the formal system THREE figurehead (GM), 
the balancing of the future/present interaction was achieved at the expense of the 
future. 
(5) System's FOUR structural inability to provide the enterprise with alternative 
dimensions of future of both the enterprise and the environment has facilitated the 
system THREE-FIVE overlap. This overlap was expressed in the figure of the General 
Manager, who was also the Chairman of the Board. 
(6) In no case the 'formal' system FIVE, i. e. the Board, represented what Beer calls "the 
essential qualities of the whole systemn to the wider systems of which the railway 
enterprise is part. Conversely, the Board was assumed to represent within the 
enterprise the sort of reality perceived at the higher level of recursion, attenuated 
through the 'filter' of political relationship. 
(7) 'Synergy'and 'interactivity' within the metasystern THREE-FOUR-FIVE were achieved by 
means of the more obvious and least effective way. That is, by the system THREE-FIVE 
overlap and the placement of system FOUR under the control of system THREE. Thus, 
whatever metasystemic interaction required, was taking place within the dominant 
figure, i. e., the General Manage r/Chai rman. 
(8) Almost the totality of the organizational structure above level 3 was pathologically 
autopoietic, i. e., it continued to produce these aspects of the organization which 
were essential to its identity, at the expense of the company as a whole and without 
promoting the implementation function. 
Concluding, using VSM terminology, the under study enterprise possessed a lot of the 
characteristics of a not viable system. Paraphrasing Beer's words, the fact that the 
railway enterprise is there does not prove that it is effectively there. It operates at 
the margins of viability at such a big cost, that it has become less and less viable in 
front of everyone's eyes. 
It seems, therefore, vital for the company to undergo an organizational redesign. 
However, though the rationale of the cybernetic model employed implies both a structural 
and cultural redesign, this is not explicitly provided in the VSM diagram. An impression 
might be gained that by restructuring the organization the problems would be resolved. 
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Though such an approach constitutes an abuse of the model, the model itself does not 
possess mechanisms to resist this abuse. 
Hopefully, the preliminary study has highlighted the influence that the overall social 
and cultural context exerts on the enterprise and, consequently, the large degree to which 
this context is responsible for jeopardised viability. This piece of work is, thus, saved 
the trouble of arriving at partial explanations of organizational failure. 
The last part of the management cybernetics study of the enterprise, will, therefore, 
deal with the cultural background. Unless an appropriate organizational culture exists, 
any organizational redesign, however sophisticated, will result to limited improvements. 
10.6. FOOTNOTES 
1. Alternative uses of this kind of 'variety engineering' tables, either for the 
allocation of managerial discretion or for the, related, design of management 
information systems are provided in: 
R. Espejo, 1980: "Information and Management: The Cybernetics of a Small Company", in 
Lucas et al. (eds. ): The Information Systems Environment (North-Holland Publishing, 
Amsterdam), pp. 291-3 10. 
R. Espejo, 1983: "Strategies for Information Management", Cybernetics and Systems, 
vol. 14, pp. 315-341. 
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CHAPTER 11 
MANAGERIAL COHESIVENESS 
11.1. INTRODUCTION 
in previous parts of this thesis (Chapters 8 and 10), the VSM of the under-study 
enterprise has been constructed and various diagnostic points have been made from a 
management cybernetics viewpoint, concerning the organizational structure. However, as 
stated in Chapter 8, even if an organizational integration was achieved, if the company as 
a whole does not have a capacity to assess whether it is 'doing' the right things, 
long-term viability and effectiveness are in danger. Moreover, the preliminary study 
(Chapter 8) has hypothesised a strong relationship between the ineffective organizational 
structure and the overall organizational culture in the case-study example, and, 
attempting to identify the background of this culture, has indicated the influence of the 
'public enterprise' characteristic, as perceived at a level of development defined by, and 
in turn defining, the company, the country, the government, and their interrelations. An 
examination of this culture was, thus, decided and the concept of managerial cohesiveness 
has been introduced. In Chapter 9, cohesiveness has been defined as a function of 
managerial agreement on key issues, assumed to reflect the organizational culture. Both 
dimensions of managerial cohesiveness are of interest in this study, i. e., the extent and 
the content of cohesiveness. These dimensions are examined by analysing the findings of 
the first part of the survey questionnaire. 
11.2. TESTING COHESIVENESS 
11.2.1. The Managerial Structure as One Sample 
A first obvious way of testing managerial cohesiveness is to consider the managerial 
structure as one sample and to examine the rate of dispersion of managerial opinions in 
respect to the several questions posed. This involves an interpretation of the frequency 
distributions of responses. 
Figures 37 and 38 illustrate these distributions, as regards the 49 variables under 
examination (variables OBJECT1 to REASON9). Table 21 provides the arithmetic values of 
related descriptive statistics (frequency values, mean, standard error, standard 
deviation). 
As shown in both the diagrams and Table 21, managerial agreement on issues examined 
varies from almost unanimous agreement (e. g., task3-std. dev. -O. 452, task6-std. dev. -O-580) 
to significant dispersion of responses (e. g., con tr3 -std. dev. - 1.919, 
reason5-std. dev. -I. 903). The recorded disagreement may be attributed to several factors, 
four of which are of interest in this study, mainly because they are objectively defined. 
These four independent variables (managerial age, level, function, and Jobtype) define 
alternative subgroupings of the managerial structure, within which a more detailed 
analysis will be performed for the evaluation of managerial cohesiveness. 
Chapter 11 -248- Managerial Cohesiveness 
40 
30 
20 
io 
0 
objectl objoct2 object3 obi*ct4 obj*06 objecte object7 
I abwcwt. lj U,. * 
2. egres, 
3. neutral 
4 disagree 
IS dies-J-0 
40 
30 
20 
10 
I t.. K2 t.. k3 t.. kA t.. kh t.. kfi t.. k7 
2 slightly I-p. rtant 
3 almost Imp-, lent 
4 Important 
ery Iml-ttent 
to 
20 
onirl ýIrW C<Mtr3 contr4 contrei c-tr6 c 
In og II %j It, 10 
2. allghtly Imp-tant 
3 alm. st Imp-loni 
4, Imp,, r to nt 
6 ý*r)' I-t""Imnt 
6 ý1181 
0 
4 
301 
20 
10 
m ýPl IV, plan tudget trqt udg ViOW2 vlew3l vle-4 
K? 912; MM 
Figure 37: Frequencies of Managers' Responses: Variables OBJECT1 to VIEW4 
Chapter II Managerial Cohesiveness -249- 
60 
40 
30 1 
10 
0 
oplnl opln2 opin3 opln4 OPM5 Op4ne op4n7 oonS oping 
so 
40) 
30 
20 
0 
0 
ressoni r*6&c-n2 rsabon3 reasoro reason-5 ressone ramaon7 reason$ roasong 
ý1 *Jgnýltcantty IrnprýVed 
K>QQQM 2: Smproyed 
3: unchanged 
4: detsmoratod 
§CICOM S @Jgniflcäntly dot*rl, ýratod 
40 
1 
30 
20 
10 
g On y 
t strongly agree 
2: agree 
3: ne. tral 
il "., 10 4- disagree 
IkINROM IS AISOV-6 
Ivu-, journz )out n3 
I oný, * a .. k 
5M6652 2: once a nwnth 
3! once a (werler 
4- once In slx rn,, Atho 
6: once a year 
a 1*66 tt)ar, n'-6 a yes, 
Figure 38: Frequencies of Managers' Responses: Variables OPINII to REASON9 
Chapter 11 -250- 
Managerial Cohesiveness 
survey responses 
vartabte *0"1"'2-'3'"4"5' 
*jectl 
object2 
Dbject3 
Dbj ect4 
object5 
object6 
object7 
taskl 
task2 
task3 
task4 
task5 
task6 
task7 
3 a 19 99 2 
3 9 21 2 10 5 
0 5 11 3 25 4 
2 9 17 7 14 1 
5 04 8 21 12 
2 21 3 23 19 
3 4 14 7 17 5 
1 5 1 6 10 8 19 
1 3 3 10 16 5 12 
0 0 0 023 45 
0 0 0 03 14 33 
0 0 2 16 13 28 
0 0 0 10 12 37 
0 0 0 05 14 31 
contrl 
contr2 
contr3 
contr4 
contr5 
contr6 
contr7 
ptan 
budget 
frqbudg 
viewl 
view2 
view3 
view4 
opt nl 
opln2 
opin3 
opfn4 
opt n5 
opin6 
opt n7 
opin8 
op i rV9 
journl 
journ2 
j ourn3 
reasoni 
reasor2 
reason3 
reason4 
reason5 
reason6 
reason7 
reason8 
reason9 
0 10 4 12 12 5 7 
1 10 9 10 11 4 5 
0 11 10 395 12 
1 14 a5 14 5 3 
0 10 756 14 8 
0 3 4 11 15 12 5 
0 17 58 12 3 4 
3 0 26 15 3 3 
14 38 12 4 9 
9 21 45 5 6 
0 23 11 10 4 2 
0 7 12 13 9 9 
0 69 14 12 9 
0 58 11 10 16 
meani Std 
errorl 
2.53 
2.60 
3.25 
2.60 
3.91 
4 171 
3: 11 
3.47 
3.08 
4.86 
4.60 
4.28 
4.70 
4.52 
2.38 
2.18 
2.46 
2.02 
2.62 
2.88 
1.90 
2.64 
3.22 
2.29 
2.02 
3.02 
3.16 
3.46 
10 4 20 12 4 0 2.40 
12 25 15 12 4 3.29 
1 1 25 18 3 2 2.59 
0 7 29 12 2 0 2.18 
0 10 28 11 1 0 2.06 
2 0 18 24 3 3 2.81 
2 0 18 23 5 2 2.81 
4 37 30 5 1 2.94 
3 3 17 24 2 1 2.67 
0 89 11 7 5 10 3.44 
0 024 6 6 32 5.24 
0 276 10 9 16 4.3( 
0 10 27 571 2.24 0.142 1.001 0 20 54 10 14 2 
1 10 21 5 10 3 2.56 O. la3 1.296 2 20 42 10 20 6 
13 11 12 21 2 3.22 0.155 1.093 26 22 24 42 4 
12 15 9 21 2 3.18 0.156 1.101 24 30 18 42 4 
12 11 13 19 4 3.30 0.155 1.903 24 22 26 38 8 
20 14 9 22 3 3.40 0.154 1.08a 40 28 18 44 6 
04 30 11 41 2.36 0. 11 7 7 0 82 08 60 22 82 
55 14 15 74 3.12 0: 203 1: 438 
1 
10 10 28 30 14 a 
1 
212 16 22 7 3.76 0.136 0.960 424 32 44 14 
std 
devtnl 
D. 163 1.120 
D. 192 1.313 
D. 175 1.212 
0.168 1.162 
0.134 0.900 
0.13810.9531 
0.17511.2021 
% distributfon 
na 0123456 
6 1638 Is 18 4 
6 18 42 4 20 10 
4 10 22 6 50 a 
4 18 34 14 28 2 
10 0a 16 42 24 
4 42 6 46 38 
6 8 28 14 34 10 
0.23311.6341 2 10 2 12 20 16 38 
0.208 1.455 - 2 66 20 32 10 24 0.064 0.452 0 00046 90 
0.086 0.606 0 0006 28 66 
0.146 1.031 0 042 12 26 56 
0.082 0.580 0 0020 24 74 
0.096 0.677 0 000 10 28 62 
0.232 1.640 0 20 8 24 24 10 14 
0.235 1.662 2 20 ia 20 22 a 10 
0.271 1.919 0 22 20 6 Is 10 24 
0.240 1.696 2 28 16 10 28 10 6 
0.257 1.817 0 20 14 io 12 28 16 
0.187 1.319 0 68 22 30 24 10 
0.246 1.741 2 34 10 16 24 68 
OJ27 0.870 6 0 52 30 66 
0.215 1.290 28 6 16 24 8 18 
0.243 1.553 Is 42 8 10 10 12 
0.165 1.169 0 46 22 20 84 
0.186 1.317 0 14 24 26 18 18 
0.186 1.315 0 12 18 28 24 18 
0.198 1.403 0 10 16 22 20 32 
0.128 0.810 20 8 40 20 80 
0.164 1.011 24 4 10 30 24 8 
0.116 0.814 2 2 50 36 64 
0.102 0.720 0 14 58 24 40 
0.101 0.712 0 20 56 22 20 
0.118 0.816 4 0 36 48 66 
0.114 0.790 4 0 36 46 10 4 
0.130 O. M 8 6 14 60 10 2 
0.131 0.907 6 6 34 48 42 
0.246 1.740 0 16 18 22 14 10 20 
0.168 1.188 0 048 12 12 64 
0.222 1.568 0 4 14 12 20 18 32 
Tabte 21: Descriptive Statistics of Managers' Responses 
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11.2.2. Contrasting Subgroups of the Managerial Structure 
The background of the statistical analysis performed in this section has been provided 
in Chapter 9. Since the purpose of the field study was to collect information to be 
utilized in two rather distinct topics, i. e., managerial cohesiveness statistical tests 
and actual VSM construction, where the principle criterion for interviewees' selection was 
to satisfy the requirements of the latter, a modification of subgroups within independent 
variables was, after data collection, required, to provide for meaningful statistical 
tests, by producing subcategories of significant size. Thus, 
The five subgroups of variable managerial age, which in fact turned out to be four, 
since no manager interviewed was less than 30 years old (subgroup 1), were recoded 
into two groups, i. e., younger managers (subgroups 2 and 3) and older managers 
(subgroups 4 and 5). 
Subgroups I (top management) and 2 (heads of departments) of independent variable 
managerial level were aggregated into one, and 
Subgroups I (operations) and 4 (signalling/telecommunications) of independent 
variable managerial function were also aggregated. 
However, descriptive statistics for the initial more detailed subgroupings are also 
provided in Appendix F (mean values and graphs). 
After recoding, two-sample median tests were performed on the dichotomous variables 
age and jobtype, and k-sample tests on variables level (three subgroups) and function 
(four subgroups). The results of these tests are displayed in subsequent tables of 
Appendix F. 
Further, wherever the existence of a significant association was revealed in the 
non-dichotomous variables, the whole set of necessary pairwise comparisons was undertaken 
(in the form of two-sample median tests), to reveal subpopulations in disagreement. These 
comparisons are also displayed in Appendix F. 
Thus, in a total of 49 variables (objectl to reason9) representing questions 3.1 to 
12.9 of the survey questionnaire, Table 22 summarises association recorded between these 
variables, and the four independent variables (i. e., managerial age, level, function and 
jobtype). 
On the basis of the revealed existence of association, further tests were undertaken 
to measure the degree of this association. Since the common measure of correlation, i. e.. 
Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient, could not be employed in this study, as 
it assumes normality of distributions and measurement on an interval scale, non-parametric 
tests were used. Thus, 
for variables where measurement was achieved at an ordinal scale, that is, all 
dependent variables and independent variables "age", "level", and "jobtype", the 
degree of association (i. e., managerial disagreement) was tested by employing 
Kendall's rank correlation coefficient, corrected for tied ranks (tau-b) 1, and 
for variable "function" (where the scale I to 5 is only nominal), the contingency 
coefficient c was employed 2. 
The results of these degree of association tests and their significance are displayed 
in Tables 23-26. 
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Tabte 22: Sunmry of Managerial, Disagreement 
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deperdent 
varlobte 
objectl 
ptan 
opin4 
reason3 
reason4 
reason9 
significant association at 95 % confidence levet. 
irdependent 
variabLe 
age 
subpoputations 
contrasted 
2+3 to 4+5 
2+3 to 4+5 
2+3 to 4+5 
2+3 to 4+5 
2+3 to 4+5 
2+3 to 4+5 
Kendatt's tau-b 
I 
significance 
-0.37329 
-0.36430 
-0.33692 
0.34166 
0.25B20 
-0.30951 
Table 23: Managerial Disagreement by Managerial Age 
dependent Independent 
variabte varlabLe 
objectl 
objectl 
object4 
object5 leveL 
object6 
reason7 
subpopulations 
contrasted 
Kerdattes tau-b 
0.0028 * 
0.0048 * 
0.0064 * 
0.0046 * 
0.0252 * 
0.0098 * 
signiffcance I 
0.0074 * 
0.0243 * 
0.0053 * 
0.0061 * 
0.0069 * 
0.0593 
1+2 to 4 
3 to 4 
1+2 to 4 
1+2 to 3 
1+2 to 3 
1+2 to 3 
0.48418 
0.30719 
-0.51362 
-0.44344 
-0.42282 
-0.26235 
significance I 
significant association at 95 % confidence teveL. 
Table 24: Managerial Disagreement by Managerial Level 
dependent independent 
variable variable 
obJectl 
freqbudg 
viewl 
opinI jobtype 
opin3 
opIn5 
reason. 3 
subpoputations 
contrasted 
to 2 
to 2 
to 2 
to 2 
to 2 
to 2 
to 2 
Kendalt's tau-b 
0.34144 
-0.31442 
0.30174 
0.30203 
0.28183 
0.15419 
-0.37217 
significant association at 95 % confidence level. 
0.0056 * 
0.0153 * 
0.0110 * 
0.0223 * 
0.0203 * 
0.1275 
0.0023 * 
Table 25: Managerial Disagreement by Managerial icbtype 
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dependent 
variabLe 
Independent 
variable. 
subpopulations 
contrasted 
contingency 
coefficient d. f. 
2 
x 
significance 
objectl 3 to 5 0.52086 4 10.7967 < 0.05 * 
contr3 2 to 1+4 0.57382 5 10.3091 ), 0.05 
contr3 2 to 3 0.55944 5 12.7558 < 0.05 * 
contr3 2 to 5 0.63722 5 14.3565 < 0.05 * 
function 
budget 3 to 1+4 0.51756 4 8.0492 > 0.05 
budget 3 to 2 0.64570 4 17.8755 < 0.05 * 
viewl 3 to 2 0.45050 4 7.1299 > 0.05 
viewl 3 to 5 0.53034 4 11.3490 < 0.05 * 
*: significant association at 95 % confidence tevel. 
Tabte 26: ManageriaL Disagreement by Managerial, Function 
11.3. ASSESSING COHESIVENESS 
In order to assess whether recorded disagreement challenges managerial cohesiveness 
the following considerations should be made: 
(1) A correlation coefficient does not give directly anything like a percentage of 
relationship. We cannot say that a tau-b of 0.50 indicates two times the 
relationship that is indicated by a tau-b of 0.25. Nor can we say that an 
increase in correlation from 0.40 to 0.60 is equivalent to an increase from 0.70 
to 0.90. The coefficent of correlation is an index number, not a measurement on 
a linear scale of equal units. 3 
(2) The examination of managerial agreement involved the utilization of several 
five-interval (and one six-interval) scales. Apparently, searching for 
disagreement involves the interpretation of statistically recorded disagreement 
in terms of its natural meaning. 
Thus, critical disagreement, i. e., disagreement challenging managerial cohesiveness, 
will be defined as any statistically recorded disagreement between two sub-populations 
with magnitude at least equal to 1.5. scale interval. That is, two groups are assumed to 
disagree, when one tends to agree strongly (value 1) and the other to be neutral (3), or 
one agrees (2) and the other disagrees (4). Lesser managerial disagreement statistically 
recorded, though amenable to further examination, may not be considered as threatening 
managerial cohesiveness. 
11.3.1. Hypotheses Related to the Objectives of the Enterprise 
Table 27 surnmarises recorded disagreement, concerning variables objectl to objecV, 
which relate to the seven stated reasons of the existence of OSE as a state-owned railway 
enterprise. 
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deperKient 
varlabte 
objectl 
object2 
object3 
object4 
objectS 
object6 
object7 
age 
2+3 4+5 
-0.373 
independen variabte 
tevet 
1+2 3 1+2 4 1 
0.484 
34 
0.307 
-0.514 
-0.443 
-0.423 
functfon 
1+4 2 1+4 3 1+4 5 23 25 35 
0.521 
Table 27: Managerial Disagreement on the Objectives of the Railway Enterprise 
jobtype 
12 
0.341 
As indicated by this table, no disagreement was recorded for variables object2, 
objecO, and objecV. Table F1 (Appendix F) shows that 
Managers' opinions concerning variable object2 ("OSE exists mainly in order to serve 
transportation needs of the lower income classes") concentrate in the interval from 
2 (agree) to 3 (neutral), with mean value 2.60. 
Managers' opinions concerning variable object3 ("OSE exists mainly in order to serve 
excess transport demand during peak periods") concentrate in the interval from 2.75 
to 3.50, with mean value 3.25, and 
Managers' opinions concerning variable objecO ("OSE exists mainly in order to 
assist in taýkling some sort of wider national problem in future") concentrate in 
the interval from 2.50 to 3.24, with mean value 3.11. 
Moderate disagreement has been recorded, as regards the remaining four variables of 
this section. Thus: 
Managers' opinions concerning variable objectl ("OSE exists mainly in order to offer 
railway services better than those to be offered by a private railway enterprise") 
differ by age, managerial level and jobtype. Older managers tend to agree, whereas 
younger managers tend to be neutral, the overall mean value lying in between (2.53). 
Similarly there is a rate of decrease of agreement going down from top management 
(1.83) to heads of departments (2.33), to divisional management (2.37) and to area 
management (3.06). Finally, headquarters managers tend to agree with this reason of 
existence (2.05) whereas production managers tend to be neutral (2.86). 
Managers' opinions concerning variable object4 ("OSE exists mainly in order to help 
the State in achieving wider policy goals") are differentiated by managerial level: 
thus, while lower management agrees that this is why OSE exists (2.00), top managent 
tends to disagree (3.33). Mean value again is somewhere in between (2.60). 
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Managers' opinions concerning variable object5 ("OSE exists mainly in order to 
maintain a complex of relations associated with interests of individuals") differ by 
managerial level and function. Lower management lies between neutrality and 
disagreement. Upper management between disagreement and strong disagreement. 
Equally, rolling stock, permanent way and signalling management do not oppose this 
option as strongly as operations management and other (i. e. mainly Corporate) 
management. Mean value for this variable is 3.91. 
Managers' opinions concerning variable object6 ("OSE exists mainly in order to 
assure the survival of railway as a means of transport") are slightly differentiated 
by level: upper management strongly disagrees (4.50-4.71) whereas lower management 
disagrees (4.00). Mean value is 4.17. 
- Concluding, no major difference in opinions between two subgroups, either by age, or 
level, or function, or jobtype, has been recorded for any of the seven variables of this 
subtheme. In general, the major null hypothesis stating that managers agree on the reasons 
of OSE's existence may not be rejected. 
11.3.2. Hypotheses Related to the Goals of the Enterprise 
No managerial disagreement has been recorded as regards the seven variables which 
constitute this subtheme, i. e. variables taskI to task7. 
Similarly, statistically significant disagreement as regards units' contribution in 
achieving the above goals was only recorded in variable contr3 (contribution it? improving 
service reliability), with respect to subgrouping by function. Thus, corporate management 
and permanent way management assess their contribution as being not as important as that 
of operations, rolling stock, and signalling/telecommunications. This is a quite rational 
assumption. 
11.3.3. Hypotheses Related to Planning and Budgeting Features 
As regards variable plan ("which way you think planning is organised in OSE ? "), a 
moderate disagreement has been revealed between younger and older managers. However, 
considering more detailed subgrouping by age (Table F6, Appendix F), while managers more 
than 40 years old hold opinions between intervals 2 (*planning adapting to changing 
conditions') and 3 ("imperfect planning, becoming non implementable'), with respective 
mean values for age groups 3,4, and 5 being 2.69,2.39, and 2.25, younger managers, less 
than 40 years of age hold opinions beyond interval 4 ("no planning: everyone tries to 
serve company's interest as he realises Uff), with a mean value of 4.25. 
Managers' opinions on OSE's planning process are not differentiated by managerial 
level, function or jobtype, the values concentrating in the interval between 2.00 and 
3.00. 
Significant disagreement was revealed as regards variable budget ("which way you 
participate in the preparation of your unit's budget? ") by managerial function. Managers 
of operations, signalling, and rolling stock units claim participation in budget 
preparation in a way different from that of permanent way managers. According to Table FI, 
while permanent way managers confess a rather formal participation in budget preparation 
(somewhere between answers 2 and 3, with mean value 2.53), the other functional managers 
tend to realise their participation as more integrated and 'democratic' (mean values 4.00, 
4.13,4.00 respectively). 
Finally, concerning variable freqbudg ("how often is your opinion asked before your 
unit's budget is amended? "), some disagreement has been recorded by managerial jobtype. 
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Thus, managers of headquarters units are more frequently asked than operations managers 
(respective values 2.94 and 1.88, Table FI). Besides other implications, this finding 
questions the participative nature of functional budgeting, as implied by most answers in 
the question of the previous paragraph. 
Overall, the major statistical hypothesis in this section, stating that railway 
managers agree on the features and their participation in the planning process, has to be 
rejected. Critical disagreement has been recorded, which will be discussed in a next 
section. 
11.3.4. Hypotheses Related to Corporate Views at Managerial Levels 
The questions in this topic were meant to be seen as an identity exercise. According 
to the statistical analysis, significant disagreement concerning variables VIew2, Vlew3, 
and vlew4 (which, in turn, represent the view that the sample believes that managerial 
levels 2 (heads of departments), 3 (heads of divisions) and 4 (area managers) hold for the 
company, was not recorded. Table FI shows that respective scores for variables vlew2, 
vleO, and vlew4 were 3.02,3.16, and 3.46; i. e., according to the rationale of question 
no. 9 of the questionnaire, that these three managerial levels have been assessed as 
viewing the company neither 'holistically', as value I implies, nor 'reductionistically' 
(implied by value 5), but rather in the middle (value 3), with a slightly increasing 
narrowing of the perspective going down the hierarchy. This is again a rational 
assumption, considering the formal structure and functioning of the under-study 
enterprise. 
On the contrary, Tables 25 and 26 have revealed a disagreement concerning variable 
viewl (which is, how managers believe that top management view the company), not by 
managerial level, as might be expected, but by jobtype and function. Headquarters' 
managers tend to assess top management's view more 'holistic' (1.52) than production 
managers do (2.38). On the other hand, permanent way managers (mean value 2.61) believe 
top management to be less properly oriented than other functional groups, namely rolling 
stock (1.40) and other (1.45), do. 
11.3.5. Hypotheses Related to Performance Assessment 
Performance assessment is illustrated by variables oplnl to opln9. At first, 
concerning overall performance expressed by variables oplnI (traffic volume), opln2 
(market share) and opln3 (service reliability), Table 25 has revealed moderate 
disagreement in variables opln1 and opln3 by jobtype. Headquarters' managers tend to be 
closer to reality (which is that neither traffic volume nor service reliability has improved over the last three years) than production managers, and this might be an indication of inadequate information flow within the company, as regards evaluation of 
Performance. 
No disagreement has been recorded relatively to the performance of the rolling stock 
subsystem (variables opln6 and opln7) and to terminal operations (variables opln8 and 
opin9). They are believed as not having shown any improvement, since mean values are very 
close to 3 (2.81,2.81,2.94,2.67). 
Finally, as regards the performance of the permanent way sub-system, there is disagreement by age (variable opin4) and by jobtype (variable opIn5). Thus, younger 
managers tend-not to find any improvement in track quality concerning train punctuality (mean value 2.83), whereas the rest find there is improvement (mean values 2.29.1.91, 2.25). Furthermore, more production than headquarters managers find an improved iMp3Ct Of 
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the quality of track on the quality of journey, though this is not clearly indicated in 
terms of mean values (1.95 and 2.14 respectively). 
Concluding, since critical disagreement has not been recorded, the null hypothesis, 
stating that railway managers agree in assessing railway performance, may not be rejected. 
11.3.6. Hypotheses Related to 'First-Hand' Information 
Variables journl, journ2, and journ3 where meant to reveal whether opinions expressed 
by managers relatively to performance assessment were based on a personal knowledge of the 
real conditions of the network. No significant differences concerning the frequencies of 
travelling in various parts of the network were recorded. However, and this is revealing, 
it seems that when managers assessed performance in the previous section, they tend to 
have in mind the main line of the network, since, on average, they travel on this line 
approximately once every three months (mean value 3.44) compared to less than a year 
travelling to North Greece lines (5.24) and less than twice a year on the narrow gauge 
network (4.30). Provided that the mean values mentioned include managers of the Athens and 
Peloponnese Regional Departments (whereas North Greece managers are not represented, 
since, as explained in Chapler 9, they were excluded from the survey), the real picture 
may be obtained by comparing mean values of headquarters managers, i. e., excluding 
regional structure. Again (Table F1, journl to Journ3 by jobtype), headquarters management 
is significantly more concerned with the main line (mean value 3.62), than with either the 
Peloponnese (4.43), or North Greece (4.76). 
11.3.7. Hypotheses Related to Performance Constraints 
Table 28 summarises the ranking of various possible reasons constraining performance 
improvement, as assessed by managers interviewed. 
rank variabte reason constraining better performance mean vatue 
1 reasonl Otd technotogicat equipment 2.24 
2 reason7 Absence of incentives 2.36 
3 reason2 State's interventions 2.56 
4 reason8 Irresponsibitity of trade unions 3.12 
5 reason4 Lack of controt 3.18 
6 reason3 Lack of ptanning 3.22 
7 reason5 Limited capacity of managers 3.30 
8 reason6 Indifference of operating staff 3.40 
9 reason9 Pro-workers tegistation 3.76 
Table 28: Managers' Ranking of Reasons Constraining Performance Improvement 
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Nine statements were provided by the questionnaire as possible reasons, and they were 
given the variable names reasonI to reason9. 
Tables 23-26 reveal no disagreement concerning variables reasonl (old technological 
equipment), reason2 (stale interventions), reason5 (limited capacity of managers), reason6 
(indifference of operating staff), and reasong (irresponsibility of trade unions). On the 
other hand, disagreement has been recorded concerning variables reason3 by age and 
jobtype, reason4 and reason9 by age, and reason7 by level. Thus: 
Younger managers assign to the lack of planning (reason3) some reasoning for poor 
performance (mean values 2.67 and 2.88), whereas older managers tend to disagree 
(3.52 and 3.75). In turn, production managers are more willing than their 
headquarters colleagues to identify a reason in the lack of planning (2.86 to 3.71). 
Similarly, there is a belief between young managers that lack of control (reason4) 
is a reason of poor performance (2.17). This belief decreases inversely with the age 
(3.18.3.39,3.50). 
On the other hand, smaller ages do not favour pro-worker legislation (reason9) as a 
cause (4.17). Here the older the manager. the less he disagrees (4.06,3.57,3.00), 
but in no case he goes further than neutral. 
Finally, lack of incenlives (reason7) is seen as a fundamental reason by managers of 
levels 2 and 3 (mean values 2.14 and 2.15). The fact that lower management (level 4) 
has not yet gone very close in identifying this reason (mean 2.53) probably is an 
indicator of recently entering the managerial structure. Similarly, top management 
was not expected to find this as a strong cause (mean 2.83), since, either they have 
been externally appointed to their present positions or they have been promoted from 
the hierarchical structure, i. e., in their point of view, good job is always 
rewarded. 
In general, the null hypothesis stating that railway managers agree on the reasons 
constraining performance improvement may not be rejected, besides minor differences in 
managerial opinions. 
11-3.8. Hypotheses Related to Methods for Improving Performance 
Managers' rank orders of methods for improving performance are displayed in Table F12. 
They were asked to rank seven stated methods as means of achieving six stated goals. Table 
29 summarises the findings. 
The emerging need to improve the planning process within the case-study enterprise is impressive. Planning is seen as the primary method to solve organizational problems and 
this is not at all far from reality. Similarly impressive is the recognition of the need for intensive staff training. In practice, as railway modernization has been seen as involving mainly the completion of a series of civil engineering projects, very little has been done to educate staff either on requirements, procedures, and details of complex 
operations, or on the actual or future utilization of technological innovations. 
The table is also revealing as regards managers' understanding that, without improved 
planning and education at first, and reorganization/effective control consequently, very little can be achieved by measures aiming at either replacings of people in the top of 
organizational pyramids, or at improving work conditions and providing salary increases. 
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improved optimum Improved Improved Improved improved 
mean quatity resource sub- sub- sub- sub- 
method rank of utiLiza- systems system system system 
services tion coopera- roLLIng perma- signatt. 
tion stock nent way teLecm 
1. improved 
ptanning 1.33 2 1 2 1 1 1 
2. staff 
training 2.00 1 2 3 2 2 2 
3. reorgani- 
zation 3.00 4 4 1 3 3 3 
4. effective 
controL 3.67 3 3 4 4 4 4 
5. change 
unit heads 5.83 7 7 5 6 5 5 
5. improved work 
conditions 5.83 6 5 6 5 7 6 
7. satary 
increases 6.33 5 6 7 7 6 
- 
7 
1 
Tabte 29: Managers' Ranking of Methods for Improving Performance 
11.3.9. Concluding on Managerial Cohesiveness 
Overall, the statistical analysis did not reveal critical disagreement on the issues 
examined, apart from issues related with the planning/budgeting process. Managers seem to 
hold similar views on principle characteristics of the railway enterprise, such as 
objectives, importance of several goals, performance evaluation, reasons constraining and 
methods to be adopted for performance improvement. 
However, whether the recorded agreement implies cohesiveness towards viability and 
development or a shared view of a declining enterprise has to be examined by interpreting 
the meaning of managerial responses. 
11.4. INTEPRETING COHESIVENESS 
11.4.1. Corporate Objectives of the Enterprise 
Table 30 provides mean Tanks and mean values for the seven possible objectives of the 
enterprise, as included in the questionnaire. It is interesting that none of these 
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rank variable objectIve 
mean 
value 
I objectl to offer services better than private railway 2.53 
2* object2 to serve transport needs of Lower Incomes 2.60 
2* object4 to help state in achieving wider goals 2.60 
4 object7 to assist in tackling future national problem 3.11 
5 object3 to serve excess demand during peak periods 3.25 
6 object5 to maintain complex of Interests of individuals 3.91 
7 object6 to assist survival of outdated transport mode 4A7 
*: tied rank 
Tabte 30: Managers' Ranking of Various Objectives 
explanations has been adopted by the managers as a justification of OSE's existence as a 
public railway enterprise. To summarise this finding, the words of one of top managers 
interviewed may be used. In his opinion: 
"None of these objectives explain or justify the public ownership of the railways. 
OSE has, for a long time, functioned as a state-owned enterprise under certain 
historical conditions. Successive governments have found the enterprise within the 
public sector and had left it there, not in order to seek some kind of objectives, 
but because they never bothered to consider either its future or the needs of a 
national transport system". 
Within this lack of realisation of the reasons of OSE's existence, managers, on 
average, come closer to adopt the first objective (to offer services better than 
private railway) as an explanation. However, even in this case, 
managers are closer to neutrality than to agreement (mean 2.53), and 
the mean value obtained is an average resulting from significant -disagreement 
between subgroups. 
As explained by several of the managers interviewed, in the case of the 
poor-performing Greek Railway, "offering services better than those to be offered by a 
private firm" should be taken to mean, that, if private, OSE would have closed down most 
of the railway lines, the operation of which cannot be justified on commercial grounds. 
Since in this category belong the Peloponnese network (with the exception of the 
Athens-Patras line), the Thessaly line, the North-West Greece lines, and the totality of 
branch lines, with the exception of the Inoi-Khalkis branch, offering 'better' railway 
services may be interpreted as offering today's services, as contrasted to their 
abolition. 
This perception of 'public interest' is also reflected in managers' second rank of 
corporate objectives. Here, tied at mean value 2.60, two 'social' justifications were 
Provided: - 
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to serve Irwisport need of lower incomes, implying that these needs are served under the 
present level of service and that they should be put in danger by privatisation and, 
consequently, closure of clearly non-viable commercially lines. 
to help state in achieving wider policy goals, implying that the most obvious wider goal 
achieved through the existence and functioning of OSE, i. e., the maintenance of 
employment, should also be endangered by a private railway, seeking optimum financial 
performance under commercial criteria. 
Managers' unwillingness to recognise other than external social objectives is also 
illustrated in Table 31, which provides mean ranks and mean values of certain operational 
goals. 
rank variable goat mean value 
I task3 to improve service reliability 4. B6 
2 task6 to improve quality of services 4.70 
3 task4 to increase traffic volume 4.60 
4 task7 to increase market share 4.52 
5 task5 to reduce journey times 4.28 
6 taski to reduce total expenditure 3.47 
7 task2 to reduce staff expenditure 3.08 
1 
Tabte 31: Managers' Ranking of Various Tasks 
The least important goal, according to managers' responses, is the reduction of staff 
expenditure. The second least important is the reduction of overall expenditure. It seems 
that in managers' point of view there is no strong connection between the developing 
modernization programme and financial efficiency. However', apart from speed increases and 
service reliability improvements, a major task of a railway modernization project is to 
permit rationalization of staff numbers, since, traditionally, slack resources within 
railway enterprises have been of great magnitude. Thus, though the labour- intensive 
character of the railway industry is unambiguous, a 18: 21 ratio of labour to overall 
expenses (as shown in Chapter 8) does not reveal an effective serving of the social (not 
to mention the commercial) interest. 
The primary importance assigned by the managers to train punctuality improvement and 
to other improvements of quality of services obviously relates to today"s low standards of 
Output, especially when considering the wider context of railway and other activities (European Community). 
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Traffic volume and market share increases have also been assessed as very important 
goals to be sought. However, these two goals are those in which managers, on average, find 
their contribution less significant, as shown in Table 32. 
rank variable contribution mean value 
1 contr6 in Improving quality of services 2.88 
2 contr5 in reducing journey times 2.62 
3 contr3 In improving service reliability 2.46 
4 contri in reducing total expenditure 2.38 
5 contr2 in reducing staff expenditure 2.18 
6 contr4 in increasing traffic volume 2.02 
7 contr7 in increasing market share 1.90 
UbLe 32: Managers' Ranking of Contribution in Achieving Various Tasks 
Since, as already stated, apart from variable contr3 (improving service reliability), 
no other disagreement has been recorded for the variables in this table, the low mean 
values shown correspond, in general, to overall trends. However, even by referring to the 
more specific values of Table FI, the highest achieved mean values for these variables 
are: 
contribution in traffic volume increase (contr4): 2.88, 
contribution in market share increase (contr7) : 3.00, 
corresponding to operations and signalling managers respectively. 
Concluding, the smallest overall mean value recorded when assessing the importance of 
operational goals (3.08, corresponding to staff expenditure reduction, Table 31) is larger 
than the bigger value obtained when assessing, on the same scale, units' contribution in 
achieving these goals (2.88, corresponding to quality of services improvement, Table 32). 
It may well be, that achieving such corporate goals implies systemic synergy; that is, no unit or sub-system is able to achieve such goals by its own. However the existence 
of this synergy is questioned when no managerial group, either in terms of age, or level, 
or function, or jobtype, identifies its central role in the pursuit of any of the listed 
operational goals. Recall, that mean values correspond to a six-interval scale from V Onegligible' to T- 'vital'. On this scale, only two functional groups, i. e., rolling 
stock managers as regards contribution in improving sevice reliablity (contr3), and 
signalling managers as regards contribution in reducing journey times (contr5), assess their contribution as being very important (respective mean values 4.20 and 4.33). 
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11.4.2. Conclusions on the Objectives and Goals of the Enterprise 
Three principle conclusions may be drawn from the interpretation of responses to the 
first three sets of questions: 
(1) Managers' ranking of reasons of OSE's existence is consistent with the character 
of the enterprise, as provided in Chapter 7, and as further discussed in Chapter 
8. OSE has always been used as a vehicle for the pursuit of external objectives, 
mainly employment maintenance. Consequently, managers realise their company as 
being more a social policy tool than an enterprise with its own goals. 
(2) Given 
- 
the above, and in the absence of a clear direction to pursue financial 
efficiency, managers fail to recognize the importance of sound financial 
performance. This is compatible with the argument provided in Chapter 5 on 
public managers' inability to operate commercially. However, in a society where 
- resources are limited; and 
alternative criteria for judging the performance of the public enterprise do 
not exist, 
failing to improve financial results leads inevitably to cuts in investment 
funds and to threatening the viability of the public enterprise, usually via 
technological underdevelopment. 
(3) The lack of bottom-line responsibility discussed in Chapter 8 is very clearly 
reflected in the way in which managers assess their units' contribution in 
achieving goals. Either the only person responsible for overall performance is 
the general manager himself (which the thesis cannot assess, since, 
unfortunately, the GM was not interviewed), or no one within the enterprise is 
responsible. There seems to be an urgent need to redefine duties and 
accountability, i. e., organizational structure. 
11.4.3. Planning, Budgeting, Organizing 
In Chapter 8, when discussing the cybernetics of the case-study enterprise, it was 
shown that planning within Greek Railways constitutes a formal, annual exercise, not 
expected to be validated during the implementation process. This is exactly reflected in 
the responses of the younger managers (variable plan, age group 2, Table FI). Top 
management (level 1) and area management (level 4) also come close to this view. Intermediate managerial levels, i. e., those mostly responsible for planning, either do not 
recognise this reality, or do not want to accept it, as it signifies their failure. An indirect indication of lower management's disbielief in the functioning of the bureaucratic structure is contained in Table 33, which provides ranks of views of various levels as assessed by each managerial level (variables viewl to vlew4). Rank I is taken to indicate the view closer to 'holistic'. An important finding of this table, indicating 
also a substantial deviation from mean ranks (first column) is that area managers assess themselves as possessing the second most 'holistic' view of the company, after top 
management. 
Another indication of a poor plan ning/budgeting process, and consequently of inadequate 
management control (since one can control only whatever has been planned) is provided by the examination of managers' responses to variable freqbudg (how frequently is your opinion. asked when your unit's budget is amended ? ). 
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Tactical planning within Greek Railways is an imposed procedure, meant to produce two 
annual budgets; one reflecting the expected financial results and a second containing 
annual investment expenditure. Both budgets are submitted to the Government to gain 
approval. However, both because 
this level's ------ ), 
inean rank of the view of top heads of heads of area 
rank this level I management departments divisions managers 
v 
I top management 1 1 
2 managers of 2 3 2 3 
headquarters departments 
regional managers 
3 and regional divisions 3 2 3 4 
managers 
4 
1 
area managers 4 4 4 2 
Table 33: Ranks of Views of Managerial Levels by Managerial Level 
- budgets are poorly prepared and inadequately justified, and 
government's approval is usually not an argument of sound budget preparation, but 
of wider policy issues (inflation control policy, balance of payments 
restrictions, etc. ), 
budget cuts are requested, which may involve either the limitation of investment projects, 
or restrictions in seasonal personnel recruitment etc. Thus, a reformation of initial 
budgets follows, almost every year. As Table FI shows, this process, which in fact 
produces exactly what could be supposed to be the definite annual programme (i. e., after 
government's opinion has been taken into account), is limited to top management and heads 
of departments. Divisions and Area Managers (Levels 3 and 4) less than rarely are asked to 
express their views (mean values 1.93 both). Hence the perception that "plans" are 
unimplementable. 
However, still concerning planning, a contradiction might be identified when comparing 
the results in Table 27 (managers' ranking of reasons constraining performance 
improvement) and Table 28 (managers' ranking of methods for improving performance). 
Managers' answers in the reasons constraining performance improvement assign to lack of 
planning (reason3) a mean value of 3.22 (that is, between neutrality and disagreement), 
the closer to agreement value (2.67, belonging to young managers) implying neutrality. On 
the contrary, when searching for methods to improve performance (Table 28), planning is 
always assessed as the best, or second best, method available. The reader is asked to pay 
some closer attention to the questions producing these phenomenically contradicting 
responses. In the first case (reasons constraining), managers were asked to identify lack 
of planning as a reason. Their spontaneous response was: *Lack of planning ? There cannot be such a reason! We are overloaded with plans! ". In the second case (methods assisting), 
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Improved planning was proposed. Apparently, improved planning was thought as having 
nothing to do with today's procedures and was assessed as the best method to improve 
performance. 
11.4.4. Feasibility of Performance Improvement 
Discussion of this topic also involves examination of the findings of Tables 27 and 
28. Starting with performance constraints (Table 27), it should be remembered that 
responses were obtained on a five-interval scale, where "In - "strongly agree" and W 
"strongly disagree". The closer- to- agreement reason constraining performance improvement 
was thought to be the old technological equipment (reasonl). It was ranked first within 
all subgroupings (Table FI), except 
older managers (age group 5), having experienced two more serious, in their point of 
view, reasons, Le, absence of incentives (reason7) and trade unions interventions 
(reason8). 
divisions' managers (level group 3) and permanent way managers (function group3), 
identifying also absence of incentives and state's interventions (reason2). 
These four reasons were agreed upon, though for one of them (trade unions' 
irresponsibility) mean value implies neutrality (3.12). From them, the plans and the 
functioning of the Greek Railways are directed towards tackling the first, i. e., old 
technology. This is the true meaning of technological modernization. However, improved 
performance cannot be achieved by merely introducing modern technology. The tackling of 
the other three identified principle reasons is required. 
11.4.4.1. Lack of Incentives and RailwaY Performance 
The introduction of 'performance im provement'- related Incentives within a state-owned 
railway enterprise like the Greek Railway, as it is today, is arguable. 
Financial incentives imply a manager's control over resources, bottom-line 
responsibilities for results, and integrated planning against which these results 
will be judged. None of these requirements exist within the under-study enterprise. 
Even overcoming these problems, it is not readily realisable in which way could a 
manager be financially rewarded for the performance of a part of an enterprise, 
which produces, by its very nature, a deficit. 
Non-financial incentives could take either the form of status within the company 
(implying promotion-not by seniority but by assessment of the actual capacity of 
managers) or offering opportunities for an exciting career (opportunities to broaden 
one's knowledge, to travel abroad, etc. ). Promotion 'by selection', is not 
restricted by OSE's legislation and, indeed, is the only formal way to reach top 
hierarchical positions (e. g., head of department). However, again, when bottom-line 
responsibilities are not clear, there is no method to assess, unless someone is 
exceptionally good. This is why in middle and lower managerial positions, where 
promotion may be achieved either by seniority or by selection, being "selected' is 
interpreted by the colleagues as being a function of maintaining personal contacts 
either with top management or with other power centres. On the other hand, there are 
very few posts within a railway (e. g., corporate planning, international relations) in which an opportunity for managerial career could be assumed an incentive. 
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11.4.4.2. State's Interventions and Railway Performance 
By the same token, to assume that the State will refrain from Intervening in matters 
concerning the state-owned railway would be very simplistic. Moreover, when a railway like 
OSE does not serve any kind of 'public interest' within the transport system, which could 
not be served by a private enterprise (e. g., by maintaining a network of urban and 
suburban services, relieving the roads of conurbations from congestion, or by providing 
the only means of linkage to isolated communities, or by taking freight off motorways), it 
is very difficult to realise any other reason for state-ownership apart from making use of 
this ability to intervene, in order to serve macro-policy issues, more or less 
successfully. 
However, the type of interventionism implied by managerial responses does not relate 
mainly to government's initiatives at the macro-economic level but to day-to-day 
interventions in operational matters. Such interventions, remnants of conditions of the 
past, when the railway was run officially as a government department, originate in a 
controversial legislation, the details of which have remained unchanged, mainly because no 
one attempted this kind of change, or, when attempted, was overwhelmed by the complexity 
of the task. Elements of this legislation imposing government's participation in internal 
decisions such as organizational structure, materials purchase, personnel training, etc., 
do not add anything either to a more effective control of the enterprise or to a more 
efficient use of national resources. 
11.4.4.3. Trade-Unionism and Railway Performance 
Finally, the problem of trade unions within a public enterprise is difficult to tackle 
and, indeed, it is questionable whether a limitation of their role should be pursued. By 
definition, a trade union aims at safeguarding the rights of its members, most valuable of 
which is the right to work. In the country in which the case-study enterprise is embedded 
(and probably not only there), two are the focal points of criticism, as regards the trade 
unions behaviour in a public enterprise context: 
either they are accused for having a narrow perspective and ignoring the interests 
of the society, when they take very seriously their role as safeguards, 
or they are asked to mind their own business, i. e., to focus narrowly on the 
interests of their members, when they aim at wider societal changes. 
The answer to the question of what constitutes a proper role of a trade union is 
beyond the ambitions of this thesis. This topic, as well as the previous one, i. e., 
State's interventionism, are elements of analysis at a higher level of recursion, that is, 
the level at which the political, social and cultural characteristics of a country and its 
perspective of the future are defined. On such issues there is no wider consensus, neither 
between nations nor within a country. Therefore, to attempt to define a policy towards 
trade unions at a railway enterprise level would be both arbitrary, as it implies a 
certain perception of social reality obtained from a particular socio-political viewpoint, 
and reductionistic, as it assumes that indeed it is feasible to tackle effectively broad 
social issues at an enterprise micro-level. 
An abstract remark would be that a management's better understanding of the fears and 
the problems of the working people solves problems before they result to conflict, i. e., industrial action. However, it should also be noted that, in many cases, the management of 
the Public enterprise does not have discretion to satisfy labour's demands, even when it feels that they are rational and justified. 
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Overall, the public enterprise/personnel homeostasis is difficult to achieve, as, to a 
large degree, it is influenced by characteristics of higher recursive levels. 
11.4.5. Conclusions on the Feasibility of Improved Performance 
It has been shown that, apart from partially tackling the new technology issue, the 
management of Greek Railways has difficulties in confronting the other reasons 
constraining performance improvement, within the existing framework of wider concepts in 
the country. Assuming that this framework is not expected to be, shortly, radically 
changed, the last question of this section of the questionnaire asked managers to rank 
several methods of improving performance. 
Table 23 provides rank orders of such methods, where performance improvement was 
subdivided into six sub-goals. The impressive emerging need to improve planning, being 
almost in any case selected as the principle method to be adopted, has already been 
discussed. The second need for intensive staff training has also been presented. Methods 
ranked third and fourth, i. e., reorganization and effective control, may be seen as 
related between them, and, further, related to improved planning. 
However, what is also interesting and reflecting either the thoughtfulness or the 
pessimism of managers interviewed, is that they do not trust either managerial changes or 
salary increases to substantially help in improving performance. The exact order of mean 
ranks provided by the respondents is indicative of a kind of crisis in the under-study 
enterprise, since in a moderately performing company, managers should be expected to 
propose methods to improve results in exactly the inverse order. 
Probably this is a symptom of a wider crisis concerning the country in which the 
under-study company is embedded. However, if this is not the case, managers" proposals 
should be rapidly implemented, by diverting limited funds, from the construction projects 
area towards the improvement of planning process and the intensive training of personnel, 
including managers themselves. 
11.5. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AS A FACTOR GOVERNING EFFECTIVENESS 
This chapter has attempted to evaluate the influence of the organizational culture on 
the performance of the enterprise. It has been shown that, overall, managers share the 
same perception of the enterprise, and the reasons of its poor performance. In other 
words, managerial cohesiveness exists. However this 'cohesiveness' is not of a positive 
nature. It rather reflects a common belief in the non-feasibility of change. This climate 
does not facilitate organizational improvement and constitutes a serious obstacle to 
attempts implying revival via an organizational redesign. 
Any attempt to tackle future challenges must inevitably involve a 're-education' of 
the human factor of the enterprise on the key-issues of its identity. The task is 
overwhelming as this identity is mainly defined by the characteristic of public ownership, 
and, therefore, directly associated with overall conditions in the country. The type of 
motivation required has to be provided by a higher level of recursion, but it is arguable 
whether this higher level has this ability. 
In some cases it has been proposed that rather than attempting to solve the complex 
public enterprise problem it is better to dissolve it. The remedy of this dissolution has been identified in privatisation. Besides opinions expressed in Chapter 5 suggesting the 
need for a regulated railway environment, the poor technological standards, the low 
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market share, and the overall sociopolitical context of the case study enterprise do not 
favour such a solution. Therefore, the difficult route of pursuing technological and 
cultural innovation has to be followed under the existing set of relations. This piece of 
work will have achieved its ambitions if, apart from facilitating the clarification of 
theoretical management control issues, has provided any help to the railway enterprise in 
which it originated. 
11.6. FOOTNOTES 
1. For any given pair of cases with measurements on variables x and y, Kendall's rank 
correlation coefficient (tau-b) is provided by the formula: 
tb = 
P-Q 
V(P +Q+ Tx) (P +Q+T Y) 
. where 
P is the number of concordant pairs (both variables for one case are higher, or both 
are lower, than the corresponding values for the other case), for all distinct pairs 
of observation, 
is the number of discordant pairs, 
Tx is the nuimber of pairs tied on x but not on y, and 
is the number of pairs tied on y but not on x. 
2. Pearson's contingency coefficient c has been defined as 
X2 
C where 
X2 +N 
N is the size of the sample. 
3. J. P. Guilford, 1965: Fundamental Statistics In Psychology and Education, Fourth Edition 
(McGraw-Hill, New York), page 103. 
CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSIONS 
12.1. INTRODUCTION 
The objectives of this thesis, as set in Chapter 1, were: 
To identify structural and cultural causes of ineffectiveness in a state-owned 
railway enterprise, in the light of the management cybernetics area of knowledge. 
To assess the capacity of this area of knowledge, especially in its abstract and 
coded form (VSM), to provide adequate explanations of organizational performance and 
organizational failure. 
This final chapter provides conclusions drawn from the project undertaken as regards 
these objectives. 
12.2. CONCLUSIONS ON THE CASE STUDY ENTERPRISE 
Several structural and cultural causes of ineffectiveness have been identified, in the 
light of the methodology employed. However, many times throughout this thesis, negative 
features of the enterprise have been shown as strongly associated with the environment of 
the railway, especially with the characteristic of state ownership. Therefore, before 
arriving at a final assessment, it might be useful to provide a few further notes about 
this environment. However, though it is likely (and detectable) that this environment 
influences the "purpose" related aspect of Greek Railways, the details of this influence 
are not endogeneous to the study. The support of the ethnographic study cannot be claimed 
in the same way as it was for the discussion on the internal workings of the organization. 
Thus, instead of introducing a subjective interpretation of this environment, the view of 
the top management of the enterprise will be employed. This view, though subjective too 
and probably not representative of the managerial structure, is of importance, since it 
belongs to the acting General Manager of the enterprise. 
12.2.1. Fundamental Characteristics of the Environment of the Enterprise 
In an early paper (January 1983), soon after the change in government (October 1981), 
the then Deputy Governor of the Greek Railways Dr Christos Papageorgiou, who returned to 
the enterprise as General Manager in August 1988, attempted to summarise his one year's 
experience within the company and to provide both some explanations of ineffectiveness and 
guidelines for future improvements. The. following analysis draws very much upon his views. 1 
The Greek Railway is embedded in a society which, beyond its overall description 
as a western society, possesses some idiosyncratic characteristics: it is a society 
to the reproduction of which the role of central authority and of the state (with 
the whole spectrum of public enterprises, banks and organizations under its control) 
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implies a mechanistically modelled organization, structured hierarchically and controlled 
centrally by a completely autonomous authority which can affect any part of the system 
without being affected by any of them. A social system conceived in terms of a mechanistic 
model can only operate effectively in a static environment. The rapidly changing 
environment of social systems poses to the organizations the requirement of continuous 
adaptation and learning. This implies the readiness, the willingness, and the ability to 
change. An organizational model based on the traditional mechanistic analogy lacks these 
qualities. 
The requirements from an organizational model based on an integrated perception of the 
management control process have been discussed by Jackson (1988). The model should support 
the "technical", the "practical" and the 'emancipatory" interests, as defined in Chapter I 
and as further discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
12.2.2. Chapter 2: Questioning the Adequacy of the Prevailing Paradigm 
Chapter 2 has provided details on the "official" perception of the management control 
issue which, in general, is based on the three-levelled analysis of managerial decision 
making (Anthony, 1965) and the distinction between programmable and non-programmable 
decisions (Simon, 1960). The instability of the prevailing paradigm in management is 
demonstrated in terms of a review of the literature on management information systems, as 
perceived, designed and 
' 
utilized within this paradigm. The widespread dissatisfaction 
associated with the performance of conventional management information systems may not 
only be attributed to technical problems. It is likely that this dissatisfaction is 
associated with the very role of management as perceived within the traditional school. 
Argyris (1980) has suggested that solutions derived from conventional explanations may 
contain inner contradictions which will produce negative results. Argyris (1977) has 
demonstrated that the type of information system that managers require is one that: 
- Contains abstract, quantitative descriptions of key performance indicators. 
- Represents stable variance. 
- Represents the results or outputs of complex processes, and not the processes 
themselves. 
Contains explicitly rational logic in that it attempts to satisfy the logical 
systematic rules for defining categories, making inferences, and confirming or 
disconfirming evaluations publicly. 
Excludes as much as possible tacit knowledge and tacit processes. 
-A 
realisation of the management control process via an information system of this kind 
is constrained by the hierarchical power structure of a mechanistically conceptualised 
organization under the influen6e'of the prevailing paradigm. Alternative models should be 
employed. An interpretation of the enterprise in cybernetic terms is a first candidate, 
since, in general, Argyriss suggestions on the characteristics of a management control 
system are perceived as implying features of a cybernetic system. 
12-2.3. Chapters 3 and 4: A Cybernetic Approach to Management 
Chapter 3 has discussed the application of cybernetics in managerial situations. The 
characteristics of cybernetic systems are complexity, probabilism, and self- organization (Beer, 1962). These are also characteristics of social organizations. The chapter has 
discussed these characteristics as well as methods employed by cybernetics in order to deal with them. 
An attempt to avoid a narrow conceptualization of social reality in terms of 
mechanistic modelling could result in an alternative kind of analogical modelling, 
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organismic modelling, which, though demonstrating some advantages over the traditional 
model, does not fulfill the requirements from an organizational model as set in Chapter 1. 
This has been the case of traditional cybernetic approaches to managerial situations which 
seek to understand the human organization as an organism feeding on information. A major 
difference between traditional and managerial cybernetics is that though the former has 
evolved in the tradition of positivism the latter has had to evolve taking into account 
the purposeful and intentional nature of human beings. The view of current managerial 
cybernetics, as discussed by Espejo (1987). is that social structures do have a great 
influence in the creation of reality by individuals, and, therefore, that reality is not 
simply created by individuals. The human organizations are not independent of the 
communities of individuals defining them. 
From this cybernetic viewpoint, management processes are not necessarily pyramidal 
power structures. Neither human situations are objectively defined, in that their 
boundaries are shared by the concerned people and the only problem is to devise the 
optimum methods of achieving the desirable results. The complexity of the contemporary 
world and the rapidly changing environment demonstrate that the management problem is more 
that of working out what to do to maintain stability in interpersonal interactions than 
that of achieving well-defined results. 
The organizational model that supports, and is in turn supported by, contemporary 
managerial cybernetics, i. e. Beer's Model of the Viable System, was presented in Chapter 
4. The evaluation of this model, in a state-owned railway context, constitutes one of the 
objectives of this thesis and as such is separately discussed in the last section of this 
chapter. 1, 
12.3. ONTHE MANAGEMENT OF A STATE-OWNED RAILWAY ENTERPRISE 
12.3.1. Chapter 5: Railway Enterprise and Public Ownership 
Subject matter of this thesis has been the testing, against each other, of a 
non-traditional organizational model and a state-owned railway enterprise. Chapter 5 
introduces the examination of the second half of this test by examining the characteristic 
of state-ownership in a railway context. 
Besides contemporary moves towards deregulation, a first conclusion is that sta; e 
regulation of railway activities is justified in financial terms, because of the very 
characteristics of the industry (Keeler, 1983). The extent of this regulation between the 
extremes of a nationalised infrastructure on which private railway companies operate, as 
proposed by Wyckoff (1973), and a nationalised railway system, as almost exclusively 
employed in Europe (both East and West) and in many other countries in the world, is a 
result of certain historical, social and political conditions. In general, state ownership is assumed to promote the efficient operation of the enterprise respectively to what Nove (1973) calls "public interest under nationalization". 
An explicit definition of "public interest" has not been attempted in this thesis. Through the review of related literature it has been shown that a universal agreement upon its content probably does not exist. An examination of the objectives of several public 
railways identified alternative dimensions of public interest such as: 
Conformance with macro-policy objectives and contribution to the efficient 
allocation of resources. 
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Offering of services under consideration of social needs of local, regional and 
national communities. 
Promotion of the human quality of those who constitute the enterprise, etc. 
The concept of public interest and, consequently, the objectives of a state-owned 
railway, become even less comprehensible by the imposition of the requirement to operate 
on a strict commercial basis. The chapter has shown that the management of a state-owned 
enterprise is in a comparative disadvantage to that of a private firm as regards both the 
definition of its role and the criteria against which the performance will be judged. 
12.3.2. Chapter 6: Cybernetic Modelling of the Railway Enterprise 
The discussion on state-owned railways which started in Chapter 5 with the issue of 
state ownership focuses, in Chapter 6 on the functional element of the enterprise. Since, 
up to now, the project had been perceived as a mutual test against each other of a railway 
company and an organizational model via the construction and discussion of the VSM of the 
enterprise, this chapter aims at conceiving the general case of a railway in terms of the 
model's principles. This implies identification of the recursive structure. 
Though literature on VSM application assigns major difficulties in identifying 
elements of systems TWO and FOUR within the under-study organization, in this project, 
problems were encountered from the very beginning; i. e., while attempting to identify 
systems ONE. Consequently, considerable time was spent on the pursuit of this task. 
According to Beer, experience suggests that it may be difficult to decide which chain of 
systems someone wants to model. He calls each chain of systems which embed each other a 
'recursive dimension'. Any viable system exists in a variety of recursive dimensions. 
However, it seems that the selection of a 'recursive dimension' can only be made after 
deciding on the viewpoint. That is, after considering on behalf of whom the organization 
is being investigated. The organizational modelling as undertaken in this thesis 
corresponds to an examination of the enterprise from within, i. e., from the enterprise's 
point of view. Alternative models of the same enterprise, corresponding to different 
viewpoints may also be set up in terms of the VSM. Indeed, an alternative 'recursive 
dimension' was initially assumed appropriate for the purposes of this thesis and is 
summarised in Figure 37. 
This approach is much more service oriented, focuses on the product, and treats each 
scheduled train as a viable system in its own right. However, this type of modelling did 
not fit the actual characteristics of the under study enterprise, where, for stated 
reasons, implementation activities are not mainly service oriented, as the company 
virtually undergoes a phase of reconstruction. In addition, this recursive dimension 
implies a strong linkage between planning activities and service output, where the 
completion of modernization projects in any part of the network is associated in. detail 
with the impact on the rail services offered. Apparently, this view facilitates the 
understanding of how things 'should be' and might serve as a model for the Production or 
the Sales managers of any railway enterprise, or, more specifically, the Greek Railway, 
whenever this company decides to employ this kind of corporate executives. 
However, and this is a very substantial advantage of Beer's model, whichever recursive 
dimension is adopted, the logic of the VSM proves helpful. In the example, even at the fifth level of recursion, when examining the System ONE 005.12 intercity train from a to b 
within Region An, systems ONE to FIVE may be easily identified and analysed. 
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recursion no. 1 
recursion no. 2 
recursion no. 3 
recursion no. 4 
recursion no-5 
Figure 37: Alternative 'Recursive Dimension' of the Railway Enterprise 
The selected 'recursive dimension' interprets the railway enterprise as consisting of 
four main sub-systems, i. e., operations, rolling stock, permanent way, and 
signalling/telecommunications. A division of these major sub-systems into further viable 
components has been offered down to the fourth level of recursion. 
The chapter has discussed the cases when these four subsystems appear as components of 
the enterprise at the first or second recursive levels, that is, whether the enterprise is 
set up functionally or possesses a regional structure. The resulting cybernetic models are illustrated and certain organizational consequences are discussed. The effective 
management of the enterprise has been presented as an argument of accountability for 
managerial activities over four broad areas -Research and Development, Planning/Organizing, Annual Programming, and Performance Monitoring- extending over four 
managerial contents -Production, Sales, Finance, and Personnel- within each system at any 
recursive level. A fifth managerial area, Relations with the State, has been identified at 
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the first recursive level with the duty to maintain the homeostasis between the enterprise 
and its institutional environment. The resulting list of managerial activities 
was assumed to constitute the basis of the survey questionnaire. The interviewees would be 
requested to indicate the accountable manager for each of the listed activities, enabling 
thus the construction of the actual VSM of the enterprise. 
12.3.3. Chapter 7: Setting Up the Case Study 
Background information concerning the specific railway enterprise which would be 
tested against the cybernetic model, i. e. the Greek Railways Organization (OSE-CH), has 
been provided in Chapter 7. 'The following conclusions directly relate to the objectives of 
this project: 
The ownership of the enterprise by the state has not originated in the pursuit of 
public interest. The main part of the network was constructed and owned by the 
state, during the early stages of the independence of the country, mainly due to the 
unwilligness of private capital to invest. Similarly, privately owned secondary 
branches went gradually public through bankrupcies. 
Specific historical and other conditions obstructed both the expansion of the 
network and its integration within the system of social activities. Consequently, 
dimensions of public interest usually served by a railway such as commuter services, 
substantial freight traffic and provincial/rural passenger transportation are 
missing in the case study. 
The poor condition of the network, as assessed within the national and international 
contexts of activities, has placed disproportionate emphasis on the technological 
modernization, during the whole post-war period. The completion of the implied 
large-scale technical projects is continuously delayed mainly due to State's 
difficulties in maintaining a constant flow of the substantial funding required. 
Consequently, the extensive technological modernization instead of being perceived 
as a required stage of the company's development tends to be understood as the 
objective of the enterprise. 
The emphasis on engineering projects as well as other reasons associated with state 
ownership have historically influenced the development of the organizational 
structure. 
Specific criteria for the assessment of the performance of the enterprise have not 
been set up by the state/owner. The enterprise is mainly judged on the magnitude of 
the annual deficit it constantly produces and on its contribution in the achievement 
of national development goals, to be demonstrated by the each time ruling party, in 
terms of investment in infrastructure. 
12.4. ON THE DESIGN AND REDESIGN OF THE SURVEY 
12.4.1. Chapter 8: Realisation of the Limitations of Beer's Model 
A preliminary study of the specific railway enterprise was undertaken in Chapter 8, 
aiming at facilitating the design of the survey concerned with the identification of the 
actual VSM by: 
diagnosing principle causes of ineffectiveness in the formal structure; and 
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deciding whether the survey layout, would be based on a functional or regional 
interpretation of the organization. 
The material for this study has been provided both by the documentation supporting the 
formal organization and by the author's participation with the company over a long period. 
The subsequent detailed description has demonstrated the influence of the non-rational 
organization on the performance of the enterprise. However, though it might be argued that 
constraints are imposed upon the mental states and actions available to individuals by an 
inadequate formal organization, Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrated that this structure is, in 
turn, the product of a culture, reflecting both the historical development of the 
enterprise and certain features of public ownership. Some limitations of the VSM 
methodology, as initially perceived, became apparent and were summarised in the following 
dilemma: 
if all information required for a proper identification of the VSM of the 
enterprise, i. e., accountability for activities as well as information flows, has 
been collected; and 
if, consequently, a detailed analysis of this material has been undertaken, that is, 
the actual VSM has been set up, and the faults and weaknesses of the organizational 
structure have been demonstrated, 
is the emerging picture of the enterprise adequate 
If, further, the enterprise adopts the recommendations of this study concerning 
organizational structure, and proceeds in an organizational rearrangement, 
is there a guarantee that the enterprise will, thus, become more efficient and 
effective ? 
12.4.2. Chapter 9: Ineffectiveness as an Argument of Structure and Culture 
Probably, the answer to the above question is no, because though the VSM deals 
explicitly with the organizational structure, it implies an organizational culture which 
is neither readily recognisable by someone utilizing the model, nor set as a prerequisite 
to its application. Beer (1985) has, somehow, acknowledged the fact: 
"Please do not expect this brief manual to reflect on matters of psychology. of 
social anthropology, of industrial relations, and so on. It is not that they are 
excluded, not that I disregard them. A lot is implicit in this book that derives 
from these fields; and even I have written about them in detail elsewhere. But we 
cannot tackle everything at once". 
The perceived limited capacity of the model, in its adopted functional version, to 
account for all assumed major causes of ineffectiveness dictated a modification of the 
design of the survey. The recursive structure of the enterprise, as set up in Chapter 6 
and examined in Chapter 8 as well as the resulted set of managerial activities at various 
levels and areas would assist in obtaining managerial responses enabling the 
identification of the actual organization. Thus, structural causes of ineffectiveness 
would hopefully become apparent. 
However, a certain methodology should develop, in order to assist a more comprehensive 
understanding of the specific organizational culture which, nevertheless, could partially 
and indirectly derive from an interpretation of the specific structural arrangements. As 
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dikussed in'Chapter 9, the culture'of the enterprise was expected to be reflected in 
survey responses on questions concerning: 
the reason(s) of the company"s existence; 
specific goals to be sought; 
the internal character of the enterprise (planning, budgeting, participation); 
the assessment of the performance of the enterprise; 
the reasons constraining performance improvement; and 
the methods to be employed in order to improve performance. 
12.5. ON THE CAUSES OF INEFFECTIVENESS IN THE STATE-OWNED RAILWAY 
12.5.1. Chapter 10: Diagnosing Structural Causes of Ineffectiveness 
The VSM analysis of the enterprise, both in its preliminary (Chapter 8) and survey 
phase (Chapter 10), identified certain origins of poor performance in the inappropriate 
organizational structure. Many of the diagnostic prescriptions contained in the VSM 
literature and discussed in Chapter 4 proved to hold. The need for an organizational 
redesign seems to be vital. 
II However, though the rationale of the cybernetic model implied both a structural and 
cultural redesign, this was not explicitly provided in the VSM diagrams. An impression 
might be gained that by restructuring the organization the problems would be resolved. 
Though such an approach constitutes an abuse of the model, the model could not resist this 
abuse. The final part of the project dealt, therefore, with the organizational culture 
under the impression that unless an appropriate culture existed, any structural redesign, 
however sophisticated, would result in limited improvement. 
12.5.2. Chapter 11: The Impact of Culture on Effectiveness 
Within I this thesis, fundamental dimensions of a certain organizational culture were 
expected to derive from managerial responses to questions concerning the identity of the 
enterprise. As the survey sample covered a major part of the managerial structure in the 
first four managerial levels and all functional areas, a first indication of the existence 
of a certain culture would derive from the rate of agreement of managers on the specific 
questions asked. In other words, lesser disagreement would be indicative of the dominance 
of a certain culture on the human element of the enterprise. This concept of dominance 
(and, consequently, of minor disagreement) has been defined in this project as managerial 
cohesiveness. The extent of cohesiveness provides the indication of the dominance of a 
certain culture. The content of this cohesiveness characterises the culture. 
In general, the managerial structure of the case-study enterprise, either examined as 
whole or in terms of managerial age, level, or function, proved cohesive. That is, a 
dominant culture existed. 
However', the 
, 
examination of the content of this agreement was indicative of a 
common-belief in the non-feasibility of change rather than of a shared perspective of a 
Positive nature. 
12-5.3. Conclusions 
The example in this thesis has demonstrated that major causes of ineffectiveness of a 
state-owned railway are rather associated with the 'public enterprise' than with the 'functional' characteristic. Any attempt to tackle ineffectiveness should, therefore, 
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reexamine the state/enterprise relationship. In Western Europe, this reexamination seems 
to result in a tendency for state-owned railways operating under strict 'commercial 
criteria' and producing social services at an extent and a cost negotiated and, finally, 
decided at a higher level of recursion. The financial remuneration for any sort of social' 
service produced by the railway is an obligation for the State. The normalised railway 
accounts should reflect this remuneration. Besides this arrangement, the enterprise should 
be freed by constraints and allowed to operate as an autonomous undertaking. 
However, the way in which a State/Railway relationship of this kind should be achieved 
will be ultimately decided by the State. Therefore, the solution of structural and 
cultural organizational problems to a large degree is not in the hands of the enterprise. 
As regards the case-study enterprise, there are not significant indications that an 
intention to reexamine the details of this relationship really exists. Therefore, it would 
be rational to assume that significant improvement of the performance should not be 
expected, or that any improvement would be achieved at a disproportionate cost. 
12.6. ON THE USEFULNESS OF THE MANAGEMENT CYBERNETICS MODEL 
In Chapter 1, three requirements were set against which the usefulness of an 
organizational model could be judged: 
(1) the model should serve the 'technical interest', by providing principles which 
'can become the basis for an efficient and effective design of goal-seeking 
systems; 
(2) the model should also seek to support the 'practical interest', by facilitating 
debate about purposes and providing mechanisms through which genuinely shared 
purposes can emerge; and 
(3) the model should support the 'emancipalory interest', by permitting reflection 
on whose purposes are actually served and how purposes are in fact derived. 
This final section of the thesis concludes on the evaluation of Beer's Model of the 
Viable System against these requirements. 
12.6.1. VSM and the 'Technical Interest' 
I 
The first requirement against which the validity of the model should be judged, is 
whether it provides principles which can become the basis for an efficient and effective 
design of goal-seeking systems, in this case railway enterprises. 
A first advantage of the model which has already been discussed in this chapter, is 
its generality. The model is set up in a way which does not imply a particular 
structure. It is concerned with what defines a system and enables it to maintain its 
identity, rather than with the various relations between components integrating 
particular parts of the organization. The applicability of the model at alternative 
'recursive dimensions' is an important feature deserving to be tested in practice. 
That is, studies of one organization in alternative recursive dimensions should be 
undertaken to demonstrate whether fundamental characteristics (for example, components 
of Checkland's methodology "root definitions") are filtered out or understimated when 
adopting a certain 'recursive dimension'. 
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(2) The model has also the ability to deal with organizations possessing parts which are 
both vertically and horizontally interdependent. The enterprise modelled in this 
thesis offers a good example, since it contained parts integrating both horizontally 
(regionally) and vertically (functionally). The elimination of the regional structure 
-in the revised, model of the enterprise (in the light of the survey findings) should 
not be considered as either a weakness of the model or a misuse, since it exactly 
corresponds to the way in which the management of the enterprise decided to cope with 
the centralization versus decentralization issue. Railway enterprises may exist in 
even more than two organizational dimensions, as the recent example of BR demonstrates 
(regional, functional and product structures), and be modelled in terms of the VSM, 
according to the command, co-ordination and control chains which will be entered in 
the model. 
(3) Another advantage of the model's structure is the use, it makes of the notion of 
recursion. The recursive structure of the model, apart from facilitating its use in 
systems and subsystems within the enterprise, introduces the concept of subsystemic 
autonomy in such a clarity that in some way obliges the management of a wider system 
to recognise both the prerequisites and the consequences of any decision it makes 
regarding the distribution of managerial power within the system. Especially in public 
interest state-owned enterprises, where the pursuit of profitability does not serve as 
the explicit major objective of the enterprise and where people, mainly at middle and 
lower managerial levels are largely freed from the "fear of the boss", the limitations 
, in autonomy and managerial discretion of subunits are to a large degree responsible 
for the loss of any interest in the job and for the consequent deterioration of 
systemic performance., It is arguable whether any other conceived organizational model 
makes this truth more explicit, and in terms as easily conceived as the information 
processing capacity of the average human brain. Though, probably, no one in the 
enterprise can work out the exact size of this capacity in bits/sec, it is well 
understood that hardly any manager can satisfactorily fulfill many of the requirements 
imposed on him arbitrarily by the formal organization chart. 
(4) By emphasising the autonomy of the subsystems and by suggesting allocation of 
discretion to the units which 'produce the company', VSM offers also a rational 
explanation for the metasysternic role of coordination, control, intelligence and 
Policy functions. In the case-study, the continuous involvement of almost everyone in 
day-to-day operational matters, apart from not at all assisting in the improvement of 
operational performance, has been shown as resulting in the reduction of the capacity 
to coordinate and control, and, even more, to plan for the future or to produce 
Policy. More rationally organised enterprises do exist. However, many examples of the 
violation of subsysternic autonomy may be identified within anyone's environment. 
(5) The model offers also a representation of the organization in close interrelationship 
with its environment. Though this capacity of the model was not utilized in the VSM 
diagrams of Chapter 10, because emphasis was placed there in the internal structure, 
subsequent information flows diagrams in Appendix E illustrate both the actual 
interactions with the environment and the type of these interactions. On the example, 
the company does not seem to control the future, because, though extended over a whole 
country, it seeks to interact with its environment almost exclusively at the first 
level of recursion, Le, at headquarters level. Further, this interaction does not 
prove effective, as basically it is not understood as related to fundamental 
components of the environment such as customers and competitors. 
The application of the model within this thesis has demonstrated its value as a diagnostic tool. The rationale of the model could equally apply both to the whole of the 
enterprise and to an information flow (homeostatic loop) between any pair of 
organizational or environmental units. It can, therefore, be argued that the Viable 
Chapter 12 -280- Summary & Conclusions 
System's Model provides a useful management tool that may be successfully employed in the 
service of the 'technical interest', that is, in order to identify and to propose specific 
improvements in the functioning of an organization. 
However, as already stated, this was only possible after deciding on the 'recursive 
dimension'. As Jackson (1988) puts it, "in terms of Checkland's (1981) 'soft systems 
methodology', applying the VSM amounts to taking one out of the multitude of possible 
perceptions of a system (one 'root definition), modelling it, and 'diagnosing' the system 
on the basis of the results obtained'. In Chapter 4, when discussing critiques to Beer's 
model, it was noted that according to Checkland (1980), any enterprise set up to carry out 
some purposeful activity'may in part be regarded as a machine. But since its components 
can attribute meaning to their situation, it will have to be regarded as many other things 
as well: social grouping, appreciative system, power struggle. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a difference between the cybernetic view of the 
organization and alternative perspectives is that the former, though providing a less rich 
picture than a detailed descriptive analysis, is more effectively directed towards the 
promotion of organizational change. It seems therefore that a successful application of 
the model depends very much upon the choice of the relevant recursive dimension. A 
recommendation has been offered that modelling of certain organizations at alternative 
recursive dimensions should be'undertaken, in order to further test the validity of the 
model. This was not done within this thesis, because the insights not directly gained by 
the construction of the VSM at the functional recursive dimension were sought in the 
examination of the organizational culture on more traditional grounds. 
12.6.2. VSM and the 'Practical Interest' 
A further dimension of the model's evaluation examines whether the model facilitates 
debate about purposes and provides mechanisms through which genuinely shared purposes can 
emerge. 
(1) It may be argued, that the structure of the model itself both demonstrates the 
necessity for shared purposes and provides mechanisms through which they can emerge, 
by advocating the need to pay attention to the different functions that the 
Organization has to fulfill. The unfolding of the systemic complexity of the 
enterprise, in the way shown in Chapter 6, and the systematic association of overall 
performance with the capabilities of the sub-systems, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
define feasible purposes and, therefore, facilitate the formulation of shared 
perceptions and goals. On the example of this thesis, the implication of the lack of 
such mechanisms has been demonstrated mainly within the first part of the 'managerial 
cohesiveness' exercise. However, it may also derive from a careful examination of the 
actual VSM, of the company, especially when considering the quality of planning and 
environment scanning at both subsysternic and systemic levels. 
(2) The same issue, i. e., the promotion of shared purposes, is further advocated by the 
model in terms of the decentralization of control. The systems ONE of the enterprise 
are subject to corporate constraints only to the qegree required for overall systemic 
cohesion and viability. This constraint rather than limiting liberty facilitates it, 
because if less control was exercised, the result would not be greater freedom for the 
parts, but anarchy. In the extreme, the VSM strongly implies employees' involvement in 
the determination of overall purposes. This is the only way to convince the parts that 
the system is serving their purposes and that they are going to benefit by seeking its 
viability. 
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However,, the model does not possess mechanisms to effectively resist a misuse. That 
is, though it advocates decentralized control and shared perspective, it may be employed 
and increase the effectiveness of organizations not possessing these qualities. On the 
example of this thesis, the increased effectiveness of a national railway system may be 
viewed as a benefit for the society, in many respects. However, this may not be the case 
when the effectiveness of social systems, with undesirable characteristics, is increased 
by the model's application. Two extremely opposite examples of the model's application for 
the improvement of the effectiveness of social systems with not unversally desired 
characteristics may be offered: 
The first refers, to the well known application of management cybernetics for the 
regulation of the national economy on behalf of the socialist government in Chile 
(Chapter 4). 
The second refers to the less known example of cybernetic modelling, in VSM terms, 
of the logistics command of the United States Air Force (Tripp et al., Chapter 4). 
In general, not many people would find desirable the increased effectiveness of both 
systems in the examples offered. It is known that the metasystems of these two systems 
themselves, i. e. the Chilean and the American parliamentary governments, both identified 
in each other a threat to its own viability. It is also known that this threat became 
reality for one of them. 
12.6.3. VSM and the 'Emancipatory Interest' 
The last requirement against which the model should be judged is whether it permits 
reflection on whose purposes are actually served and how purposes are in fact derived. The 
model may not be viewed as satisfying this requirement. 
Within this thesis, in the parts dedicated to a VSM analyis of the enterprise, i. e., 
mainly in Chapters 8 and 10, a deliberate attempt has been made to provide explanations of 
situations only in terms of the model's principles. Thus, in general, most justifications 
have been offered in terms of the variety handling capacity, and this is very obvious in 
the 3-4-5 metasystern analysis of the ethnographic study. Since variety, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, is just an information- theoretic measure of complexity, it refers, as pointed 
by Ulrich (1981), to "the number of distinguishable states that a system or its output call 
assume at the syntactic level". This kind of explanation leads, probably, to the view that 
9good' management is the one that establishes requisite variety between itself and the 
operations and between the enterprise and the environment, and nothing more. This view is 
not compatible with the previous discussion, i. e. that good management must also be 
concerned with the nature of the purposes served and the meaning and significance of these 
purposes for the participants in the enterprise. 
Jackson (1988) argues that the substitution of a 'semantic-pragmatic' criterion of 
good management by a 'syntactic' one, as discussed by Ulrich (1981), is general throughout 
cybernetics and seriously constrains theoretical development and practical relevance. Ile 
suggests that the formulation of a 'semantic-pragmatic' criterion of good management has 
to be achieved outside cybernetics, because "only on the basis of the meaning and 
significance of purposes for concerned individuals can decisions be taken which impose 
limitations on their autonomy". 
The inadequacy of the model to satisfy this third requirement does not imply that 
within traditional management the issue is tackled in a way promoting the 'emancipalorY 
interest'. In the example of the railway enterprise, the problem of how much autonomy to 
grant to the parts is resolved as a matter of 'managerial' convenience, at the top of the 
enterprise. 
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12.6.4. Overall Assessment 
, 
Certain advantages and shortcomings of the model have been demonstrated by its 
application in this thesis. The overall conclusion may be that though successfully 
covering a major part of the organizational reality the model places the source of 
viability of an organization in its structural arrangements rather than in its corporate 
culture. A danger exists, that attempts to implement recommendations for change stemming 
from a thus partial understanding of the enterprise may indeed lead to more undesirable 
consequences. Therefore, certain methodologies should develop which, while making use of 
the advantages of the model, will be able to improve its deficiencies. Within this thesis, 
an example of a methodology of this kind has been offered in terms of the analysis 
undertaken in Chapter 11, aiming at assessing organizational culture by interpreting 
managerial answers to questions concerning the identity of the enterprise. It was shown 
that it is more likely for an organizational problem to be of a cultural origin and not 
the other way round. However, a proper tackling of cultural problems inevitably involves 
organizational redesign. To this end the Viable System's Model makes a unique 
contribution. 
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APPENDIX A 
ELEMENTS OF BEER'S MODEL OF THE VIABLE SYSTEM (VSM) 
A. I. ICONIC REPRESENTATION - DIAGRAMMATIC CONVENTIONS 
The model consists of five elements (Systems ONE to FIVE), which can be labelled 
implementation, co-ordination, operational control, intelligence and policy. I 
Figure A] depicts the iconic representation of the model of any viable system. The 
five interacting subsystems are labelled ONE, TWO, etc. In the figure two Systems ONE are 
shown (there could be more), each of which contains a complete viable system displayed at 
a 45 degrees angle. 
The whole-page viable system is shown as interacting in a precisely defined way with 
its environment, through its Systems ONE and System FOUR, and not otherwise. In the same 
way, the embedded viable systems are shown as interacting in exactly the same way with 
local environments, that are specific to each of them, although they are (inevitably) 
subsets of the total environment. 
Beer stresses that the topology of recursion demands an exact replica in each case. In 
the iconic representation (Figure A]) the only discrepancy is that in the second System 
ONE, the connection between its System 4 and its sub-environment has not been completed, 
for obvious graphical reasons. 
Whenever a line appears that is delimited at each end by a dot, a homeostatic 
relationship is intended. That is, each of these lines stands for a pair of arrows 
(homeostatic loop). Two directional arrows in the environmental areas also indicate 
homeostasis. Beer (1979) argues that to each of these homeostats (which, practically, are 
hundreds in any viable system concerned) the following principles of organization must 
apply: 
The first principle of organization: 
Managerial, operational and environmental varieties, diffusing through an 
institutional system, tend to equate; they should be designed to do so with minimum 
damage to people and to cost. 2 
The second principle of organization: 
The four directional channels carrying information between the management unit, the 
operation and the environment 3 must each have a higher capacity to transmit a 
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Figure Al: Beer's Model of the Viable System (VSM) 
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given amount of information relevant to variety selection in a given time, than the 
originating sub-system has to generate it in that time. 4 
The third Principle of organization: 
Wherever the information carried on a channel capable of distinguishing a given variety 
crosses a boundary, it undergoes transduction; the variety of the transducer must be 
at least equivalent to the variety of the channel. 5ý 
The fourth principle of organization: 
The operation of the first three principles must be cyclically maintained through time 
without hiatus or lags. 6 
A. 2. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE VIABLE SYSTEM 
A. 2.1. System ONE 
The first sub-system of'any viable system, according to Beer, consists of those 
elements that produce it. These elements are themselves viable systems. Systems of 
increasing complexity are nested within each other to produce the whole. Hence Beer's 
theorem of recursion: "In a recursive organizational structure, any viable system 
contains, and is contained in, a viable system-. 7 
Beer (1985) insists that systems ONE are producers of the organization and not just 
adjuncts to it, however important. 8 
According to Beer, the beginnings of a theory of autonomy and de- centralization lie in 
the fact that the management of the Viable System under study (the Senior Management) is, 
in principle, unable to entertain the variety generated by any one of its subsidiary 
viable systems that constitute System ONE. 
The fundamental variety balancers in a modern organization, shown diagrammatically in Figure A2, are: 
Legal and Corporate Requirements, i. e. variety attenuators; that signify the identity 
of subsidiaries as corporate entities. 
The Resource Bargain, Le. the Ideal' by which some degree of autonomy is agreed 
between the Senior Management and the Systems ONE. The homeostatic loop sketched in 
the diagram indicates that a dynamic process is involved. It is essentially 
attenuative because it excludes a huge range of alternatives. However, in some 
instances it can provide amplification (e. g., by superior knowledge or unexpected 
financing). 
Accountabillt;, i. e. responsibility for resources provided in terms of variety 
engineering. 
Management in System ONE is charged with conducting its operations according to a Resource Bargain agreed with Senior Management. Then the transmission of plans, programmes 
and procedures to the operational circle should be reagrded as an act of regulation. , 
This regulation, 
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amplifies managerial variety (the basic details of the Resource Bargain must be 
elaborated); 
attenuates operational variety (operational variety must be harnessed to agreed 
objectives). 
Thus, the Regulatory Centre, the activities of which are marked diagrammatically by a 
triangle, is the focus of homeostasis between management and operations. 
Regulatory 
Centre 
A. 2.2. System TWO 
Figure A2: Fundamental Variety Balancers 
System TWO is the viable system's anti-oscillatory device for System ONE. Beer (1985) 
argues that it is almost totally misunderstood and under- represented in contemporary 
management technique. "It is always present, or the organization would shake itself to 
pieces. But because it is not properly handled, enterprises come very close to 
disintegration". 10 
The maintenance of balance in Systems ONE is threatened by the disbalance induced by 
inter-elemental oscillation, which the Senior Management does not command the Requisite 
Variety to resolve by dictat on the central axis. 
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System TWO does not lie on the central command axis. Its function is not to command, 
but to damp oscillations. 
System TWO is the Regulatory Centre for the Viable System under study. Unlike the 
regulatory centres on the horizontal axes of Systems ONE, it is in touch with System ONE 
as a complete entity. 
Each System ONE is served by more than one System TWO (or System TWO has more than one 
functions), because there are always several oscillatory sources. System TWO depends on 
Senior Management, since it deals with the whole of System ONE. 
Figure A3 focuses on the functions and the relationships of System TWO. 
e. g., 
schemata for tactical planning 
production control 
advertising 
social mores 
costing standards 
stem two 
Figure Al System TWO: Anti-Oscillatory 
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A. 2.3. System THREE-* 
Up to now, five vertical channels have been mentioned: 
-the Corporate Intervention (Legal & Corporate Requirements), ' 
-the Resource Bargain, 
-Operational (Sqiggly-line) linkages, 
-Environmental intersects, and 
-System TWO (anti-oscillation). 
All of them are filters of variety, from which the first, the second and the fifth 
have been specially designed to filter management Information. 
A danger exists that what the management most needs to know is filtered out (by the 
use of totals, averages and so on). 
Beer (1985) argues that "poor managements, having too little insight or training, or 
suffering from 'corporate paranoia'that has them feeling constantly threatened, diregard 
the filters, and try to restore Requisite Variety on the central axis. That is, they 
disregard the resource bargain (where in principle the homeostatic message upward needs to 
be only 'OK'), and invigilate the horizontal activities with all the zeal of all 
Inquisition". 11 
There is a whole set of acceptable management practices that do not involve this 
centralisation of manifest power, which (properly designed) are capable of generating 
enormous variety. Such mechanisms work sporadically and (by agreement with System ONE 
management) penetrate straight to the operations themselves. These procedures, which may 
generically be called 'audits' consitute the System THREE-* (three-star). 
System THREE-* is depicted in Figure A4 as the sixth vertical channel. 
Figure A4: SystemTHREE-*: Sporadic Audit 
ystem two 
463215 
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A. 2.4. System THREE 
Beer (1985) states that, in discussing the viable system, the notion of hierarchy 
cannot be altogether escaped, although the whole analysis constantly reveals theý 
equivalent importance of the five major sub-systems. The reason is the existence in all 
viable systems of an equation of power. "The will for survival seems to be what governs 
this situation. And whether we look at animals, in which the brain 'commands' the nervous 
system and (in man at least) 'masterminds' the will to survive, or at social institutions, 
acknowledged hierarchies emerge". 12 1ý, 
System Three Operations 
Directorate Chief 
Executive 
Officer 
loperational Researc Strategic 
r Schemata for 
Work Study Planning Tactical Planning 
Engineering and Production Production 
Building Services Director Con trol 
Sales Training Sales II Advertising and 
on Site Drector II House Image 
Union Personnel Social Mom Negotations Director 
Budgetary Audits 
Co Costing Standards I Control 
3* 
Figure A5: System THREE and its Supportive Management 
It has been shown that: 
2 
,j, 
System ONE and not 'Senior Management' produces the viable system. 
A System TWO would be needed to damp the oscillatory behaviour, inherent in the 
structure of System ONE. 
Then, the role of System THREE is to observe the ONE-TWO complex. This role is a necessary 
condition for viability, and is graphically depicted in Figure A5. 
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Beer (1985) argues that feelings of oppression are very real when System's ONE variety 
so much needed to provide requisite variety on the horizontal axis is, or even feels as if 
it is, wholly absorbed by System THREE. In such case, it would be better to replace the 
System ONE management by a computer, because it is not free to face variety with its own 
creative variety, but has to pretend that the 'world' is really the outcome of a simple 
formula. "And this is just what is happening -from the management of the economy, to the 
lack of choice in consumer goods- in contemporary Western society". 13 
Beer's definition of autonomy derives from this relationship between Systems ONE and 
THREE: 
When we know what is the purpose of the system, which is, what the system does, 
after convergence between System THREE 
and System ONE (Strategic Planning), 
then we may also know the criteria for distinguishing possible states, i. e., how to 
measure variety. 
This will then tell us how much variety the First Axiom 14 must necessarily handle, 
and it will determine the minimum variety on the vertical command axis transmitting 
regulation that guarantees cohesion in the viable system. 
Autonom means the freedom remaining to the management on the horizontal axis to 
manage. 
15 
Beer calls the part of the viable system studied up to know, i. e. the 3-2-1 of the 
viable system, 'autonomic management' of the organization. They are capable of optimising 
the productive performance of the enterprise within an established framework and 
maintaining internal stability without reference to higher management levels. Autonomic 
management does not, however, possess an overall view of the orghanization's environment 
and is therefore incapable of reviewing corporate strategy and reacting to threats and 
opportunities in the organization's environment. This is where Systems FOUR and FIVE come 
in. 
A. M. System FOUR 
System THREE has been discriminated as responsible for Inside-and-now. System FOUR 
deals with the ou tside- and- then. System FOUR provides also self-awareness for the viable 
system. In order to do that, System FOUR must hold a model of Itself embodied In a model 
of the whole viable system (Figure A6). 
Thus: 
The account of the Inside-and-now is filtered upward via System THREE. 
The System FOUR model of itself arrives in a model of the whole of System FOUR. 
System FOUR of the viable system contains a model of that System FOUR, which 
contains a recursive model Indefinitely. 
It is just the Infinite regression of self-images that seems to hold the key to the 
characteristic self-awareness of viable systems. 16 
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Beer argues that the THREE-FOUR homeostat (depicted by two arrows in Figure A7) must 
also obey the four principles of organization. From the first principle of organization, 
referring to the equation of variety (para. A. 1) and the first axiom of management, which 
is a measure of variety in System THREE (para. A. 2.4), derives the following second axiom 
of management, concerning the THREE-FOUR homeostat: 
The Second Axiom of Management: 
The variety disposed by System THREE resulting from the operation of the First Axiom 
equals the variety disposed by System FOUR. 17 
ystem two 
ocal 
ulatory 
Figure A6: System FOUR: Outs ide-And -Then 
A. M. System FIVE 
The main functions of System FIVE are: 
to supply logical closure to the viable system; and 
to monitor the THREE-FOUR homeostat (Figure A7). 
Appendix A -307- VSM Description 
The system 3-4-5, dealing with the future, is metasystemic to 3-2-1, hence the 
phenomenical greater significance of System THREE, as belonging both to the autonomic 
management (3-2-1) and the metasystem (3-4-5). 
Beer argues that even in these days, when a less authoritarian image of management is 
promoted, mainly by behavioural science, the 'boss' still exists. The heads of enterprise 
do preserve certain rights of decision. 
Figure A7: System FIVE: Monitoring the THREE-FOUR Homeostat 
Discussing System FIVE, Beer (1985) introduces the concept of lethost: *Ethos is a 
variety sponge of gigantic capacity". 18 The 'variety sponge' at System FIVE is 'mopping 
up' the variety that the homeostasis of ONE-THREE and THREE-FOUR will not have accounted 
for. Hence the third axiom of management: 
Third axiom of management: 
The variety disposed by System FIVE equals the residual variety generated by the 
operation of the Second Axiom. 19 
Appendix A -308- VSM Description 
System FIVE 'masterminds' a metasystem called 3-4-5, the outside-and-then management. 
By shifting the set of recursions one level up, the metasystern 3-4-5 becomes System ONE of 
the new Viable System. This leads to the Law of Cohesion: 
The Law of Cohesion (for multiple recursions of the viable system): 
The System ONE variety accessible to System THREE of Recursion x equals the variety 
disposed by the sum of the metasystems of Recursion y, for every recursive pair. 20 
A. 3. FOOTNOTES 
1. R. Espejo and J. Watt, 1979: "Management Information Systems: A System for Design", 
Journal of Cybernetics, Vol. 9, pp. 259-283. 
2. S. Beer, 1979: page 97. 
3. Throughout the iconic representation of VSM, a management unit is depicted by a 
square, operations by a circle and the environment by an amoeba shape. 
4. S. Beer, 1979: page 99. 
5. S. Beer, 1979: page 101. 
6. S. Beer, 1979: page 258. 
7. S. Beer, 1979: page 118. 
8. "While the profit centres produce the company, cost control, quality control, 
management inventory, stock control, all these are obvious examples of homeostatic 
regulation, and financial accounting generates the balance sheet after all". (S. Beer, 
1985: Diagnosing the System for Organizations, Wiley, Chichester, page 9). 
9. S. Beer, 1985: pages 37-41. 
10. S. Beer, 1985: page 66. 
11. S. Beer, 1985: page 82. 
12. S. Beer, 1985: page 91. 
13. S. Beer, 1985: page 97. 
14. The first axiom on management: "The sum of horizontal variety disposed by n 
operational elements equals the sum of vertical variety disposed on the six vertical 
components of corporate cohesion". (S. Beer, 1979: page 217). 
15. S. Beer, 1985: page 102. 
16. S. Beer, 1985: page 116. 
17. S. Beer, 1979: page 298. 
18. S. Beer, 1985: page 125. 
19. S-Beer, 1979: page 298. 
20. S. Beer, 1979: page 355. 
APPENDIX B 
GREEK RAILWAYS: ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION 
The appendix contains: 
- Organization charts of the under study enterprise illustrating changes in the 
period from 1965 up to now (Figures BI to B4). This material is mainly discussed 
in Chapters 7 and 8. 
- Recent information on the distribution of employees (Table BI) and managers (Table 
B2) within the various parts of the company (Chapters 7 and 9). 
- Organization charts indicating survey sample within the company (Figure B5) and 
interviewed members of the survey sample (Figure B6), as discussed in Chapter 9. 
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Department 
number of e mployees Percen tage within 
Headquarters Production Headquarters Production Enterprise 
DOMP 116 13.20 0.94 
DEL 14 1.60 0.11 
DET 25 2.84 0.20 
DEM 37 4.20 0.30 
DG 40 4.55 0.32 
DNE 16 1.82 0.13 
DOY 111 12.63 0.90 
DOE 16 1.82 0.13 
DEE 109 12.40 0.88 
DIP 51 5.80 0.41 
DAP 222 25.26 1.79 
DP 42 4.78 0.34 
DD 
OPA 
DPTh 
DPP 
DER (DISTY) 
YSTHE 
YA 
80 
3 231 
3 480 
9.10 0.65 
28.09 26.09 
1 30.25 1 28-10 
2 746 23.87 1 22.17 
1 482 
11 
12.88 il. 97 
218 
348 
1.89 1 1.76 
3.02 2.81 
total: 12 384 879 11 505 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Notes: 1.1982 date. 
2. Roiling Stock Maintenance (Depots) personnel. is incLuded in Regional Departments, where It beLonged at that time. 
Table BI: Greek Railways (OSE): Number of Employees by Department 
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Informalion 
mana9erIaLLeve 
unIt234 totaI 
Top Management Departments Divisions Area Units 
Board 9 9 
GM & AGM 5 
DOMP 152* 
DEL 2* 4 
DET 2 
DEM 12 3 
DG 13 4 
DNE 14 5 
DPA 13 11 15 
DPTh 13 11 15 
DPP 139 13 
DISTY 126 9 
YSTHE 13 4 
DOY 2 3 
DOE i 
DEE 2 3 
DIP 1 2 
DAP 1 2 
DP 2 3 
DD 1 2 
totat 14 is 39 41 112 
Level. 4 managers within headquarters Departments have been excLuded. Exceptionatty, Levet 4 managers In DomP and DEL Departments have been 
recorded, either because they report directty to the Head of Dept, or because the division manager position is vacant. 
Table B2: Greek Railways (OSE): Number of Managers by Managerial Level 
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Figure B5: Greek Railways : Organization Chart Showing Managerial Levels 1 to 5 
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APPENDIX C 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
The questionnaire presented in the following pages was designed and used in order to 
collect information utilized in this thesis. 
Its rationale is explained in Chapter 9. The following notes should be made here: 
- Section One (General Information) and Section Two (General Characteristics of 
Greek Railways) were designed to be answered by all respondents. 
Section Three (Analysis of Activities) lists a total of 168 managerial activities 
at various levels and concerning different functions. Therefore, each respondent 
was requested to answer activities, in front of which a black square was marked. 
Consequently, each functional group of respondents answered the part of this 
section, related to its duties. Furthermore, top level management and other 
corporate level respondents were asked to answer almost the whole list of 
activities. Finally, for several activities for which, to the interviewer's 
personal knowledge, there were not clear responsibilities, the question was posed 
to all respondents assumed to be in some way related with the activity. 
- Section Four (Information Flows) consists of five pages. However they all refer to 
one activity. Therefore, each respondent had to fill in as many sets of five 
pages, as the number of activities for which he had declared responsibility. In 
practice, each respondent had to fill 6-10 such sets. Frequently, there was a 
grouping of similar activities in the same set. 
Appendix C -319- Survey 
Questionnaire 
SECTION ONE: GENERAL INFORMATION - 
In this part of the questionnaire information about 
resporident's- characteristics is asked, in terms of 
age and status within the company. 
NAME: 
(This survey Is not interested in your personal 
identification; is only interested in problems and 
views of managers at various company levels. By 
fitting in your name, if you want, you help to 
guarantee the reliability of this work, as assessed 
by those who will judge It). 
NAME OF THE UNIT WHICH YOU MANAGE: 
DEPARTMENT: 
DIVISION: 
UNIT: 
1. Age: 
Leave bLank for coding 
tess than 31-40 41-50 51-60 over 
30 years years years years 60 years 
(Tick the appropriate box) 
2 3 4 5 
How long have you been holding this position ? 
less more 
than 1-3 3-5 5-10 than 
1 year years years years 10 years 
(Tick the appropriate box) 
El 13 0 
1 2 3 4 5 
Appendix C -320- Survey 
Questionnaire 
SECTION TWO: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GREEK RAILWAYS (OSE) 
3. How much do you agree that each of the following statements 
expresses the main reason for the existence of OSE ? 
(Tick the appropriate box for each reason) 
3.1. OSE exists mainly In order to offer 
railway services, better than those 
to be offered by a private railway 
enterprise. Agree ? 
3.2. OSE exists mainly in order to serve 
transportation needs of the tower 
income classes. Agree ? 
3.3. OSE exists mainly In order to serve 
excess transport demand during peak 
periods, since this kind of demand 
cannot be undertaken by the rest of 
the transport system. Agree ? 
3.4. OSE exists mainly in order to help 
the state In achieving wider policy 
goals (development goals, e. g. regio- 
nat development, social goats, e. g., 
maintenance of employment, inflation 
control), via the spectrum of public 
enterprises under Its control. Agree ? 
3.5. OSE exists mainly In order to maintain 
a complex of retations, associated with 
fInanciaL and poLiticat interests of 
Individuals. Agree ? 
3.6. OSE exists mainty in order to assure 
the survivaL of raRway as a means of 
transport, which, being technoLogicat- 
Ly outdated, couLd not survive In free 
competition conditions. Agree ? 
3.7. OSE exists mainly in order to assist 
in tackling some sort of wide national 
problem in future (e. g., oil crisis, 
war). Agree ? 
strongly . strongly 
don't 
agree agree neutral disagree disagree answer 
F7 El DD Fý m 
123456 
m 1: 1 D ED ED 1-: 1 
Fý [1 0 11 11 Fý 
cl cl 0 11 
, F-71 1-: 1 
EI EI EI, EI EI EI 
EI EI EI EI E3 EI 
EI r-i 
EI, Fi E3 EI 3 Fý 
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4. How important do you think each of the following goals of OSE's 
operation is ? 
(Ring the appropriate number) 
Operational Goal: don't slightly almost very 
know unimportant important Important Important Important vital 
4.1. To reduce total expenditure: dn 0 
4.2. To reduce staff expenditure: dn 0 
4.3. To improve service reliability: dn 0 
4.4. To increase traffic volume: dn 0 
4.5. To reduce Journey times: dn 0 
4.6. To 1mrpove quality of services: dn 0 
4.7. To increase market share: dn 0 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
How do you assess your unit's contribution in achieving each 
of the goals mentioned above ? 
(Ring the appropriate mxnber) 
my unit's contribution in: don't slightly almost very 
know negligible significant significant significant significant vital 
5.1. Reducing totaL expenditure: dn 0 1 2 3 4 5 
5.2. Reducing staff expenditure: dn 0 1 2 3 4 5 
5.3. Improving service reLlabiLity: dn 0 1 2 3 4 5 
5.4. Increasing traffic volume: dn 0 1 2 3 4 5 
5.5. Reducing journey times: dn 0 1 2 3 4 5 
5.6- Imrpoving quaLity of services: dn 0 1 2 3 4 5 
-5.7. Increasing market share: dn 0 1 2 3 4 5 
A ppendix C Sul-vey Questionnaire 
6. Which way you think work is organized in OSE ? 
(Tick the appropriate box) 
There is 
planning 
and Is strictly 
implemented. 
F-I 
There Is 
pLanning 
adapting to 
changing 
conditions. 
D 
2 
There is 
ptanning 
but so 
imperfect, 
that becomes 
not 
implementable. 
3 
There is no 
pLanning. 
Evereyone tries 
to serve the 
interest of 
the company 
as he 
reallses it. 
D 
4 
if you ticked box 61 write down which way you think work is organized in OSE: 
5 
Work in OSE 
is not organized 
In any of the 
five mentioned 
ways. 
Fl 
in OSE, every year, a budget is prepared. Which way do you 
participate in the preparation of your unit's budget ? 
(Tick the appropriate box) 
I sun up 
the proposals 
of the units 
reporting 
to me. 
El 
I examfne 
the proposaLs 
of the unfts 
reportfng to me 
and ask for 
Justificatfon 
of expenses. 
2 
I examine 
the proposals 
of the units 
reporting to me 
in relation with 
directives from 
my superiors. 
3 
I exhaust 
the capabitities 
for discussion 
between units & 
superiors, prior 
to unit's budget 
preparation. 
0 
4 
There is no 
planning. 
Everyone tries 
to avoiding being 
charged with 
duties which are 
not definitely 
his responsibility. 
My unit's budget 
Is the outcome of 
discussion and 
agreement between 
all involved 
headquarters, 
regional and 
supportive units. 
EJ 
5 
I do not 
, articipate 
as ImpLied by 
any of these 
mentioned 
ways. 
D 
6 
If you ticked box 06, write down which way you participate In your unit's budget preparation: 
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Usually, before being approvedr OSE's budget-is reformed by the 
State. How often is your opinion asked, before your unit's 
budget is amended ? 
(Tick the appropriate box) 
I 
9. What kind of view do you think that each of the following 
managerial levels holds for the company ? 
(Tick the appropriate box for each managerial. teveL) 
aLmost aLmost don't 
never rareLy sometimes often aLways answer 
El 0 El 0 El 
123456 
VIa wthe Enterp rIaaa s 
A whole: A set of A set of A sun of A sun of 
They are activities activities relatively Independent 
mainly In close Inter- relatively Independent activities: Interested relationship: Interrelated: activities: They are only In the the performance the performance They are more Interested in 
performance of parts Is of parts is Interested In the performance 
of the significant to equally the performance of each part. 
total. the extent that significant of parts than In This wilt define 
defines the as the the performance the performance 
performance performance of the total. of the total. 
of the total. of the total. 
El 11 
2 3 4 5 
9.1. Top management: Fl m Fl mm 
9.2. Functionat management: 
9.3. Regional management: 
mm F-1 
Fl EI EI 
7 El 
9.4. Lower management: 
F-7 El' Fl MM 
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10. Which way do you think that the following characteristics of OSE1s 
operation have developed during the last three years ? 
(Tick the appropriate box for each char acteristic of OSE's operation). 
has 
significantly 
has 
slightly 
has 
remained 
has 
slightly 
has 
significantly don't 
improved Improved stable deteriorated deteriorated know 
D C-1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
10.1. OSE's traffic volume (absolute figures) El 
10.2. OSE's market share 
r7 
10.3. Service reliability 
Track quality, concerning: 
10.4. -train punctuality r7 Fý Fý 
10.5. -quality of Journey C1 
RoLLIng stock quality, concerning: 
10.6. -train punctuality 
D 
10.7. -quality of Journey 
11 C] D 
Terminals' capabilities, concerning: 
10.8. -traffic handling 
D 
10.9. -quality of services offered 
D 
ja. How of ten have you travelled by train during the last three years ? 
(Tick the appropriate box for each part of the network) . 
almost almost almost almost almost less than 
every once a once twice a once a once 
week month quarterly year year a year 
ED ED ED Fý ED 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
11.1. on the Athens-Thessatoniki main Line 11 ED 
M ED 
11.2. On the North Greece network F1 11 
11.3. On the narrow gauge line 11 ED 
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12. HOW much do you agree that each of the following statements 
illustrates. the main reason of OSE's problems ? 
Mck the approprfate box for each statement). 
12.1. Main reason of OSE's problems is its 
old technological equipment. Agree ? 
12.2. Main reason of OSE's problems is the 
inflexibility , stemming from state's 
interventions. Agree ? 
12.3. Main reason of OSE's problems is the 
Lack of planning. Agree ? 
12.4. Main reason of OSE's problems is the 
Lack of control. Agree ? 
12.5. Main reason of OSE's problems is the 
Limited capacity of its managers. Agree ? 
12.6. Main reason of OSE's problems is the 
lack of Interest of the operating staff. 
Agree ? 
12.7. Main reason of OSE's problems Is the 
absence of incentives for the personnel 
of all levels. Agree ? 
strongly strongly don't 
agree agree neutral disagree disagree answer 
D 
23456 
00 
0 0 0 El 
El 11 1: 1 
El El 
El 0 11 
0 0 El 
12.8. Main reason of OSE's problems Is the 
Irresponsibility of trade unions. Agree ? 
F7 
12.9. Main reason of OSE's problems is the 
pro-workers legislation , within and 
outside the railways. Agree ?F 
El cl 
M- mM 
Fý 11 
0 0 
oD 
o 
00 
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13. Under the: 
present level of financing OSE's investment programmes, and 
the existing set of relations between OSE and the Stater 
which do you think is the most appropriate method, in order 
to tackle the following issues ? 
(Rank by writing from 1 to 7 at the respective space. Atternativety, write "there Is no way" or "I don't know"). 
13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 
Improved Optimum improved Improved improved improved 
quality of utilization co-operation performance performance performance 
services of Rolling between of Rolling of Track, of signalling 
offered. Stock, operations, Stock. Buildings and tete- 
Track, and Rolling Stock, and communications 
Installations. Track and Installations. systems. 
Signalling and 
TeLecoms 
sub-systems. 
Reorganization 
Change of respective managers 
improved planning 
Effective control 
Intensive staff training 
improved work conditions 
Salary increases 
other method: 
There Is no way n 
Don't know Cl 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
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SECTION THREE: ANALYSIS OF ACTIVITIES 
14. Listed below are the fundamental activities at the various 
managerial levels in the railway enterprise. Tick the 
activities for which you are personally responsible. 
(Tick the appropriate box for-any activity, to the Left of which a- is marked). 
14.1. Activities at Corporate Level 
I am responsible is 
activity responsible ... (fiLL 
In) 
C1 
1. Relations with the State 
001 Informing the Enterprise on State's requirements from 
the Rail. ways .......................... 13 
002 Informing the State on the prerequisites for the futflitment of these requirements ........... o.......... 13 
003 Informing the State on OSE's performance ............ 
13 
004 Bargaining with the State the funding of the Investment 
Programme ............... o. o........ 
ID 
005 Bargaining with the State the generat features of the 
Annuat Budget .......................... 
Cl 
2. Research and Development 
006 [3 Monitoring international trends In the development of 
the railways and other modes of transport ....... ...... 
C1 
007 C] monitoring trends in national development ............ 
008 C] Preparation of alternative scenarios of OSE's development, 
related to alternative directions of development of the 
country ............................. 
Planning-Organizing 
009 Identification of sectors of transport market which the 
enterprise decides to enter, as deriving from the adopted 
general direction for the development of the company ...... 
010 Identification of the features of services to be offerred, 
as deriving from the adopted general direction for the 
development of the company ................... 
011 Identification of required investment, in order to succeed 
in entering the above market sectors and In offerring the 
above transport services .................. 
012 C] Identification of required organizational changes, In 
order to succeed In entering the above market sectors and in offerring the above transport services ............ 
4. Annual Programming 
don't know 
who is 
responsibLe 
0 
3 
EI 
13 
EI 
EI 
0 
0 
13 
0 
0 
0 
13 
013 0 Preparation of the annual investment programme ......... 
13 
014 [] Preparation of the annual budget ................ 
11 
Appendix C -328- Survey Questionnaire 
don't Gow 
I am responsibte Is who is 
activity responsibte ... (fiLl. In) responsibte 
1: 1 
12 
C] 
3 
S. Performance Monitoring 
0 1 5 Monitoring the development of traffic volume ........ .. 
0 1 6 Monitoring the development of market share ......... .. 
Monitoring the development of the investment progrmamme: 
0 1 7 (3 Monitoring the rate of absorbtion of investment funds .... .. 
0 1 8 C] Monitoring the rate of completion of investment projects 
Monitoring the development of the annual budget: 
0 1 9 C] Revenue monitoring ..................... .. 
0 2 0 Expenditure control ..................... .. 
0 2 1 Cash flow control ...................... .. 
Monitoring the Enterprise-Personnel relationship: 
0 2 2 (: ] Monitoring the relations with the trade unions ....... .. 
0 2 3 C] Monitoring absenteism .................... .. 
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14.2. Activities Related to Railway operations don't know 
I am responsible is who is 
activity responsible ... (filL in) responsible 
23 
1. Research and Development 
024 Monitoring international trends in methods and 
characteristics of railway operations .............. 
025 monitoring financial activity in the various sectors of 
the national economy ...................... 
026 Monitoring activities and methods of other transport 
undertakings .......................... 
027 Identification of alternative possible ways of increasing 
traffic volume and market share ................. 
2. Planning-organizing 
028 Identification of requirements in new railway Installations 
(or modification/extension of existing) ............. 
13 13 
029 Identification of requirements in new roiling stock 
(or modification/refurbishment of existing) ........... 
13 ED 
030 Identification of requirements in technical configuration 
of the track (required axle Loads, journey speeds) ....... 
031 Identification of requirements in Line's capacity configuration 
(singte/double, signalling, central traffic control) ...... 
0 C1 
032 C] Definition of passenger services characteristics 
(first/standard class, couchettes/sLeepfng cars, buffet 
services, comfort/cLeantiness requirements) ........... 
El 
033 C] Definition of freight services characteristics 
(block trains, containerization, combined transport, 
'door-to-door, services) .................... 
Ann ual Programming 
034 Identification of pricing poticy and speciat offers 
(reductions for specific groups, specific customers, etc. ) .... 
13 Cl 
035 TimetabLe preparation (timing, train composition, stops) .... 
13 13 
Definition of requirements from the 'Traction/RotLing Stock' sub-system: 
036 C] RoLting stock avalLabiLity requirements ............. 13 
037 RoLting stock operationaLity requirements ............ 
Cl Cl 
038 RoUlng stock cLeanLiness, comfort, etc. requirements ...... 
Definition of requirements from the "Track and Permanent 
InstaLlationso sub-system: 
039 Track avalLabiLity requirements ................ 
040 C] Track operationaLity requirements .............. o 
041n TerminaLs and Instattations operationaLity requir ements .... 
0 
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Activities Related to Railway Operations (continued) 
don't know 
I am responsible Is who Is 
activity responsible ... MLL In) responsible 
23 
Definition of requirements from the 'Signalling and 
Telecommunications, sub-system: 
042[: ]SignatLing systems operationaLity requirements 13 
043 C] Telecommunications/radioteLephones systems operationatity 
requirements .......................... 
0 
044 C] LeveL crossings guarding systems operationality 
requirements .......................... 
Cl 
045n CentraL traffic controL systems operationaLity 
requirements .......................... 
0 Cl 
4. Performance Monitoring of the 'Railway Operations' system 
046 Traffic volume development monitoring by route ......... 
1: 1 0 
047 Traffic volume development monitoring by type of traffic 
.. 
Cl (passenger, freight) .................... 
048 Receipts development monitoring by route ............ 
C3 
049 (D Receipts development monitoring by type of traffic ....... 
1: 1 
Operations expenditure development monitoring: 
050 rl Train crews expenditure development .............. 
0 
051 TerminaLs/Marshatting crews expenditure development ...... 
C3 
052 Other train operations, terminals and marshalling 
expenditure (excluding fueLLing/tubricatfng) .......... 
D 
053 Scheduled reliability monitoring by route ........... 
054 Monitoring, on behalf of the 'operations, system, the 
behaviour of the 'Traction/Rotting Stock' sub-system, in 
relation to defined requirements ................ 
055 Monitoring, on behalf of the operations' system, the 
behaviour of the 'Track and Permanent Installations' sub-system, 
In relation to defined requirements ............... 
056 Monitoring, on behalf of the 'operations, system, the 
behaviour of the 'Signalling and Telecommunications, sub-system, in relation to defined requirements ............... 
Monitoring the features of services offered, In relation 
to planned requirements: 
057 trains (operationaLity, cleanliness, buffets, couchettes, 
sleeping cars etc. ) ...................... 
058 terminals (operationaLity, condition, cleanliness, customers 
services, etc. ) ......................... 
059 C] Trains crews'(appearance, behaviour) .............. 
060 C] Terminals staff (appearance, behaviour) ............. 
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14.3. Activities Related to the 'Traction/Rolling Stock' sub-system 
don't know 
I am responsibte Is who Is 
actIvity responsibte ... (fitt In) responsibte 
012 El 
3 
1. Research and Development 
061 F1 Monitoring technological development in railway traction 
issues ............................. 
13 
062 C3 Monitoring technotogicaL development in railway rotting 
stock issues .............. 6........... 
13 
063 C3 Monitoring technological development in rotting stock 
repair/maintenance issues .................... 
064 Monitoring technological development in rotting stock repair/maintenance installations and equipment issues ...... C3 
065 Preparation of alternative scenarios of traction and 
rotting stock development in OSE ............. .... 
ID C3 
2. Planning-Organizing 
06 6 C] Definition of rotting stock repairs Issues (methods, C1 timing), by type of rotting stock .............. .. 
C1 
06 7 Definition of rotting stock maintenance issues (methods, 
timing), by type of rotting stock .............. .. 
06 8 Definition of requirements in rotting stock repairs 
Installations and equipment ................. .. 
06 9 C] Definition of requirements in rotting stock maintenance 
i nstallations and equipment ................. .. 
C1 
07 0 (3 Definition of requirements In materiaLs/spare parts for 0 rotting stock repairs .................... .. 
13 
07 1n Definition of requirements in materials/spare parts for 
rotting stock maintenance .................. .. 
C3 13 
3. Annual Programming 
072 Preparation of the annual rotting stock repairs programme. ... 
ID C3 
073 Preparation of the annual rotting stock maintenance programme. 0 
074 C1 Preparation of the annual programme of materials/ spare parts purchases for . . rotting stock repairs ............ 1-: 1 0 
0750 Preparation of the annual programme of materiaLs/spare parts purchases for rotting stock maintenance ............. 
Performance Monitoring 
o76 C] Repairs quaLity controt by type of rotting stock ...... .. 
1: 1 ID 
o77 Cl Maintenance quaLity controL by type of rotting stock .... .. 
Cl 13 
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Activities Related to the I Traction/Rol ling stock' sub-system (continued) 
don't know 
I am responsibLe is who is 
activity responsibLe ... (ffLL in) responsfbte 
13 
12 
11 
3 
07 8 Monitoring the development of the repairs programme ....... 
[I 
07 9 Monf toring the development of the maintenance programme ..... 
C3 
08 0 rI Monitoring the availability of materiats/spare parts in workshops [: ] 
08 1 C] Monitoring the availability of materfals/spare parts in depots 
08 2 (D Monitoring the quality of sub-contracted work (e. g. 
vehicle cleaning) ....... ................. 
08 3 rI Monitoring the development of rolling stock repairs expenditure. 
08 4 C] Monitoring the development of roll. stock maintenance expenditure 
08 5 Monitoring the development of fueL/tubricants expenditure .... 
0a 6 Monitoring the performance of the rolling stock repairs 
staff ............ .................. 
08 7 Monitor f ng the performance of the rolling stock maintenance 
staff ............ .................. 
_____ 0 
______ 0 
______ 0 
______ 0 
EI 
0 
0 
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14.4. Activities Related to the 'Permanent Way' sub-system 
activity 
don't know 
I am responsible is who is 
responsible ... (fiLL in) responsible 
Cl 
203 
1. Research and Development 
088 (3 Monitoring technotogicat devetopment in track subgrade 
and structure issues ...................... 
0 C] 
089 C] Monitoring technotogicat devetopment In tunnets, bridges 
and constructions issues .................... 
C1 
090 Monitoring technotogicat devetopment in terminaLs issues 
(buitdings, accessibitity, sidings, track tayout) ........ 
091 Monitoring devetopment in organizing and managing 
civit engineering projects ................... 
2. Planning-organizing 
092 (3 Definition of the track maintenance regime 
(methods, rules, etc. ) ..................... 13 0 
093 C3 Definition of the maintenance regime for tunnels, bridges, 
rd constructions (methods, rules, etc. ) ............ 
094 
: 
efinition of the maintenance regime for Iron constructions 
(methods, rules, etc. ) ..................... 
095 Definition of the terminals maintenance regime 
(methods, rules, etc. ) ..................... 
0 0 
096 Preparation of studies for track subgrade maintenance/renewal 
or construction of new subgrade (new Lines, doubling, etc. ) ... 0 
097 C3 Preparation of studies for track maintenance/renewat or 
laying of new track (new Lines, doubling, etc. ) ......... 
C3 
o98 F1 Preparation of studies for maintenance/construction of 
bridges, tunnels and other civil engineering constructions ... 
099 F1 Preparation of studies for construction/extention/maintenance 
of stations and other buildings ................. 
100 CD Identification of requirements In machinery/toots/equipment 
for track construction/renewal/maintenance ........... 
10 10 Identification of requirements in machinery/toots/equipment 
for tunnels/bridges/etc. construction/maintenance ........ 0 
102 [] Identification of requirements In machinery/tools/equipment 
for buildings construction/extention/maintenance ........ 
103 C] Identification of requirements in materials for track 
construction/renewal/maintenance ................ 0 
104 C] Identification of requirements In materials for tunnets/bridges/ 
etc. construction/maintenance .................. 
105 (D Identification of requirements in materials for buildings 
construction/extention/maintenance ............... 
3. Annual Programming 
106 (D Preparation of the annual programme of track and permanent Installations renewal/maintenance ................ 
107 C3 Preparation of the annual programme of new constructions in track and permanent installations .............. 13 
13 
Appendix C -334- Survey Questionnaire 
Activities Related to. the 'Permanent Way$ sub-system' (continued) 
don't know 
I am responsible is who is 
activity responsible ... MU in) responsible 
11 
112 
11 
3 
108 [] Preparation of the annual programme of purchases of machinery/ 
equipment, for track and installations maintenance/renewaL 
109[: ]Preparation of the annual programme of purchases of materials. 
for track and installations maintenance/renewaL ......... 
4. Performance Monitoring, 
10 Monitoring the condition of the track and the quaLity of 
renewaL/maintenance works .................... 
11 Monitoring the condition of tunnets/bridges/constructions 
and the quality of renewat/maintenance works .......... 
1 12 C1 Monitoring the condition of stations and other buildings 
and the quality of renewat/extention/maintenance works ..... 
1 13 [3 Monitoring the quality of Large projects, undertaken by third 
i r] part es (tunneLs, large buildings, etc. ) ............ 0 
I I 4n Monitoring the development of the annual programme of track and permanent Installations renewal/maintenance ...... 13 C1 
1 15n Monitoring the development of the annual programme of 
new constructions ........................ 0 
1 16 C3 Monitoring the availability of materials/tools in units ..... 13 
1 17(: ] Monitoring the development of expenditure In track and 
permanent installations renewat/maintenance works ........ 0 
1 18 rl Monitoring the development of expenditure in track and permanent Installations new constructions projects ....... 13 
1 19 Monitoring the performance of the track and permanent installations renewat/maintenance works staff .......... 13 C1 
1 20 Monitoring the performance of the track and permanent 
Installations new works projects staff ............. 
13 0 
Appendix C -335- Survey Questionnaire 
14.5. Activities Related to the 'Signalling/Telecoms, sub-system 
activity 
1. Research and Development 
don't know 
I am responsibte is who is 
responsibte ... (fitt in) responsibte 
1: 1 
12M3 
121 C1 Monitoring technological development in railway signalling 
Issues ............................. 
El 13 
122 Monitoring technological development in telecommunications 
networks issues (telephones, radiotelephones, etc. ) ....... 
123 Monitoring technological development in railway central 
traffic control issues ..................... 
124 C] Monitoring technological development in LeveL crossings 
keeping issues . ... ...................... 
125 (] Monitoring development in organizing and managing mechanical 
and electrical engineering projects ............... 
2. Planning-organizing 
Definition of characteristics of SfgnalLing system 
126 [3 SeLection of signalLing system ................. 
Cl 0 
127 Definition of the way of instaLLation of signaLLing system .... 
13 C3 
128 Definition of maintenance regime of signaLLing system ...... 
0 Cl 
Definition of characteristics of Tetecommunicatfons, system 
129 C] Selection of telecommunications system ............. 
130 (] Definition of the way of installation of telecommunications system[: ] 
131 C] Definition of maintenance regime of telecommunications system C] 
Definition of characteristics of CentraL Traffic Controt system 
132 SeLection of centrat traffic controL system ........... 
133 Definition of way of instaLLation of centrat. traffic controL 
system ............................. 
134 C] Definition of maintenance regime'o'f centrat traffic controt 
system ............................. 
Definition of characteristics of teveL crossings keeping system 
135 Setection of tevet 
'crossings keeping'system ........... 
13 
136 Definition of way of InstatLation of LeveL crossings keeping 
system ............................. Cl 
137(: ]Definition of maintenance regime of teveL crossings keeping 
system ............................. 
38 rl Identification of requirements in tools/materials/spare parts for the maintenance of signalling system ............ 
39 C3 Identification of requirements In tools/materiats/spare parts for the maintenance of telecommunications system ........ 
140 C3 Identification of requirements in tools/materials/spare parts for the maintenance of central traffic control system ...... 
13 0 
Appendix C -336- Survey Questionnaire 
Activities Related to the 'Signalling/Telecoms' sub-system (continued) 
don't know 
I am responsibLe is who is 
activity responsibLe ... (ML in) responsibLe 
ID 
12 
1-: 1 
3 
141 C] Identification of requirements in tools/materiaLs/spare parts 
for the maintenance of LeveL crossings keeping system. 
3. Annual Programming 
142 Preparation of the annual programme of signalling system 
maintenance ........................... 
143 Preparation of the annual programme of telecommunications 
system naintenance ....................... 
C3 
144 Preparation of the annual programme of central traffic 
control system naintenance ................... 
145 Preparation of the annual programme of Level crossings 
keeping system maintenance ................... 
146 Preparation of the annual programme of new signalling 
systems Installation ...................... 
147 rj Preparation of the annual programme of new telecommunication 
systems installation ...................... 
148[: ] Preparation of the annual programme of new central traffic 
control systems installation .................. 
149 rl Preparation of the annual programme of new level crossings 
keeping systems installation .................. 
4. Performance Monitoring 
50 rl Monitoring the condition of signalling systems and the 
quality of maintenance works .................. 
51 C] Monitoring the condition of telecommunications systems and 
the quality of maintenance works ................ 
52 Monitoring the condition of central traffic control systems 
and the quaLity of maintenance works .............. 
153 Monitoring the condition of Level crossings keeping systems 
and the quality of maintenance works .............. 
54 C] Monitoring the quality of Large projects, undertaken by 
third parties (installation of new signalling, etc. systems) 
1 55n Monitoring the expenditure of the signalling system 
(maintenance, operation) .................... 
1 56 C] Monitoring the expenditure of the telecommunications 
system (maintenance, operation) ................. 
1 57[: ]Monitoring the expenditure of the central traffic control 
system (maintenance, operation) ................. 
1 58 C] Monitoring the expenditure of the level crossings keeping 
system (maintenance, operation) ................. 
J 59 Monitoring the expenditure of large projects, undertaken by third parties (installation of new systems) ......... 
1 60 monitoring the availability of signalling maintenance materials/tools/spare parts ................... 
1 61 Monitoring the availability of telecommunications maintenance 
materiats/tools/spare parts ................... 
Appendix C -337- Survey Questionnaire 
Activities Related to the 'Signalling/Telecomso sub-system (continued) 
don't know 
I am responsible Is who Is 
activity responsible ... MLL in) responsible 
11 ri 
16 2 Monitoring the avaitabitity of centrat traffic controt system 
maintenance materiaLs/tools/spare parts ............. 
Cl Cl 
16 3 Monitoring the performance of the sIgnaLLing system 
maintenance staff ..... .. .. ............... 
16 4 rl Monitoring the performance of the teLecommunications system 
maintenance staff ..... .. .. ............... 
Cl ID 
16 5 rl Monitoring the performance of the Levet crossings keeping 
systems staff ....... .. .. ............... 
ID 
16 6 C] Monitoring the performance of the signatLing operating 
staff ........... .. .. ............... 
Cl 
16 7 C] Monitoring the performance of the centraL traffic controL 
system operating staff .. .. .. ............... 
16 8 rl Monitoring the performance of the LeveL crossings keeping 
staff .......... .. . ................ 
Appendix C -338- Survey Questionnaire 
activity I page 
SECTION FOUR: INFORMATION FLOWS 
15. For each activity of Section Three (Analysis of Activities), 
for which you noted that you are responsible, fill in this 
section. 
(FiLL one copy for each activity). 
TItLe of Activity: Code of Activity: 
15.1. Where from you receive information when performing this activity ? 
(write down any kind of information, I. e.: directions. etc., receiving from superiors. 
- reports, etc., receiving from subordinates. 
direct information, received through personaL Investigation of 
the environment, the company's operations, etc. ) 
outside the RaRways cl 1 
From Top Management Cl 2 
From FunctionaL Management r7l 3 
From RegionaL Management Cl 4 
From RegionaL DivislonaL Management c, 
From Area Management Cl 6 
From Foremen, Stationmasters an other OperationaL r' 7 
Specify: 
Specify: 
Specify: 
Specify: 
Specify: 
Specify: 
Specify: 
JLS. 2. For each origin of information you mentioned, fill the table below: 
origin of 
information: 
nformation Not 
Written yes- no 
Written, 
not Processed yes no 
[] 
Written, 
Processed yes 
0 
no 
(verbal, 
visit , etc. ) 
2 (reports, directions, 1 
publications, etc. ) 
2 (data tables, 
graphs, etc) 
12 
; pecify: 
[nformation 
teceipt per per per per per per per per per per per per per per ! per per per per 
'requency day week month quarte r 1/2year year day week month quarter 1/2year year day week mont h quarter 1/2year year 
rick a box: 13 
1 
13 
2 
11 
3 
13 
4 
13 C El 00 00 13 13 1: 1 13 6 
information 
)uaLity 
totally 
ade- ade- 
almost. 
ade- inade- 
totally 
Inade- 
totally almost 
ade- ade- ade- inade- 
totally 
Inade- 
totally 
ade- ade- 
almost 
ade- 
totally 
Inade- inade- 
quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate 
rick a box: 
2 
1: 1 
3 
F1 
4 
1: 1 
5 1 
13 0 C3 1: 1 
3 13 4 135 
Appendix C -339- Survey Questionnaire 
activity I page 2 
origin of 
Information: 
information Not Written, 
E3 
Written, 
Type Written yes no not Processed yesE] no Processed yes no 
(verbal, 12 (reports, directions, 12 (data tables, 12 
visit , etc. ) publications, etc. ) graphs, etc) 
specify: II 
Information 
Receipt per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per 
Frequency day week month quarter 1/2year year day week month quarter 1/2year year day week month quarter 1/2year year 
Tick a box: 11 1: 1 Q 1: 1 1: 1 ID ED El El rl C) Cl 1: 1 rl Cl Cl 
4 
ID 
5 
1: 1 
6 
Information tota(ty almost totatty totatty atmost totatty totatty atmost totatty 
Quatity ade- ade- ade- Inade- inade- ade- ade- ade- inade- Inade- ade- ade- ade- Inade- Inade- 
quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate 
Tick a box: 11 EI 1: 1 EI 13 EI EI El EI EI 13 1: 1 EI 13 0 
origin of 
information: 
Information Not Written, Written, 
Type Written yes C] no not Processed yes no [] Processed yes no C] (verbal, 2 (reports, directions, 12 (data tables, 12 
visit , etc. ) publications, etc. ) graphs, etc) 
specify: I 
information 
Receipt per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per 
Frequency day week month quarter 1/2year year day week month quarter 1/2year year day week month quarter 1/2year year 
Tick a box: C] 
1 
11 
203041: 
1 
5 
13 
61 
ID 
1 
11 
2 
11 
3 
ID 
4 
11 
5 
11 
61 
CD 
I 
C3 
203 
E] 
4 
E3 
5 
C] 
6 
Information totatty atmost tota(LY totaLLY aLmost totaLty totatLy aLmost totatty 
Quatity ade- ade- ade- inade- inade- ade- ade- ade- inade- inade- ade- ade- ade- inade- Inade- 
quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate 
Tick a box: EI [3 1: 1 1: 1 1: 1 EI 13 13 13 1: 1 
3 
1: 1 
4 
1: ) 
5 2345123451 
Appendix C -340- Survey Questionnaire 
activity I page 3 
15.3. What do you think about the total information you receive, 
concerning this activity ? 
(Tick the appropriate box). is is is 
absolutely adequate almost 
adequate adequate 
123 
Is is 
inadequate absolutety 
inadequate 
45 
15.4. Where do you send information when performing this activity ? 
(write down any kind of information, Le.: 
- directions. etc., to subordinates, 
- reports, etc., to superiors, . 
- direct information, received through personat Investigation of 
the environment, the company's operations, etc. ) 
outside the Raitways 1: 11 
To Top Management 02 
To FunctionaL Management 3 
To RegionaL Management 4 
To Regional. Divisionat. Management 5 
To Area Management 6 
To Foremen, Stationmasters an other OperationaL 7 
Specify: 
Specify: 
Specify: 
Specify: 
Spec ify: 
Specify: 
Specify: 
15.5. For each destination of information you mentioned, fill the table 
below: 
information 
Destination: 
information Not Written, Written, 
Type Written yes C] no not Processed yes C] no C] Processed yes 
C] no C] 
(verbal, 1 21 (reports, directions, I 21(data tables, 12 
1 
visit , etc. ) publications, etc. ) graphs, etc) 
specify: 
informatfon 
Sending per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per 
Frequency day week month quarter 1/2year year day week month quarter 1/2year year day week month quarter 1/2year year 
Tick a box: 13 Cl [1 [3 (3 cl cl 13 [1 [D [3 [3 [3 cl 0 13 
6 
Information totatLy a(most totatty totatty atmost totatty totatty atmost tota(ty 
QuaLlty ade- ade- ade- Inade- Inade- ade- ade- ade- Inade- inade- ade- ade- ade- Inade- Inade- 
quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate 
ck a box: 1: 1 EI 1-3 1: 1 EI EI 11 EI C [3 E3 1: 1 EI 11 EI 
Appendix C -341- Survey Questionnaire 
activity i page 4 
information 
Destination: 
information Not - Written, Written, 
Type Written yes no not Processed yes 
C] 
no 
[] Processed yes no 
(verbaL, 1 21 (reports, directions, 12 (data tabLes, 
visit , etc. ) pubLications, etc. ) graphs, etc) 
Specify: 
information 
Sending per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per 
Frequency day week month quarter 1/2year year day week month quarter 1/2year year day week month quarter 1/2year year 
Tick a box: C3 
1 
13 
2030000 
El C3 0 C3 D" Cl C3 2 
1: 1 
3 
C3 
40506 
Information totatty atmost totatty totatty a(most totatty tota(ty atmost totatty 
QuaLlty ade- ade- ade- Inade- Inade- ade- ade- ade- Inade- Inade- ade- ade- ade- Inade- inade- 
quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate 
Tick a box: 
information 
Destination: 
information Not Written, Written, 
Type Written yes no not Processed yes no Processed yes no (verbal, 12 (reports, directions, 21(data tables, 2 
visit , etc. ) publications, etc. ) graphs, etc) 
specify: 
informatlon 
Sending per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per per 
frequency day week month quarter 1/2year year day week month quarter 1/2year year day week month quarter 1/2year year 
Tf ck a box: Cl, 
1 
13 
2 
1: 1 
3D4 
13 
5 
13 
6 
11 
1 
13 
2 
13 
3 
1: 1 13 11 0 Cl 0 1-1 
4 
1: 1 
5 
13 
6 
information tota , Ity almost totally totally almost totally totally almost totally 
aual, I tY ade- ade- ade- inade- inade- ade- ade- ade- inade- inade- ade- ade- ade- inade- inade- 
quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate quate 
lick a box: ID C] 
2 
ri 
3 
El 
4 
1: 1 
5 
Appendix C -342- Survey Questionnaire 
activity 1 page 5 
15.6. What do you think about the total information you send, 
concerning this activity ? 
(Tick the appropriate box). is Is is is is 
absotutely adequate atmost Inadequate absotutety 
adequate adequate inadequate 
00 11 11 11 
1234 
APPENDIX D 
SURVEY DATA 
This appendix contains all data collected during the survey within the case study, 
that is: 
Managerial responses to Questions 3-12 (Table DI) and Question 13 (Table D2) of 
Section Two of the Survey, Questionnaire. This material is discussed in Chapter 11. 
Managerial responses to the accountability allocation questions of the Survey 
Questionnaire (Question 14, Section Three), referring to managerial activities at 
Corporate Level (Table D3, Question 14.1), activities of the Operations system 
(Table D4, Question 14.2), the Rolling Stock system (Table D5, Question 14.3), the 
Permanent Way system (Table D6, Question 14.4. ) and the Signalling & 
Telecommunications system (Table D7, Question 14.5). This material was used in 
Chapter 10, for the construction of the VSM of the enterprise. 
- Managerial responses relating to information exchange associated with managerial 
activities and corresponding to the information flows questions of the Survey 
Questionnaire (Question 15, Section Four). This material is contained in Table D8, 
extending over 19 pages, and was partly utilised in the information network 
discussion of the last part of Chapter 10. 
Appendix D -344- Survey Data 
object task contrib pbf view opin journ reason 
ýSponclent Lur 
adq 
1234567 1234567 1234567 ngb 1234 123456789 123 12-3456789 
2123433 3255454 5234243 565 2324 233233332 124 241235354 
2 2244554 3354354 2333443 361 2445 342223333 345 223322333 
3 2243444 5254545 0023433 665 1254 242324443 453 123344355 
6 2244554 3354354 2333443 331 2445 342223333 345 223322333 
8 2444554 5345455 3200030 365 1255 232213232 365 242324445 
9 1142454 3455555 4353435 244 1234 222222233 222 125554114 
11 5544242 5334344 3200340 366 1334 333323222 354 414344224 
12 3221341 4555555 4440442 263 2333 22221222 333 24432323 
13 5554554 2243541 256 1200 2323333 364 332 
15 2242444 5555555 5555555 266 1112 232222211 565 11 4'4 4424 
16 2244444 3355555 0000000 266 2222 132112211 666 444432233 
17 2242444 5555555 5500000 266 1112 232222211 565 11444424 
18 1441442 2255555 3300020 232 1444 222123232 133 224444223 
19 2242444 5355555 5411122 261 2222 353222332 666 224443234 
20 2122352 3355545 4432422 211 1525 222232 556 224422124 
21 2223342 5455555 2251523 333 3555 252455 244 42344223 
22 2224451 5355555 3000040 221 1333 222 464 2444524 
23 2223222 4555555 0000000 224 1244 2112233 663 424144234 
24 4444455 3254455 0013444 255 3345 3113333 336 224444244 
25 3224432 4455555 3143524 362 4345 32123332 266 222444244 
26 2454444 4244544 3111411 331 3334 333223333 255 222233233 
27 3343342 2254344 2054444 255 3445 444333333 444 133333233 
28 4444443 0055555 0055253 231 2553 3323323 366 244442244 
29 1555555 2555153 2133331 225 3555 243323333 136 144433314 
30 4354454 3333333 252 2345 13222233 666 224342233 
31 22424 3355555 2104033 264 1333 233222232 464 224444344 
34 1232444 3355453 5454445 251 4444 455435444 564 443414224 
35 4443443 5554444 3322220 321 2424 343333443 266 323242211 
36 2232452 5553443 3333232 351 1445 242222232 3'6 6 212223222 
37 4422541 5355555 3533133 251 2232 332223333 142 124422224 
38 4111512 4255555 1155555 366 5555 222213433 364 114444454 
39 3112344 5354444 0100540 311 3533 24225544 156 212223235 
40 3442344 5555555 0011110 411 3333 4333333 266 222234244 
41 4222452 3354444 3342422 332 4432 232213323 166 213224434 
42 3242344 0055455 0000130 631 1111 333222232 166 112555235 
43 1141554 5255555 2111120 236 1111 112112222 662 254444333 
44 1141554 5255555 2111120 236 1111 112112222 662 254444333 
46 1111555 2155455 1211231 566 1151 245222233 442 111112112 
47 4444233 4455555 3313443 321 5555 442224442 664 222224224 
48 3333243 1144443 1123433 321 3333 333333333 662 311234225 
49 3222452 
4222552 
4353343 
5 
2211311 233 3222 223233332 661 343224243 
50 
51 4251551 
555555 
2155 
2232332 234 1122 333333333 551 33323333 
11 
355 1210120 433 4523 243334333 662 232244224 
52 52 
244244 
5354444 2343322 241 1334 233232333 265 223322123 
53 
4 2554455 
0055555 5552452 353 1223 442222222 263 423234224 
5 
57 2542455 
0255555 
2455554 
0250530 441 2345 342213333 365 222455455 
58 5544513 0555125 
4354013 
5550030 
221 
651 
1233 
3555 
52222333 
3423355 
466 
265 
244432223 
555232515 
59 
0 
3244342 
1111443 
5533254 00505 541 1445 333333 463 442233223 
6 55555 400530 224 1233 1222222 166 334343333 
Table DI: Survey Questionnaire, Section Two: Questions 3-12: Managers' Responses 
Appendix D -345- Survey Data 
as 
I 
method 
iponden 
improved 
quatity of 
services 
9fIw 
a 
rnFeso 
m 
eG 
0evk 
vIcr 
ruy 
9a3eoi 
it 
ct2n rc 
oa it r ahnIe Iet01a 
0aIr10s n? nne nsggss 
4712536 
2347156 
2531476 
2347156 
2514367 
32145 
2534176 
5613427 
12 
5764231 
5764231 
1726534 
1534276 
6 73 1254 
5417632 
7653142 
1723465 
4765231 
6472135 
1723465 
1627354 
1725643 
2 73 4156 
6752143 
1524376 
214 73 65 
654327 
561347 
1345267 
6712345 
735264 
5614327 
1346275 
7561234 
12 
12 
6714523 
1324567 
2176453 
1723465 
4762135 
6521473 
7521364 
1435267 
2714635 
7653124 
2176 
4732165 
6751243 
resources 
optfmum 
utitization 
ms Ww 
rnfeso 
oivtkr 
r 
gu 
IV 
Icy 
ne0f 
ctn rc 
Ia0aIr 
ahnnIte 
eat r3 Ia 
r10 
0A 
In 
nn 
nsg? gss 
2736145 
2347156 
1426735 
2347156 
2614357 
1743265 
4612537 
5 74 1236 
213 
5764321 
5764321 
2643157 
1543276 
6732145 
3714265 
7643152 
3512467 
5726341 
1234657 
1723465 
1726354 
5712634 
3752146 
4612357 
3147265 
654327 
721356 
3621754 
735264 
5614327 
3247165 
7452136 
12 
12 
6712345 
1324567 
2156734 
1723465 
6732154 
7521364 
7521364 
1452367 
2715634 
6713245 
1276 
5743126 
2314657 
improved 
systems 
cooperation 
ý M, Iws rnPeSo e90ct 
0evkr 
r 
9uvcy 
a01 
n?, It 
00 
n trc 
zIr 
ahanonolt Ie0t01: 
0AIr10 n? nn 
ns9gss 
1425367 
2347156 
3412576 
2347156 
1425367 
1723465 
1324567 
3425 
12 
2614357 
2614357 
1526347 
1453276 
3712654 
1726345 
76 21354 
4523167 
2765341 
2314576 
1723465 
1726354 
1432576 
5732146 
1324567 
2147365 
265437 
2731465 
6712345 
735264 
5614327 
1243576 
1243567 
12 
12 
34i2576 
1324567 
2476135 
1623475 
6732145 
6431275 
3412567 
1432567 
2715634 
1725346 
127 
1324576 
improved 
subsystem 
rotting stock 
ms 
EIIw 
rnFeso 
eg0C 
0evKr 
r 
gU 
IV 
ICy 
a01 
7?: tn trC 
za0a1r 
ahnnIe te7r7: 
10 Annne 
nsg? gss 
2416357 
2347156 
5712634 
2347156 
1324567 
2734156 
4653217 
52134 
21354 
2631457 
1453276 
4523167 
2756341 
1324567 
1723465 
1726354 
76 12345 
4732156 
3247165 
465327 
721365 
1523467 
735264 
5614327 
7653124 
12 
12 
1324567 
2176453 
1723546 
4321576 
7521364 
1543267 
2715634 
6734215 
13256 
6745123 
1235467 
improved 
subsystem 
permanent way 
91 
MS 
aFes WO 
rn 
eg 
0evkr 
ry 
9Uc 
ane0 tn 
crc It 
za0ar 
ahnnIe Ie7t0a 
0Ar10s nfnne 
nsggss 
3215467 
2347156 
5621743 
2347156 
6734125 
12345 
3541267 
2631457 
1453276 
5 73 2164 
2516374 
7643152 
4523167 
5746231 
3615274 
1723465 
1726354 
2713654 
4732156 
3247165 
654327 
412367 
1523467 
735264 
5614327 
7236154 
6542137 
1324567 
2176453 
1723456 
6732154 
7521346 
7521364 
1432567 
2715634 
2134567 
improved 
subsystem 
signatting/tcm 
RIIw 
m 
a 
rn? eS'of 
e 
oivtkr 
r 
gU 
IV 
IcY 
ane0f 
in Ictn trc 
za001r 
ahnnIte 
e0t018 
Ir10s 10 An? 
nne 
nsggSs 
3625147 
2347156 
6742153 
2347156 
1234567 
13245 
6431257 
2631457 
1534276 
4523167 
5736241 
1723465 
1726354 
7612345 
4732156 
3247165 
234567 
721365 
1743256 
735264 
5614327 
6542137 
12 
12 
1324567 
2175463 
1623475 
7412365 
7521364 
2715634 
11523467 
Table D2: Survey Questionnaire, Section Two: Question 13: Managers' Responm,, t 
Appendix D -346- 
Survey Data 
Frequencies of Managers' Answers to the Question "Who Is Responsible for This Actfv! tY 
r a S p0 n si b Las 
NUMBER 
ACTIVITY 
OF 
MANAGERS A A A A EDEMY n 
k 
INTER- I am A G G G G D ADPKIRXTS 
VIEWED S M M M M 0D DD D DDDD D LPYIGSSSYM 
K D G E G E P ME EED N 00EI A DDLMEETPTIIGGHH n 0w 
E S M K R L R PT MLG E YEEP P PDDKRKHAYAARREE a tn 
001 6 1 3 2 5 
002 6 1 5 2 2 
003 6 1 2 4 
004 6 1 1 6 2 
005 6 2 1 5 1 2 
006 9 1 2 1 62 6 
007 9 1 2 2 3 
008 9 1 6 2 
009 9 1 3 3 '2 3 1 
010 9 2 2 2 3 32 2 
Oil 9 1 1 2 7 
012 10 1 3 9 
013 9 1 1 8 
014 9 1 1 1 a 
015 12 3 1 3 71 2 
016 12 2 2 2 61 3 
017 9 1 3 6 1 
018 9 1 2 5 1 
019 10 2 1 3 1 7 
020 10 2 1 3 1 7 
021 10 1 2 1 7 
022 8 3 2 3 7 1 1 
023 8 1 1 224 
ASKE 2 Representative Assembly for Social Control 
DS 2 Board 
GM a General Manager 
AGM = Assistant General Manager (EK: Operations, GR: Track & Signalling, EL: Rolling Stock, PR: Personnel Finance) 
DOMP = Department of Organization and Planning 
DET Z Department of Operations (Technical) 
DEM Department of Operations (Commercial) 
DEL Department of Traction 
DG Department of Permanent Way 
DNE Department of New Projects 
DOY Department of Financial Affairs 
DOE a Department of Financial Control 
DEE x Department of Receipts Control 
DIP x Department of Tenders and Purchases 
DAP a Department of Stores 
DP x Department of Personnel 
DD a Department of Clerical Affairs 
ALLD U ALL Heads of Departments 
MK a Computer Department (reports to DOMP) 
DPER Z Regional Managers (DPA: Athens Region, DPTh: Thessaloniki Region, DPP: Peloponnese Region) 
YEK U Regional Functional Managers, Operations 
EPITH a Area Managers, Operations 
KGPA x Train Crew Controllers, operations 
DISTY a Department of Mechanical Engineering 
EgSIA a Workshop Managers 
M)CSIA Z Depot Managers 
YGR Z Regional Functional Managers, Permanent Way 
yMGR Area Managers, Permanent Way 
, ySTHE Manager, Signalling, Telecommunications and Electrical installations 
TTHE Regional Managers, Signalling, Telecommunications and Electrical Installations 
Table DI Survey Questionnaire, Section Three: Activities nos. 1-23: Managers' Responses 
Appendix D -347- Survey Data 
Frequencies of Managers' Answers to the Question "Who Is ResponsibLe for This Activity 
ACTIVITY 
024 
025 
026 
027 
028 
029 
030 
031 
032 
033 
034 
035 
036 
037 
038 
039 
040 
041 
042 
043 
044 
045 
046 
047 
048 
049 
050 
051 
052 
053 
054 
055 
056 
057 
058 
059 
060 
Table D4: Survey Questionnaire, Section Three: Activities nos. 24-60: Managers' Responses 
NUMBER 
OF 
MANAGERS 
INTER- 
VIEWED 
8 
8 
21 
25 
21 
23 
15 
15 
15 
15 
25 
24 
24 
27 
27 
27 
15 
15 
25 
15 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
18 
22 
11 
18 
17 
11 
II 
I am 
7 
S 
6 
8 
6 
7 
6 
responsIbI. eIS 
A A A A E DEM y 
A G G G G D A D P K IRX T S T 
s M M M M 0DDD DDDDDDL P YI G SSS YM T T 
KDG E G E P MEEED N00EIADDLM E ET P TII GG H H 
ESM K R L R PTMLG EYEEPPPDDK R KH A YAA RR E E 
3 44 
1 4 3 2 
14 
2 34 
12 1 1 1 5 3 1 
2 15 2 14 7 
91 14 1 2 1 
1 16 1 2 2 2 2 1 
97 4 3 1 
9 10 4 2 1 
13 1 
13 1 1 1 
2 17 5 3 7 1 1 
2 12 10 3 3 5 
1 75 11 7 1 1 
1 12 10 3 3 1 1 
1 12 1 15 3 1 1 2 
1 16 1 5 2 5 6 1 1 
11 2 1 1 2 1 
8 1 1 8 1 
6 19 1 1 1 4 4 1 
7 1 2 2 4 1 1 1 
4 27 1 4 1 
4 27 1 5 1 
2 8 32 1 1 1 
2 8 32 1 1 1 
1 6 2 2 
1 6 2 2 1 
1 6 2 2 1 
91 4 5 1 
92 6 6 1 
11 1 3 5 1 
4 1 3 4 1 
422 9 7 1 1 
3 1 5 10 1 
2 5 5 3 
2 5 5 1 
n 
0 
0 
n 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Appendix D -348- Survey Data 
Frequencies of Managers' Answers to the Question "Who Is ResponsibLe for This Activity ? 11 
ACTIVITY1 
061 
062 
063 
064 
065 
066 
067 
068 
069 
070 
071 
072 
073 
074 
075 
076 
077 
078 
079 
080 
081 
082 
083 
084 
085 
086 
087 
NUMBER 
OF 
MANAGERS1 
INTER- 
VIEWED 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
12 
12 
10 
11 
11 
I am I 
5 
5 
r e s p 0 n sib L e s 
AA A A E D E M y n k 
AGG G G D A D PK I R X T ST o n 
sMM M M 0 DD D D DD DDDL P YIG s s s YM TT 0 n0 
KDGEG E P M EE E DN 00 EIADDL ME ETP T I I GG HH n ow 
ESMKR L R P TM L GE YE EPPP0D KR KHA Y A A RR EE e tn 
3 
2 9 4 
10 
11 
8 4 
3 
4 
25 
25 
1 1 
1 1 3 
1 1 3 
1 5 1 
2 
2 
32 
32 
2 
1 
32 
0 
02 
0 
0 
92 
82 
01 
02 
91 
912 
612 
3 
83 
73 
i 
f 
Table D5: Survey Questionnaire, Section Three: Activities nos. 61-87: Managers' Responses 
Appendix D -349- Survey Data 
ACTIVITY 
088 
089 
090 
091 
092 
093 
094 
095 
096 
097 
098 
099 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
III 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
JIB 
119 
120 
NUMBER 
OF 
MANAGERS 
INTER- 
VIEWED 
9 
8 
12 
9 
12 
11 
12 
11 
15 
16 
17 
16 
12 
14 
11 
12 
13 
11 
14 
17 
14 
14 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
13 
15 
16 
15 
15 
Frequencies of Managers' Answers to the Question "Who Is ResponsibLe for This Activity 71, 
r e s p0n s ib t e I S 
A A AA E D E M Y n k 
am AG G GG D A D PK I R X T ST o n 
SM M MM 0 DDD DDDD D DL P YIG S S S Y M TT 0 n0 
KDGE G EP M EEE DN00E I ADDL ME ETP T I I G G HH n 0w 
ESMK R LR P TML GEYEE P PPDD KR KHA Y A A R R EE e tn 
3 95 
4 38 
4 10 7 10 
3 65 1 
1 
1 
2 
11 
1 
1 
1 
4 14 
11 9 
7 13 
15 8 
10 
11 1 
7 
10 
10 
7 
9 
8 10 
1 
3 
49 
0 
12 
9 
72 
482 
7 
49 
3 
8 4 
8 5 
9 5 
9 5 
11 7 
8 5 
13 7 
9 6 
11 7 
11 7 
9 6 
9 8 
9 8 
9 4 
9 7 
5 
7 2 
5 4 
1 
9 7 
6 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
11 
Table D6: Survey Questionnaire, Section Three: Activities nos. 88-120: Managers' Responses 
Appendix D -350- Survey Data 
NUMBER 
OF 
MANAGERS 
INTER- 
VIEWED 
Frequencies of Managers' Answers to the Question "Who Is ResponsibLe for This Activity 711 
IACTIVITY 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
re 
A A A A E DEM y 
am A G G G G D A D P K IRX T S T 
s M M N M 0 DDDDDDDDDL P YI G SSS YM T T 
KDG E G E P M EEEDN00EIADDLM E ET P TII GG H, H 
ESM K R L R P TMLGEYEEPPPDDK R KH A YAA RR E E 
3 4 
1 3 4 
4 3 
3 8 6 
1 3 
4 4 
2 5 
1 1 3 
1 3 4 
1 4 
1 2 
5 2 
3 
2 
9 2 4 26 
6 4 3 38 1 
4 1 4 3 10 1 
5 1 
5 1 
5 1 
3 4 49 2 
5 1 
5 1 
5 1 
2 2 10 1 
1 2 1 2 2 
1 2 3 
1 3 2 1 
11 6 5 24 1 
2 4 2 
1 4 1 
2 4 1 
1 1 29 4 
4 1 
4 
4 
3 
2 3 57 3 
2 1 
4 2 
4 2 
1 2 4 11 5 
3 1 
3 1 
1 1 2 18 3 
3 1 
2 1 
6 83 
0 
0 
n 
e 
1 
k 
n 
no 
0w 
tn 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Table D7: Survey Qu 
lestionnaire, 
Section Three: Activities nos. 121-168: Managers' Responses 
Appendix D -351- Survey Data 
information from information to 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- c ffq ffq ffq c ffq ffq ffq 
o UNIT oru oru 0ru 0 UNIT 0ru oru 0ru page of 19 
DENT d rea rea rea d rea rea rea 
e mqL mqL mqL e mqL mqt mqL 
1 2 2 05 173 372 2 05 273 
3 2 2 05 362 2 05 263 
4 3 3 15 133 343 1 82 132 352 
3 a 81 122 243 2 03 132 342 
5 3 2 03 132 
3 3 61 1,2 3 232 342 1 82 132 352 
3 8 81 132 232 2 03 342 
8 1 85 161 1 85 161 
8 3 
. 
61 351 3 61 351 
6 Is 3 10 252 
15 3 20 252 
15 3 24 252 
15 3 29 252 
15 3 31 252 
15 1 86 241 352 2 04 241 
15 1 87 241 352 2 05 241 
7 15 1 84 232 
15 1 85 232 1 85 232 
15 1 87 232 2 32 232 
15 2 04 232 
8 15 1 84 232 
15 1 85 232 1 85 232 
15 1 87 232 2 32 232 
15 2 04 232 
9 15 2 04 232 
15 3 32 232 
15 1 85 242 1 85 232 
15 2 04 232 1 84 232 
10 2 2 05 373 2 05 273 
15 2 04 232 
15 3 32 232 
15 1 85 242 1 85 232 
15 2 04 232 1 84 232 
11 16 2 05 332 
16 1 85 262 1 85 142 242 342 
16 3 32 142 252 352 3 32 232 
16 4 33 252 4 33 232 
12 19 1 85 263 1 85 261 
19 2 04 153 242 2 04 241 341 
19 3 33 241 341 
19 3 32 243 3 32 241 341 
13 16 2 05 332 
, 16 1 85 262 1 85 142 242 342 
16 3 32 142 252 352 3 32 232 
16 4 33 252 4 33 232 
14 8 2 04 162 2 04 162 
8 3 61 351 3 61 351 
15 3 2 03 143 
3 3 is 243 342 1 82 142 
17 2 04 243 
17 3 31 242 1 85 243 
16 17 1 85 242 1 85 243 
17 1 94 242 2 04 243 
17 16 4 33 232 
16 1 85 262 1 85 142 242 343 
16 3 32 142 252 352 
16 3 32 252 352 2 05 332 
16 4 33 252 3 32 232 
18 16 2 05 332 
16 1 85 262 1 85 142 242 342 
16 3 32 142 252 352 3 32 232 
16 4 33 252 4 33 232 
19 3 3 61 133 342 1 82 143 352 
8 3 61 332 2 05 332 20 3 3 61 133 342 1 82 143 352 
8 3 61 332 2 05 332 21 8 3 61 233 2 05 233 22 1 1 82 242 1 82 242 
Table D8: Survey Questionnaire, Section Four Information Flows: Managers' Responses 
Appendix D -352- Survey Data 
Information from information to 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- c ffq ffq ffq c ffq ffq ffq 
0 UNIT 0ru aru 0ru 0 UNIT 0ru oru aru 
DENT d rea rea rea d rea rea rea 
e mqI mqI mqL e mqt mq mq page 2 of 19 
22 1 2 04 253 2 04 142 
3 1 82 123 1 82 132 
3 2 03 132 352 
3 3 66 352 
8 1 82 124 224 1 82 124 224 
23 8 3 67 2,3 2 2 05 232 
24 15 3 10 252 
15 3 20 252 
15 3 24 252 
15 3 29 252 
15 3 31 252 
15 1 86 241 352 2 04 241 
15 1 87 241 352 2 05 241 
30 4 52 272 
30 5 34 272 
30 1 83 173 273 3 20 272 
30 1 87 1 73 273 3 10 272 
30 4 52 173 2 73 3 24 272 
25 8 1 84 233 
8 1 85 233 
15 232 1 84 232 
15 1 85 232 1 85 232 
15 1 87 232 2 32 232 
15 2 04 232 
26 15 232 1 84 232 
15 1 85 232 1 85 232 
15 1 87 232 2 32 232 
15 2 04 232 
27 15 1 232 1 84 232 
15 1 85 232 1 85 232 
15 1 87 232 2 32 232 
15 2 04 232 
30 3 10 272 
30 4 35 273 3 31 272 
28 30 1 83 173 273 3 15 273 
30 1 87 173 273 3 24 273 
30 3 24 173 273 3 20 273 
35 5 36 132 233 3 29 252 
35 6 42 143 243 
35 6 37 143 243 3 20 252 
35 6 58 143 243 5 39 233 
36 3 35 261 
36 3 39 241 
36 3 52 261 
36 6 37 243 3 29 261 26 6 38 243 3 31 261 
43 5 36 3 29 
44 6 37 253 3 29 243 363 
44 8 81 232 5 39 243 363 29 30 1 83 173 273 3 10 273 30 1 87 173 273 3 15 273 30 3 10 173 273 
53 3 29 253 3 29 243 53 6 57 134 243 
53 6 58 134 243 
53 8 81 132 
30 26 1 83 263 
26 3 29 163 263 
30 1 83 173 273 3 15 273 30 1 87 173 273 3 24 273 30 3 24 173 2 73 
30 3 20 173 273 3 20 273 31 30 1 83 173 273 3 15 273 30 1 87 173 2 73 3 24 273 30 3 20 1 73 273 
30 3 24 173 273 
43 5 36 3 29 44 6 37 253 3 29 243 363 
Table D8: (continued) 
Appendix D -353- Survey Data 
information from information to 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- cffq ffq ffqc ffq ffq ffq 
o UNIT oru oru oruo UNIT oru oru oru 
DENT drea rea read rea rea rea 
emqt mq t mqLe mqL mqL mqL page 3 of 19 
31 44 8 81 232 5 39 243 363 
32 30 1 83 173 273 3 15 273 
30 1 87 173 273 3 31 273 
30 3 31 173 273 
43 3 31 
43 5 36 3 29 
44 3 31 263 
44 6 37 263 3 29 263 
33 30 1 W 173 273 3 15 273 
30 1 V 173 273 3 31 273 
30 3 31 173 273 
43 3 31 
43 5 36 3 29 
44 3 31 263 
44 6 37 263 3 29 263 
35 30 1 99 273 4 35 272 
30 4 35 273 
36 30 4 35 273 4 35 272 
30 4 52 273 4 52 272 
36 4 52 122 242 
36 6 37 112 221 3 29 231 
36 6 38 112 221 4 35 122 232 
37 30 4 35 273 4 35 272 
30 4 52 273 4 52 272 
36 221 4 52 122 242 
36 6 37 112 222 3 29 231 
36 6 38 112 222 4 35 122 232 
38 30 4 35 273 4 35 272 
30 4 52 273 4 52 272 
35 5 36 162 
36 4 52 122 242 
36 6 37 112 221 3 29 231 
36 6 38 112 221 4 35 122 232 
39 30 3 20 273 3 20 272 
30 4 35 273 4 35 272 
36 4 35 241 
36 6 37 232 3 29 261 
36 6 38 232 5 39 231 
40 30 3 20 273 3 20 272 
30 4 35 273 4 35 272 
36 4 35 241 
36 6 37 232 3 29 261 
36 6 38 232 5 39 231 
41 28 1 87 342 
28 3 20 361 
28 3 29 143 253 3 29 331 
30 3 20 273 3 20 272 
30 4 35 273 4 35 272 
35 5 36 133 233 5 36 242 
35 5 39 133 233 5 39 242 
35 6 37 133 233 
35 6 42 133 233 
35 6 58 133 233 3 29 242 
36 4 35 241 
36 6 37 232 3 29 261 
36 6 38 232 5 39 231 
42 30 3 24 273 3 24 272 
30 5 34 273 5 34 272 
43 30 3 24 273 3 24 272 
30 5 34 273 5 34 272 
45 30 3 24 273 3 24 272 
30 5 34 273 5 34 272 
46 17 
- 1 04 242 17 3 31 242 1 85 242 
30 2 04 272 372 
30 4 35 173 273 1 85 272 372 
36 3 31 362 
43 3 18 
Table D8: (continued) 
Appendix D -354- Survey Data 
Information from information to 
RES- 
ACTIVIT Y PON- c ffq ffq ffq c ffq ffq ffq 
o UNIT oru oru oru o UNIT oru oru oru 
DENT d rea rea rea d rea rea rea 
e mq t mqI, mqt e mqt mqL mqI, page 4 of 19 
46 43 3 29 
43 5 36 3 31 
44 3 IS 333 
44 3 29 333 
7 96 333 3 31 333 
47 17 1 04 242 
17 3 31 242 1 85 242 
30 2 04 272 372 
30 4 35 173 273 1 85 272 372 
36 3 29 362 
36 3 31 362 
43 3 18 
43 3 29 
43 5 36 3 31 
44 3 18 333 
44 3 29 333 
44 7 96 333 3 31 333 
48 43 3 Is 
43 3 29 
43 5 36 3 31 
44 3 18 333 
44 3 29 333 
44 7 96 333 3 31 333 
49 43 3 18 
43 3 29 
43 5 36 3 31 
44 3 18 333 
3 29 333 
44 7 96 333 3 31 333 
53 30 2 04 272 372 
30 4 35 173 273 1 85 272 372 
35 5 36 112 211 5 36 112 212 
35 5 39 112 211 5 39 112 212 
35 6 37 112 211 
35 6 42 112 211 
35 6 58 112 211 
35 a 81 1-1 2 211 
36 4 52 132 242 
36 5 39 132 232 
36 5 55 132 232 
36 6 37 122 232 
36 6 38 122 232 
36 3 29 241 3 29 241 
36 6 38 232 3 10 132 242 
36 6 37 232 4 35 132 242 
43 3 18 
43 3 29 
43 5 36 3 31 
44 3 18 333 
44 3 29 333 
44 7 96 333 3 31 333 
54 35 5 36 112 211 5 36 112 212 
35 5 39 112 211 5 39 112 212 
35 6 37 112 211 
35 6 42 112 211 
35 6 58 112 211 
35 a 81 112 211 
36 4 52 132 242 
36 5 39 132 232 
36 6 37 122 232 
36 6 38 122 232 
36 6 55 132 232 
36 3 29 241 3 29 241 
36 6 38 232 3 10 132 242 
55 
36 6 37 232 4 35 132 242 
35 5, 36 112 211 5 36 112 212 
35 5 39 112 211 5 39 112 212 
35, 6 37 112 211 
,b 
Table D8: (continued) 
Appendix D -355- Survey Data 
information from information to 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- c ffq ffq ffq c ffq ffq ffq 
0 UNIT 0ru 0ru oru 0 UNIT oru oru oru 
DENT d rea rea rea d rea rea rea 
e mqL mqL mqL e mqI. mqL mqL page 5 of 19 
35 6 42 112 211 
35 6 58 112 211 
35 8 81 112 211 
36 3 29 251 3 29 251 
36 3 20 261 4 35 141 241 
36 6 37 132 242 5 39 141 241 
36 6 38 132 242 6 37 141 241 
56 35 5 36 112 211 5 36 112 212 
35 5 39 112 211 5 39 112 212 
35 6 37 112 211 
35 6 42 112 211 
35 6 58 112 211 
35 8 81 112 211 
36 6 37 141 241 
36 3 34 271 3 29 251 
36 6 37 172 272 4 35 141 241 
36 6 38 172 272 5 39 141 241 
57 35 5 36 112 212 5 36 112 
35 5 39 112 212 5 39 112 
35 6 37 112 212 
35 6 42 112 212 
35 6 58 112 212 
35 8 81 112 212 
36 1 84 222 1 84 221 321 
36 2 04 121 221 2 04 121 221 
36 3 29 151 3 29 231 
36 3 31 151 3 31 231 
36 4 35 121 231 4 35 121 221 
36 6 37 112 211 6 37 121 221 
36 6 38 111 211 6 38 121 221 
43 3 18 
43 3 29 
43 5 36 3 31 
44 3 18 333 
44 3 29 333 
44 7 96 333 3 31 333 
58 35 5 36 112 212 5 36 112 
35 5 39 112 212 5 39 112 
35 6 37 112 212 
35 6 42 112 212 
35 6 58 112 212 
35 8 81 112 212 
36 1 84 222 1 84 221 321 
36 2 04 121 221 2 4 121 221 
36 3 29 151 3 29 231 
36 3 31 151 3 31 231 
36 4 35 121 231 4 35 121 221 
36 6 37 112 212 6 37 121 222 
36 6 38 112 212 6 38 121 221 
43 3 18 
43 3 29 
43 5 36 3 31 
44 3 Is 333 
44 3 29 333 
59 35 5 36 112 212 5 36 112 
35 5 39 112 212 5 39 112 
35 6 37 112 212 
35 6 42 112 212 
35 6 58 112 212 
35 8 al 112 212 
36 1 84 222 1 84 221 321 
36 2 04 121 221 2 04 121 221 
36 3 29 151 3 29 231 
36 3 31 151 3 31 231 
36 4 35 121 231 4 35 121 221 
36 6 37 112 212 6 37 121 221 
36 6 38 112 212 6 38 121 221 
38 5 36 112 212 311 5 36 112 212 332 
Table DS: (continued) 
Appendix D -356- Survey Data 
information from information to 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- cffq ffq ffqc ffq ffq ffq 
0 UNIT oru oru oruo UNIT oru oru oru 
DENT drea rea read rea rea rea 
e mq t mq I mqLe mqL mqL mqt page 6 of 19 
59 38 7 96 11 2 212 332 
43 3 18 
43 3 29 
43 5 36 - 3 31 44 3 18 333 
44 3 29 333 
44 7 96 333 3 31 333 
46 5 36 133 243 342 5 36 243 331 
46 6 37 132 242 311 
46 6 58 132 242 311 
46 6 96 132 242 311 
60 35 5 36 112 212 5 36 112 
35 5 39 112 212 5 39 112 
35 6 37 112 212 
35 6 42 112 212 
35 6 58 112 212 
35 8 81 112 212 
36 1 84 222 1 84 221 321 
36 2 04 121 221 2 04 121 221 
36 3 29 151 3 29 231 
36 3 31 151 3 31 231 
36 4 35 121 231 4 35 121 221 
36 6 37 112 212 6 37 121 221 
36 6 38 112 212 6 38 121 221 
43 3 IS 
43 3 29 
43 5 36 3 31 
44 3 18 333 
44 3 29 333 
44 7 96 333 3 31 333 
61 9 3 29 112 222 331 
9 4 52 112 222 331 
9 1 83 232 332 2 04 112 222 331 
9 1 87 232 332 3 10 112 222 331 
11 1 83 123 243 363 1 93 242 
11 1 93 123 243 363 2 04 123 232 351 
11 3 29 233 352 3 29 113 232 351 
11 3 52 112 233 351 4 52 113 232 351 
12 3 83 242 332 3 10 142 232 342 
12 3 29 242 332 3 29 142 242 343 
12 4 52 242 332 4 52 142 242 342 
13 1 83 132 233 
13 1 87 132 233 
13 3 10 122 232 332 
13 3 29 122 232 332 
62 9 3 29 112 222 331 
9 4 52 112 222 331 
9 1 83 232 332 2 04 112 222 331 
9 1 87 -- 232 332 3 10 112 222 331 
11 1 83 123 243 363 1 93 242 
11 1 93 123 243 363 2 04 123 232 351 
11 3 29 233 352 3 29 113 232 351 
11 4 52 112 233 351 4 52 113 232 351 
12 1 83 242 332 3 10 142 242 342 
12 3 29 242 333 3 29 142 242 342 
12 4 52 242 333 4 52 142 242 342 
13 1 83 132 233 
13 1 87 132 233 
13 3 10 122 232 332 
13 3 29 122 232 332 
63 9 3 29 112 222 331 
9 4 52 112 222 331 
9 1 83 232 332 2 04 112 222 331 
9 1 87 232 332 3 10 112 222 331 
13 1 83 132 233 
13 1 87 132 233 
13 3 10 122 232 332 
13 3 29 122 232 332 
Table DS: (continued) 
Appendix D -357- Survey Data 
Information from information to RF: 4t- 
ACTIVITY PON- 
DENT 
c 
o 
d 
e 
UNIT 
ffq 
oru 
rea 
mqI. 
ffq 
oru 
rea 
mqI. 
ffq 
oru 
rea 
mqt 
c 
o 
d 
e 
UNIT 
ffq 
oru 
rea 
mqt 
ffq 
oru 
rea 
mqt 
ffq 
oru 
rea 
mqt 
63 53 1 86 163 263 
53 1 83 224 6 58 133 243 
53 1 87 163 6 57 133 243 
53 6 57 163 222 
53 6 58 163 224 
54 1 93 214 322 1 93 112 212 
54 1 a3 214 322 3 10 112 212 312 
54 1 87 214 322 3 29 112 212 312 
54 3 10 112 212 312 4 52 112 212 312 
54 3 29 112 212 312 5 53 112 212 312 
54 4 52 112 212 312 6 57 112 212 312 
54 5 53 112 212 312 6 58 112 212 312 
54 6 57 112 212 312 
54 6 58 112 212 312 
64 9 3 29 112 222 331 
9 4 52 112 222 331 
9 1 83 232 332 2 04 112 222 331 
9 1 87 232 332 3 10 112 222 331 
53 1 87 163 
53 1 83 224 6 58 133 243 
53 1 86 163 263 6 57 133 243 
53 6 57 163 224 
53 6 58 163 224 
54 1 93 214 322 1 93 112 212 312 
54 1 83 214 322 3 10 112 212 312 
54 1 87 214 322 3 29 112 212 312 
54 3 10 112 212 312 4 52 112 212 312 
54 3 29 112 212 312 5 53 112 212 312 
54 4 52 112 212 312 6 58 112 212 312 
54 5 53 112 212 312 6 57 112 212 312 
54 6 57 112 212 312 
54 6 58 112 212 312 
58 1 93 144 243 1 93 154 
58 5 53 153 362 5 53 233 
58 7 92 134 ý 
65 9 3 29 112 222 331 
9 4 52 112 222 331 
9 1 83 232 332 2 04 112 222 331 
9 1 87 232 332 3 10 112 222 331 
11 1 83 123 243 363 1 93 242 
11 1 93 123 243 363 2 04 123 232 351 
11 3 29 233 353 3 29 113 232 351 
11 4 52 112 233 351 4 52 113 232 351 
66 9 3 10 262 362 2 05 342 9 4 52 262 362 4 52 342 53 1 6 57 243 333 53 1 93 153 233 313 6 58 243 332 
53 6 57 113 
53 6 58 113 
57 1 83 232 4 52 113 222 362 57 4 52 113 233 353 7 92 112 232 57 6 58 124 233 
57 7 92 114 244 
67 9 4 52 342 9 3 10 262 362 2 05 342 9 4 52 262 362 3 10 342 53 1 93 153 233 313 6 58 243 332 53 6 58 113 
53 6 57 113 6 57 243 332 58 1 93 144 262 1 93 163 58 5 5 55 113 212 58 5 53 123 224 362 5 53 112 222 58 8 81 113 214 362 5 56 113 212 68 9 4 52 342 9 3 10 262 362 2 05 342 9 4 52 262 362 3 10 342 53 1 83 234 362 1 85 362 53 1 87 143 234 362 3 15 362 
page 7 of 19 
Table D8: (continued) 
Appendix D* -358- Survey Data 
information from information to 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- c ffq ffq ffq c ffq ffq ffq 
o UNIT oru oru oru o UNIT oru oru oru 
DENT d rea rea rea d rea rea rea 
e mqI mqt mqt e mqt mqt mqt page 8 of 19 
6. e 53 6 57 363 3 64 362 
53 6 58 363 3 10 362 
53 8 81 153 233 362 
57 1 93 153 253 4 52 262 
57 4 52 153 263 
57 7 92 154 263 
69 9 4 52 342 
9 3 10 262 362 2 05 342 
9 4 52 262 362 3 10 342 
53 1 83 234 362 1 85 362 
53 1 87 143 234 362 3 15 362 
53 6. 57 363 3 64' 362 
53 6 58 363 3 20 362 
53 8 81 153 233 362 
58 1 93 144 243 1 93 154 
58 5 53 153 362 5 53 233 
58 7 92 134 
70 9 4 52 342 
9 3 10 262 362 2 05 342 
9 3 64 262 362 3 64 342 
9 4 52 262 362 3 10 342 
53 3 65 322 3 64 312 
53 6 57 312 
53 6 58 312 
57 1 93 113 262 1 93 113 262 
57 3 64 113 213 3 64 113 213 
57 3 65 113 213 3 65 113 213 
57 4 52 113 213 4 52 113 213 
57 6 58 124 253 
57 7 92 124 253 
71 9 4 52 342 
9 3 10 262 362 2 05 342 
9 3 64 262 362 3 64 342 
9 4 52 262 362 3 10 342 
53 3 65 322 
53 6 57 312 
53 6 58 312 3 64 312 
57 1 93 113 262 1 93 113 262 
57 3 64 113 213 3 64 113 213 
57 3 65 113 213 3 65 113 213 
57 4 52 113 213 4 52 113 213 
57 6 58 124 253 
57 7 92 124 253 
58 5 53 135 243 
58 7 92 113 223 1 93 114 214 
59 4 52 333 
59 7 92 313 3 64 333 
72 9 3 10 362 
9 3 15 362 
9 3 61 362 
9 3 64 362 
9 4 52 362 2 05 362 
53 6 57 242 362 6 57 362 
53 6 58 242 362 6 58 362 
53 8 81 222 322 
57 4 52 163 253 4 52 163 263 
57 6 58 164 263 
57 7 92 154 253 
73 9 3 10 362 
9 3 15 362 
9 3 61 362 
9 3 64 362 
9 4 52 362 2 05 362 
53 6 57 242 362 6 57 362 
53 6 58 242 362 6 58 362 
53 8 81 222 322 
59 7 92 332 
59 5 52 332 5 52 332 
Table DS: (continued) 
Appendix D -359- Survey Data 
information from information to 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- cffq ffq ffqc ffq ffq ffq 
0 UNIT oru oru oru0 UNIT oru oru oru 
DENT drea rea read rea rea rea 
emqI, mqL mqI. e mqt mqL mqL page 9 of 19 
74 9 3 10 362 
9 3 15 362 
9 3 61 362 
9 3 64 362 
9 4 52 362 2 05 362 
53 3 65 322 3 64 312 
53 6 57 312 
53 6 58 312 
75 9 3 10 362 
9 3 15 362 
9 3 61 362 
9 3 64 362 
9 4 52 362 2 05 362 
53 3 65 322 3 64 312 
53 6 57 312 
53 6 58 312 
59 4 52 333 
59 7 92 313 3 64 333 76 9 3 29 112 212 312 2 05 212 312 
9 4 35 112 212 312 
9 4 52 112 212 312 
53 6 57 332 
53 6 58 332 2 04 112 332 
54 6 57 112 212 312 
54 6 58 112 212 312 
54 4 52 112 212 312 3 10 112 212 312 
54 6 58 112 212 312 4 52 112 212 312 
54 6 57 112 212 312 5 53 112 212 312 
57 7 92 113 243 
57 2 04 124 2 04 123 
57 4 52 133 233 4 52 133 233 
57 6 58 113 233 6 58 113 243 77 9 3 29 112 212 312 2 05 212 312 
9 4 35 112 212 312 
9 4 52 112 212 312 
53 6 57 332 
53 6 58 332 2 04 112 332 
54 6 57 112 212 312 
54 6 58 112 212 312 54 4 52 112 212 312 3 10 112 212 312 54 6 58 112 212 312 4 52 112 212 312 
54 6 57 112 212 312 5 53 112 212 312 58 5 55 125 235 333 
58 5 36 125 235 333 5 53 134 224 333 58 7 92 112 
59 5 36 315 5 52 312 59 5 55 315 7 92 312 78 9 3 29 112 212 312 2 05 212 312 9 4 35 112 212 312 
9 4 52 112 212 312 
53 6 57 332 
53 6 58 332 2 04 112 332 57 4 52 163 253 4 52 163 263 57 6 58 164 263 
57 7 92 154 253 
79 9 3 29 112 212 312 2 05 212 312 9 4 35 112 212 312 
9 4 52 112 212 312 
53 6 57 332 
53 6 58 332 2 04 112 332 58 5 55 125 235 333 
58 5 36 125 235 333 5 53 134 224 333 58 7 92 112 
59 
59 5 52 332 
7 
5 
92 
52 
332 
332 80 9 3 29 112 212 312 2 05 212 312 9 4 35 112 212 312 
9 4 52 112 212 312 
Table D8: (continued) 
Appendix D -360- Survey Data 
RES- 
information from information to 
ACTIVITY PON- cffq ffq ffq cffq ffq ffq 
0 UNIT oru oru oru 0 UNIT oru oru oru 
DENT drea rea rea drea rea rea 
emqI mqL mqL emqL mqL mqL page 10 of 19 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
6 57 332 
6 58 332 2 04 112 332 
7 92 113 233 
3 64 113 213 2 04 133 252 
3 65 113 213 3 64 113 213 
4 52 113 213 3 65 113 213 
6 58 113 233 4 52 113 213 
7 92 113 233 6 58 113 233 
3 29 112 212 312 2 05 212 312 
4 35 112 212 312 
4 52 112 212 312 
6 57 332 
6 58 332 2 04 112 332 
7 92 113 233 
3 64 113 213 2 04 133 252 
3 65 113 213 3 64 113 213 
4 52 113 213 3 65 113 213 
6 58 113 233 4 52 113 213 
7 92 113 233 6 58 113 233 
5 53 112 233 333 
7 92 112 323 3 35 112 233 333 
4 52 333 
7 92 313 3 64 333 
3 29 112 212 312 2 05 212 312 
4 35 112 212 312 
4 52 112 212 312 - 1 93 112 221 321 1 93 112 221 321 
2 04 122 222 2 04 112 221 331 
3 10 122 222 3 10 122 232 
3 29 122 222 3 29 122 232 
4 52 122 222 4 52 122 232 
6 57 122 222 6 57 122 232 
6 58 122 222 6 58 122 232 
6 57 332 
6 58 332 2 04 112 332 
4 52 123 223 
6 58 133 233 
7 92 133 233 
4 52 142 242 1 93 133 233 
6 58 133 232 3 64 123 223 
7 92 133 232 3 65 123 223 
5 
7 
3 
4 
4 
6 
6 
3 
4 
4 
6 
6 
3 
223 
123 
1122123122 05 212312 
112212312 
112212312 
332 
3322 04 112332 
1122123122 05 212312 
112212312 
112212312 
332 
3322 04 12332 
335 
335 
123 
1122123122 05 212312 
112212312 
12212312 
343 3 61 362 
332 
332 2 04 112332 
112212 312 2 05 212312 
112212 312 
112212 312 
332 
332 2 04 112332 
153 2 04 153 
Table D8: (continued) 
Appendix D -361- Survey Data 
Information from information to 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- c ffq ffq ffq c ffq ffq ffq 
0 UNIT 0ru 0ru 0ru 0 UNIT oru 0ru oru 
DENT d rea rea rea d rea rea rea 
e mqt mqt mqt e mqt mqt mqt page II of 19 
57 4 52 123 262 4 52 123 262 
87 '9 3 29 112 212 312 2 05 212 312 
9 4 35 112 212 312 
9 4 52 112 212 312 
53 6 57 332 
53 6 58 332 2 04 112 332 
58 5 36 225 4 52 123 
58 5 55 225 4 52 363 
58 7 92 114 
59 5 36 315 5 52 312 
59 5 55 315 7 92 312 
88 21 1 83 123 223 323 
21 1 87 123 223 323 
21 1 86 123 223 323 5 39 233 333 
26 1 83 244 354 
26 1 86 144 244 354 
89 23 1 87 362 5 39 132 252 
25 1 85 153 252 5 39 143 
25 1 86 162 362 5 26 143 
25 4 95 133 243 
26 1 83 244 354 
26 1 86 144 244 354 
90 28 1 87 342 3 29 331 
28 3 20 361 
28 3 29 143 253 
30 5 34 272 
30 1 83 173 273 3 20 272 
30 1 87 173 273 3 10 272 
30 1 83 273 4 52 272 
30 4 35 173 273 3 24 272 
91 21 1 83 123 223 323 
21 1 87 123 223 323 
21 1 86 123 223 323 5 39 233 333 
25 1 86 162 262 
92 21 1 83 123 223 323 
21 1 87 123 223 323 
21 1 86 123 223 323 5 39 233 333 
93 23 1 83 112 5 39 242 
94 23 1 83 112 5 39 242 
51 1 83 263 363 7 92 122 242 
51 3 20 144 263 3 20 242 
51 5 39 132 242 5 39 242 
96 26 1 83 134 234 344 5 25 333 
97 21 3 29 133 233 
21 3 24 133 233 5 39 332 
21 5 39 133 233 
26 1 83 134 234 344 5 25 333 
98 23 1 83 112 5 39 242 
26 1 83 134 234 344 5 25 333 
42 3 20 133 243 353 5 39 133 243 
42 5 39 123 223 363 7 92 143 243 
42 7 92 134 244 
51 1 83 263 363 7 92 122 
51 3 20 144 263 3 20 242 51 5 39 132 242 5 39 242 99 22 3 10 265 
22 3 29 265 5 39 341 22 4 35 265 
22 4 52 265 
26 1 83 134 234 344 5 25 333 100 21 3 24 263 3 15 362 21 5 39 263 3 64 362 39 6 42 122 222 3 20 232 40 6 42 122 222 3 20 232 41 7 91 133 233 5 39 112 232 362 41 8 81 122 
47 2 06 123 
47 3 20 133 232 3 20 132 232 332 
Table D8: (continued) 
Appendix D -362- Survey Data 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- 
DENT 
Information from infomation to 
cffq ffq ffq 
o UNIT oru oru oru 
drea rea rea 
e mq t mq t mq t 
cffqffqffq 
0 UNIT oruoruoru 
drearearea 
a mq I mq I mq I page 12 of 19 
100 47 
48 
48 
48 
101 21 
21 
39 
40 
42 
47 
47 
47 
48 
48 
48 
50 
50 
51 
51 
51 
51 
51 
102 39 
40 
41 
41 
47 
47 
47 
48 
48 
48 
50 
50 
103 21 
21 
39 
40 
41 
41 
47 
47 
47 
48 
48 
48 
50 
50 
104 39 
40 
42 
47 
47 
47 
48 
48 
48 
50 
50 
51 
51 
51 
105 39 
40 
41 
41 
47 
47 
5 
7 
6 
6 
42 122 232 342 6 42 122 232 
20 123 3 20 123 
39 111 5 39 113 
42 123 6 42 123 
24 263 3 15 362 
39 263 3 64 362 
42 122 222 3 20 232 
42 122 222 3 20 232 
92 163 263 5 39 262 
06 123 
20 133 232 3 20 132 232 332 
42 122 232 342 6 42 122 232 
20 123 3 20 123 - 
39 111 5 39 113 
42 123 6 42 123 
91 133 233 5 39 223 333 
81 132 232 
39 122 3 20 232 
39 362 5 39 232 
39 232 5 39 132 
92 212 7 92 222 
92 122 7 92 122 
42 122 222 3 20 232 
42 122 222 3 20 232 
91 133 233 5 39 112 232 362 
81 122 
06 123 
20 133 232 3 20 132 232 332 
42 122 232 342 6 42 122 232 
20 123 3 20 123 
39 111 5 39 113 
42 123 6 42 123 
91 133 233 5 39 223 332 
81 132 232 
24 263 3 15 362 
39 263 3 64 362 
42 122 222 3 20 232 
42 122 222 3 20 232 
91 133 233 5 39 112 232 362 
81 122 
06 123 
20 133 232 3 20 132 232 332 
42 122 232 342 6 42 122 232 
20 123 3 20 123 
39 111 5 39 113 
42 123 6 42 123 
91 133 233 5 39 223 332 
81 132 232 
42 122 222 3 20 232 
42 122 222 3 20 232 
92 163 263 5 39 262 
06 123 - 20 133 232 3 20 132 232 332 
42 122 232 342 6 42 122 232 
20 123 3 20 123 
39 111 5 39 113 
42 123 6 42 123 
91 133 233 5 39 223 332 
81 132 232 
362 3 20 232 
39 122 232 362 5 39 132 232 
92 122 212 7 92 122 222 
42 122 222 3 20 232 
42 122 222 3 20 232 
91 133 233 5 39 112 232 362 
81 122 
06 123 
20 133 232 3 20 132 232 332 
Table D8: (continued) 
Appendix D -363- Survey Data 
information from information to 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- c ffq ffq ffq c ffq ffq ffq 
0 UNIT 0ru oru oru 0 UNIT oru oru oru 
DENT d rea rea rea d rea rea rea 
e mqt mqt mqL e mqI, mqt mqL page 13 of 19 
105 47 6 42 122 232 342 6 42 122 232 
48 3 20 123 3 20 123 
48 5 39 111 5 39 113 
48 6 42 123 6 42 123 
50 7 91 133 233 5 39 223 332 
50 a 81 132 232 
106 39 6 42 142 242 3 20 262 
40 6 42 262 3 20 262 
*41 7 91 1 3.3 233 5 39 143 361 
41 8 81 122 
42 7 92 123 233 5 39 123 233 363 
47 3 20 153 253 363 3 20 132 232 362 
47 3 42 142 242 362 6 42 132 232 362 
48 3 20 153 253 363 3 20 132 232 362 
48 6 42 142 242 362 6 42 132 232 362 
50 5 39 232 332 5 39 142 242 363 
50 6 37 143 243 
50 6 58 143 243 
50 7 91 153 253 
51 3 20 232 
51 5 39 122 232 362 5 39 132 232 
51 7 92 122 212 7 92 122 222 
107 16 2 05 332 
16 1 85 262 1 85 142 242 342 
16 3 32 142 252 352 1 85 242 
16 4 33 252 4 33 232 
21 3 24 262 3 15 362 
21 5 39 262 3 64 362 
25 3 20 161 
25 3 24 161 5 39 152 
28 2 06 162 2 06 162 
39 3 24 153 253 3 24 162 
40 5 39 162 5 39 162 
41 7 91 133 233 5 39 143 361 
41 8 81 122 
47 3 20 162 262 362 3 20 132 242 362 
47 3 24 262 3 24 152 262 362 
47 6 42 132 232 362 6 42 132 242 362 
48 3 20 162 262 3 20 132 242 362 
48 3 24 262 362 3 24 152 262 362 
48 6 42 132 232 362 6 42 132 242 362 
50 5 39 232 332 5 39 142 242 363 
50 6 37 143 243 
50 6 58 143 243 
50 7 91 153 253 
51 3 20 232 51 5 39 122 232 362 5 39 132 232 
51 7 92 122 212 7 92 122 222 108 21 3 24 262 3 14 362 21 5 39 262 3 64 362 39 6 42 142 242 3 20 262 40 6 42 262 3 20 262 41 7 91 133 243 5 39 143 252 41 8 al 122 
42 7 92 163 263 5 39 262 47 3 20 133 243 363 3 20 132 232 362 47 3 64 133 253 363 3 64 132 232 362 47 3 65 133 233 363 3 65 132 232 362 47 6 42 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 48 3 20 133 243 363 3 20 132 232 362 48 3 64 133 253 363 3 64 132 222 362 48 3 65 133 233 363 3 65 132 232 362 48 6 42 132 242 362 6 42 132 242 362 50 5 39 232 332 5 39 142 242 363 50 6 37 143 243 
50 6 58 143 243 
50 7 91 153 253 
51 3 20 232 
Table D8: (continued) 
Appendix D -364- Survey Data 
information from information to 
RFq- 
ACTIVITY PON- c 
o UNIT 
DENT d 
e 
ffq ffq ffq cffq ffq ffq 
0ru 0ru 0ru 0 UNIT 0ru 0ru 0ru 
re r e rea drea rea rea z 
mq q 
z 
m mqt emqI. mqt mqt page 14 of 19 
108 51 5 
51 7 
109 39 6 
40 6 
41 7 
41 a 
42 7 
47 3 
47 3 
47 3 
47 6 
48 3 
48 3 
48 3 
48 6 
50 5 
50 6 
50 6 
50 7 
51 
51 5 
51 7 
110 21 5 
39 6 
39 8 
40 6 
40 a 
41 7 
41 8 
47 3 
47 6 
48 3 
48 6 
50 6 
50 6 
50 7 
50 8 
Ill 39 6 
39 8 
40 6 
40 a 
42 7 
47 3 
47 6 
48 3 
48 6 
50 6 
50 6 
50 7 
50 a 
51 
51 7 
51 8 
112 22 3 
22 5 
22 5 
39 6 
39 8 
40 6 
40 8 
41 7 
41 8 
42 7 
47 3 
47 6 
48 3 
48 6 
50 6 
39 
92 
42 
42 
91 
81 
92 
20 
64 
65 
42 
20 
64 
65 
42 
39 
37 
58 
91 
92 
81 
29 
36 
39 
42 
81 
42 
81 
91 
81 
92 
20 
42 
20 
42 
37 
122 232 362 5 39 132 232 
122 212 7 92 122 222 
142 242 3 20 262 
262 3 20 262 
133 243 5 39 143 252 
122 
163 263 5 39 262 
133 243 363 3 20 132 232 362 
133 253 363 3 64 132 232 362 
133 233 363 3 65 132 232 362 
122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
133 243 363 3 20 132 232 362 
133 253 363 3 64 132 222 362 
133 233 363 3 65 132 232 362 
132 232 362 6 42 132 232 362 
232 5 39 142 242 363 
143 243 
143 243 
153 253 
3 20 232 
122 232 362 5 39 132 232 
122 212 7 92 122 222 
353 2 06 142 342 
122 232 
211 
132 232 5 39 132 
132 
112 232 5 39 122 352 
122 
143 253 363 3 20 132 242 362 
122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
143 253 363 3 20 132 242 362 
122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
134 234 
134 234 5 39 232 362 
123 223 
132 
122 232 
211 
132 232 5 39 132 
132 
123 233 363 5 39 123 233 363 
143 253 363 3 20 132 242 362 
122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
143 253 363 3 20 132 242 362 
122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
134 234 
134 234 5 39 232 362 
123 223 
132 
7 92 122 
112 222 3 20 132 262 
122 5 39 122 232 
263 5 39 342 
263 
263 
122 232 
121 
132 232 5 39 132 
132 
112 232 5 39 122 352 
122 
123 233 363 5 39 123 233 363 
143 253 363 3 20 132 242 362 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
143 253 363 3 20 132 242 362 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
134 234 
Table D8: (continued) 
Appendix D -365- Survey Data 
Information from information to 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- c ffq ffq ffq c ffq ffq ffq 
o UNIT oru oru oru 0 UNIT oru oru oru 
DENT d rea rea rea d rea rea rea 
e mqt mqt mqI, e mqL mqt mqt page 15 of 19 
112 50 6 58 134 234 5 39 232 362 
50 7 91 123 223 
50 a 81 132 
51 7 92 122 
51 7 92 112 222 3 20 132 262 
51 a 81 122 5 39 122 232 
113 25 1 85 252 352 2 06 142 252 
25 a 81 132 3 24 122 232 
39 6 42 111 211 4 35 121 
40 6 42 112 212 5 39 212 
47 3 20 363 3 20 362 
47 3 '20 253 3 20 232 
47 3 20 143 3 20 132 
47 6 42 232 6 42 232 
47 6 42 362 6 42 362 
47 6 42 122 6 42 122 
48 3 20 143 253 363 3 20 132 232 362 
48 6 42 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
114 21 5 39 353 2 06 142 342 
39 6 42 122 222 
40 6 42 112 5 39 112 
41 7 91 112 232 5 39 122 352 
41 8 81 122 
42 7 92 233 363 5 39 233 363 
43 5 39 3 20 
47 3 20 143 253 363 3 20 142 242 362 
47 6 42 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
48 3 20 143 253 363 3 20 142 242 362 
48 6 42 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
50 7 91 123 233 5 39 133 242 342 
50 8 81 132 
115 6 3 15 174 
6 3 24 142 272 362 
6 3 20 142 272 362 2 05 173 273 
6 8 81 172 362 
28 2 06 332 
28 3 15 332 
28 3 24 233 2 05 332 
39 6 42 122 222 
40 6 42 112 5 39 112 
116 21 3 64 232 
21 5 39 353 2 06 142 342 
39 6 42 142 232 - 3 20 242 40 6 42 132 5 39 132 
47 3 20 163 253 363 3 20 132 232 362 
47 6 42 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
48 3 20 163 253 363 3 20 132 232 362 
48 6 42 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
117 42 7 91 312 5 39 332 
42 7 92 113 333 5 39 333 
47 5 39 3 20 
47 3 20 153 263 363 3 20 142 252 362 
47 6 42 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
48 3 20 153 263 363 3 20 142 252 362 
48 6 42 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
51 3 18 232 
51 5 39 132 232 
51 7 92 112 232 3 61 232 
118 6 3 24 174 274 344 
6 3 61 174 274 344 
6 3 15 274 344 2 05 173 
28 2 06 332 
28 3 15 332 
28 3 24 233 2 05 334 119 39 6 42 122 222 
40 6 42 122 5 39 122 
41 7 91 332 5 39 352 
42 7 92 113 333 5 39 333 
Table D8: (continued) 
Appendix D -366- Survey Data 
information from information to 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- cffq ffq ffq cffq ffq ffq 
0 UNIT oru oru oru o UNIT oru oru oru 
DENT drea rea rea drea rea rea 
emqL mqL mqL emqL mqL mqL 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
5 39 
3 20 153 263 363 
6 42 122 232 362 
3 20 153 263 363 
6 42 122 232 362 
7 91 123 233 
a 81 132 
7 92 112 222 
8 81 112 
8 81 132 
6 42 122 222 
6 42 122 
1 83 244 
1 83 173 273 
1 87 1 73 273 
1 83 2 73 
4 35 173 2 73 
1 83 244 
1 83 173 273 
1 87 173 273 
4 35 173 273 
1 83 244 
1 83 173 273 
1 87 173 273 - 4 35 173 273 
1 83 123 223 323 
1 87 123 223 323 
1 86 123 223 323 
1 83 244 
1 83 173 273 
1 87 173 273 
4 35 173 273 
1 83 244 
1 83 173 273 
1 87 173 273 
4 35 173 273 
1 83 244 
1 87 1 73 2 73 
1 83 173 273 
1 83 244 
1 83 244 
1 83 244 
1 87 1 73 2 73 
1 83 173 273 
1 83 244 
1 83 244 
1 87 1 73 2 73 
1 83 1 73 273 
1 83 244 
1 a3 244 
1 87 1 73 273 
1 83 1 73 273 
3 20 133 263 363 
4 34 133 263 363 
6 42 122 232 362 
3 20 
3 20 
6 42 
3 20 
6 42 
5 39 
5 39 
3 24 
5 39 
3 24 
5 34 
3 20 
3 10 
4 52 
3 24 
3 24 
4 52 
5 34 
3 20 
3 10 
3 24 
3 24 
4 52 
5 34 
3 20 
3 10 
3 24 
5 39 
3 24 
4 52 
5 34 
3 20 
3 10 
3 24 
3 24 
4 52 
5 34 
3 20 
3 10 
3 24 
3 24 
5 34 
2 04 
3 24 
3 24 
3 24 
3 24 
5 34 
2 04 
3 24 
3 24 
3 24 
5 34 
2 04 
3 24 
3 24 
3 24 
5 34 
2 04 
3 24 
3 20 
4 34 
6 42 
142 232 362 
122 232 362 
142 232 362 
122 232 362 
233 342 
132232 
132262 
122 
54 
72 
72 
72 
72 
72 
54 
72 
72 
72 
72 
72 
54 
72 
72 
72 
72 
72 
233 333 
254 
272 
272 
272 
272 
272 
254 
272 
272 
272 
272 
272 
254 
173 2 73 
1 73 2 73 
1 73 2 73 
254 
254 
254 
173 273 
1 73 273 
1 73 273 
254 
254 
1 73 2 73 
1 73 2 73 
1 73 2 73 
254 
254 
173 273 
173 273 
1 73 273 
132 232 362 
132 232 362 
122 232 362 
page 16 of 19 
Table DS: (continued) 
Appendix D -367- Survey Data 
information from Information to 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- Cffq ffq ffq cffq ffq ffq 
o UNIT oru oru 0ru 0 UNIT oru oru oru 
DENT drea rea rea drea rea rea 
emqL mqI mqL emqL mqI mqI page 17 of 19 
136 47 3 20 
47 '4 34 
47 6 42 
137 39 6 42 
40 6 42 
47 3 20 
47 4 34 
47 6 42 
138 60 
60 
60 7 92 
139 60 
60 
60 7 92 
140 60 
60 
60 7 92 
141 39 6 42 
40 6 42 
42 7 92 
47 3 20 
47 4 34 
47 6 42 
60 
60 
60 7 92 
142 60 7 92 
60 8 81 
143 60 7 92 
60 8 81 
144 60 7 92 
60 a 81 
145 47 3 20 
47 4 34 
47 6 42 
60 7 92 
60 a 81 
146 27 3 20 
27 3 29 
27 3 15 
147 27 3 20 
27 3 
. 
29 
27 3 15 
148 27 3 20 
27 3 29 
27 3 15 
149 21 
21 
21 
21 5 34 
21 5 39 
27 3 20 
27 3 29 
27 3 15 
47 3 20 
47 4 34 
47 6 42 
50 7 91 
50 8 al 
150 36 
36 
36 6 37 
60 7 92 
60 a al 
151 36 
36 
36 6 37 
60 7 92 
133 263 363 
133 263 363 
122 232 362 
132 232 
132 232 
133 263 363 
133 263 363 
122 232 362 
11 
11 
211 
132 232 
132 232 
163 263 
133 263363 
133 263363 
122 232362 
11 
131 221 
131 221 
131 221 
131 221 
131 221 
131 221 
133 263 363 
133 263 363 
122 232 362 
131 221 
131 221 
362 
362 
362 
362 
362 
362 
362 
362 
362 
252 
252 
362 
362 
362 
133 263 363 
133 263 363 
122 232 362 
143 243 
143 
242 
1211 
1211 
242 
1211 
3 20 122 232 362 
4 34 122 232 362 
6 42 122 232 362 
3 20 262 
5 39 132 232 
3 20 122 232 362 
4 34 122 232 362 
6 42 122 232 362 
3 65 .211 5 34 211 
1 93 211 
3 65 211 
5 34 211 
1 93 211 
3 65 211 
5 34 211 
1 93 211 
3 20 262 
5 39 132 
5 39 262 
3 20 122 232 362 
4 34 122 232 362 
6 42 122 232 362 
3 65 211 
5 34 211 
1 93 211 
5 34 261 
5 34 261 
5 34 261 
3 20 122 232 362 
4 34 122 232 362 
6 42 122 232 362 
5 34 261 
3 25 362 
3 25 362 
3 25 362 
2 04 252 
5 34 252 
5 39 252 
1 84 252 
1 85 252 
3 25 362 
3 20 122232 362 
4 34 122232 362 
6 42 122232 362 
5 39 263 
3 20 251 
5 34 251 
3 29 251 
3 20 251 
5 34 251 
3 29 251 
Table D8: (continued) 
Appendix D -368- Survey Data 
information from information to 
RES- 
ACTIVITY PON- c ffq ffq ffq c ffq ffq ffq 
0 UNIT oru oru oru 0 UNIT oru oru oru 
DENT d rea rea rea d rea rea rea 
e mq1. mqt mq e mqt mqt mqt page 18 of 19 
60 8 81 111 211 
152 36 3 20 251 
36 5 34 251 
36 6 37 242 3 29 251 
60 7 92 111 211 
60 a 81 111 211 
153 36 3 20 251 
36 5 34 251 
36 6 37 242 3 29 251 
42 7 92 123 233 363 5 39 123 233 363 
47 3 20 133 233 363 3 20 132 242 362 
47 4 34 133 233 363 4 34 132 242 362 
47 6 42 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
60 7 92 111 211 
60 8 81 111 211 
154 27 3 24 252 
27 3 25 132 2 04 252 
158 41 7 91 312 5 39 332 
43 5 39 3 20 
47 3 20 133 233 363 3 20 132 242 362 
47 4 34 133 233 363 4 34 132 242 362 
47 6 42 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
50 7 91 222 5 39 232 
50 8 81 133 232 
159 27 3 24 252 
27 3 25 132 2 04 252 
160 60 7 92 211 
161 60 7 92 211 
162 39 6 42 132 232 3 20 262 
40 6 42 132 232 5 39 132 232 
47 3 20 133 233 363 3 20 132 242 362 
47 4 34 133 233 363 4 34 132 242 362 
47 6 42 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 
60 7 92 211 
163 60 7 92 111 232 5 34 262 
60 8 81 111 232 
164 60 7 92 111 232 5 34 262 
60 8 81 111 232 
165 43 5 39 3 20 
47 3 20 133 233 363 3 20 132 242 362 47 4 34 133 233 363 4ý 34 132 242 362 
47 6 42 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 60 7 92 111 232 5 34 262 
60 8 81 111 232 
166 60 7 92 111 232 5 34 262 60 8 al I11 232 
167 60 7 92 111 232 5 34 262 
60 8 81 111 232 
168 39 6 42 232 4 35 232 
40 6 42 232 5 39 232 41 7 91 312 5 39 332 43 5 39 3 20 47 3 20 133 233 363 3 20 132 242 362 47 4 34 133 233 363 4 34 132 242 362 47 6 42 122 232 362 6 42 122 232 362 50 7 91 222 5 39 232 50 8 81 133 222 
Table D8: (continued) 
Appendix D -369- survey iiata 
page 19 of 19 
index: 
1. Activities numbers: 
as Survey Questionnaire 
2. Code: 
1: outside the Railways 
3: Headquarters Departments 
5: Production Division Managers 
7: Elementary managerial units 
Unit: 
3: Board 
7: AGM EK 
11: DEL/TY 
15: DOMP/YM 
19: DOMP/YO/TO 
23: DG/GEME 
27: DNE/YMESTH 
31: DEM 
35: DPER 
39: YGR 
54: DISTY/TY 
60: TTHE 
64: DIP 
81: Personal. Information 
85: State/PubLic Sector 
92: SYNERGEIA 
96: GPA/STATIONMASTERS 
4. information form: 
1: not printed 
5. information frequency: 
1: Every day 
4: Once every 3 months 
7: Whenever happens 
6. Information quatity: 
1: AbsoluteLy adequate 
4: Inadequate 
2: Top Management 
4: Production Departments 
6: Production Area Managers 
8: Personal information 
4: GM & AGM 
8: AGM PR 
12: DEL/TK 
16: DOMP/YP 
20: DG 
24: DNE 
28: DNEAMEEKE 
32: ALL HDOS DEPTS 
36: YEK 
42: TMGR/TMK 
55: YEL 
61: DOY 
65: DAP 
82: Trade Unions 
86: Seminars/Education 
93: Trade/Manufacturers 
99: Public 
5: GM 
9: AGMEL 
13: DEL/YM 294 
17: DOMP/YSK 
21: DG/YG 
25: DNE/YK 
29: DET 
33: ALL PRODUCTION DEPTS 
37: EPITH 
52: DISTY 
57: ERSIA 
62: DOE 
66: DP 
83: Literature 
87: UIC/Raftways/Cnfrncs 
94: Carriers 
6: AGM GR 
10: DEL 
14: DOMP 
18: DOMP/MK 
22: DG/YKTE 
26: DNE/YM 
30: DET/TY 
34: YSTHE 
38: KGPA 
53: DISTY/YOSTY 
58: MHXSIA 
63: DEE 
67: DD 
84: Press 
91: ERGODHGOI 
95: DNE supervisors 
2: printed, not processed, 3: printed, processed 
2: Every 15 days 3: Once a month 
5: Once every 6 months 6: Once a year 
2: Adequate 3: Almost adequate 
5: Absolutely Inadequate 
Table D8: Survey Questionnaire, Section Four- Information Flows: Managers' Responses 
APPENDIX E 
VSM CONSTRUCTION 
The appendix contains information utilised in Chapter 10 of the thesis. Thus:: 
- Table El (four pages) provides a functional analysis of managers interviewed for 
each of the 168 managerial activities, listed in Section Three of the Survey 
Questionnaire. This table illustrates the functional relation of the interviewed 
managers to any activity for which they were requested to allocate accountability, 
as discussed in Chapter 9. 
Tables E2 to E6 provide the results of accountability allocation, under the 
methodology discussed in Chapter 9, concerning: 
activities at Corporate Level (Table E2), 
activities of the Operations sub-system (Table E3), 
activities of the Rolling Stock sub-system (Table E4), 
activities of the Permanent Way sub-system (Table E5), and 
activities of the Signalling/Telecommunications sub-system (Table E6). 
- Table E7 provides a summary of accountability allocation by allocation criterion 
and content of managerial activity. 
- Figures El to E13 provide graphical interpretation of accountability allocation, 
either in terms of Type of activity, Content of activity and Specific Content 
(as regards Production, Materials and Finance content) in respect to the 
allocation criteria (a to e), I 
or in terms of the accountable managerial units in respect to Type, Content 
and Specific Content of groups of activities. 
- Figures EU to E33 contain information flows diagrams corresponding to the four 
Types of managerial activities (Research and Development, Planning/Organizing, 
Annual Programming, Performance Monitoring) for each of the five components of the 
Railway Enterprise (Corporate, Operations, Rolling Stock, Permanent Way, 
Signalling/Telecommunications). 
Appendix E -371- VSM Construction 
HEADQUA RTER S REG IONAL ST RUCTURE ROLL ING S TOCK 
SIGNAL. 
A T 
H AND H 
C CORPORATE R. 0 P. E OPERA- PERMAN. D WORK DE- 
MANAGEMENT S. P. W. A TIONS WAY TELECOM Q SHOP POTS 0 
T D S 
I T 
D Y 
v E D G 
T G E T Y D E M A 
1 0 D / / D PK T S T I R x 
A A 0 D D D P Y IG Y TM T T S S S 
T R G M E E N E E TP G MG H H T I I L 
D M P L M E R K HA R KR E E Y A A 
Y 
3 3 5 3 3 9 2 2 3 2 7 1 1 3 1 2 so 
1 3 3 6 
2 3 3 6 
3 3 3 6 
4 3 3 6 
5 3 3 6 
6 3 3 3 9 
7 3 3 3 9 
8 3 3 3 9 
9 3 3 3 9 
10 3 3 3 9 
11 3 3 3 9 
12 3 3 4 10 
13 3 3 3 9 
14 3 3 3 9 
15 3 3 4 2 12 
16 3 3 4 2 12 
17 3 3 3 9 
18 3 3 3 9 
19 3 3 4 10 
20 3 3 4 10 
21 3 3 4 10 
22 3 3 2 8 
23 3 3 2 8 
24 2 3 3 8 
25 2 3 3 8 
26 2 3 3 a 
27 2 3 3 8 
28 2 3 3 6 2 2 3 21 
29 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 1 2 25 
30 2 3 3 6 2 2 3 21 
31 2 3 3 7 2 2 3 1 23 
32 2 3 3 2 2 3 15 
33 2 3 3 2 2 3 is 
34 2 3 3 2 2 3 15 
35 2 3 3 2 2 3 15 
36 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 1 2 25 
37 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 1 2 24 
38 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 1 2 24 
39 2 3 3 5 2 2 3 2 5 27 
40 2 3 3 5 2 2 3 2 5 27 
41 2 3 3 5 2 2 3 2 5 27 
42 
- 
2 
-- 
1 
- 
1- 
3 
- 
1 
1- 
2 
- 
2 
1- 
3 
- - - 
1 
- - - - - 
15 
- 
page I of 4 
Table El: Accountability Allocation: Functional Analysis of Managers interviewed per Activity 
Appendix E -372- VSM Construction 
page 2 of 4 
HEADQUA RTER S REG IONAL ST RUCTURE ROLL ING S TOCK 
SIGNAL. 
A T 
H AND H 
C CORPORATE R. 0 P. E OPERA- PERMAN. D WORK DE- 
MANAGEMENT S. P. W. A TIONS WAY TELECOM 0 SHOP POTS 0 
T D S 
I T 
D Y 
v E D G 
B T G E T Y D E M A 
1 0 D / / D PK T S T I R X 
A A 0 D D D P Y IG Y TM T T S S S 
T R G M E E N E E TP G MG H H T I I L 
D M P L M E R K HA R KR E E Y A A 
Y 
3 3 5 3 3 9 2 2 3 2 7 1 1 3 1 2 50 
43 2 1 3 1 2 2 3 1 15 
44 2 1 3 4 2 2 3 2 5 1 25 
45 2 1 3 1 2 2 3 1 15 
46 2 3 2 2 3 12 
47 2 3 2 2 3 12 
48 2 3 2 2 3 12 
49 2 3 2 2 3 12 
50 2 3 2 2 3 12 
51 2 3 2 2 3 12 
52 2 3 2 2 3 12 
53 2 3 2 2 3 12 
54 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 1 2 Is 
55 3 5 2 2 3 2 5 22 
56 3 1 2 2 3 1 ll 
57 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 1 2 18 
58 3 2 2 3 2 5 17 
59 1 3 2 2 3 11 
60 1 3 2 2 3 11 
61 1 1 3 3 1 2 il 
62 1 1 3 3 1 2 ll 
63 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
64 1 1 3 3 1 2 ll 
65 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
66 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
67 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
68 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
69 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
70 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
71 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
72 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
73 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
74 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
75 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
76 1 3 3 1 2 10 
77 1 3 3 1 2 10 
78 1 3 3 1 2 10 
79 1 3 3 1 2 10 
so 1 3 3 1 2 10 
81 1 3 3 1 2 10 
82 1 3 3 1 2 10 
83 2 1 3 3 1 2 12 
84 2 1 3 3 1 2 12 
85 1 3 3 1 2 10 
86 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
87 1 1 3 3 1 2 11 
Table El: (continued) 
Appendix E -373- VSM Construction 
HEADQUA RTER S REG IONAL ST RUCTURE ROLL ING S TOCK 
SIGNAL. 
A T 
H AND H 
C CORPORATE R. 0 P. E OPERA- PERMAN. D WORK DE- 
MANAGEMENT S. P. W. A TIONS WAY TELECOM Q SHOP POTS 0 
T D S 
I T 
D Y 
v E D G 
B T G E T Y D E m A 
1 0 D / / D PK T S T I R X 
A A 0 D D D P Y IG Y TM T T S S S 
T R G M E E N E E TP G MG H H T I I L 
D M P L M E R K HA R KR E E Y A A 
Y 
3 3 5 3 3 9 2 2 3 2 7 1 1 3 1 2 50 
88 1 7 9 
89 1 6 8 
90 1 1 3 7 12 
91 1 1 7 9 
92 1 1 3 2 5 12 
93 1 1 2 2 5 11 
94 1 1 2 2 6 12 
95 1 1 2 2 5 11 
96 1 1 6 2 5 15 
97 1 1 7 2 5 16 
98 1 1 6 2 7 17 
99 1 1 7 2 5 16 
100 1 1 3 2 5 12 
101 1 1 3 2 7 14 
102 1 1 2 2 5 11 
103 1 1 3 2 5 12 
104 1 1 2 2 7 13 
105 1 1 2 2 5 11 
106 1 1 3 2 7 14 
107 1 1 7 2 6 17 
108 1 1 3 2 7 14 
109 1 1 3 2 7 14 
110 1 3 2 5 11 
111 1 2 2 7 12 
112 1 3 2 7 13 
113 1 6 2 5 14 
114 1 2 3 2 7 15 
115 1 2 6 2 5 16 
116 1 1 3 2 6 13 
117 1 2 2 1 2 7 is 
118 1 2 6 2 5 16 
119 2 3 1 2 7 15 
120 2 6 2 5 15 
'121 1 1 2 1 1 1 7 
122 1 1 2 1 1 1 7 
123 1 1 2 1 1 1 7 
124 1 1 2 8 1 14 
125 1 1 2 1 1 7 
126 1 1 2 1 1 7 
127 1 1 2 1 1 1 8 
128 1 1 2 1 1 1 8 
129 1 1 2 1 1 1 8 
130 1 1 2 1 1 1 8 
page 3 of 4 
Table El: (continued) 
Appendix E -374- VSM Construction 
HEADQUA RTER S REG IONAL ST RUCTURE ROLL ING S TOCK 
SIGNAL. - 
A T 
H AND H 
c CORPORATE R. 0 P. E OPERA- PERMAN. D WORK DE- 
MANAGEMENT S. P. W. A TIONS WAY TELECOM 0 SHOP POTS 0 
T D s 
I T 
D Y 
v E D G 
B T G E T Y D E M A 
1 0 D / / D PK T S T I R X 
A A 0 D D D P Y IG Y TM T T S S S 
T R G M E E N E E TP G MG H H T I I L 
D M P L N E R K HA R KR E E Y A A 
Y 
3 3 5 3 3 9 2 2 3 2 7 1 1 3 1 2 50 
131 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 8 
132 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 8 
133 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 8 
134 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 8 
135 1 1 2 3 1 2 5 1 1 17 
136 1 1 2 3 1 2 5 1 1 17 
137 1 1 2 3 1 2 5 1 1 17 
138 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
139 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
140 1 1 1 1 1 6 
141 1 1 1 1 2 5 1 1 14 
142 1 1 1 1 5 
143 1 1 1 1 5 
144 1 1 1 1 5 
145 1 1 3 2 5 1 1 14 
146 1 1 1 1 1 5 
147 1 1 1 1 1 5 
148 1 1 1 1 1 5 
149 1 1 7 2 5 1 1 18 
150 1 1 1 1 1 5 
151 1 1 1 1 1 5 
152 1 1 1 1 1 5 
153 1 3 1 1 2 5 1 1 15 
154 1 1 1 1 5 
155 1 2 1 
156 1 2 1 
157 1 2 1 1 1 1 7 
158 1 2 3 1 1 2 5 1 1 17 
159 1 2 1 1 1 6 
160 1 1 4 
161 1 1 4 
162 1 3 2 5 1 1 13 
163 2 1 1 1 1 6 
164 2 1 1 1 1 6 
165 2 3 1 2 5 1 1 15 
166 2 1 1 1 1 1 7 
167 2 1 1 1 1 6 
168 
- 
2 
- - - - 
3 
- 
1 
- 
1 
I- 
- 
2 
- 
5 
- 
1 
- 
1 
1- - - - 
16 
page 4 of 4 
Table El: (continued) 
Appendix E -375- VSM Construction 
ACTIVITY 
001 
002 
003 
004 
005 
006 
007 
008 
009 
010 
Oil 
012 
013 
014 
015 
016 
017 
018 
019 
020 
021 
022 
023 
accountabitity aLLocation M [survey data] accountabLe manager 
AAnk 
AGGDA0nP Inter- accepte 
SMM0DDDDL0n0 name M viewed respon- 
KDGEPMEEN0DDLn0w sibiLit 
ESNKRPTMEYPDDetn 
50 33 83 GH 83 N 
17 83 33 33 GM 83 N 
33 67 GM 67 N 
17 100 - 33 GM 100 N 
17 83 17 33 GM 83 N 
22 11 67 22 DOMP 67 YY 
22 22 67 
67 33 DOMP 67 YY 
33 33 22 22 22 
22 22 33 33 22 22 11 
11 22 78 DOMP 78 YY 
30 90 DOMP 90 YY 
11 89 DOMP 89 YY 
11 89 DOY 89 N 
8 25 58 8 17 DOMP 58 YY 
17 17 50 8 25 DOMP 50 YY 
33 67 DOMP 67 YY 
22 56 11 10 DOMP 56 YY 
10 30 10 70 DOY 70 N 
10 30 10 70 DOY 70 N 
20 10 70 DOY 70 N 
25 38 88 13 AGMPR 88 YY 
13 25 25 50 ALLD 50 YY 
Table E2: Activities at Corporate Level: Accountability Allocation 
noone crite- 
+ rfon 
not 
known 
0a 
0a 
0b 
0a 
0a 
0b 
67 e 
33 d 
22 e 
11 e 
0a 
0a 
0a 
0a 
0c 
0c 
0b 
11 c 
0b 
0b 
0b 
0 a. 
0c 
Appendix E -376- VSM Construction 
ACTIVITY 
024 
025 
026 
027 
028 
029 
030 
031 
032 
033 
034 
035 
036 
037 
038 
039 
040 
041 
042 
043 
044 
045 
046 
047 
048 
049 
050 
051 
052 
053 
054 
055 
056 
057 
058 
059 
060 
ac coun tabi Lity alt ocat ion M [su rvey dat a3 acco untabte manager 
A A A D 0 n k % 
G G G D D I t 0 n p Inter- accepted noone crite- 
M M M 0 D D D D D P Y S Y h o no name viewed respon- + rion 
E E P M E E E D N 0 E E T G e n oW sibiLity not 
K L R P T M L G E Y R K Y R r e tn known 
13 38 50 50 13 DET so Y Y 0 c 
DEN 50 Y Y 0 c 
13 50 38 25 13 13 13 DOMP 50 Y Y 26 d 
13 13 50 13 13 DEN 50 Y Y 13 C 
13 25 38 50 13 25 DEN 50 Y Y 25 d 
5 57 5 5 5 24 14 5 10 DET 57 Y Y 10 c 
4 8 60 a 56 28 8 DET 60 Y Y 8 c 
36 5 67 5 10 5 10 10 e 
4 70 4 10 10 10 4 17 DET 70 Y Y 17 c 
7 60 47 27 20 7 7 DET 60 Y Y 7 c 
7 60 67 27 13 7 7 DEN 67 Y Y 7 b 
7 87 7 7 DEN 87 Y Y 7 a 
7 87 7 7 7 DET 87 Y Y 0 a 
8 68 20 20 12 28 4 4 DET 68 Y Y 0 b 
8 50 42 42 13 13 21 4 DET 50 Y Y 4 c 
4 29 21 21 46 29 4 4 4 4 e 
4 4 44 11 11 4 7 4 11 15 e 
4 44 4 11 4 8 7 4 4 8 e 
4 59 4 a 11 22 4 7 4 DET 59 Y Y 4 c 
73 13 6 20 6 DET 73 Y Y 6 b 
53 6 20 6 DET 53 Y Y 6 c 
24 4 4 16 12 DG 76 Y Y 0 a 
47 13 13 27 20 7 7 e 
33 17 54 8 33 8 a DEN 54 Y Y 8 c 
33 17 54 8 42 8 DEN 54 Y Y 0 c 
17 67 25 8 8 25 8 DEN 67 Y Y 8 b 
17 67 25 8 8 25 8 DEN 67 Y Y 8 b 
8 50 17 17 33 DOY 50 N 33 d 
8 50 17 17 a 33 DOY 50 N 33 d 
a 50 17 17 8 33 DOY 50 N 33 d 
75 8 25 42 a DET 75 Y Y 0 a 
50 11 11 33 33 5 6 6 DET 50 Y Y 12 c 
50 14 23 4 5 18 DET 50 Y Y 23 d 
36 27 36 9 9 9 e 
22 11 11 11 50 39 6 6 6 DPER 50 Y Y 6 c 
18 29 59 6 6 YEK 59 Y Y 6 c 9 18 45 45 27 0 e 9 18 45 45 9 0 e 
T able El Ac tivi ties of the Op erat ions sys tem :A cco unta bili ty All ocatio n 
Appendix E -377- VSM Construction 
ac coun tabi tity alt ocat ion M [su rvey dat a] 
A D E M n 
ACTIVITY G D D I R X o 
M 0 D D D D D p Y S S S o 
E M E E 0 1 A E E T I I n 
L P T L Y P P R K Y A A e 
061 9 9 100 27 
062 9 18 82 36 9 
063 9 91 9 
064 9 100 
065 9 73 36 9 
066 9 100 
067 9 100 
068 9 100 
069 9 91 9 
070 9 9 27 91 is 
071 9 9 36 82 9 9 
072 9 ioo 9 
073 9 100 9 
074 9 18 45 91 
075 9 18 45 91 9 
076 10 90 20 
077 10 80 20 
078 10 10 100 io 
079 10 100 20 
080 10 10 30 20 90 10 10 
081 10 10 30 20 90 10 20 
082 10 30 20 60 10 20 
083 8 8 25 67 
084 8 8 25 67 8 
085 10 50 10 20 30 
086 18 73 27 
087 18 64 27 
k 
accountabie manager 
n 
no 
0w 
tn 
8 
10 
I inter- I 
name 
I 
(%P) viewedl 
DEL 
DEL 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DEL 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DISTY 
DEL 
DISTY 
DISTY 
100 
82 
91 
i0o 
73 
100 
100 
100 
91 
91 
82 
100 
100 
91 
91 
90 
80 
100 
100 
90 
90 
60 
67 
67 
50 
73 
64 
accepted 
respon- 
siblLity 
noone crite- 
+ rion 
not 
known 
a 
a 
a 
a 
b 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
C 
b 
b 
C 
b 
C 
Table E4: Activities of the Rolling Stock system: Accountability Allocation 
Appendix E -378- VSM Construction 
accountabitfty aLLocation (%) [survey data] accountabLe manager 
ACTIVITY 
A 
G 
M 
A 
G 
M 
D 
0 D D D D 
D 
P Y 
T 
M 
T 
T 
n 
o 
o 
ý 
n 
k 
n 
o name 
P inter- 
viewed 
accepted 
respon- 
% 
noone 
+ 
crite- 
rion 
E G M E D N 0 A E G G H n o W sibiLity not 
K R P T G E Y P R R R E e t n known 
088 
089 
090 
091 
092 
093 
094 
095 
096 
097 
098 
099 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
III 
112 
113 
114 
115 6 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
1 
66 
6 19 
7 
71_ 
83 
6 
100 55 
38 100 
58 83 
67 56 
100 
100 
100 
73 
27 93 
69 56 
41 76 
94 50 
83 
79 7 
64 
83 
77 
64 
64 
47 59 
86 
93 
73 
50 
38 
29 64 
67 
75 
69 
47 13 
251 50 13 
47 
27 60 
8 
9 
7 
7 
7 
11 
8 
9 
17 
27 
6 
12 
6 
67 
57 
82 
75 
85 
73 
93 
53 
79 
79 
82 
75 
69 
64 
60 
31 
54 
33 
6 
60 
40 
12 
33 
36 
45 
42 
54 
45 
50 
35 
50 
50 
55 
67 
62 
29 
47 
15 
27 
47 
7 
8 
7 
7 
77 
DG 
DNE 
DNE 
DET 
DNE 
DG 
DNE 
DG 
DG 
DG 
DNE 
DG 
DNE 
DNE 
DG 
DNE 
DG 
YGR 
DG 
YGR 
YGR 
DG 
YGR 
YGR 
DG 
YGR 
YGR 
DNE 
YGR 
DG 
YGR 
DG 
YGR 
YGR 
DG 
YGR 
TMGR 
YGR 
TMGR 
DNE 
YGR 
DG 
YGR 
DNE 
DG 
YGR 
DNE 
YGR 
DNE 
101 
5! 
101 
6 
51 
101 
101 
101 
9" 
61 
51 
7 
91 
5 
8 
6 
7 
5 
8 
8 
7 
8 
7 
7 
9 
5 
5 
8 
7 
9 
7 
a 
7 
7 
6 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y0 
y0 
y0 
y0 
y0 
y0 
y0 
y0 
y0 
y0 
y 
Iy 
y 
I- 
a 
c 
a 
a 
a 
b 
c 
a 
a 
a 
e 
a 
b 
c 
Table E5: Activities of the Permanent Way system: Accountability Allocation 
Appendix E -379- VSM Construction 
ac coun tabi Lity atL ocat ion (%) [su rvey dat a] 
A D Y 
ACTIVITY G D D I T S T 
M 0 D D D P Y S Y M T T 
G M E D N 0 E E T G G H H 
R P T G E Y R K Y R R E E 
121 43 57 57 
122 14 43 57 57 
123 57 43 71 
124 21 57 43 57 
125 14 43 14 29 
126 57 57 29 
127 25 63 25 
128 13 13 38 50 
129 13 38 50 50 
130 13 13 13 50 50 
131 13 25 63 
132 63 25 50 
133 13 38 50 
134 13 25 63 
135 24 53 12 24 12 35 
136 35 24 18 18 47 6 
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A C TI V I T I ES 
crftaria activities 
per Corpora te RaR Rolling Permanent Signal ling/ Tot aL 
criterion Level Operati ons Stock Way Tetecomms 
activities 9 9 4 4 20 20 19 19 12 12 64 
64 
criterion a 
% 39 39 11 11 74 74 58 58 25 25 38 38 
activities 6 5 4 7 3 25 
criterion b II ,I 
% 26 13 15 21 6 15 
activities 15 9 24 26 15 
89 
criteria a+b 
% 65 24 89 79 31 53 
activities 4 15 3 5 19 46 
criterion c 
% 18 41 11 15 40 27 
activities 19 24 27 31 34 135 
criteria a+b+c 
% 83 65 100 94 71 80 
activities 1 6 0 0 3 10 
criterion d 
% 4 16 0 0 6 6 
activities 20 30 27 31 37 145 
criteria a+b+c+d 
% 87 81 100 94 77 86 
activities 23 37 27 33 48 168 
total 
% 100 100 i0o 100 100 
activities 3 7 0 2 11 23 
non-accountabLe - (criterion e) - - - - - - - - - 
% 
I 
13 19 0 6 23 14 
Table E7: Accountability Allocation by Allocation Criterion and Content of Activity 
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APPENDIX F 
TESTING COHESIVENESS 
Information, contained in this appendix relates to the 'organizational culture' test 
undertaken in Chapter 11 in the form of managerial cohesiveness. 
- Table FI provides mean values of the variables OBJECTI to REASON9 (Survey 
Questionnaire, Section Two, Questions 3-12), concerning the total sample as well 
as the various subgroupings by age, level, function and jobtype, as described in 
Chapter 9. 
- Figures FI to F7 provide graphical illustration of these mean values. 
- Table F2 provides mean values for variables related to improvement of systemic 
performance (Survey Questionnaire, Section Two, Question 13). 
- Tables F3 to F9 display the two-sample or k-sample median tests involving the 49 
variables of this section (variables OBJECTI to REASON9) against the independent 
variables-age, level, function and jobtype. 
- Tables FIO and FIl display pairwise comparisons for those of the non-dichotomous 
variables for which the k-sample median tests have indicated siginificant 
association. 
- Table F12 provides rank orders of methods for improving performance (Survey 
Questionnaire, Section Two, Question 13). 
- Figure 8 provides a graphical illustration of these rank orders. 
Appendix F -415- Testing 
Cohesiveness 
indepndt variable age group tevel group function group jobtype 
entire 
vatue sampLe +30 +40 +50 top dpts dfv area raft rott perm sign othr 
LabeL -40 -50 60 +60 mgmt mgmt mgmt mgmt ops stck way ttcm hdqs prdc 
popitn 50 9 19 13 9 67 20 17 a 10 18 3 11 21 29 
dependent 
% 100 18 38 26 18 12 14 40 34 16 20 36 6 22 42 58 
variable 
c 2345 1234 12345 12 
object12.53 3.33 2.88 2.09 2.33 1.83 2.33 2.37 3.06 2.14 2.88 3.00 1.67 2.00 2.05 2.86 
0bjact22.60 2.33 3.00 2.45 2.00 2.00 2.83 2.79 2.50 2.29 3.63 2.50 2.00 2.36 2.37 2.75 
objact33.25 3.50 3.19 3.32 2.75 3.67 3.43 3.42 2.81 2.86 3.56 3.00 2.67 3.82 3.42 3.14 
objact42.60 2.83 2.75 2.55 2.00 3.33 2.57 2.89 2.00 2.00 2.67 2.89 2.00 2.64 2.89 2.41 
object53.91 4.17 3.56 4.15 3.67 4.50 4.20 3.56 4.00 4.83 3.57 3.56 3.67 4.27 3.83 3.96 
0bjact64.17 3.67 4.25 4.14 4.75 4.50 4.71 4.00 4.00 4.14 4.11 4.22 4.00 4.18 4.21 4.14 
0bject73.11 2.50 3.25 3.24 2.75 3.83 3.50 3.05 2.75 3.17 3.11 2.78 3.00 3.64 3.11 3.10 
task13.47 3.00 3.44 3.52 4.00 3.67 3.71 3.50 3.25 3.75 2.90 3.33 2.50 4.18 3.90 3.14 
task23.08 3.00 3.13 2.96 3.75 2.83 3.29 3.00 3.19 3.00 3.60 2.83 2.50 3.18 3.52 2.75 
tas, k 3 4.86 4.67 4.76 4.96 5.00 4.83 5.00 4.85 4.82 5.00 4.60 4.89 5.00 4.91 4.86 4.86 
task44.60 4.33 4.53 4.74 4.50 4.50 4.57 4.65 4.59 4.63 4.50 4.56 4.67 4.73 4.71 4.52 
task54.28 3.17 4.47 4.39 4.50 4.00 4.00 4.60 4.11 4.13 4.00 4.39 4.00 4.55 4.38 4.21 
task64.70 4.17 4.71 4.91 4.25 4.83 4.57 4.75 4.65 4.88 4.50 4.67 4.67 4.82 4.86 4.59 
task74.52 4.50 4.41 4.61 4.50 4.50 4.43 4.55 4.53 4.38 4.50 4.56 4.00 4.73 4.62 4.45 
contr12.38 2.33 2.06 2.48 3.25 2.67 2.14 2.50 2.23 2.13 2.90 1.61 3.67 3.00 2.81 2.07 
contr22.18 2.00 2.00 2.17 3.25 2.17 1.86 2.05 2.47 2.13 2.90 1.39 3.33 2.55 2.33 2.07 
contr32.46 3.33 2.06 2.35 3.50 2.67 2.00 2.40 2.65 2.38 4.20 1.94 3.33 1.55 2.10 2.72 
contr42.02 2.50 1.71 2.04 2.50 2.67 2.57 1.75 1.88 2.88 2.10 1.67 2.67 1.73 1.81 2.17 
c0ntr52.62 1.83 2.88 2.52 3.25 3.00 2.43 2.80 2.35 2.13 2.80 3.00 4.33 1.73 2.43 2.76 
contr62.88 M7 2.88 2.91 2.25 3.50 2.57 2.85 2.82 3.13 3.40 2.61 3.67 2.45 2.81 2.93 
-C ontr11.90 2.33 1.41 2.09 2.25 2.83 1.71 1.75 1.82 2.25 2.10 1.72 3.00 1.45 1.86 1.93 
pLan2.64 4.25 2.69 2.39 2.25 3.20 2.14 2.50 2.87 2.63 2.78 2.71 2.00 2.60 2.40 2.81 
budgat3.22 3.75 2.77 3.60 2.75 3.50 2.83 3.40 3.15 4.00 4.13 2.53 4.00 2.67 3.00 3.31 
fraqbud92.29 2.83 1.87 2.63 1.75 3.50 2.83 1.93 1.93 2.60 1.88 2.00 3.33 2.86 2.94 1.88 
vIaw12.02 2.50 2.06 2.00 1.25 1.50 1.71 2.10 2.23 2.00 1.40 2.61 2.67 1.45 1.52 2.38 
vIaw23.02 3.83 2.82 2.87 3.50 2.83 3.43 3.15 2.76 3.00 2.90 3.44 3.33 2.36 2.90 3.10 
,vIew33.16 3.50 3.06 3.26 2.50 3.83 2.86 3.30 2.88 3.75 3.00 3.22 3.67 2.64 3.10 3.21 
vfaw43.46 3.83 3.18 3.43 4.25 4.50 3.86 3.70 2.65 3.38 3.60 3.50 4.00 3.18 3.62 3.34 
0pin12.40 2.20 2.73 2.30 2.25 2.33 2.00 2.50 2.50 1.88 2.71 2.58 4.00 2.09 2.11 2.64 
0pin23.29 3.50 3.50 3.16 3.00 3.33 3.00 3.40 3.25 3.00 3.29 3.36 4.50 3.18 3.31 2.27 
opin32.59 2.67 2.59 2.59 2.50 2.17 2.71 2.58 2.71 2.75 2.40 2.71 3.33 2.27 2.30 2.79 
0pin42.18 2.83 2.29 1.91 2.25 2.17 2.00 2.00 2.47 2.00 2.50 2. il 3.00 1.91 2.05 2.28 
0pfn52.06 2.33 2.12 1.87 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.18 1.75 2.00 2.22 2.67 1.91 1.95 2.14 
0pfn62.81 3.33 2.88 2.68 2.33 3.00 2.50 2.95 2.71 2.38 2.50 3.25 3.33 2.64 2.68 2.90 
opin72.81 3.17 2.88 2.63 3.00 2.83 2.83 2.79 2.82 2.50 2.60 3.19 3.00 2.64 2.58 2.97 
0pin8,2.94 3.40 2.94 2.76 3.25 3.17 3.00 2.79 3.00 2.88 3.00 3.18 3.00 2.55 2.84 3.00 
opin92.67 3.20 2.53 2.64 2.75 2.67 2.57 2.58 2.81 2.63 2.89 2.94 3.00 2.00 2.45 M2 
ourn3.44 3.00 3.41 3.70 2.75 2.67 3.29 3.75 3.41 3.50 2.80 3.56 3.33 3.82 3.62 3.31 
journ25.24 5.17 5.82 4.91 4.75 3.83 5.00 5.00 5.53 5.13 5.20 5.39 5.33 5.09 4.76 5.59 
J0urn34.30 3.83 4.71 4.04 4.75 4.00 5.00 4.55 3.82 4.00 4.00 4.39 4.67 4.55 4.43 4.21 
raas0n12.24 2.67 2.29 2.13 2.00 1.67 2.00 2.45 2.29 1.50 2.90 2.28 2.67 2.00 2.19 2.28 
r e. a s0n22.56 3.17 2.35 2.65 2.00 2.67 2.71 2.35 2.71 2.25 3.10 2.22 3.33 2.64 2.57 2.55 
raas0n33.22 2.67 2.88 3.52 3.75 2.83 3.71 3.20 3.18 3.38 3.80 2.78 3.33 3.27 3.71 2.86 
reason43.18 2.17 3.18 3.39 3.50 3.17 3.57 3.20 3.00 3.25 3.50 2.0 3.33 3.36 3.62 2.86 
raas0n53.30 3.17 3.41 3.26 3.25 3.00 3.29 3.45 3.24 3.00 3.70 3.22 2.67 3.45 3.62 3.07 
raas0n63.40 3.67 3.71 3.26 2.50 3.50 3.00 3.55 3.35 3.00 3.40 3.56 3.33 3.45 3.48 3.34 
raas0n72.36 3.17 2.35 2.35 1.25 2.83 2.14 2.15 2.53 2.50 2.40 2.17 2.33 2.55 2.33 2.38 
raas0n83.12 3.00 3.47 3.17 1.50 3.50 2.43 3.35 3.00 2.63 2.50 3.39 2.67 3.73 3.48 2.86 
reaa0n93.76 
- 
4.17 4.06 3.57 3.00 
1 
4.00 3.29 3.80 3.82 3.25 4.00 4.06 3.33 3.55 4.00 3.55 
Table ri: Mean values of variables: Variables OBJECTI to REASON9 
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indepndt variable age group level group function group jobtype 
entire 
value sample +30 +40 +50 top dpts div area rail roll pem sign othr 
label -40 -50 -60 +60 mgmt mgmt mgmt mgmt ops stck way ttcm hdqs prdc 
popLtn 50- 6 17 23 4 67 20 17 8 10 18 3 11 21 29 
dependent 
% 100 12 34 46 8 12 14 40 34 16 20 36 6 22 42 58 
variable 
c 2345 1234 1345 12 
improved quality 
of services by: 
-reorganization 3.53 3.40 3.47 3.20 6.33 2.40 4.33 3.06 4.13 4.13 4.00 3.53 3.00 2.75 3.13 4.00 
-changing heads 5.38 4.83 5.47 5.50 5.00 4.33 6.00 5.65 5.25 5.86 5.00 5.33 4.67 5.75 5.71 5.00 
-improved planning 3.19 2.60 3.75 3.00 2.75 2.50 3.00 3.32 3.40 2.80 2.50 3.61 3.67 3.25 3.17 3.22 
-effective control 3.49 2.17 3.12 4.60 1.50 3.67 3.00 4.17 2.88 3.13 2.50 3.72 5.00 4.00 3.72 3.23 
-staff training 2.88 3.83 2.82 2.68 2.75 3.00 2.14 3.11 2.88 2.40 3.10 3.00 2.67 3.00 2.80 2.96 
-better work cndtns 4.74 6.00 4.44 4.40 5.75 5.17 5.50 4.56 4.50 4.88 4.78 4.67 5.00 4.63 4.63 4.86 
-salary increases 4.65 5.00 5.06 4.30 4.00 6.20 4.20 4.22 4.80 5.29 5.43 4.22 4.00 4.63 4.43 4.90 
r: sources optimum 
tiLization by: 
-reorganization 3.60 3.60 3.47 3.39 5.00 1.67 5.17 3.19 4.21 4.83 3.88 3.82 2.00 2.50 3.09 4.21 
-changing heads 5.30 4.33 5.00 5.72 6.00 5.00 6.17 5.56 4.81 6.20 5.30 5.17 3.67 5.63 5.75 4.75 
-improved planning 2.76 3.00 2.25 3.00 3.25 3.00 2.57 2.72 2.79 2.13 2.75 2.67 2.33 3.75 2.96 2.55 
-effective control 3.44 4.17 3.24 3.67 2.25 5.50 2.67 3.59 2.81 1.83 2.30 3.72 5.67 4.63 3.63 3.24 
-staff training 3.06 3.33 3.82 2.55 2.00 2.50 2.14 3.39 3.31 2.88 3.40 3.06 3.67 2.63 2.83 3.30 
, better work cndtns 4.66 4.50 4.44 4.67 5.75 4.67 5.00 4.71 4.47 5.00 4.33 4.83 5.33 4.13 4.48 4.86 
-salary increases 5.09 5.00 5.63 4.72 4.67 5.67 4.60 4.88 5.29 5.60 5.50 4.89 5.33 4.75 5.00 5.21 
improved systems 
cooperation by: 
-reorganization 2.24 2.75 1.82 2.53 2.25 1.67 2.67 1.94 2.69 3.17 1.43 2.71 1.33 1.63 2.00 2.56 
-changing heads 4.79 3.00 4.65 5.18 6.00 4.17 5.67 5.18 4.21 5.67 4.38 5.00 3.67 4.50 4.96 4.60 
-improved planning 2.45 2.40 2.69 2.32 2.25 2.50 2.71 2.06 2.85 2.13 1.86 2.89 2.67 2.25 2.36 2.55 
-effective control 3.79 3.60 3.75 4.11 2.75 4.83 3.17 3.94 3.43 2.50 3. BS 3.56 5.67 4.50 3.96 3.60 
-staff training 3.41 3.75 3.69 2.90 4.50 2.83 3.57 3.61 3.31 3.13 4.57 3.28 3.67 2. B8 3.30 3.52 
-better work cndtns 5.40 6.75 5.44 4.94 6.00 5.83 5.33 5.47 5.15 5.67 4.71 5.39 6.00 5.63 5.35 5.47 
-salary increases 5.68' 6.00 5.81 5.56 5.33 6.17 5.00 5.71 5.69 5.80 5.86 5.28 5.00 6.63 5.70 5.67 
improved subsystem - rolling stock by: 
-reorganization 3.06 4.25 3.20 2.09 4.33 2.33 4.25 2.83 3.27 4.00 3.75 3.08 1.67 2A7 2.53 3.63 
-changing heads 4.89 4.40 4.60 5.17 6.00 4.50 6.25 5.33 4.23 6.00 5.10 4.92 3.67 4.50 5.06 4.71 
-improved planning 2.82 2.20 2.94 2.79 3.33 2.50 3.20 2.43 3.23 2.33 3.00 2.92 3.00 2.67 2.78 2.85 
-effective control 3.72 3.20 3.81 4.08 2.67 5.00 3.00 3.62 3.46 2.25 3.30 3.92 6.00 3. B3 3.83 3.61 
-staff training 3.00 4.00 3.50 2.23 2.00 2.83 2.20 3.07 3.33 2.33 2.89 3.23 2.67 3.50 2.88 3.10 
-better work cndtns 4.80 4.60 4.33 5.17 6.00 4.83 5.50 5.08 4.25 6.00 3.67 4. B4 5.67 5.17 4.76 4.83 
-salary Increases 5.42 5.00 5.60 5.42 5.00 6.00 3.67 5.69 5.27 6.00 5.00 5.23 5.33 6.17 5.59 5.25 
Improved subsystem 
permanent way by: 
-reorganization 3.50 5.50 3.14 2.69 6.00 3.60 5.40 2.57 3.80 3.75 3.25 3.88 2.00 M7 3.22 3.81 
-changing heads 5.06 3.75 5.21 5.15 5.67 4.20 6.20 5.50 4.30 5.67 5.25 5.33 3.33 4.67 5.56 4.50 
: improved planning 2.61 2.00 2.73 2.67 2.50 2.50 2.83 2.19 3.20 2.00 2.20 2.72 3.00 3.00 2.63 2.58 
effective control 3.61 3.25 3.53 4.31 2.00 4.33 2.80 3.73 3.40 2.50 2.20 3.94 5.67 3.50 3.68 3.53 
-staff training 2.79 3.75 3.13 2.33 2.25 2.83 1.83 3.13 2.80 2.33 3. BO 2.50 3.00 3.17 2.58 3.00 
-better work crdtns 5.25 4.75 5.13 5.38 5.75 4.83 5.40 5.67 4.80 6.00 5.00 5.06 5.67 5.33 5.37 SA2 
-salary increases 5.23 5.00 5.53 5.15 4.33 5.50 3.75 5.20 5.70 6.67 5.40 4.72 5.33 5. B3 4.95 5.56 
Improved subsystem 
signaLLing/tcm by: 
-reorganization 3.33 5.33 3.33 2.50 4.50 2.80 4.50 3.40 3.00 3.50 5.00 3.73 1.67 2.50 3.21 3.46 
: Changing heads 5.04 5.67 4.75 5.40 4.00 4.20 5.50 5.40 4.88 5.67 5.33 5.00 4.67 4. B3 5.36 4.69 improved planning 2.61 2.33 2.62 2.75 2.33 3.00 2.60 2.17 3.00 2.50 1.75 2.67 2.67 3.17 2.67 2.56 
-effective control 3.66 3.00 3.31 4.50 3.00 4.67 3.50 3 45 3 25 2 83 5 75 2 50 3 33 3 B3 57 73 3 3 
, staff training 2.71 1.67 3.38 2.00 3.67 . . 1.83 2.80 3.00 2.88 . . . . . 2 67 3 25 2 33 75 2 67 2 . . 2 20 3 19 
'better work cndtns 5.21 5.00 5.15 5.20 5.67 4. B3 5.50 5.28 5.25 . . . . . 08 5 5.75 4.50 5 67 5 33 . . 07 5.36 5 
"salary increases 5.39 5.00 5.69 5.30 4.50 5.67 3.67 5.45 5.75 . . . 5.67 5.00 5.17 5.33 6.00 . 5.47 5.31 
Table P2: Mean Values of Variables: Improvement of Systemic Performance . 
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indpt 
var 
vari 
I 
able condition 
D. F. 
aga 
2+3 4+5 total 
1 
avai 
1+2 34 total 
2 
function 
1+4 23 
15totat 
3 
jobtype 
1 
above median 14 61 20 __ 21 -61 121 20 3 4 12 11 [ 20 2. _ 
2 18 20 
below median _ 8 19 1 27 1 "1 41 27 7 4 6 10 + L 27 - 27 1 17 7 1 17 10 
E 
27 27 
object 1 total 72- 25 1 47 121 191 161 47 101 81 181 11 4 7 47 19 9 19 19 28 47 47 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
2 
7.5206* 
0.0610 
2 
11.1163** 
0.0039 
2 
10.1461** 
0.0174 
2 
11.2733** 
0.0008 
above median 9 81 17 41 81 51 17 31 51 6 41131 17 
below mediaEl 13 17 1 30 ;1 111 111 30 71 31 12 30 
object 2 total 22 1 25 1 47 121 191 161 47 101 81 18 191281 47 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
2 
0.4023 
0.5259 
2 
0.4995 
0.7790 
2 
3.0070 
0.3905 
2 
2.1536 
0.1422 
above median 2 21 4- 11 21 11 4 11 11 21 01 4 ' 
13 4 
below median 20 24 1 44 121 171 151 44 91 81 161 44 181261 44 
- object 3 FotaL 22 1 22 1 4R 131 191 161 48 101 91 181 -1-9-129 8- L-4 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
4 
0.0305 
0.8613 
4 
0.2175 
. 8969 
4 
1.3091 
0.7270 
4 
0.0079 
0.9291 
above media! I 11 11 2 8 8 11 3 22 21 41 101 61 22 111 11122 
below median 11 15 26 
L 
5 
L ý8 
131 
E 
26 
E 
6 81 51 81 51 26 81 
- - 
181 26 
- - - object 4 total 22 1 26 48 1 3 19 4 8 10 = 181111 48 -1 99 1 8- 29 F4 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
2 
0.2840 
0.5941 
2 
7.1322** 
0.0283 
2 
3.7167 
0.2937 
2 
1.1264 
0.2885 
above median 4 8 11 2 5 11 1 61 12 5 11 13 13 1 12 48 8 4L 8 1122 
below media n 18 15 . - __ 13 33 6 1 17 1 101 33 4 16 1 15 18 1 33 I 14 19 14 19 
J 
33 33 3ý 3 
t 
total object 5 22 1 23 1 11 1 18 1 161 45 9 17 1 18 1 Il l 45 
_ 
87 27 2 =2 28 45 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
4 
1.5846 
0.2081 
4 
7.0480** 
0.0295 
5 
4 
. 3121 0.1503 
4 
0.0426 
0.8365 
above medisEL 8 1 11 1 19 9 4 61 19 4 14 1 81 3 1 19 7 12 1 19 
below median 14 1 15 1 29 4 1 15 
N 
10 29 6 15 1 101 8 1 29 12 117 1-29- 
object 6 total 22 1 26 1 48 
S 
I 3 161 48 10 19 1 181 11 1 48 19 129 1 48 
Median 
Chf-Square 
Staniffcance 
4 
0.1761 
0.6748 
4 
7.5352** 
0.0231 
4 
0.9646 
0.8098 
4 
0.0002 
0.9900 
above mediar 8 1 14 1. g2 8 19 15 12 Z 4 14 1 61 8 1 22 1 ? 22 1 
below median 14 1 11 1 25 4 1 10 1 Il l 25 5 15 1 121 3 1 25 
9 17 
25 
object 7 total 22 1 25 1 47 12 1 19 1 16 1 47 9 19 1 181 11 1 47 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
3 
1.8123 
0.1782 
3 
3.4586 
0.1774 
3 
4.3211 
0.2288 
3 
0.4175 
0.5182 
significance at the 90 % confidence level 
significance at the 95 % confidence Level 
Table F3: k-Sample Xedian Test: variables OBJECTI to OBJECT7 
- 
Appendix F -425- Testing 
Cohesiveness 
i ndpt 
var 
variable condition 
D. F. 
a9e 
2+3 4+5 total 
1 
LeveL 
1+2 34 total 
2 
functIon 
1+4 
121315 
total 
3 
Jobtype 
1 
ýtotaL 
1 
above median 10 1 9 19 5 12 -3-1 4 5 7 19 9 10 19 
below median 12 1 18 1 30 8 1 T2_ 10 0 3 
1 
7 
E 
6 6 131 41 30 12 18 
1 
30 
task I total 22 27 1 49 13 18 16 49 
1 
0 0 10 a L 
. 
10 181 111 49 21 49 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
4 
0.7502 
0.3864 
4 
0.0241 
0.9880 
4 
4.1116 
0.2497 
4 
0.0448 
0.8324 
above median 9 8 17 31 71 71 17 2 6 63 17 ; 1 7 1 
below median 13 1 19 
Lý3_2 
101 131 91 32 8 41 121 8 32 ý 1 1 2 
task 2 total 22 1 27 131 2 101 101 181 111 49 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
_ 3 
0.6807 
0.4093 
3 
1.3543 
0.5081 
3 
4.0615 
0.2549 
3 
0.0169 
0.8966 
above mediao 1 0 0 01 01 01 0 01 01 01 01 0 0 01 0 
below median 1 2 3 27 131 201 171 50 111 101 181 1 21 291 50 
task 3 total 23 1 27 131 201 171 50 111 101 181 1 . 2JJ ý50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
above median 01 0 0 0 01 01 0 0 01 0A -0 
0 01 0 
below median 23 1 27 50 50 13 201 171 50 11 10 181 Ill 50 211291 50 
task 4 total =50 13 -201 171 50 11 10 181 Ill 50 _2_1T29 L50_ 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Siqnificance 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
5 
0.0 
.0 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
above median 0 10 01 -0 10 10 0 01 0 10 10 2 2 2 
below median 23 27 50 
t 
131 20 1 17 1 ý_O 11 
d 
101 
k 
18 8 1 il l 50 ý 1 29 2 0 5 
task 5 total 23 1 27 50 13 1 20 1 17 1 11 i 8 1 il l 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
above medign 0 0 10 0 10 10 10 0 10 1 01 0 10 0 0 2 2 0 
below median 23 7 1 50 13 1 20 1 17 1,50 11 1 10 1 181 Il l 50 21 2 9 
t5 
O 
task 6 total 23 1 27 13 1 20 1 17 1 50 11 1 10 1 181 11 150 2T , T9 50 
median 
Chf-Square 
Significance 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
-5 
0.0 
1.0 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
above medign 0 0 1 0 10 10 10 0 10 1 01 0 10 09 02 02 
below medi an 23 
1 
27 59 13 1 20 1 17 1 50 il l 10 11 1 181 1 50 211 299 1 E 
t 
55000 
task 7 total 23 1 27 50 13 1 20 1 17 1 50 11 1 10 . 1 181 11 1 50 9 2 1 550 
_0 Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
5 
0.0 
1.0 
significance at the 90 % confidence levet 
significance at the 95 % confidence Levet 
Table P4: k-Sample Median Test: Variables TASK1 to TASK7 
Appendix F -426- Testing Cohesiveness 
i ndpt 
var 
variable condition 
D. F. 
age 
2+3 4+5 totaLl 
-1 
1- 
1 
LeveL 
1+21 314 
ItotaL'1 
2 
function 
1+41 2315 
TtotaL 
3 
jobtype 
T121totat 
1 
above median 11 13 1 24 5 121 71 24 -5 -61 7 24 12 12 24 
below median 12 14 1 26 8 81 101 26 
1 
6 
1 
4 121 
1 
4 26 9 17 26 
contr 1 total 
ý 
23 
E 
13 201 171 50 
j 
1 11 10 181 11 50 21 29 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
2 
0.0005 
0.9819 
2 
1.9448 
0.3782 
2 
3.2343 
0.3569 
0 
0 . 
6633 
. 4154 
above mediao 7 14 1 21 61 81 71 21 5 61 41 61 21 10 11 21 - below median 16 
1 
13 1 29 71 121 101 29 6 
1 
41 141 51 29 11 18 
t 
29 
contr 2 total 23 27 1 50 131 201 171 50 11 101 181 111 50 21 29 50 = 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
2 
2.3386 
0.1262 
2 
0.1297 
0.9372 
2 
4.9850 
0.1729 
2 
0.1558 
0.6930 
above median 8 9 17 2 8 7 17 3 91 41 11 17 -5 
121 17 
below median 15 18 33 111 121 101 33 
J 
8 8 11 141 1 16 17ý 33 
contr 3 total 23 27 50 131 201 171 50 1 11 101 181 1 L1 29 
E50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Sfqnificance 
3 
0.0116 
0.9141 
3 
2.7186 
0.2568 
3 
18.3511** 
0.0004 
3 
0.9841 
0.3212 
above median 10 13 3 91 81 61 23 8 51 61 41 23 10 13 23 
below median 13 1 14 7 
ft 
41 121 Ill 27 
! 
=3 5 121 71 27 11 16 27 
contr 4 total 
E 
50 131 201 171 50 1 1 L 11 10 181 111 50 
- 
21 29 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
2 
0.1090 
0.7412 
2 
3.8986 
0.1424 
2 
4.8016 
0.1869 
2 
0.0085 
0.9267 
above median 9 13 22 6 10 6 22 4 51 101 31 22 9 131 22 
below median 14 14 28 , 7 11 11 1 28 
J 
7 7 51 81 12LI61 28 
contr 5 total 23 27 50 13 20 17 1 50 1 11 1 10 1 181 1 211291 50 
median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
3 
0.4099 
0.5220 
3 
1 0.8396 
0.6572 
3 
2.6310 
0.4521 
3 
0.0225 
0.8807 
above medi! n 7 10 1 17 4 9 4 17 3 5 1 61 3 1 17 89 1 17 
below median 16 17 1 33 9 11 13 33 f8 
§ 
5 12 1 121 8 1 23 13120 1 33 
contr 6 total 23 27 1 50 13 1 20 1 17 1 50 111 
Ell 
18 1 81 11 1 50 21129 1 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
3 
0.2413 
0.6233 
3 
1.9695 
0.3735 
3 
1.5881 
0.6621 
3 
0.0474 
0.8276 
above median 8 12 2 20 7 8 5 
1 20 6 3 1 -7 14 1 20 9 Ill 20 
below median 15 ý 15 h d 30 6 12 
J 
12 30 51 7 11 7 30 12 1181 30 
contr 7 total 23 E 27 50 El 3 0 17 1 50 11 10 1 18 1 Il l 50 21 1291 50 
an 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
2 
0.4831 
0.4870 
2 
1.8326 
0.4000 
2 
1.4562 
0.6924 
2 
0.0034 
0.9534 
significance at the 90 % confidence leyet 
significance at the 95 % confidence tevet 
Table F5: k-Sample median Test: Variables CONTR1 to CONTR7 
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variable 
i ndpt 
var 
condition 
age 
2+3 4+5 totaLl 
LeveL 
l+2[3 4 totatl 
func t'i on 
l+41 2131 
TStotat 
jobtype 
1[ 2 total 
D. F. 2 3 1 
above medi 13 1 8 5 9 7 21 U -41 -101 41 21 6 15 21 
below med! 7 19 
ff 
7 , 11 81 
- 
26 81 51 71 61 26 14 12 26 
plan total 20 1 27 12 1 12 20 151 47 Ill 91 171 101 47 _FO ý7 47 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Sionificance 
2 
5.8154** 
0.0159 
2 
0.0689 
0.9662 
2 
2.8132 
0.4213 
2 
2.0899 
0.1483 
above medi 51 8 13 
- 
31 61 41 13 51 71 1 11 01 13 31101 13 
below medi n 12 1 
± 
11 13 51 -91 91 23 31 11 1161 _ Y3_ 71161 23 
budget total 17 1 19 81 151 131 36 81 81 1171 101261 36 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Sknificance 
3 
0.6266 
0.4286 
3 
0.2658 
0.8755 
3 
20.0008** 
0.0002 
3 
0.0074 
0.9314 
above median 91 11 1 20 7 71 61 20 51 31 81 41 20 11 9 20 
below median 12 1 91 21 51 81 81 21 3 5 10 3 21 5 
1 
16 
1 
21 
freqbudg total 21 1 20 1 41 121 151 141 41 81 81 181 71 41 16 25 41 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Siqnificance 
1 
0.6045 
0.4369 
1 
0.6617 
0.7183 
1 
1.3415 
0.7193 
1 
2 
0 . 
9799* 
. 0843 
above medign 9 71 16 2 7 7 16 4 11 Ill 01 16 2 141 16 
below medi an 14 20 1 34 11 13 10 34 7 
t 
91 7 11 34 
. 
191 151 34 
view I total 23 27 1 50 13 20 171 50 
1 
11 101 181 Ill 50 21 L2 6__ 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Sknificance 
2 
0.9952 
0.3 85 
2 
2.3899 
0.3027 
2 
14.5072** 
0.0023 
2 
6 
0 . 
7192** 
. 0095 
above mediln 8 10 1 18 5 18 15 1 18 5 21 81 31 18 6 12 1 18 
a below median 15 17 1 32 8 1 12 1 12 1 32 6 6 8 101 81 32 15117 1 32 
view 2 total 23 27 
- 
1 50 131 20 1 17 1 50 11 11 10 
1 
181 111 50 129 21 150 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
3 
0.0274 
0.8685 
3 
0.4933 
0.7814 
ý 3 
2.4586 
0.4828 
3 
0.4004 
0.5269 
above median 9 1 12 1 21 6 11 4 21 7 3 7 4 21 _F_ 9 12T 2-1 
below median 14 1 15 1 29 7 9 13 29 4 7 11 7 29 121171 29 
view 3 
- 
total 
- 
=23 17 1 50 13 20 17 50 Il i 10 ! 18 ' Ili 50 =50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
3 
0.1440 
0.7044 
3 
3.8605 
0.1451 
3 
2.9200 
0.4041 
3 
0.0345 
0.8526 
above medign 
_ 
7 9 16 6 7 13 116 5 3 1 61 2 1 16 
1 
7 9 1 16 
9; Lowmedijan 16 34 L 13 1 14 1 34 6 7 
1 
1 121 9 1 34 14 20 1 34 
view 4 total 23 1 27 . 50 _- 13 20 1 17 1 50 11 10 1 181 11 1 50 21 129 1 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
4 
0.0480 
0.8267 
4 
2.8890 
0.2359 
4 
1.9134 
0.5906 
4 
0.0183 
0.8925 
significance at the 90 % confidence levet 
significance at the 95 % confidence leveL 
Table F6: k-Sample Median Test: Variables PLAN to VIEW4 
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6hesiveness 
i ndpt 
var 
variabt e condition 
D. F. 
age 
2+3 4+5 total 
LeveL 
+2 3 total 
2 
function 
1+41 21315 total 
3 
jobtype 
1 
[T2totaL 
1 
above medign 81 81 16 3 7 3 4 -6 1 31 16 -4 12 16 
a- below medi n 81 16 1 
E24 
9 1 9 - 7 
ý3 
61 81 24 14 10 24 
opin I total 16 1 24 0 12 101 71 121 111 40 18 22 40 - Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
2 
1.1111 
0.2918 
2 
1.7188 
0.4234 
2 
2.5162 
0.4724 
2 
3.0682* 
0.0798 
above median 71 91 16 51 71 41 16 51 31 41 141 
16 1 2 4 1 
below median 91 13 1 22 61 81 81 22 41 41 71 71 22 ý 1 2 0 22 
opin 2 total 16 1 22 1 38 111 151 121 38 91 71 111 111 38 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
3 
0.0307 
0.8610 
3 
0.5574 
0.7568 
3 
0.9671 
0.8092 
3 
0.0248 
0.8748 
above median 13 1 10 1 23 6 71 101 23 61 41 101 31 23 6 17 
below median 10 1 16 1 26 71 121 71 26 51 61 71 8 26 P 21 14 1 26 
opin 3 total 31 26 1 49 131 191 171 49 ill 101 271 11 " ý 20 
E291 
49 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
2 
1.5982 
0.2062 
2 
1.7450 
0.4179 
2 
3.1211 
0.3733 
2 
2.8287* 
0.0926 
above med 10 14 14 31 41 31 41 51 21 14 0 1 4 1 1 
below medi n 13 
± 
1 23 T6_ 10 1 16 1 131 91 36 15 7 3 
opfn 4 total 23 1 27 1 111 101 181 111 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
2 
5.0616** 
0.0245 
2 
2.2553 
0.3238 
2 
1.2436 
0.7426 
2 
0.7756 
0.3785 
above medýan 7 151 12 3 3 61 12 21 21 61 21 12 10 1 12 
ja below med an 16 , 38 1 22 10 1 17 1 111 38 9 18 1 12191-38 19119 1-- 8 
opin 5 total 23 1 27 1 50 
-13 
1 20 1 171 50 Il 
1 
l 10 1 181 111 50 21129 L50 
- Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
1 2 
0.9669 
0.3255 
2 
2.0831 
0.3529 
2 
1.3557 
0.7160 
2 
2.9040 
0.0884* 
above med 4 216 1 4 11 16 1 10 1 41 1 16 24 16 
below med an 
_. 
L9 23 1 42--' 11 1 15 1 16 1 42 10 10 121 10 1ý42 ' 17125 1 42 
opin 6 total 
- 
23 1 25 1 48 
_12 
119 1 17 1 48 11 10 
1 
161 11 1 48 19129 1 48 
Median 
Chf-Square 
Significance 
3 
9.9660 
3257 0. 
3 
2.1418 
0.3427 
3 
3.9481 
0.2671 
3 
0.0124 
0.9112 
above median 
- 
3 . 47 2 4 11 17 0 32 17 25 7 
below medT an E20] 
t2l 
41 10 15 
1 
1 16 1 41 9 10 
1 
1 131 9 1 41 
ý7 
24 41 
opfn 7 total 23 25 48 12 19 1 17 1 48 11 10 1 161 11 1 48 9 9 19 29 48 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
3 
0.0841 
0.7719 
3 
1.7134 
0.4246 
3 
2.1590 
0.5401 
3 
0.0513 
0.8208 
*: significance at the 90 % confidence teveL 
Table P7: k-Sample Median Test: Variables OPIN1 to OPIN7 
Appendix F -429- Testing Cohesiveness 
varfabte 
indpt 
var 
condition 
a00 
2+3 4ý5 totat 
evet 
1+2 34 totat 
functfon 
1+4 23 
Jobtype 
Ftot 
aL 
11F 
2 
D. F. 2 3 - 1 
above medi n 4 3 17 2 4 1 7 1 1 3 2 17 2 5 7 n 
an a betow med an 18 22 1 40 11 15 14 40 10 7 14 40 17 17 
1 
23 40 
E ý 
40 
opfn 8 totat 22 1 25 1 47 
El 
3] 19 15 47 11 8 17 19 19 28 47 47 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
3 
0.3528 
0.5525 
3 
1.3720 
0.5036 
3 
0.5239 
0.9136 
3 
0.0758 
0.7831 
above median 2 12 14 0 3 1 11 4 l 1 l 1 21 1 3 4 
betow median 20 1 24 1 44 Ij J6 1 151 44 0 i 1 8 1 1 151 19 125 1 44 
opin 9 totat 22 :] = =48 9 1 161 48 11 19 1 171 1 20 128 1 48 
Median 
Chf-Square 
Significance 
3 
0.0305 
0. 8613 
3 
2.6555 
0.2651 
3 
1.3612 
0.7147 
3 
0.0312 
0.8599 
above median 9 . 13 2 4 1 10 18 1 22 6 2 81 6 1 22 101121 22 
betow median 14 
t 
14 
1 
8 
t 
9 1 10 19 1 28 5 
ý 
8+ 101 5 1 28 111171 28 
Journ I totat 23 2 7 27 50 13 1 20 1 17 1 50 Il l 10 1 181 Il l 50 211291 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
3 
0.4099 
0.5220 
3 
1.2803 
0.5272 
3 
3.3320 
0.3432 
3 
0.0225 
0.8807 
above medi 01 0 0 0 1 01 01 01 01 01 0 01 01 0 
betow medf n 23 1 
E 
27 ! ý_O_ 13 1 201 Ill 101 181 111 50 "21 29 50 
Journ 2 totat 23 1 27 1 13 1 201 171 50 Ill 101 181 111 50 2i 291 50 
Median 
Chf-Square 
Significance 
6 
0.0 
1.0 
6 
0.0 
1.0 
6 
0.0 
1.0 
6 
0.0 
1.0 
above median 13 12 25 81 101 71 25 4 101 71 25- 101 151 25 
betow median 10 15 25- 
t 
51 101 101 25 71 61 ' 81 4 ý 25 llt l4f 
-25 lourn 3 totat 23 27 0 5= 131 201 171 50 Ill 101 181 11 a 5 211 291 50 
median 
Chi-Square 
Sianificance 
4.5 
0.7246 
0.3946 
4.5 
1.2217 
0.5429 
4.5 
2.2586 
0.5205 
4.5 
0.0 
1.0 
above medi 71 6 13 11 61 61 13 2 51 41 21 13 58 13 
betow medi n 16 21 
1 
7 121 141 111 37 9 51 141 91 37 16121 "7 
reason I totat 23 27 0 
E5 
131 201 171 101 181 111 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
2 
0.4354 
0.5094 
2 
3.1942 
0.2025 
_ 2 
3.8262 
0.2809 
2 
0.0007 
0.9792 
above medi 11 81 19 41 61 91 19 51 51 51 41 19 71121 19 
betow medi n - 
12 1 19 1 31 -9 F 1: fl 81 31 61 51 131 71 31 141171 
- 
31 
reason 2 i otat 23 
-1 
27 1 50 131 201 171 50 Ill 101 181 Ill 50 
- Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
2 
1.7455 
0.1864 
_ 2 
2.4426 
0.2948 
2 
1.6825 
0.6411 
2 
0.0803 
0.7769 
significance at the 90 % confidence levet 
significance at the 95 % confidence leveL 
Table FS: k-Sample Median Test: Variables OPINS to REASON2 
Appendix F -430- Testing Cohesiveness 
i ndpt 
var 
variable condition 
D. F. 
age 
2+3 4+5 total 
evet 
1+2 34 
Itotat 
2 
function 
1+4 2315 total 
3 
jobtype 
1 
n2 
total 
1 
above median 71 17 1 24 6 101 81 24 7 6 5 15 
. 9 24 
below median 16 1 10 
E ý 
6 
E 
7 7 101 91 26 4 4 
1 
13 5 
j 
26 6 20 26 
reason 3 total 1 23 27 0 13 13 201 171 50 11 _I0 18 i 50 21 29 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
SIwificance 
3 
5.2650** 
0.0218 
3 
0.0558 
0.9725 
4.7923 
0.1877 
3 
6.4262** 
0.0112 
above medi 71 17 24 61 11 7 4 61 51 71 6 24 113 11 24 
below medi n 16 1 10 71 9 101 26 51 51 Ill 51 26 
* 
8 8 18 26 
reason 4 total 23 1 27 _ 171 50 111 101 181.111 50 21-29 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
3 
5.2650** 
0.0218 
3 
0.7275 
0.6951 
3 
0.9923 
0.8031 
3 
1.9264 
0.1652 
above median 10 1 14 1 24 61 121 61 24 51 41 81 71 24 13 Ill 24 
below median 13 1 13 26 7 11 111 26 61 61 101 - 
81181 26 
reason 5 total 23 1 27 50 113± 201 171 50 Ill 101 181 2IT291 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Siqnificance 
3 
0.3489 
0.5547 
3 
2.2711 
0.3212 
3 
1.4536 
0.6930 
3 
1.9264 
0.1652 
above medi 41 11 5 1 21 21 5 01 21 21 3 2 5 
below medi n 19 1 26 1 45 12J 181 151 45 Ill 81 161 181 27 [ 45 
reason 6 total 23 1 27 1 50 _ 131 _ 201 171 50 111 101 181 211 291 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Siqnificance 
4 
2.5854 
0.1079 
4 
0.1357 
0.9344 
4 
2.3681 
0.4996 
4 
0.1460 
0.7024 
above median 8 8 1 16 8 2 6 16 5 13 1 31 51 16 88 16 
below median 15 19 1 34 5 18 11 34 6 17 1 151 6 1 34 13121 1 34 
reason 7 total 23 27 1 50 13 1 20 1 17 1 50 11 1 10 1 18111 1 50 21129 1 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
2 
0.1516 
0.6971 
2 
9.7460** 
0.0077 
2 
3.7934 
0.2846 
2 
0.2296 
0.6319 
above medi 10 6 16 5 6 5 16 2 12 17 15 1 16 88 1 
below medi n 13 21 1 34 8 i 
ý 
1 14 12 
ý 
34 1 34 9 18 1 11 1 IIJ21 1 34 
reason 8 total 23 1 27 13 
S] 
1 50 50 il l 10 1 18 1 21129 1 50 
Median 
Chi-Square 
Significance 
3 
2.5789 
0.1083 
3 
0.3385 
0.8443 
3 
2.9347 
0.4018 
. 
3 
0.2296 
0.6319 
above median 
_ - 
8 1 19 2 3 4 9 0 13 14 1 2 9 4 5 9 
ý Iow medi n 7n 1 15ý 1 26 zi- 1 11 
ý 
17 13 
ý4 
41 11 17 1 14 19 41 
l 
17 24 
1 
41 
9 reason ictat 3S 27 50 1 
E1 
20 17 50 50 il l in i IA l Il 50 21 29 50 
median 
Chi-Square 
significance 
I- 
4 
8.1277** 
0.0044 
. 4 
0.5343 
0.7655 
4 
3.6079 
0.3070 
4 
0.0436 
0.8346 
significance at the 90 % confidence levet 
significance at the 95 % confidence teveL 
Table F9: k-Sample Median Test: Variables REASON3 to REASON9 
I 
Appendix F -431- Testing Cohesiveness 
var funct0n 
variable condition 1+4 2 total 1+4 3 total 1+4 5 
Itotat 
2 total 25 
Itotat 
35 
Itotat 
3 
D. F. 
79y-e -median 31417 -1 -2ý1 5 -T 14 112 1 1T 415 12 1 13 4 
betow median 11 Z61 13 7 10 17 4161 10 4 10 14 6 10 16 
object 1 totat lOltE 
ý10 
18 1 28 10 1 
ý11 E21 
A 11 1 2A 
3 J8 
11 T9- T 8- -11 29 
W(; 3i -an' 222222 
Significance 0.6305 0.0623 0.3108 0.6645 0.1108 0.0025** 
above median 3191 12 31417149141 13 91 10 415 
betow median 81119,8 114 1 22 81 18 1 114 1 15 :1 110 1 11 : 14 110 24 
contr 3 totat 11 110 1 21 11 118 1 29 11 
Ill 
1 22 10 118 10 Ill 1 21 18 Ill 79 
Median 333333 
Significance 0.0075** 0.7578 0.5865 0.0011** 0.003** 0.3A37 
budget tota IMedian 
** 
beLOW median 7191 16 7171 14 
view 1 totat 11 110 1 21 
. 
11 118 1 29 
Median 22 
Significance 0.3108 0.1956 
significance at the 90 % confidence I. evel 
significance at the 95 % confidence Levet, 
2 
0.0902 
21212 
0.0159* 0.4762 0.0010** 
Table P10: Pairwise Comparisons by FUNCTION: Variables OBJECT1 to VIEW1 
Appendix F -432- Testing Cohesiveness 
i ndpt 
var LeveL 
variable condition 
I 
1+2 3I 
L 
totaL 1+2 4I totaL 3 4I totaL 
D. F. 
above median 2 61 8 21 12 14 6 12 1f a 
below median 10 1 13 23 10 1 4 14 13 
] 
11 13 
ýJ 
4 17 
ý 
17 7 
ý 
oblectl total 12 1 19 1 31 . 
12 1 16 1 28 jq 12. 16 3r 35 
Median 
Significance 
2 
0.3554 
2 
0.0023** 
2 
0.0264* 
above medi 20 8 11 1 9 L9 8 3 11 11 31 14 
below median 51 81 13:: 51 13 1 18 81 13 1 21 
object4 total 13 1 19 1 32 13 1 16 1 29 19 1 16 1 35 
Median 
Significance 
2 
0.8367 
2 
0.0182* 
2 
0.0446 
above median 5 1 6 5 6 11 1 7 
below median 6 17 23 6 1 10 1 16 17 10 1 27 
object5 total 11 1 18 1 29 11 = 27 18 16 1 34 
Median 
Significance 
4 
0.0101** 
4 
0.6794 
4 
0.0609 
above median 9 14 13 9 16 1 15 4 6 10 
below median 4 1 15 19 4 1 10 1 14 15 10 1 25 
object6 total 13 1 19 32 13 1 16 1 29 19 16 1 35 
median 
Significance 
4 
0.0064** 
4 
0.0890 
4 
0.4855 
above median 8 12 1 10 8 6 14 2 6 8 
below median 5 1 18 1 23 5 16 18 1 11 29 
reason7 total 13 1 20 1 33 13 
. 
20 1 17 1 37 
Median 
Significance 
2 
0.0016** 
2 
0.1533 
2 
0.1438 
significance at the 90 % confidence teveL 
significance at the 95 % confidence LeveL 
Table Fil: Pairwise Comparisons by LEVEL: Variables OBJECTI to REASON7 
3 
Appendix F -433- 
Testing Cohesiveness 
Indepndt variable age group 
entire 
value sample +30 +40 +50 
Label -40 -50 -60 +60 
popLtn 50 6 17 23 4 dependent 
% 100 12 34 46 8 
variable 
C 2 3 4 5 
improved quality 
of services by: 
-reorganization 4 3 3 3 7 
-changing heads 7 5 7 7 5 
-improved planning 2 2 4 2 2* 
-effective control 3 1 2 6 1 
-staff training 1 4 1 1 2* 
-better work cndtns 6 7 5 5 6 
-salary increases 5 6 6 4 4 
resources optimixn 
utilization by: 
reorganization 4 3 3 3 5 
changing heads 7 5 6 7 7 
-improved planning I 1 1 2 3 
-effective control 3 4 2 4 2 
-staff training 2 2 4 1 1 
-better work cndtns 5 6 5 5 6 
-salary increases 6 7 7 6 4 
Improved systems 
cooperation by: 
-reorganization 1 2 1 2 1* 
-changing heads 5 3 5 6 6* 
-improved planning 2 1 2 1 1* 
-effective control 4 4 4 4 3 
-staff training 3 5 3 3 4 
-better work cndtns 6 7 6 5 6* 
-salary increases 7 6 7 7 5 
Improved subsystem 
Y. rolling stock b 
-reorganization 
-changing heads 
-improved planning 
-effective control 
-staff training 
-better work cndtns 
-salary Increases 
Improved subsystem 
permanent way by: 
-reorganization 
: changing heads 
improved ptanning 
-effective controt 
-staff training 
-better work cndtr 
-satary Increases 
Improved subsystea 
signatting/tcm by: 
-reorganization 
-changing heads 
-improved ptannlný 
-effective control 
: Staff training 
better work cndu 
-saLary increases 
*: tied ranks 
3 
3 
tevet group function group 
jobtype 
: op dpts div area rait rott perm sign othr 
Igmt mgmt mgmt mgmt ops stck way ttcm 
hdqs prdc 
67 20 17 a 10 18 3 11 21 29 
12 14 40 34 16 20 36 6 22 42 58 
123412345.12 
1 5 1 4 
5 7 7 7 
2 2* 3 3 
4 2* 4 
3 1 2 
6 6 6 5 
7 4 5 6 
1 6 2 4 
5 7 7 6 
3 2 1 1 
6 3 4 2 
2 1 3 3 
4 5 5 5 
7 4 6 7 
1 1 1 1 
4 
2 2 
4 4 
3 3 
6 6 
7 7 
4 4 2 
7 
4 4 
7 6 
3* 4* 
2 2 
6 4* 
3* 3 
7 6 
5 7 
24 
77 
32 
43 
11 
65 
56 
34 
75 
21 
42 
13 
56 
67 
2 
2 
44 
33 
66 
77 
4 4 1 5 2 2 4 5 2 1 1 1 4 
5* 6* 4 7 6 5 5* 7 6 4 5 6 5 
3 3 2 3 1 1 2* 2 1 3 2 2 1 
4 2 6 2 4 4 1 3 4 7 4 4 3 
2 1 3 1 3 3 2* 1 3 2 3 3 2 
5* 6* 5 6 5 6 5* 4 5 6 6 5 6 
7 5 7 4 7 7 5* 6 7 5 7 7 7 
7 3 3 7 3 5* 2 4 4 3 3 1 2* 3 4 
5* 5 4 7 6 5 5 7 7 4 5 7 5 
2 3 1 3 1 2 1 1* 2 2* 1 2 1 
4 1 5 2 4 3 3 1* 4 6* 4 4 3 
1 2 2 1 3 1 2 4 1 2* 2* 1 2 
7 6 6 5* 7 6 6 5 6 6* 6 6 6 
5* 4 7 4 5 7 7 6 5 5 7 5 7 
3 6 3 2 5* 2 5 3 2* 4 5* 3 1 2 3 3 
7 5 7 4 4 6* 6 5 5* 7 5 4 5 6 5 
2 1 3 1 3 1 1 2* 1 1 1 2* 3 2 1 
3 2 4 2 5 3 4 4 3 2 4 5* 4 4 4 
1 4 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 2* 1 1 2 
4* 6 5 7 6 6* 5 6 7 4 6 7 6 5 7 
4* 7 6 5* 7 4 7 7 5* 5* 7 5* 7 7 6 
Table P12: Methods of Improving Performance: Rank orders 
Appendix F -434- Testing Cohesiveness 
UN .2 
0>0Mp >C> 
12.0 e; 2 Co CL li 
CD ZM 
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